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Few statesmen stand so high in the annals ot the modern 
Papacy as Ercole Cardinal Consalvi, Secretary ot State of Pope 
Pius VII. The conspicuous ability which he displayed in dealing 
with such ditticult diplomatic problems as the negotiation of the 
French Concordat of 1801, the restoration of the Papal territories 
at the Congress of Vienna, and the defense of Papal interests 
during the revolutionary upheaval of 1820-1821 entitles hi~ to 
rank among the leading Papal diplomats of reoent centuries. In 
internal affairs, he was the first Papal statesman to realize 
that it was necessary to liberalize the Papal government and bring 
it into greater harmony with modern conditions--the forerunner 
of Pius IX. 
The importanee of Conaalvi fS ca.reer has not been unrecog-
nized by historians, but their attention has been largely confined 
to hi3 first ministry (1800-1806), to the neglect of his second 
(1814-1823). That they have been attracted to the earlier phases 
ot his career is understandable. In 1800-1815, the Papacy moved 
on an heroic plane: it was an age of crisis, of dramatic struggle 
agains t the ruleD' of halt Europe, of courage and endurance amid 
persecution, exile, and imprisonment, ot tinal victory against 
1 
2 
overwhelming odds. Little wonder, then, that the spectacular 
events and obvious importance of Consalvils first ministry during 
the turbulent Napoleonic period have overshadowed his second 
during the superficial calm of the Restoration era. 
Yet Consalvils second ministry, though less abundant in 
drama, has its own importance. In domestic affairs, it was 
marked by the nearest, indeed the only, approach to a liberaliza-
tion and modernization of the Papal government before the days of 
Pius IX--the longest such attempt in the history of the Papal 
state. In the field of diplomacy, this period saw the Papacy 
involved in a half-hidden but still bitter struggle to preserve 
its spiritual authority against the Erastian rulers of Europe 
and its temporal independence against the encroachments of its 
presumed ally Austria, while at the same time it had to deal with 
the growing threat of the revolutionary movement. 
In view of its importance this latter part of Consalvils 
career is deserving of greater attention than it has hitherto 
received from historians. Some part at least of the neglect of 
this subject may be remed1ed by treat1ng one of its most sig-
nificant aspects: the Cardinal's Austrian policy. 
The most important single thread in the diplomacy of 
Consa1vi's second min1stry was his conduct of Austro-Papa1 re-
lations. It was inevitable that the Papal Secretary of state 
shOUld have to give much of his time and thought to this re-
lationship. The Hapsburg Empire was the dominant political and 
3 
military power in Italy, the leader of the conservative cause 
in Europe, and, during the eclipse of France, the greatest power 
in the Catholic world. Austrian and Papal interests were in 
contact--and often in conf1i.ct--a10ng a wide tront in both the 
secular and the religious fields. What should be the relation-
ship between the Papacy, intent on preserving its temporal 
independence, and Austria, desirous of exercising hegemony in the 
Italian Peninsula? How and to what extent should the Papacy co-
operate with Austria against their common foe, the revolutionary 
movement? How should the Papacy react to the attempts of the 
I~perial government to dominate the Church in its territories? 
These and other questions arising from his dealings with 
Austria were among the most important problems that Consa1vi had 
to solve in 1815-1823, but no comprehensive study of the 
Cardina1's Austrian dip1omaoy exists. Moreover, of the few 
works that do touch upon this subject, a large proportion are 
either out of date or distorted by the anti-Austrian and anti-
clerical prejudioes of the Risorgimento era. In particular, 
these works, when dealing with Austro-Papal relatiOns under 
Consalvi, usually take the worst view possible of Austrian 
policies and intentions and tend to pictUre Empire and Papacy as 
being on consistently hostile terms. l 
ISee, LZ.., N1correde Bianchi, Storia docu:nentata della 
diplomazia europea in Italia dall'anno 181# a1 1851-{8 vola.; 
Turin, 1865-1872}, r, 221-223; nellie Cassl, Llcrardinale C:msalv 
ed i prir;t~ anni della restaurazione ~ontificia; jID"5-a8~ {Milan, I93I)j an Y.rnesto Veraes!, Plo-vrrTurln, 1933 _ 25 - 3. 
4 
This traditional Italian interpretation, however, is' not 
borne out by the documents in the Vatican Arohives, whioh demon-
strate that both Consalvi and the Austrian Foreign Minister, 
Prince Klemens von Metternich,2 sincerely desired a mutually 
advantageous co-operation between the Papacy and Austria and for 
a time, in 1815-1817, came close to achieving it. After 1817, 
however, conflicting religious and political interests gradually 
drove the two states apart, relations deteriorated rapidly after 
1820, and the experiment in co-operation ended in failure. By 
the time Consalvi left office in 1823, Austro-Papal relations we 
unfriendly, almost hostile, but this hostility had developed late 
in Consalvi's ministry and was not a permanent feature of it. 
Consalvi had had a long and distinguished career in the 
service of the Papacy before the Restoration era opened. 3 Born 
2prince Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859), Austrian 
Foreign Minister 1809-1848, Imperial Chancellor, 1821-1848. Long 
the bane of liberal and nationalist historians because of his 
oonservatism, Mettcrnich has been defended by the Revisionist 
historians, led by Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, whose Metteruich: 
Del' Staatsmann und del' Mensoh (3 vols.; Munioh, 1925-1954) is the 
s tanaard b!ograpny.--- ----
3The basic source for Consalvits career prior to 1815 is his 
own Me~orie., ed. Mario Nasalli Rocca di Corneliano (Roma, 1950); 
this worK will be referred to henoeforth as Memorie. The most 
thorough study of Consalvi1s diplomaoy during thIs period is 
Ilario Rinieri, La (i1RlomaZia pontifioia nel aeoolo XIX (5 vols.; 
Rona-Torino, 1901'-=-1'90 ), based on very thorougIiI'esearch in the 
Vatican Archives. For a useful short account, see Joseph 
Sohmidlin, Histoire des paPfi de Itepogue oontem~ralne1 I: Pie 
VII, le Pape--ae-ra--Restaura on, trans .i:. March (Par s"; 1938). 
Also U8erur-ls-vOIuW~·XX or the" F11che-Martln Hlstoire de 
1 !_~.e;11~,~ I Jean Lerlon, La .=!'la~ ~evoluti~alre;-1j82-1B1r6 (Paris 
r9491. There is no gooa; mo-dern DIOgrapny C>n'onsal vi. 
5 
at Rome of noble parents on 8 June 1757, he was destined to the 
Churoh from an early age. However, though he successfully 
oompleted his eoclesiastioal studies, he never chose to be 
ordained a priest, but remained a deaoon throughout his l1fe. 
His ab1lity attraoted the attent10n of Pius VI, under whom he had 
risen to h1gh ofrioe in the Papal government by the time of the 
Frenoh invasion of 1798. After a bl"'ief imprison'11ent by the 
Frenoh, he was released in time to attend the Conolave whioh met 
at Venice to ohoose a suocessor to Pius VI. Eleoted Seoretary of 
the Conolave, Consalv1 performed a major service to the Papacy 
when he promoted the compromise that broke a three-and-a-half 
month deadlock with the election of the Bishop of Imola, Gregorio 
Cardinal Chiar~nonti, as Pius VII. This was the beginning of an 
association that ended only with the death of Pius in 1823, an 
association marked net only by the closest offioial eo-operation, 
but by a rare degree of personal affection and mu.tual trust as 
well. The new pontiff Boon demonstrated his confidence in 
Consalvi by raiSing him to the Cardinalate and appoint1ng him 
Secretary of State in August, 1800. The Cardinal was promptly 
involved in negotiations w1th the French government that resulted 
in the ra.e-tOUS Concordat of 1801, perhaps his '1108 t notable 
aohievem.ent. 
After five years of defending the political and religious 
rights of the Papacy against Napoleon, Consalvi reSigned under 
French pressure in 1806. His continued oppos1tion to Napoleon 
6 
led in 1810 to his arrest and banishment tp Beziers. In 1814 
he was freed and returned to Italy, but was promptly sent by Pius 
VII as Papal representative to the Congress of Vienna. Hera he 
was chiefly occupied with securing the restoration of the Papal 
territories seized by France and now occupied by Austria and 
Naples. It was while engaged in this difficult task that he 
first encountered Metternich, with whom he worked closely during 
the latter part of the Congress. While devising solutions for 
the many difficult problems involved in the restoration of the 
Papal territories, the two statesmen developed a mutual respect 
and esteem tha.t was an important factor in later Austro-Papal 
relationa. For several years afterwards, Consalvi, and possibly 
Metternich as well, remained convinced that:nos t of the Papal 
problems with Austria could be readily solved if only they could 
meet again and hold friendly discussions, as they had done 60 
successfully at Vienna. 
In the end, the Cardinal's diplomatic ability ... - greatly 
aided, it must be confessed, by favorable circwnstancea--
secured a resounding trlumpa: all of the Popels Italian territ~r­
les (except a a~all part of the Legation of Ferrara) were retul~­
ed to him. Consalvi returned to Rome in triwnph, to the applause 
of friend and toe alike. It was the sumrllit of his oareer. never 
before had he known auch general acclaim, nor would be ever again. 
Within a few short years his poliaies were to turn into bittel.' 
ene,nias ,l1any ~Iho now cheered him, in Rome a.nd Vienna alike. rl1he 
Vietor'S laucels have ever withered rapidly in the hot Roman sun. 
CHAPTER II 
AN ERA OF GOOD FEELING, 1815-1817 
1. The Aftermath of the Austrian Occupation 
After his success at the Congress of Vienna, Consalv1 
believed that he would be able to turn away from diplomatic 
problems for a time and devote himself instead to internal 
reform. Leas than a week after his return to Rome, however, 
he had to confess sadly to the Nuncio in Vienna, Msgr. Antonio 
Severoli: 
I hoped after the immense labors undergone at Vienna 
to obtain the restoration of our Provinces, that there 
would be nothing else to occupy me after my return to 
Rome except the Plan for the new form of govern~ent 
to be given to them. Unfortunately, and to the infinite 
surprise and sorrow of His Holiness and myself, I find 
myself in the midst of infinite difficulties • • • • 
This "multitude of cares" arose from the Austrian occupation 
or the Papal state (all save the area E3.round Rome) and its 
aftermath. 1 
1ArchiVio Vaticano (hereafter cited as A.V.), Archives of 
the NuncIiture' rn~enna, tile #125 (hereafter cited 88 ANY 
followed by file number), Consa1vi to Severo1i, 10 July 1815. 
The above document, like all others quoted in the dissertation, 
was translated by the author. Magr. Antonio Severo1i, nuncio in 
Vienna, 1801-1817; a Cardinal in 1816; at first a supporter or 
Consalvi, but broke with him in 1816 over the 1atter's rerorms 
in the Papal states; then became a bitter enemy of Consa1vi and 
a leader or the reactionary party (Zelanti) in the Curia that 
opposed the Secretary or State's policies. 
The occupation itself had not notioeably contributed to 
better Austro-Papal relations. The occupying forces, their 
discipline sapped by years of war, were often guilty of brutal 
mistreatment of the people whom they were supposed to be 
defending. Papal protests brought only the true but unhelpful 
reply that indiscipline was by nO)1 epidem'.c in all armies and 
that the Austrian gove~1ment obviously could net be held 
responsible for excesses co~mitted by its troops, much though 
it regretted them. 2 
8 
~~ore serious, the long Austrian occupation had aroused 
widespread suspicion that Austria coveted the Papal territories, 
and even after the Treaty of Vienna had provided for their return 
the conduct of the Austrian provisional govern~ent there con-
tinued to provoke the livel:l.est distrust. A pro:ninent example 
was the issuance of a circu.1ar by the Austrian Intendant-General 
Dondi on 27 ,June 1815, ordering all public officials and employee 
in the occupied areas to swear an oath of loyalty to the 
Austrian provisional government. The Papacy protested vigorously 
that the oath was a violation of Papal sovereignty which could 
give rise &rrIOng the "ill-lntentioned" to doubts as to whether 
Austria really intended to return the territories or not. Austri 
replied, reasonably enough, that as the oath was only to a 
provisional government, it was itself only provisional, and would 
2A.V., ANY 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 1 July, 5 July 1815. 
lapse when the government did. 3 9 
The question as to why Austria should exact an oath of 
loyalty to a regime which was to end in a few weeks remained un-
answered. A possible answer soon suggested itself when it became 
apparent that Austria intended to prolong the occupation far 
beyond its determined end. An Austro-Papa1 Convention of 12 June 
1815 had provided that the Austrian evacuation would begin within 
four weeks, that is on 10 July, and Metternich had promised 
Consa1vi that it would take place by 15 July at the 1atest.4 
Shortly after his arrival in Rome on 3 July, Consalvi was 
informed that Count Franz Saurau, in charge of the Austrian 
occupying forces, refused to turn over the occupled territories 
until a number of conditions had been met. In particular, the 
Papacy must agree to pay certain debts contracted by the former 
Kingdom of Italy (into which the Papal territories had been 
incorporated) and by the Austrian occupation forces. Furthermore, 
even if the Papal government complied with all these demands, 
the transfer of sovereignty made to it would still be only 
"virtual and Ero forma"; the territories themselves would only 
be turned over gradually, over an extended period of time, and 
in the interim the administration would remain in Austrian hands. 
3A.V., RtUbrica, i.e., file) 260, Pacca to Lebze1t~rn, 1 
July 1815; Le zeltern toIrronsalvi, 7 July 1815. 
4A•V., R242, Consalvi-Pacea, 12 June 1815; Convention of 
12 June 1815, in R242. 
10 
Consalvi protested vehemently to Metternich that the debts in 
question were no concern of the Papal government, and that the 
Convention of 12 June had definitely provided for the return in 
full sovereignty of the Papal territories within four weeks, with 
no mention of further delay for any cause. ttl have never seen 
anything like this," complained Consalvi in exasperation. "The 
Holy Father is exasperated, with good reason, and public opinion 
"5 
• • • • • • is most unfavorable to Austria. 
Consalvi's vigorous protests, together with those which he 
instructed Severoli to make in Vienna, had the desired effect. 
The Impertal govern~nt ordered the transfer of the provinces, 
in both theory and fact J to the Papacy. The trat".llfer of authori-
ty took place on 15-18 July 1815, and the evacuation of Austrian 
troops followed soon after. 6 
In all probability, the responsibility for this attempted 
delay did not lie with Vienna. When Severoli protested to Count 
Hudelist (in charge of foreign affairs during the absence of 
Metternich from Vienna), the latter seemed genuinely astonished 
and annoyed, and assured Severoli that the Imperlal government 
had not ordered Saurau to pursue this course of action. Probably 
Hude11st.s protests were sincere; neither Francis I nor 
5Charles van Duerm, CorresI?ondence du Cardinal Hereule 
Consalvi avec le Prince Clement de Mitternicn, 1815-!~§f (touYain, -r899T,- 81, COll8al vi to-~tternich, 10 J'Uly 5. 
6 A.V., ANY 125, Consalv1 to Severoli, 27 July 1815. 
11 
Metternich was likely to have ordered a policy that was certain 
to annoy the Papacy without producing any visible benefits for 
Austria. Severoli was inclined to put the blame upon the failure 
of the Imperial government to maintain effective control and 
supervision over its subordinates, such as Saurau, who were thus 
allowed to devise their po1icies. 7 
Meanwhile, even before the transfer of the Papal territories 
had taken place, two new sources of dispute had appeared: the 
destruction of the fortress at Ancona by the Austrians, and the 
Austrian request for the arrest of suspected revolutionaries in 
the Papal State. 
The latter problem was quickly dealt with by Consalvi. On 
10 July 1815, the Austrian Provisional Government requested that, 
in the general amnesty which the Pope was soon to proclaim, an 
exception be made for certain suspected revolutionaries, or, at 
least, that the Papal government refrain in practice from apply-
ing the amnesty to these suspects. Consalvi rejected both 
alternatives as contrary to Article 103 of the Treaty of Vienna, 
which obliged the Pope to grant a general amnesty without any 
sort of limitation. Moreover, to grant either request would have 
7A•V., R247, Severo1i to Consalvi, 26 July 1815. Count 
Franz Saurau, Military Governor of the Austrian-held territories 
in Italy, 1813-15J a firm Josephist, hostile to the Papacy in 
general. Count Josef von Hude11st (1759-1818), close friend and 
collaborator of Metternich, through whose influence he was ap-
pointed a Councillor in the Staatskanz1ei in 1813. 
12 
amos t pernicious effect upon public opinion; the l:second in 
particular would cause general distrust of' the Papl!ll government'8 
8 good faith. 
Although Austria accepted this rejection with(:>ut apparent 
protest, the saMe problell soon reappeared. Shortly after the 
transfer or Bologna to the Papal governnent, the De~legate of 
that city received from the commander of the Austr:tan troops in 
that area, General Steff'anini, a request that some nine suspects 
be arrested and transported to Trieste. Whether these suspects 
were a'Tlong those whom the Provisional Government hald wished ex-
oepted from the ~~nesty is uncertain, but it seems very possible 
that this was another attempt, perhaps by the local oommander on 
his own initiative, to secure the punishment of the suspects in 
question. If so, this attempt was equally unsuooessful. 
Consalvi repeated that Pius could not violate Article 103 by 
granting the Austrian request; in addition to the moral factors 
involved, the effects on public opinion of such a violation would 
be most unfortunate. 9 These argu~ents seem to have convinced 
the Austrtan government, which made no further attempt to bring 
up this subject. 
No Austrian action of 1815 aroused such Papal :lndignation 
as the destruction of the Papal fortress at Ancona. Early in 
-----.. -
8 A.V., Bologna R165, Consalvi to Lebzeltern, 13 July 1815. 
9A•V., R260, Consalv! to Lebzeltern, 29 July la15. 
13 
July, 1815, Consalv1 was alnazed to learn that "1n sp1te of 
everything agreed upon in the first article of the Convention 
[of 12 June 1815], that the fortress of Ancona would be restored 
intact, now that the time for that restoration draws near, the 
fortress is being blown up" by the Austrian troops.lO 
The Cardinal's strong protests produced no imm~diate action 
from Austria, though many expressions of regret, for both the 
Emperor and Metternich were absent from Vienna and no one there 
seemed to have the authority to halt the destructIon. ll 
Meanwhile, the destruction of the fortress continued, until 
finally the Emperor was informed. of the situation. He promptly 
ordered the destruction to cease, and promised full compensation 
to the Papal govern~ent for its losses. The E~peror was highly 
annoyed by the destruction, which was the result of old orders 
which he had g1ven dur1ng the war and had neglected to revoke, 
and which "were therefore carried out at a tIme when all was 
confUSion, dtsorder" a.nd the arbItrary will of subalterns in our 
Italy. ,,12 
lOA.V., ANV 125, Consalvi to Severoli, 10 July 1815. 
llIbld., Consalvi to Severol1, 27 July 1815; Severoli to 
Consalvl,--"26 July 1815 (#1). 
12 
-A.V., R247, Severoli to Consa1vi, 12 August 1815. Also, 
R260, Delegate of Ancona to Consalvi, 13 August 1815. Van Duerm, 
90-92, Note 2: FranciS I to Mettern1eh, 7 August 1815. 
14 
A "mult1tude of cares 1\ 1ndeedl··-and all or most of them 
had arisen not from-the will of the Imper1al government# but 
from the spontaneous or un1ntended actions of its Bubordinates. 
It 1s not surprising that in exasperation at the ftinfinite 
diff1culties II surrounding hl':n--none of them critical in itself 
but all taking the Cardinal's time and distracting hi~ from his 
desperately-needed plans for internal reform--Consalvi should 
have cried out to Mette:t--nich that "I have wished a thousand times 
to be with Your Highness, and I have been tempted a thousand 
times to take the post-horses and hurry to talk with you," had 
he only been ce~taln where Mett~rnloh was to be found; for surely 
he and the Prince, if they could only meet, could work out a 
satisfaetor-.r solution for any pr"blems, as they had done at 
Vlenna .. 13 
Metternichls reply was fr1endly and oonciliatory. He 
apologized for not replying earlier to Consalvlfs complaints, 
but "facts aX'e worth rnore than prOr:'llSe3, n a.nd surely Consa.lvi 
must have been convinced by the satisfactory way in which these 
disputes had been settled that "if any measures have given the 
Court of Rome just cause for complaint, the motives that provoke 
them have always re~-:'la.lned alien to the will of His t4:ajesty. "14 
The Austrian spoke too soon, tor not all problems growing 
out or the occupation had been settled. T\10 f.inancial questions 
l3Ibid., 87, Conealvi to ~tternlch, 12 August 1815. 
l4I~id., 90, Metternieh to Consalvi, 28 August 1815. 
15 
l"'emained, and neither was to be solved qu1ckly, or 1n a w'ay 
sat1sfactory to Consalv1. 
As had been noted, the Emperor Francis I promised com-
pensation to the Papacy for the danage done at Ancon8.. Unfor-
tunately, this pro::nise soon slipped the Emperorfs mind, for five 
i;lOnths pa.ssed '>'lith no further a.etion by the Austria.n government, 
a,lt;hough beth Consalvi and the Pope spoke to Iebzeltern15 
several times on this subject. At the end of. January Consalvi's 
patience Car:l(~ to an end and he a.ddressed a stiff note of protest 
to the Austrian ambassador, dema.nding that the Imperial govern-
ment fulfill the Emperor's promise as soon as possible. 
Lebzeltern not only forwarded Consalvi's protest, but also wrote 
to Metternlch urging rapid B atls faction of the Papal demands, 
which he considered juatifled.16 
Consalvifs protest, supported thus by Lebzeltern. produced 
prompt but not entirely satisfactory results. Upon the report 
l5Count Louts Lebzeltern, Austrian B..!"1lbaese.dol" at Ronte from 
AprIl 1814 to May 1816. A strong Bupporter of Austro-Papal 
co-operation as essential for European stability, he often op-
posed the po11c1es of his government that seemed likely to weaken 
Austrc-PapaJ. good relattona. He was on close and friend.ly terms 
with Conaalvi; Blanchi's claim (I, 221) that he worked against 
Consal vi's pol1otes is not borne out by the evldeno~. See Prinop. 
Emanuel de Robich (ed.), Un Collaborateur de Metternleh: 
Memoires et p-a~iers de Leozeltern (ParIs, 1949 ,; hereafter oited 
tebzeltern. ASo-;'lIudar," 15'fe-Oe~fterrelchlsche Vatikanbotschaf't, 
I8.~~§ -~~I1?""{ Mun:t ch, 1952), rr-=-41. - ~ . 
16A•V., R260, Consalvl's Note to Lebzeltern, 26 January 
1816; Consalv! to Lebzeltern, 30 J!!tnuary 1816; Lebzeltern to 
Consalvl, 3 February l816. 
16 
of an Austrian investigating commission, the Emperor ordered 
the shipment of a large battery of artillery to replace that 
destroyed by his troops at Ancona. Unfortunately, even the best 
artillery could not effectively defend a half-ruined fortress, 
and Austria refused Consalvi'. requests to provide the funds 
necessary to repair the destruction its troops had caused. The 
fortress therefore remained in a state of near-uselessness for 
some years, until the impoverished Papal government could at 
last afford to repair it.17 
The Austrian refusal to compensate fully the Papal govern-
ment for its losses at Ancona was particularly annoying because 
Vienna was just at that moment rigorously insisting upon the 
most scrupulous fulfillment by the Papal government of its 
financial obligations. 
By an article "separeet secret" of the Convention of 12 
June 1815, Consalvi had reluctantly agreed that the Papal 
government should pay Austria the sum of 1,700,000 Roman Scudi 
as compensation for the latter '8 expenditures in reconquering 
the Papal States for the Pope. Payment was to be in installments 
18 to be oompleted by 12 June 1816. Though not explicitly stated, 
it seems likely that this payment was a quid pro quo for Austrian 
---17--
Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 10 March 1816; Apponyi to 
Consalvr,-B August 1816. 
18 
Ibid., Lebze1tern to Consa1vl, 23 September 1816, with 
copy of~ secret article. Five Roman scudi were approximately 
equa.l to one pound sterling. 
17 
support for the restoration of Papal territories at the Congress 
of Vienna. 
Almost immediately the Papal government began to experience 
the greatest difficulties in meeting the installments, and in 
December, 1815, it was obliged to request a delay. Austria 
agreed to show its "sincere respect" for the Holy Father by not 
insisting upon any further payments until June 1816, when, how-
ever, the entire balance must be paid in ful1. 19 
This respite, though most welco1'l'1e, was only temporary. The 
payment of the whole sum would eventually have to be made, and 
Consa1v! was frankly doubtful whether this could be done without 
res ort to ruinous expedients. He therefore begged the Aus trian 
government to give concrete proof of its ott-expressed devotion 
to His Holiness by remitting the Papal debt in part if not in 
full, or at least extending the date due until 1817 when Papal 
finances would be on a sounder basis. Although in his letters 
to Lebzeltern Consalvi eXhausted his ingenuity and rose to new 
heights of eloquence in discovering and expressing reasons for 
the remission or delay of payment, it was to no avail. 
Lebzeltern and Metternich expressed their sincere sympathy for 
the Papacy's difficult position, but they could do nothing, for 
the matter was outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. They could only refer the question to the 
19Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 8 January 1816, Conealvi 
to Lebziltern, 14 January 1816. 
Imperial Minister of Finance, who insisted that the money was 
absolutely necessary to supply the deficit created by Austrian 
military operations in Italy.20 
18 
Payment of the debt was therefore necessary, and by heroic 
efforts Consalvi was able to raise the sum by the apPointed day. 
The Austrian government accepted with effusive thanks: it was 
"ravished with delight" at the "loyalty and precision with \,fhich 
the Papal government satisfied its obligations," which it felt 
would result in a still greater increase in Austro-Papal friend-
Ship.21 
Consalvi's reaction was less enthusiastic. 22 The Austrian 
government often appeared at its worst in financial matters: its 
general tendency was to insist upon the rigorous fulfillment of 
all Papal obligations while showing itself negligent about its 
own. However, the Cardinal does not seem to have blamed 
Metternich or the Emperor for this rigorous insistence, for it 
was too obviously the result of the determination of the 
Austrian Finance Minister to collect everything due his govern-
ment, without regard for the interests of Austrian diplomacy--
a policy which the disorganisation of the Austrian goverrunent 
2Orbid., Consalvi to Lebze1tern, 14 January, 10 February, 
4 June,~June 1816; Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 5 February, 28 
March 1816. 
21Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 9 June 1816. 
22~bi~., Consalvi to Severoli, 9 June 1816. 
19 
and its lack of effective central control encouraged. Nor did 
Consalvi allow either this financial disagreement or the other 
disputes arising from the Austrian occupation to dissuade him 
from giving a favorable response to the overtures which 
Metternich was even then making for a policy of close Austro-
papal co-operation. 
2. The Theme of Austro-Papal Co-operation 
Consalvi was correct in not ascribing responsibility to 
Metternich for the disputes of 1815·-1816 for nothing was farther 
from the Austrian Foreign Minister's mind than unnecessary 
conflict with the Papacy. 
If Metternich had had his way, the years after 1815 would 
have been a period of close Austro-Papal co-operation--of a 
"Union of Throne and Altar" on an international scale. The 
neceSSity of using religion as a bulwark against the spread of 
revolutionary principles was a comnonplace of Restoration 
thought; the special value of papal support for the 1tgood cause" 
of oonservatism was obvious. "A close and cordial union between 
the Holy See and H.I.~ ••• , a perfect accord aacerdotium inter 
.. -
et imperium,ff was, Metternich felt, a necessity to defeat the 
"Spirit of the Agel! that was attacking seoular and religious 
authority alike. 23 The temporal power alone could not entirely 
destroy this revolutionary spirit, for its roots were in a 
warped morality which only spiritual weapons could reach. 24 
23A .. V. J R247, Leardi to Conealvi, 22 February 1818. The 
following abbreviations of the titles of the Austrian Emperor 
ooeur in the documents: H.MrHls Majesty; H.I.r·f.-His Imperial 
MajestYJ H.I.R.A.M.-His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty. 
24A•V., R245, Franois I to Pius VII, 12 April 1821. 
21 
Fortunately, the true Catholic was impervious to its influence 
because he revered the authority or his King as he did that of 
his bishop and the Pope. 25 
Nor did Metternich need the advice or Gentz 26 or 
Lebzeltern 27 that the support of the Papacy was especially 
necessary in turbulent Italy, where Austria had recently ac-
quired valuable terri tories • He was convinced that: 
Their [Austria fS and the Papacy fS] intimate union is 
not merely deSirable, but even absolutely necessary 
for maintaining the repose of Italy. Her tranquility 
will never be compromised if the Court of Rome is 
filled with the importance of employing all the 
spiritual means at its disposal for the common interest 
of the two governments. 
Seconded by this moral force, the military power 
of Austria in Italy ofters the surest guarantee of her 
internal tranquility, while that of the maintenance of 
peace with the outside world is found in its [Austria IS] 
political system, which is essentially conservative. It 
is therefore in the interest of both courts to remain 
closely united.28 
With Metternich thus firmly convinced of the neceSSity of Papal 
co-operation, it is not surprising that he showered Consalvi 
25A•V .. , R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 22 February 1818, R242, 
Leardi to ConsalTi, 18 January 1821. 
26 Wittichen, Friedrich Carl, and Ernest Salzer (ads.) 
Briefe von und an Friedrich von Gentz (Munich, 1913), III, 
P'art I, -2lJ9;--tJeiii"z to MetteriiICh, II April 1814. Friedrich von 
Gentz (1764-1832), friend and publicist of Metternich and 
Secretary of the Restoration congresses. 
27 Lebzeltern, 308-311, Lebze1tern to Metternich, 23 April 
1814. 
28 Maass, Ferdinand, Der JOBernin1SmuB. Quellen zu seiner 
Geschichte in Oesterreic~;-r76Q-!~O (VIenna; 1956-1901) IV, 
5Blf=586, "Instructions tor PrInce aunt tz, 31 May 1817; here-
atter cited as Maass. 
with voluminous exhortations to Austro-Papa1 unity.29 
22 
How should Consa1vi respond to these overtures? He could 
hardly be unaware that Austrian and Papal interests were not 
always so "identical" as Metternich c1aimed;30 pOints of conflict 
were numerous in both the religious and the political fields. 
The development of Austro-Papal relations since 1780 did 
not encourage overmuch faith in the Hapsburg Empire. Thirty-
five years of almost continuous religious conflict with the 
Josephist Court of Vienna had emb1ttered the Papacy, and this 
strife had not yet ended in 1815. 31 The Emperor Francis I, 
though devoutly religious, held firmly to Josephist principles, 
as did most of the Imperial bureaucracy. Metternich alone, 
disinterested in religious problems as such and reluctant to 
sacrifice political for religious advantages, dared to oppose 
the J08ephist faction but his influence over Francis I in 
2%ee, .L.!..-, A. V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 21 July 1816, 
11 October 1817, 5 November 1817, 22 February 1818, R260, 
Lebze1tern to Consa1vi, 6 April 1816; Metternich to Consalvi, 23 
April, 3 July 1816, 11 January 1817. 
3~.v., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816; 
Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816. 
3l"JoSephinism tt was the name given to the system of the 
Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790), who wished to bring the Austrian 
Chureh under the control of the secular government. See below, 
Chapter III, for a further description of Josephinism and its 
effects on Austro-Papal relations. 
religious matters was not great)2 
23 
COn:3al Vi had encountered 
difficulties with the Erlperor over the latter's Josephiat 
policies during the Congress of Vlenna}3 and hardly had the Pop 
been restol~d to Rome than Severoli was dispatching a stream of 
aomplaints concerning !~perial interferenoe In the Austrian 
Church. 34 
Nor In seeular affa1rs had the Aus tri8,n behsLvior been pre-
oisely that expected of' the "Premier Protecteur Clle 1 'Egl1se." 35 
Pius VII knd his Secretary of state could rememb~r only too well 
tha.t Aust~':'La, having driven tht! Freneh from the I,egations (the 
northcaatern provinoes of the Papal state, aroundl Bologna) in 
1'799, had then sought to add them to her own terrjitorles; that 
she had attempted to dominate the Conclave of Venice to seoure 
a Pope \'lho would consent to thIS annexatIon; and ,that when 
despite her efforts Pius VII had been elected, she had shown her 
displeasure in no uncertain fashion. Even then, Austria had not 
abandoned her efforts to retain the Legations, but had con-
~inued to put the strongest pr~ssure on Pius VII .to compel him 
I 
32For a discussion of Metternieh's attempts to check the 
Josephists, see below, Chapter III. 
3~ln1eri, IV, 340-348. 
34E•g ., A.V., ANV 233, Severoll to Pro-Secre·tary of State 
Pacea, 29 August, 10 September, 19 November 1814, 18 February, 
30 April 1815. 
35van Duerm, 64, Cousal"i to Metternich, 21 February- 1815. 
The following may be consulted for Austro-Papal roelations during 
the first flfteen years of Plus VII's pontificate: Memorie, 
Chaptem II, IV, and Appendix; Schm'.dlln, Chapter,s rand II, 
Rinleri; Lebzeltern, Chapters I, II, x. 
to yield the desired territories by a fo~a1 treaty. Only 
the destruction of Austrian power by Napoleon at Marengo had 
finally brought thIs pressure to an end. 
24 
During the Napoleonic era Austrian policy towards the 
Papacy had been largely dictated by selfish considerations, with 
little regard for the welfare of the Church. In 1804-1806 she 
had encouraged the Papacy to resist Napoleon and had done her 
best to stir up strife between them; then, having become after 
her defeat the camp follower of the Emperor of the French, 
Austria had endeavored to pers~ade Pius to make peace with 
Napoleon by granting him the conoessions which he desired. 
Throughout the long imprisonment of Pius VII, Austria had done 
little to aid him. but had only sought to persuade him to oease 
that heroic resistance which Francis I, MetternIch, and all 
EllrOpe so lavishly praised later. Only when the tide had 
definitely tltrned against Napoleon did Austria dare to speak 
out for the Pontiff. 
In 1814 Austrian troops drove the French from the Papal 
State and restored Pius VII to hIs See--a deed of which Francis 
I was fond of reminding the Pope when he wanted conceSSions. 
The gratitude of Pius and Consalvi was considerably diminished 
when Austria demanded a sizable sum to cover the expenses of 
this liberation, and was still further tempered by the realisa-
tion that Austria had acted thus only for her own strategiC 
1nterests.36 Moreover, Consalvi nourished well-founded 
suspicions that Austria had not yet lost interest in annexing 
the liberated territories,37 and he soon learned that she had 
not scrupled to buy the support of Murat by promising him a 
sizable area of the Papal State.38 
25 
At the Congress of Vienna Austria did indeed display great 
interest in the legatiOns, and apparently considered retaining 
them as won by right of conquest. 39 That she did not press for 
annexation at the Congress was not due to any special reverence 
for the Papacy. The real explanation can be found in 
Metternich's fear that the turbulent Romagnols would make 
undesirable subjects who might infect the other Austrian 
~6---
A.V., R260, Conaalvi to Lebzeltern, 10 February l8l6J 
Lebzeltern to Conaalvi, 28 March 1816. 
37 
38 
A.V., R242, Conaalvi to Pacca, 26 June 1814. 
By a secret treaty of 11 January 1814: Rinieri, IV, 
45-74. Joachim Murat, apPOinted King of Naples by Napoleon in 
1808; went over to the Allies with the above treaty; in 1815 
tried unsuocessfully to arouse a national movement against 
Austria in Italy; captured and shot. 
39 
Rinieri, IV, 309-310 does not believe that Austria had 
serious designs on the Legations, an idea which Consa1vi came 
to share to some extent: A.V., R242, Consalvi to Paoca, 8 
September 1814. But for convincing evidence to the contrary, 
see Lebzeltern, 322-341, and especially Angelo Filipuzzi (ed.), 
Pio LX e la ~olitioa austriaca in Italia dal 1815 a1 1848, 
nellareaIi"z one de Riccardo WeISs at starICenreIS '{"Florence, 
1958), -"I;T-156, Metternlcl'i t'o LebzeItern, June TIUS. 
26 
territories with revolutionary ideas,40 and in the crucial fact 
that Austria "could not retain the Legations without making 
proportional concessions to Russia and Prussia, disadvantageous 
in that they would necessarily have involved lands and subjects 
"41 
• • • infinitely more valuable. 
With this background in view, it is not surprising that 
distrust of Austria was endemic in the Papal States, or that 
rumours circulated widely that Francis I was only awaiting some 
favorable moment--perhaps a revolution or the death of Pius 
VII--to seize the Legations. 42 These suspicions were nourished 
by the agitation of a faction in the legations which wished 
Austrian annexation, pretering the efficient and secular 
43 Imperial rule to the Papal administration. 
In fact, such suspiCions seem to have been unjustified. 44 
40---~ 
Prince Clement de Metternich, Memoires, documents, et 
ecrits divers, ed. Richard de Metternrch { Paris, 188o-1884r; 
~tternrch to Francis I, 3 November 1811. Also, G. de 
Bertier: de Sauvigny, Metternich et son temps (Paris, 1959), 




Casai, 189-192. A.V., 247, Excerpt from Morning Chron-
icle, 21 April 1819. R260, Genotte to Consalvi, n-""J"'UW 1819. 
ANV--'250, Mazio to Leardi, 16 September 1823. 
43 
A. V ., ANV 233. Severo1i to Pacca, 5 Augua t 1814.; Severoli 
to COTh~alvl, 13 September 1815. R242,Consa1vl to Paeca, 24 May 
1815. 
44 
Bianchi, I, 221--223, and Cassi, 130, 189-193, accept 
these suspicions as correct, but give no evidence other than the 
rumours then prevalent in Italy to support their contention. As 
for the faction in the Legations that sought Austrian rule, 
Austria distrusted rather than encouraged it: Van Duerm, 175, 
Apponyi to Metternich, 18 March 1817. 
27 
There is no evidence that the Austrian government seriously 
considered annexation after the Congress of Vienna, nor that it 
was in any way involved in the agitation in the Legations. Ap-
parently, Austria, having onoe decided in 1815 not to annex 
that area, definitely abandoned the projeot. 
Consalvi never shared these suspicions. His apprehensions 
in regard to Austria were more limited, but more concrete. The 
real Austrian threat was not annexation, but the gradual ex-
tension of Austrian influence over the Papal State to such a 
degree that the latter would become a mere satellite or 
protectorate, losing thereby that temporal independence which 
was then felt to be essential to the spiritual freedom of the 
Papacy. COi'lsalvi was well aware the "Austria seems to believe 
that she has the right • • • to take a sort of predominance" 
in the management of Italian aftairs,45 and that her aim was 
"the acquisition of a direct influence on the governments of all 
the Italian states, indeed the political management of them.~46 
Metternleh would have preferred to achieve this aim 
through the crea.tion of an Italian Confederation, somewhat 
-~---- ---",----,. 5 ' 
A.V., R242, Instructions for Spina, 1822. Metternich did 
in fact believe that Austria was entitled to sueh predominance: 
see G. Viezzoll, till princ1pe di Carignano nei d:!spaeci dei 
ministri 3.U8trlaci a TorIno," RUI!I~na. Storl~ti. del Risorglmento~ 
XXX (1943), 293, Metternlch tost'arnemberg-~-o-JUly 1815. --
46 
A.V., R242, Quesitl ahe oi propongono ••• , 1822, Also, 
R248, Consalv1 to Macchi, 2 December 1822. 
28 
similar to that in Germany.47 He had privately suggested such 
a Confederation at the Congress of Vienna, but Consalvi had re-
:iected the plan. 48 In view of Italian reSistance, Metternieh 
began to work more cautiously. Abandoning for the moment his 
Con:"ederation; he l30ught instead to extend Auatr>ian influence in 
the indtvidltal states I especially by perauading them to sign 
treaties of' alliance giving Austria cons:l.t'1erable control over 
their policies. In this more limited aim he had considerable 
success: the petty states of Parma and Modena were AustrIan 
satellites by their nature end loeation, while both Naples and 
Tuscany were persuaded to sign secret treaties of a11iance. 49 
Sardinia was placed under heavy pres8ure to do likewise, but 
with English and Russian diplomatic support was able to resist. 5 
-- ----zrr.--------
ill.d., Instructions for Spina~ Quesiti che si propongono • 
• • ,1822. On Matt.mich'e Confederation scheme, see Antonio 
Bettaninl, nUn disegno 0.1 confederazlone Ita1iana nella politica 
Internazionale della restaurazlone,1I in his Stud1 di "tor1a dei 
trattatl e politica internazionale (Padua, 193~- 3=50i. ---
-_. 48"'· .-.. -.-.. ---- -" .-- -.- ... -
A. V., R2Ll2, Consal vi to Pacca, 8 Septe'nber 1814, 1 
November 1814, 1 February, 11 February 1815,J Pacca to Conaalvi, 
13 November 1814. 
49 
I·. S. B. Chodzko ("Comte d 'Angeberg n ) I Recuel1 des 
~~.!~~SI'h~,?-ntenti~,1~-, ~_t( .. !~~-~~ ·ld';.~;~1!l~-~!q~~~ ~~~~-~.fP..~ t 
.J. '.t\u"r c e e l' a .... le Paris ,0;;.19/ 20r-203, RUS ... ro-l-Jeapo1i an 
Trea"ty'of--12-"June" 'I'Bf'S. 
50 
Bettanlnl, 3-50. Blanchi, I, 440-441. N. Rosselli, 
I~~1ter~~ ~. Reltl!o ~1: ~ardeln~ .~~l !!?15 a~ ~§!rr (Turin, 1954), 
39-&+ • 
29 
To a certain extent, then, Metternichrs overtures to the 
Papacy for close co-operation were only a part of his overall 
Italian policy. However, the spiritual character of the Pope 
made his co-operation more valuable than that of the mere ruler 
ef a minor state would have been, while at the same time it made 
difficult the application to him of such direct pressure as 
could be used with other Italian princes. Papal co-operation 
would have to be won by persuasion, not force--hence, the 
frequent Austrian messages of this period stressing the identity 
of Austrian and Papal interests and the need for close co-
operation and unity between them. 51 
Consalvi was aware of Metternichrs ulterior aims, that 
Austria, "not being able to obtain a Federation~ . . , will try 
all the ways of obtaining at least a direct influence upon the 
governments of the other Italian states,,,52 and "not being able 
to propose this project openly now • • • will seek to prepare 
for it by securing the adoption of principles and institutions 
of such a nature as to lead little by little to a system of 
51 
See especially A.V., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 16 
April 1816, 4 May 1816, 1 July 1816; Metternich to Consalvi, 
3 July 1816; et pass im in much of the R260 correspondence 
for l8l6-l8lr;-AISO;1r247, Severoli to Consalvi, 21 July 
1816; Leardi to Consalvi., 5 November 1817, 22 February 1818, 
et E~~~im in R247, 1816-1818. 
52 
A.V., R242, Quesiti che si propongono ••• , September, 
1822. See also Consalvils similar comments in R242, Instructions 
for Spina, 1822; 
30 
federation under Austrian protection.,,53 He was therefore wary 
of too-close unity with Austria, which might enable that state 
to establ~.sh gradually a quasi-protectorate over the Papal State 
Yet, at the sarne time Gonsalvi eould see sound reasons in 
favor of eo-operation with Austria. The Napoleonic Wars had 
proven beyond s.ll doubt that the Papal States wer-a too weak 
mill tarily to de:t'end thernsel ves, and that neither tt .. e Papal 
principle of neutrality nor fear of ita spiritual sanctions 
would. suffic.e to protect thert) fro'n attack by an unscrupulous 
and determined enemy. As in the past, the spiritual sword. 
needed the temporal aword to support; it, &l1Q for this role 
Austria, as the greatest Catholic state and the dominant power 
in Italy, was clearly indicated. 54 In fact, though no new 
Napoleon arose to threaten the Papal States, Austrian aid was 
useful tn the diplomatic sphere. For example, in 1816 a 
diplomatic break threatened by Russia because of what it deemed 
mistreatment of" its representative at Rome was s'l1oothed over by 
Austria'S good offices, while in 1823 Austria upon Consa1vi's 
request used its influence to persuade Naples to halt its 
-----53----.. ··---
Ibid., InstructIons for Spina, 1822. 54---'" 
Consalvi was 30 well aware of this that during the tense 
sprIng of 1815 when an attack by Murat was feared, he had re-
proached Metternioh for not ~xtending a guarantee of Austrian 
protection to include the Papal State--a recognition of Papal 
dependenoe upon Austrian protection that he may well have 
regl'-'etted later. Van Duerm, 64, Consa1vi to Metternich, 26 '1, 
February 1815. 
I 
pernicious practice of exiling suspected revolutionaries to 
the Papal States. 55 
Austrian friendshlp could be equally valuable for the 
protection of the spiritual interests of the Church. No less 
than three times in 1815-1823 persecutions of Catholics in the 
ottoman Empire which the Papacy was powerless to hinder were 
halted when Consalvl invoked the influence of Austria at 
Constantinople. 56 Austrian support also proved useful in the 
controversy between the Papacy and the Protestant German 
princes over the control of the Church in their states. 57Nor 
was such Austrian support automatic: it ~ould be quickly 
terminated, for Austria, intent upon its own interests, would 
- 55 
A.V., R260, Consalvi to Metternich, 2 June 1816; 
Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816. ANY 250, Consalvi to 
Leardi, 26 Apr!l, 31 May 1823, ANV247, Leard! to Consalvi, 
8 May, 15 May, 29 May 1823 .. 
56 
In Bosnia in 1816: ANY 242, Hudelist to Severoli, 25 
May 1816. At Aleppo in 1818: ANY 242, Consalvi to Metternieh, 
4 July 1818: f>1etternioh to Leardi, 22 December 1818: R247, 
Muxi to Consalvi, 24 April, 8 May 1819. At Constantinople 
in 1819: R2J.rT, Leardi to Consalvi, 20 October 1819, 8 June 
1822. 
57 
See especially A.V., R247, Severol! to Consalvi, 12 
Apr!l 1817; Leardi to Conaalvi, 4 July 1818, 16 January, 16 
October, 6 Novereber 1819, 5 January 1820; et £assim in R247 
during those years.. On the controversy between~he-'Papacy 
and the Protestant,German princes of the upper Rhine, see 
Schmidlin, 306-318. 
withdraw should the Papacy prove unco-operative. 58 
32 
However, the chief motive impelling Consalvi towards co-
operation with Austria was-- as Metternlch correctly divined59_-
the threat from the S~_~~ar,t on the one hand and the Ze1.?-n~J: on 
on the other. 60 Each of these factions represented in its own 
way a menace to the stability, and indeed to the very existence, 
58 
Austrian support was in fact withdrawn temporarily in 
the controversy with the German princes when Austria failed in 
1817-1818 to obtain desired religious concessions from the 
Papacy (see below, Chapter III). The Papacy was bluntly told 
that Austria. could easily "extinguish this conflagration," but 
saw no reason to do so in view of the papal attitude: A.V., ANY 
246, Leardi to Consa1vl, 25 May 1818. 
59 
Maass, IV, 584, Metternichfs Instructions for Prince 
Kauni t~, 31 May 1817. 
60 
The 8ettarj were the members of the If Sects", the Italian 
secret soeietres-of the Restoration Era which sought to over-
throw the existing Italian governments by foree, drive out the 
Austrians, and set up a constitutional unified Italian state; 
the CarLonari were the best known of these societies; see below, 
sectTon 4 of -this chapter. The Zelanti or "Zealots" were a 
faction in the Papal Curia. Theihad no definite organization 
or program, but were held together by certain com~on character-
istics: dislike of the predominant position of Consalvi in the 
Papal government, fir~ OPPOSition to any attempt to modernize 
or reforTI the Papal regi~, and a desire to increase the effec-
tive control of the P~paey over the Catholic Church as a whole 
by an uncompromising assault upon the secular rulers of Europe 
who had gained control of the Church within their territories. 
These aims brought them into conflict with Conaa1vi, a.nd they 
sought constantly to hinder his policies and to drive him .from 
oftice. See below, Chapter II, Section 3, and Chapter III, 
Section 1, for a discussion of these two groups, their aims 
and policies, and their relation to Consalvi and his policies. 
33 
of the Papal State: the S~.tta~J, because ~'i(> ,- ( -( '-,;,~·~.r-l.·;:,::,-~·~ ~ 
they were oonstantly plotting to overthrow the Papal government 
which stood in the way of their liberal and nationalist ideals; 
the Z~}~n);_i, because their ultrareactionary principles would, 
if fully put into effect, arouse such discontent that revolution 
would be almost inevitable. The moderate Conaa1vi feared all 
fanatics equally, and '.dshed at the savne time to carry out 
refo~ns despite ~a~ 0pp~sition and to suppress the ?ettarJ. 
Metternich, realizing the necessity of these policies for the 
stability not only of the Papal State but of all Italy as well, 
and realizing too that only Consalvi could carry them out,61 
gave the Cardinal his wholehearted support in both endeavours. 
This natural community of interests was largely responsible 
for the good relations that existed between Metternich and 
Con"3alvL 
For "good" those relations generally were, at least in 
the years iMmediately following the Congress of Vienna when 
their mutual fear of the Zelantl and the ~~~.i.arj was strongest 
--61-····--
Sauvigny, 178, Instructions for Apponyi, 16 September 
1820. For T·1etternich fS fears of the harm a Zelanti-dominated 
Papacy could do, see G. de BertieI' de Sauvigny," France and the 
~t~Fean Alliance, 1816-1821 (South Bend, Ind., 1958)~ 1~~1g;­
. e ernlCen to Rioherieu~ 17 April 1817; hereafter cited as 
sauvifnl 1~28. These opinions conflict with those of Bianchi, I: 22 -22~, and Cassi, 189-192, who attempt, without supporting 
evidence except dubious ru,'11o,!-ra.,·to.p.t~ture Consal vi and 
Metternich as cons t ant lYfP. lIe; the latter is described as 
plotting against Consalv 8hd opposing hta plans for reform. 
, 'J '.' ;; 
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and when those aspeots of Austrian policy that threatened 
papal interests were less in evidence than they had been earlier 
or would becoMe later. During the 1815-1817 period, therefore, 
and to a steadily lessening extent therearte~, Consalvi 
s:tn(}erely desirt1d to co-operate with Austria and sought to do 
so "in any i,fay that would not \lieaken the te'T;!)opal independence of 
rr-
the Pap3,c~l" or its ess,~:mtlal spi:r.-ltual a:uJGhorit3·• o£: 
Consal vi could not, o~' course, be unalfzare of' the threaten-
tng as}:ects of Austrian pollcy--its deslre for' hege"l()ny 1n 
Italy, the nenaoe of its Josephiat policies-·-but; in the yeal"S 
l.mmediately a.fter l81~~ thEwe elc:nentG were not 8 tr'uJl[;:;ly in 
evidence; they were then overshadowed for Cons 9.1 vi hy the r:lore 
immediately serious pr()ble~.13 of internal :;:'ef'rJl--r", Zel?-nt1: 
opposltlO1'l, and Set~a.r.t subversion, in all of which Austria.n 
SUppOl"'t would be helpful a.nd perhaps invaluable. 
This situation c:)uld not long endure: the A'ustro··Papal 
a.1liance was unstable frOTl'l the beginning. No 8.'flount of good 
will, or of fine rhetoric about the identity of Papal and 
Austrian interest, could per:nanently concGal the pa.inful truth 
that those inter~sts were in fact divergent, a.nd at times 
-----'-62-----'-
For apparently sincere expres3ion3 of -chis deJire, see 
Consalvi '3 lsttel"S to iiletternich in Van li'Uerrn, 136, 151, 196, 
206, 218. Both Lebzeltern (Van Duerra, 127) and lVietternich 
(Maass, IV, 584; Sauvigny, 173) believed 1n the Cardinal's 
sincerity. 
diametrleall~r opposite. In the la.at analysis, Austria. did 
consider herself entitled to exercise hege'1'lony in Ita.ly, 8. 
heger'lony which Cans al vi could not recognis e, while the 
J ooephis t spIrit d·Y·'linating the Austrian court was in dlrect 
contradlcti0~ to the Papal clai~s o~ a~lritual authority. 
wft t,) th~'Jlselves, '~::msalvl and f"ietternich c,)uld have 
postpon:?c! 01" !1itie;ated Austra::?apal conflict, especially in 
the religious f'iL!1.d. l'oth favored a ',ore conciliatory policy 
in reI i.gious lr!s'cters than the;! t;ltH--e able to ad.opt. 1\his w'as 
especially tl"UI3 of Netternich~ "iho had no gl"ea°t; zeal 1'01' 
Josephif~t principles c'ne]. was ul1HillL1g to sacrifice '!;he 
political advantages of' Papal co· ope rat inn fo:! the sake of 
tncrea.~ing royal control ov(~r the Chur'ch. Consalv:i. toe would 
have been willing to ma.ke sJ'newhat great~r ooncessions on 
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non essential natters and opposed. the unrealistic a'nbltiona of 
thf:! t~}.!int3:, but he could not; comprotlise on the E:sserltlals of 
the Pa.pal poslt~ion. As the Carclinaltold Metternich, no matter 
how strongly he r'1ight t'lish closer friendsh:i;p with Austria, 
there wer'e cp.rtain po:tnts on which he 00\,1.10. not yield, ana if 
Austl~ia insisted on de .. la.'1ding IT'ore than he CQuld give, she 
1iJQuld dest:-..-.os' the baDis of Auatro-Papal unity o3--aa in fact she 
eventually did. 
For ulti~ately neither Ifletternich nor Consalvi iJ{as entirely 
63 ---
Van DueX'r.1, 136, Consalv! to Metternlch> 11 .June 1816. 
the master of his own policy. Behind Metternich were the 
Josephist Court and Emperor; behind Consalvi were the Zelanti 
with their growing influence on Pius VII in religious matters. 
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Under Josephist influence, Francis I demanded far greater con-
cessions than Consalvi, much less the Zelanti, could make. As 
Consalvi warned Metternich, If I desire a close union with Austria 
and will do everything possible for this. But there are certain 
things which are impossible for us. • • • I beg Y. H. (jour 
Highnes~ for the love of God to oppose with all your influence 
things of this nature. n64 But Metternich1s opposition could not 
prevent Francis I from demanding such things, while Consalvi, 
hampered by the Zelanti, could not adopt as flexible an attitude 
on non-essential points as he would have liked. 65 That Austro-
Papal co-operation broke down as soon as it did was in large 
part the result of the influence of these two factions, Zelanti 
and Josephists, on the policies of their respective courtsj66 
but the break-down itself was in the long run probably inevitable 
64 Ibid. Also, 206-210, Consalvi to Metternich, 1 October 
1818, in-wKich the Cardinal declares he has obtained for Austria 
everything except those things on which the Pope cannot yield. 
65For the way in which the conciliatory religious policies 
advocated by Metternich and Consalvi were thwarted by the 
Josephists and the Zelanti, especially the fo~ner, see below, 
Chapter III. 
66~. 
3. Reform and Opposition in the Papal State 
Oppos1t10n to Consalv1 at Rome had not been absent dur1ng 
h1s first ministry; 1t was an early consequence of jealousy of 
his influence over P1us VII, d1s11ke of h1s reform1ng po11c1es, 
and d1strust of h1s f1ex1b1e att1tude towards Napoleon. However, 
it W88 not unt11 h1s second m1n1stry that he became 1nvo1ved 1n 
open conflict w1th a powerful oppos1t10n party w1th1n the Cur1a: 
the ultra-react10nary ~lant1. The conf11ct was an unequal one. 
The Ze1ant1, led by such 1nf1uent1a1 Card1nals 88 Severo1i and 
Bartolomeo Pacca, included the majority of the higher clergy 
and the College of Card1na1s, while Consa1v1's supporters--
the "D1p10mat1c1" or "Po11t1cant1"--1nc1uded only a few 
cardinals and a limited number of the lower c1ergy.67 Only the 
support of P1us VII kept Conaalv1 1n power aga1nst such strong 
oPPo31t!OD, and as the Pope grew older the Ze1anti gained an 
----67 
On Consa1vi's struggle wlth the Ze1anti, see: Massimo 
Petrocch1 La restautazlone, 11 Card1nale Conselvl, e 1a Rlforma 
de 1 1816 (FlOrence, 1941), hereafter clteda.s petroc'Chrt941 J 
Scnmmin, 190, 197-198J Lef1on, 317-320J A.V.=; R241, IX raot 
from MDrnl~ Chronlo1e, 27 Apr11 1819, presents an lnteresting 
contemporary view. ~arto1omeo Cardlnal Paoea (1756-1844), Pro-
Secretary of State ln 1808-1809; flrm1y opposed all oompromise 
wlth Napoleon, who impr1soned him 1n 1809-1813J Pro-Beoretary 
of State during Consa1vl's absenoe in Vienna, 1814-1815J proba-
bly the most influential leader of the Ze1ant1 in 1815-1823_ 
31 
increasing influence over him. 68 
38 
Aside from personal factors, there were two main causes 
for conflict between Consalvi and the zelant~. The first point 
at issue was the question of reform or reaction in the Papal 
government. Consalvi favored reforming and modernizing the 
antiquated and inefficient Pontifical regime, while the Zelanti 
were bitterly opposed to any innovation. The second question 
was the policy which the Papacy should adopt toward the secular 
power in religious affairs. This question involved a difference 
not of principle--both Consalvi and the Zelanti opposed the 
interference of' secular government in religious matters and 
wished to prevent it--but of tactics. The Ze1anti tended to 
favor an open assault on governmental control over the Church 
and to oppose any compromise with the secular power. Consalvi, 
with a more realistic appreciation of the international !!I.eRe; 
and the strengths and weaknesses of' the Papal position than his 
adversaries, f'e1~ that any such policy would be most unwise. A 
frontal attack upon the principle and practice of governmental 
control over the Church would surely lead to conflict with moat 
of the European powers, a conf'lict which would have the most 
unfortunate effecta on religion in general and the Papacy in 
particular. Such a conflict was especially undesirable at that 
particular moment when the revolutionary threat was so strong, 
-.----68 
Van Duerm, 263, Note 1; 281, Apponyi to Metternich, 20 
September 1820; Maass, V, 113-114, Genotte to Metternich, 5 
February 1820. 
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as a long church-state conflict would only weaken both, to the 
joy of their common enemy. Consalvl was theretore reluctant to 
attack the secular power openly. He preferred to work indirect-
1y, taking advantage ot favorable opportunitles to increase 
Papal control over the natlonal churches. Unlike the ~lanti, 
he was willing to make conceaelons on non-essentlal8 If it 
seemed advlsable. In so far as Austria was concerned, the 
Zelan~ were bltterly antagonlstic to that Josephist power, 
while Consalvi, though dlstrustful of' Austrlan alms, was well 
aware of' the politlcal and rel1g10us advantages of' remaining 
on good terms w1th her. 
The Zelanti gained a major in1tial advantage over Conealvi 
when the latter spent the fIrst year ot the Re8toration away 
trom Rome, thus leav1ng a free f1eld to his opponents to take 
control ot the admin1stration and carry out their react10nary 
policies. Both MOnsignor Agostino R1varola, Whom Pius VII 
sent ahead to restore Papal government in the territories of' 
the Mprima ricupera" (that i8, those restored to the Papaoy in 
1814, principally Rome and the surround1ng area, as opposed 
to the "seconda ricupera;" the rest ot the Papal possessions 
restored at the Congress ot Vienna), and the heroic but in-
transigent Pacca, appointed Prosecretar,y ot State upon the 
Pope's arrival 1n Rome, were Zelanti fervently opposed to any 
~---........"--". 
innovation 1n Church or State. The two lost no time destroying 
every traoe ot the French regime and replacing it with the 
69 40 
ancient pre-1189 Papal administration. The French admini-
strative and financial innovations were abolished, and the 
modern efficient French law codes and courts were replaced by 
70 
the antiquated and dis organized Papal legal ays te:n. The 
reaction extended even to the abolition of such salutary 
measures as vaccination, lighting of the streets, and ew~nci­
pation of the Jews from the ghetto. The Inquisition (With the 
power of capital punishment though not of torture) was re·· 
established, as were the feudal rights and jurisdiction of the 
nobility. The aale or secularized ecclesiastical properties 
was annulled and a commis81on set up to supervise their return; 
few or the well-to-do would not have SUffered loss from these 
measures. Almost equally otfensive to the educated classes ,_.;' 
---, '~-'osr'---- .... --' -- ... 
The best account of the reaction under Pacea, as well as 
the reforms of Consalvi, 1s in the works of Massimo Petrocahi: 
La restaurazione romana, 1812-1823 (Florence, 1943), hereafter 
OIted as fetrOcchrI91i"j; ana Petrocchl 1941. A good briet 
account i8 "In Scnmial1n, 119-201. ni'conthe reaetion, 
R1n1er1 1 IV, 203-297, rather apologetiC in tone; and the excel-
lent but very critioal Adolfo Omodeo, ttCattolicismo e clvilta 
modemo nel aecolo xix, III: II Cardinale Consalvi al Congresso 
di Vienna," 1n La Critica, XXXVI (November, 1938), 426-440. 70 -- -----. 
A system described by a moderate eontemporary as "a law 
code compiled thirteen centuries ago, oontaining tourteen or 
more thousand laws, often mutually contradictory, and no longer 
eompat1ble with the customs and outlook ot the times whioh have 
utterly changed •••• " A.V., R25, Pro-Memorial ot Dr. Gua~ani, 
sent to Consalvi by Cardinal Opizzoni, 18 October 1815. This 
Memorial contains a very interea ting analys 18, all the more 
impressive tor ita comparative moderation, of the manifold Ills 
of the Papal regime. 
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was the removal of laymen from the Papal government. The 
laicization of the administration by the French had been highly 
popular with the educated classes, especially the numerous and 
often impecunious lawyers, and the return to ecclesiastical rule 
was bitterly erltlelzed.71 
More defensible, though :nuch ar:lti<.!lzed. abroad~ was the 
general removal from their benefices ot the elerg;r who had 
taken the oath of loyalty to Napoleon; desirable on polItical 
and religious grounds, it was perhaps equally 30 as a ~atter 
of justice. It could scarcely be denied that the olergy who 
had sur;ered for their refusal to take the oath should be re-
stored to their positions at the expense of the jurors, nor 
could men like Paoca, who had suffered per.secutlon ror their 
refusal to bow to Napoleon, be expacted to have muoh sympathy 
for those who had been 1038 heroio. Also underatandable was 
the punishment of a vel" few 1n:; collaboratore, notably those 
who had led the assault on the Quirinale in 1309. Less 
justifiable was the publio hwniliatlon inflicted on certain 
prelates liiho had co-operated ~lith the Frenoh. There was, 
however, no widespread persecution, no "white terrorJ~,·, despite 
the wildly exaggerated stories whioh circulated freely beyond 
7I 
It is significant that ex-ottieial~ replaced by 
eccleSiastics were perhaps the most important single grQup 
in the secret societies. Petrocchi ~943, 38, 53. 
\ 
the Alps, spread by enemies of the Papal governl1ent. 72 
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Consal vi was appalled by these proceed1ngs. He was not 
a liberal in the strict senae of the te~a:73 his refornm and his 
administI'ation as a whole had more in common with the 
EnlIghtened Ve.patIsrn of the eighteenth century then wIth the 
Liberalism ot' the nineteenth. However, 1f not a liberal, he 
was oertainly an anti-reaotionary, an intelligent and statesman-
like conael-v'atlve who realized that llthe circUJr18i;ancea of the 
Age we live In are very dIfferent from those of the Past. • .It 
is necessary to come to terms with the spirit of the tlmes. il74 
He had long planned a thorough refo~~ of the Papal regime, but 
during his first m1nistry zelL~i~ opposition and his own pre-
oocupation with other problems had combIned to thwart his plans. 
'7 _. 
12 
A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacea, 9 June, 17 August 1814. 
R247, Severoli to Pacea, 25 July, 30 July, 6 August H314. Suuh 
stories rendered Consalvl ts task in securing restoration of 
the P8.pal States l"IjUch more d:U'"fi cuI t . 
73 
The theme of Casai's work, th~t Conaalv1 W~~ indeed a 
true liberal, seems untenable; the general spirit pervading his 
T-efON15 and hie ac5.mintstration was tha.t of an intelligent con-
servative. Upon being informed that a SwiSS paper had praIsed 
hiB refol"i115 as u11bera1 ft, Conea,lvl replied that such articles 
were attempts by the Liberals to associate the Papacy with their 
cause in the pub1:tc eye. He stated h1.8 opposition to Liberalism 
as a doctrine and denied that his reforms were liberal in that 
sense" A. V., R257, Consalvi to Vftlentl, 10 Februa.r.r 1817. 
'"{4 
A.V., R247, ConealvLto Severo'11; .. ll1. September 1816. 
Severoli had criticized Consalv1 '8 reformn J and an increasingly 
bitter dispute sprang up between them that eventually led to an 
open break. Severoli later became an implacable foe of the 
Secretary of State and led th~ ~J!l,!l~.~" in the Conclave of 1823. 
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In 1815, the disrupt10n of the Papal government by the French 
occupation seemed to offer the opportun1ty for thorough re-
organization for wh1ch he had hoped during his oxile. 75 Any 
attempt to restore the past would be futile, and would merely 
al'ouse popul&.l." diseontent and a.1ienate Europea.n op1n:5.on. It 
was necessary to move forward, to carry out rei'OlTlS thr.t 'Would 
be in keeping with the "Spirit of the Age!' if the best interests 
of the Papacy and its subjects were to be served. Consalvi had 
no intention of satisfying liberal d.emands for a wrl tten oon-
stitution, a parliament. or any other innovation that might 
weaken the authority of the Pope, which must be absolute 1n 
secUlar as in religious matters. 76 Consa.lv1 was willing to 
adr~lt that the syateT:1. or eOIl8tltutlonal government, "oBsia del 
Contratto Sociale, ff might be desirable in a government ruled by 
a purely secular prineeJ but in an eooles1astical state it 
would be "most perilous," for a.ny limitation of tr..e authority 
of the Pope as a secular ruler might be thought to affect his 
75 
r~morie, 145-161, written by Consalvi during his 
lmprisorunem'l:n 1811, describes hiB earlier attedpts at refOrI'Il, 
his bitterness at the reaotionaries who had frustrated hls 
projects, and his hope that in the event of a Papal l'eator-ation 
he would be able to profit by the disruption of the old system 
to create a new one. 
76 
A.V., R242, Consalvl to Paoca, 20 Maroh 1815J Consalvi 
to Spina, 8 FebruaI"Y' 1821 J Irmtruettons fur Spina, 1822, Rl6S, 
Cons 3.1 vi to Metternieh, 23 Augus t 1823 (oopy). 
-necessary and divinely-given absolute power as Head of the 
Church. 77 
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What the Cardinal did propose was an amnesty for the past, 
plus large-seale administrative rerorm that would eliminate 
the sources or popular discontent against the Papal ~egi~e. A 
general raorganlsatlon and streamlining of the administrative 
system to l.nomue its effioiency and its a.bility to disoha.rge 
it3 funotions satisfaotorily, flnanoial reforms to reduce the 
burden of' taxat1on, stimulate the eeOnOii'ly, and place the st!l.te 
on a. sound f.'1n~nej.al bas is, a well-organized and huynane legal 
eystelJ1, the abolition of priv1lege, and the admission of laymen 
to the government in larger numbers-~the3e were the rero~~~ 
that Consalvl sought to put into affect. 
Throughout his stay in Vienna Consalvl dispatched a con-
stant stream of letters to Paces urging moderation and reform 
and pOinting out the evil effects of the prevailinr; reaction 
and repreesion. 78 In O~ of his last di8pRt~hes before depart-
ing f0r Rome, the Cardinal warned that: 
77 
A.V., R2!~2, Consalvl to Spina, 8 February 1821. 
78 
"Jar.! espeola.l1y A.V., R2!~2, Consalv1 to Pacca, 30 June, 
17 August, 3 Deoember, 7 December, 14 December, 25 Deoember 
191!l, l!~ .January J 12 .Tune 1815; and P:\cca fS de~en8e of' th(:! justice and neoessity of h1s polioies, Paeea to Consalvl, 8 
cTun~, 23!uly.. () ,~uglJS t, 8 AUgt.lfl t, 17 A'llgus t, 20 September I 3 
November 1814. Much of this Consalvi-Paoca oorrespondenoe has 
been published 1n R1nieri, V; it is an excellent 30urce f8r the 
confliot of opinion between Consalvi and the Zelantl 1n 1814-
1815 when open strife between the'cn had not yet-brOKen out. 
If it has been difticult, God knows, to recover what 
haa been recovered, it will be yet more difficult to 
preserve it. You must believe what I am about to tell 
you. It we do not take the right path, if tata1 errors 
are made, we will not keep the recovered territories 
45 
s 1x months. Heaven grant that the future does not con-
firm this predictionI But unfortunately so it will be 
if we make the wrong moves. 
The only "right path tt was to conciliate the people by a policy 
of moderation and retorm, in particular by "adopting as soon 
as possible a new plan [ot government] based on those views 
that wisdom, prudence, experience, the nature or the age, and 
circumstances imperiously counael ••• 0. When the current is 
of such great torce that it cannot be reSisted, better to seek 
to control and direct it than to let oneselt be swept aW87 by 
it." 79 
It was in this firm conviction that Consalvi set to work 
upon hi. return to Rome. His tirst step was an Edict of 5 July 
1815, providing tor the temporary maintenance of the French 
legal and administrative sy8te~ with some necessary modifica-
tions, in the Seconda Ricupera. 80 Soon afterwards, an Edict of 
79 
A.V., R242, Consalvi to Facca, 12 June 1815. 
80 
The provisional government set up by this Edict was 
based on the plans which two Roman lawyers, Cristaldi and 
Barberi, had drawn up at the orders of Pius VII, and which they 
presented to Conselvi upon his return. However, though not 
developed by the Cardinal, it was revised by him prior to its 
publication. Its provis1ons, even it not ent1rely originated 
by Consalvi, show his influence and are in keeping with the 
spirit of his policy. See Ano~ous, "La cong1ura d1 Macerata: 
la ReBta~razione Pontific!a del 1815 e 1e scontentezze settarie, 
La C1v11ta Cattol1ca, 1916, I, 405. Also Petrocchi 1941, 52-53. 
- ~-.. ----- ~
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14 July guaranteed a complete amnesty and the possession or all 
purchased secularized ecclesiastical land. 8l Meanwhile, though 
distracted by other problema,82 he had begun work on the pre-
paration of a Plan of Reform, which proved to be a long and 
laborious task. The Plan might have appeared in early 1816 
had it not been constantly hampered and delayed by the opposi-
tion ot the Zelanti, who had taken advantage ot the Cardinal's 
long absence to occupy most ot the ottices, spiritual and 
secular alike, in the State and to win considerable influence 
over Pius VII.83 Finally, in March, 1816, the Plan was com-
pleted, and COMalvi looked forward to its speedy PUQ,lJ1<iEi.tJ;;<ll'h\? ' 
However, when the Plan was submitted to Pius VII, although 
he stated his approval, the Pope hesitated to publish it, tor 
the Z~lanti: were now making a supreme ertort to persuade him to 
reject it. For two montha the Pope heSitated and the issue hu 
in the balance, while Cons.lv1 fought a constant, desperate 
battle with the Zelant~ for the support of Pius VII. The long 
and bitter struggle took its toll or even Consalvi's indomitable 
spirit, and so weary and disheartened was he at times by the 
81 
Some Zelanti officials did their best to ignore this 
amnesty: A. V :, H2o, Consalvi to Leopardi, 6 September 1815; 
Pro-Memorial or Monaldo Leopardi, 1815. 
82 
See above, Section 1, for these problems. 
83 
Van Duerm, 127 Lebzeltern to Metternich, 30 April 1816, 
21 May 1816. A.V., R247, Extract trom Morning Chronicle, 27 
April 1819. ANV 125, Consalvi to Severoli, 4 Febru&r7 1816. 
84 
ANi 125, Consa1vi to Severoli, 25 March 1816. 
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exhausting conflict, by his inability to secure the refo'rms 
he knew to be vitally necessary, and above all by the tailure 
ot his triend Pius to support him that he told Lebzeltern that 
he was seriously oonsidering resigning his oftice. The 
Austrian ambassador, well aware of the gravity of Consalvi's 
position, tried to encourage the Cardinal, but nonetheless his 
report to Metternich painted the situation in dark colors: 
The party opposed to him has daily gained ground, it 
spares no means of injuring him in the opinion of the 
publio and the Pope •••• Strong in his conscience, 
sacrificing his existence to his sovereign and the 
general welfare, he errs perhaps by over-confidence 
in the righteousness of his intentions and leaves too 
much latitude to hiS adversaries. The Pope, oonstantly 
surrounded and worked upon by them, does not oease to 
respect him, but has less confidence in him_ He is 
reticent towards him, he struggles between his attrac-
tion to a man 'Who has rendered him suoh great services 
and the impressions that are given him daily_ 
His Plan of organization is already criticized, 
before being known. Even the most innooent moves of the 
Cardinal are misinterpreted, until an accolade which he 
gave to Lord stuart was taken here as a baccio di fra-
massoni, for the Cardinal 1s judged such-Slnce he fias 
Deen in Vienna and has announced ideas more liberal, or 
rather, les8 reactionary and ignorant than those that 
prevail in this city which has become the homeland of 
ignorance and egoism. He is reproached with wishing 
to do everyth1ng hirnself and tUlowing others to do 
nothing: a just reproach, but the answer 1s that it he 
abandoned the smallest matter to others, it would in-
tallibly be thwarted and concluded 1n a sense contrary 
to his views. 
The delay 1n introducing necessary reforms was caUSing mounting 
discontent and the sprea.d of' revolutionary sel1ti!1lent: 
During the few weeks that I have been gone, I have 
found that public sentiment has deteriorated remark-
ably in every w~, and I consider this state in a 
sort of criSiS, due chiefly to the bad administration 
•• - ,. to ignorance, to presumption, and above all to 
the intrigues of the CardInals, who ~itate against 
the Secretary of State quite openly [visiere levee] 
without control or opposition, authorlzea,--so--i(;--
speak, by the weakness of the Holy Father. 
Lebzeltern gloomily conoluded that he doubted Consalvl would 
be able to carry through his reform Plan.85 
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Though Consalvi's threat to resign rn~ have been uttered 
mainly to impress 18bzeltem with the gravity of his pOSition 
in order to wtn Austrian support in the struggle, the 
Ambassador's description was not exaggerated. The opposition 
had suceoeded 1n checkIng his plans, and diScontent was growing 
stead1ly as a result of the delay. Much alarmed by the de-
terltorating Situation, Mettemich reacted as Consalvi had hoped 
by giving the Cardinal his support against the Zelanti.86 
Metternich had long been interested in reform In the Papal 
State. Contrary to the tradition ot nIneteenth century LIberal 
hIstorIans, Metternich did believe in retorm, but onlY' to a 
certain extent and in a limited sense. No concessions that 
affected the rights of sovereignty or the prerogatives ot the 
crown could be granted, tor "kings, like bankers, when they 
live on their capital, must sooner or later arrIve at bank-
ruptcy." However, legislative and administrative reforms that 
---:--._----_ .. _-
85 
Van Duerm, 127, Lebzeltern to MetternIoh, 30 Apr!l, 1816 
86 
A.V., ~TV 233, Severoll to Consa1vi, 13 AprIl 1816. 
Lebzeltern was already doing his best to support and encourage 
Consalvi, almost oertainly upon 1nstr-uctlons from Mette.rnioh: 
Van Duerm, Lebze1tern to MetternIeh, 121: 30 April 1816. 131: 
21 May 1816. 
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did not affect the rights ot sovereignty were quite another 
matter: "they ~l~ simply gove~~nt acts, tending to a 
progresalve amelioration, a process just, simple, and WiSe. n87 
Change Gould not be avoided; the reform ot government in keep-
ing with Ilthe progress of' knowledge and the needs which recent 
events have created." was neeessary. 88 The eBsentia.I point was 
that such refol~ must be gr~nted by the sovereign of his own 
free Will, not wrung from him by revolutionary pressure.89 
~~ttern1oh did not fall to apply these pr1nciples to the 
Papal state. rrne widespread discontent and consequent growth 
of revolutionary activity in that Stnte was not only distaste-
ful to his conservative principles, but a direct menace to 
Austria, for revolutionary agitation there would certainly 
spread to Austria's Italian territories. 90 Thorough repression 
of the Setta~l was necessary, but it was equally neees8&r,1 to 
remove the legitimate causes of discontent by timely reforms, 
thus depriving the revolutioraries of popular support. 




Metternieh, V, 392, !etternieh to Neumann, 31 October 
Sauvig~, 77, Caraman'8 dispatch of 23 February 1818. 
89 
Ibid., 77, Circular of 12 Ma1 1821. For Metternioh's 
attempts-to secure suoh reforms "trom above" in the Hapsburg 
Empire, see Srblk, I, 454-464. 
90 
A.V., ANV 233, Severo11 to Consalvl, 16 July 1814, 10 
October 1815, R260, Lebze1tern to Consalv1, 1 July 1816, 
Mettern1ch to Consalv1, 3 July 1816. 
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Congress ot Vienna; but as the chief point of the suggested 
reforms was some: sort of constitution similar to the French 
Charter, the plan was rejected as incompatible with Papal 
8uthorlty.91 However, the Austrian minister dId not lose sight 
of the situation in the Papal States, and Consalvi's reforms, 
being quite in line with his Ow"TI Idea.'3,'llet wj.th hi3 approval. 
It was natural therefore that when Lebzeltern tnforned him of 
Consalvi's difficult position, he was seriously alarmed and 
instructed Lebzeltern to give COI15alvi full support to secure 
the adoption of these necessary refo~I~. 
Meanwhile I though by 1'l11d-Ma~r the Plan had been in Pius' 
hands for six weeks, not all Consalvifs argwuents a.nd pleas 
could pel"'8ua.de him to publish it. It did not seem impossible 
that in the end the ~~.1ant~. might persuade the Pope to reject 
the Plan, or to 50 modify it as to destroy its va1ue. 92 Either 
outcome would have disastrous consequences fer the Papal states, 
where the Plan was awa1ted wjth great impatience as the sole 
hope of saving the' rapidly deteriorating lSituatlon,,93 It would 
also, Lebze1tern believed, result in the tall of Consalvi, who \ 
had committed himself to carry1ng out reform and would certain! 
resign if he failed to do 90. 94 
91 
R21l-2, COMa1v! to Pacoa, 20 May 1815. 
92 
Van Duerm, 131, Lebzeltern to Metternlch, 21 May 1816" 
93 
94 
A.V., ANY 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 24 Februar,r 1816. 
Van Duerm, 131, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 21 May 1816. 
Realizing that Consalvl fa reaignation waa oontrary to both 
Austrian and Papal interests, Lebzeltcrn did everything he 
could to aid the Cardinal. The crisis calJ!e in late May: Pius 
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was about to make his decision, and neither Consalvl nor 
Lebzel tern e~)uld be aUl'"e that it would not bd unfavorable. The 
Austrian 8}nbassl1clor found Consalvi in an extremely \iorr1eo 
state: 
Exhausted by the battles which he lWUSt fight at every 
moment> mortified at seeing hinself so wet'lkly, so 111 
supported by a sovereign to whom he has rendered such 
great nerviees a.nd whoso chs.::."2.cter and principles have 
much ehanged and who has yle::i.ded himself up to the 
daily impulses he receives; seeing himself deprived of 
all means of execution by the maneuvers of the party. • • 
which took care to f':tll with its creatures all offices 
before the arrival of Gonsalvi from Vienna, he is in a 
truly critioal ii'lOo:1lent. 
I..cbzeltern diel hls. best to calm the "extreme agitation" of 
Consalvi and to enaourage him to continue the struggle. Nor 
did he confine hie ass 1stance to mere encouragement: 
As I am conv1noed or the extreme l~lportanee of keeping 
Consalvi 1n office [Lebzeltern explained to ~1etternich1, 
ror both the public good and for Austria; as I am also 
eonvinced that 1f Consalvl resigns and 1f the Pope 
decides to do everything after the rashion of '96, he 
will ensure the most evil consequences for this oountry, 
inhabited by malcontents or every type; I plan to have 
an interv1ew with His HolIness on these subjects, and I 
flatter myself that the remonstrances which I plan to 
make with m1 usual frankness, will not be made without 
success. 
The Pope was to make his decision w1thin the next eight hours. 
If the decision was unfavorable and Conealvi reSigned, "public 





confusion that would result from the restoration of the old 
regime would form his greatest triumph. n95 
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Fortunately, Lebzeltern did not have an opportunity to 
determine the accuracy of his prediction, for the Pope decided 
1n favor of publishing the Plan of Reform. The extent to which 
Lebzeltern's "remonstrances t1 and Austrian support in general 
contributed to this outcome 1s uncertain. In v1ew of the Pope's 
recognition of the Papal need for Austrian support and good 
W111,96 he would probably be inclined to listen with respect to 
Lebzeltern's remonstrances, and the Austrian ambassador'S support 
was therefore almost certainly of signlflcant value. 
Opposition to Conaalvi'8 rcforrns was not by any means ended 
by the Pope IS decision. The ~e.~;ttnt! continued to use every means 
to block or delay the appearance ot the Plan, wh1ch was finally 
published only in mid-July. During this try1ng period Consalvi 
lost the much-appreciated support of Lebzeltern, wno (much 
against his will) \fas recalled to Vienna preparatory to being 
sent as ambassador to St. Petersburg.97 
95 
Ibid. 96----
Ibid., 127, Lebzeltern to Metternlah, 30 April 1816. 
97 
Lebzeltern, 345,-349. Consa,lvi and Lebzcltern remained on 
close tS)?1;lS for some years afterwards, exchanging letters in vera-
friendly terms. The Zelanti, however, never forgave Lebzeltern 
for supporting ConsalvI"f s-re'foMlS, and when in 1826 Austria 
proposed to send him back as ambassador, their oppos1tion caused 
the project to be dropped. I 
I:! 
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However, his sucoessor, Count Apponyi, was instruoted to support 
consalvi "en tout at pour tout~98 The ,secretary of state waa 
also assured of continued Austrian support by Lebzeltern himself 
in a. long letter written by the latter shortly before his de-
parture from Vienna; this letter embodied the ideas of ~~tternlch, 
who wa.s unable to write hLullelf beoa:use uf an eye ail;1rent. 
After onoe again stressing the need for Auetr'o-Papal unity, 
Lebzeltern assured Consalvi that the Emperor was extremely in-
terested in the fate of the Reform Plan and of Consalv1 himself, 
ot whose possible diamissa.l he had heard alarming rUi;10Ul~. The 
Plan was eagerly awaited not only at Vienna but throughout Europe, 
beoause of' Uthe news. perhaps exaggerated, If of discontent in the 
papal Sta.te t and because the Holy Father'S Ediet of III July 1815 
had given rise to general hopes that he wou~d tollow a moderate 
and progressive polley as the only means of quieting this dis-
content. Vienna realized that an eaaleslastical state could not 
be governed 1n exactly the sa..'TI.E' way as others, but the enl1ghtened 
principles now beIng adopted by the other J'llel~-J~{H'B of the "GNat 
Family" of nations must be imitated to the greatest extent 
pract1eal. for a reactlonar,r poliey could only lead to "the most 
fatal consequences." It was known at Vienna t~at Pius VII and 
Consalv1 supported reforrna I but unfortunatel,. they were opposed 
--.---
98 
Van Duerm, 160, Mettemleh to Conaalvl, 2 Septe l71ber 1816. 
Anton Count Apponyl, AustrIan ambassador in Rome, M,y 1816 to 
March 1817, and 1820-1826; at first on very good terms with 
Consalvi, he beoame very or1tieal ot the Card1nal and ot Plus VII 
atter 1820. See Hudel, 42-47, 61-73. 
by many at Rome who were ut'terly ignorant of the realities 5Jt 
of the 7l1odern wOY'ld "bey-ond the Aurel:tan Walls." Their intrigues 
were notorious and universally condemned. 'tNo one can unC.erstand 
why the Pope tolerates them, or why He does not make energetic 
use of His authott:tty to end them at one stroke. If Only !lH18 
goodness and evangelical sweetness" could explain h1s strange 
reluctance to suppress their opposition and their intri.gues. 99 
Having expressed Austria's interest in reform and its 
OPPOSition to the ~~~ant~, Lebzeltern went on to the chief point 
of his letter: Austrian BUppO:rt for Consalvi and opposit1on to 
hiS dismissal: 
If." I were to assure Y.E. rYour Eminence] that the 
Emperor axpretsses personally thIS "noat sincere esteem 
and confidence for you and that Prinoe Metternich 
professes towards you sentiments of genuine affection, 
I would not be saying enough to Y.E. The fact 1s that 
you have inspired high confidenoe and sincere respeot 
in all cabinets •••• They, like ourselves, would 
regard your dism1ssal as a veritable calam1ty, as an 
event that could lead to the most disastrous con-
sequences for the Holy See. If only oertaln peraona 
of my acquaintance, very hIghly placed too, who would 
lik-e to take the Holy See back to the t'ourteenth 
century. • • . would take the trouble to become ac-
qua.inted With the CatholiC world beyondi;;he Oll"cuit 
of the Aurelian Wall, they would tremble at the 
possible consequences (·f their systemo 
Lebzeltern conoluded by apologizIng for hIs frankness, which he 
99 
Worth noting ia the remarkable way in which CaBsi, 181, 
allows his anti-Austrian bias to distort the meaning of this 
passage. By careful selection and omiSSion, he ~i1li.kes it appear 
as if Lebzeltern was oriticizing the Pope for his excessive 
toleranoe towards the Liberals (who are in fact 'battelymentioned 
in this letter) inateaa of.' £he Zela.ntl. Schmidlin, 201, Note 31, 
unfortunately follows Cassl on £&18 point, as he also does on 
some others. 
said was motivated only by regard for the welfare of Consalvi 
and the pope. lOO 
The purpose of this letter was apparently to encourage 
Consalvi and to a.ssure him of Austrian support for reform, as a 
weanon to strengthen him in his struggle against the Zelanti • 
.a.. _ _.~ 
There is no evidence that Pius VII at any time considered dis-
missing his Secretary of State, though if the Plan had been re-
jected he might have reSigned. However, this new pledge of 
Austrian support may have aided Consalvi to aooelerate the 
publication of the Plan, which appeared soon afterwards as the 
Motu-pr0J>J:'l.i.'>. of 6 July 1816.101 
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Only the most important points of this lengthy and detailed 
plan need be recounted here. 102 The administration was thoroughl 
reorganized along Napoleonic lines of oentralization and uniform-
ity. In accord with enlightened contemporary opinion, separation 
of administrative from judicial powers was effected. In response 
to general demand, laymen were to be admitted to most secular 
offices. A limited concession was made to liberal demands for 
popular representation by providing that each delegate, legate, 
106--'-" 
A.V., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816. 
101 
Barber! (ed.), Bullaril Romani Continuatio (Rome, 1835-
1855), XIV, 47 -196, Motu:~rojirro --or--oJitly 1816 ~r.t'hrough dated 
6 July, it was not aCtual y puolished until 18 July: Anonymous, 
"II governo provvisorio degli State Pontifici nell 'anno 1815 "I 
e 10 statuto del 1816,", 409, in ~ivi1ta Cattolica, 1915, II, 404-420. --.-------
102 
For a more detailed analysis of the Motu-P£oprio, see 
Petrocch!_.~241_, 67-80, or Schmidlin, 184-189:----- --
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and governor W88 to be assisted by a council ot two to four men 
trom his provinceJ their functions were pure17 consultative, but 
they must be summoned three times a week to give their opinion 
on important matters. The intricate network ot privileges ot the 
Old Regime was swept away, except for a tew baronial privileges 
in the Prima Ricupera. 
The complicated, inefficient, and disorganized Judicial 
system was to be much simplified and reduced to coherent order, 
under the influence of the Cod! Napoleon. New civil, criminal, 
and commercial tribunals were to be provided; the old ecclesias-
tical tribunals survived, but their Jurisdiction was strictly 
limited to ecclesiastical affairs. Torture and arbitrar.r punish-
ment or imprisonment were forbidden. Commis.ions were to be 
named to draw up new civil, criminal, and commercial codes) in 
the interim, the present system would remain in effect. 
The financial sytltem was reorganized OD simp1er:- and more 
efficient lines, so that it would be possible to reduce taxation 
by a million scudi a year. Taxes, customs duties, and government 
monopolies were made uniform in all provinces, and an effort was 
made to redistribute the tax burden on a more equitable basiS. 
These reforms were, as the Preamble to the ~t:!!-proprio 
made clear, onl1' a basis on which further reforms must be con-
structed. Consalvi was aware how limited they were and would 
have preferred more extensive innovations, especially in regard 
to abolishing all noble privileges and replacing eccleSiastics 
57 
by laymen in the government;103 but in view of the oPPosition 
which even these limited measures aroused, there can be little 
doubt that Consalvi had indeed, as he claimed, accompllshed all 
that was posslb1e under the cIrcumstances .104 
MOdest though they were, the reforms stlrred the Zelanti to 
rury and allied with, them the nobilIty who resented the loss of 
their privileges. 105 The Plan was denounoed as "Jacobinism" 
and "Napoleonic," the latter with a certain amount of justice.106 
The ~elat:!ti, led by Consalvi's bItter enemsr, Annibale Cardinal 
Della Genga, worked day' and night to influence Pius VII to dis-
miss his Secretar,r ~r State, L~d a few fanatical reactionaries 
10"3 
A.V., R247, Consalvi to Severoli, 14 September 1816. 




Van Duerm, 151-160, Consalvi to Mattemich, 23 August 
See especially A.V., R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 10 
August, 17 August, 6 November 1816, 4 January, 12 February 1817. 
25, Giuatiniani to Consalvl, 17 August 1816. Severoll was 
typical of many- former admirers (e.g., At'V 233, Severo1i to 
Pacca, 17 J~ne 1815) of Consalvi who now turned against him. 
106 
Ibid., Severo1i to Consa1vi, 6 November 1816, Consalvi 
o SeverOl)L;- 14 December 1816. R257, Conaalvi to Valenti, 10 
ebruary 1817. The strong inf1uenoe of Napoleonic precedents 
n Consalvl's reforms is undeniable( though Artaud de Montour, 
toria di Papa Pio VII (Lucca, 1837" III, 182, exaggerates 
n- s8¥lng t1ii:t' 'n-except tor the changed nomenclature", the new 
rganization was "nothIng other than the French system". 
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were even sald to be p10ttlng agalnst the Pope hlmse1f. 107 
Consalvl remained undaunted by the furious critioism and abuse 
of the Ze1anti--for Whom he had only contempt- ... "dolts," "asses," 
"fools," (to quote a few of his more charitable descrlptions) 
who could not Bee that the old regime had gone forever and 
thought they could turn the clock back to 1789!108 
Conaa1vi was consoled for Ze1antl condemnation by the 
generally favorable reaction to his Plan of moderate liberals 
and intelligent conservatives both at home and abroa.d. 109 In 
particular, Metternieh was pleased that the reforms he had long 
advocated had at last been enacted. Though the Papal government 
as reformed and reorganized by the Motu-proEri~ was still not 
entirely satisfactory, it was a great improvement over the past, 
It it is still far from being entirely in conformity 
with the circumstances and spirit of the times, it 
nonetheless approaches them sufficiently to be in 
harmony with that government which we have introduced 
in our provinces and to paralyze the efforts ot those 
1157 .--
C&8s1, 157-159. Annibale Cardinal della Genga (1760-1829) 
was sent in May, 1814, to represent the Papaoy at the conferenoe 
drawing up the Peace of PariS. Through his own procrastination, 
he arrived too late to defend Papal interests, thus earning a 
harsh rebuke from Consa1viJ the two prelates were thenceforth 
on hostile terms, and when Della Genga was elected as Pope Leo 
XII (1823-1829), he undid much of Consalvi's work of reform. 
108 
A.V., R247, Conealvi to Severoli, 14 September, 14 
December 1816, 20 January 1817. 
109 
Ibid., Consalvi to Severo1i, 14 December 1816, R254 
Papal Internunzio in Lucerne to Conaalvl, 3 August 1816, R257, 
Valenti, oharge d'affaires in Turin, to Consalvi, 7 August, 28 
SeptemberJ.1JI'6;" '2rjanuari 1817. 
who have not moved with the age and who cherish the 
vain and dangerous hope of seeing re-establ1shed an 
order of things which twenty years or war and revolu-
tion ha.ve ''lorally and phyaica1lJr destroyed. It .+lould be superfluous to l1nger over the inconveniences that 
would necessar1ly result from so impolitic a system; 
it 1s undoubtedly- to be f"eare d by us, but hO!l~Ch 
more dangerous for the Roman government. • ! 
Though he recognized that there were definite l1mits to what 
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the Secretary of State could accomplish under the circumstances 
and was pleased that he had managed to do as much as he had, 
Metternich cont1nued to urge Consalvi to carry out further re-
forms, especially greater laioization of the govermnent. The 
Cardinal, he urged, must continue onward 1n hi= course and not 
allow fear of opposition to divert him from What was necessary.11 
Conaalvi needed no encouragement to continue his work of 
reform, whibh ocoupied him tor the rest of his ministry. Numerous 
economic reforms were enacted with a view to sti~u1ating the 
economy, but they had little effect beca.use of the prolonged 
post-war depression. The police and army were reorganized and 
their efficiency increased, so that some progress was made 
against the endemio soourge of brigandage.112 
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Maass, IV, 584, Inst~ctions tor Kaunitz, 31 May 1811. 
111 
A.V., R241, Severoli to Consalvi, 13 November 1816: 
Leard! to Conaalvi, 30 June 1821. 
112 
Consalv1 '8 retoz-ms are summarized conveniently in 
Petrocchi 1943, Chapter I. Anonymous, "La industrie, il oommerol0, 
Ie impost·e-sotto 1 Pontifici Pio VI e Pio VII, sino a1 1815, tt 
Civi1ta Cattolioa, 1906, IV, 434-449_ Cassl, 65-71, 161-79. 
A~V:-;-tf21r7-;'""Sivi'roli to Consa1vi, 13 November 1816J Leardl to 
Consalvi, 30 June 1821, ANV 250, Consalvi to Leardi, 8 July 
1823. 
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In the more important areas of refo~, however, he was able 
to make little headway against the constant Zelanti opposition. 
A code of civil procedure was enacted in 1817 and a code of 
commercial law in 1821,113 but the codes of civil and criminal 
law promised in the Motu-pr?prio were never published. They were 
drawn up and submitted for considerat1on to congregations ap-
pointed for the purpose,114 but apparently the opposition to 
them was too strong, as they never appeared. Nor did he succeed 
in introducing further political reforms} indeed, because of the 
ceaseless opposition which it enoountered at all levels of the 
Papal government, many parts of the Mo~u-proprio of 1816 itself 
remained a dead letter. 115 
----~T3--- -- --, . 
Barberi, XIV, 444, Motu-trO~io ot 22 November 1811. 
A.V., R241, Consalvi to Learar;- 2eember 1817, 9 June 1821; 
Leardi to Consalvi, 30 June 1821. 
114 
A.V., R242, Instructions for Spina, 1822. R247, Consalvi 
to Leardi, 9 June 1821. 
115 
A.V., R241, Extract trom the Morning Chronicle, 27 
April 1819; Leardi to Consalvi, 30 June 1821. R25, Consalvi 
to the Delegate of Fermo, 5 July 1817, provides an interesting 
example of opposition on the loeal level: this Delegate had 
publicly proclaimed that he had never read the Motu-prorrio, 
did not plan to do so, and hoped to die before PUttIng ts 
provisions into etrect. R242, Instructions tor Spina, 1822. 
Maass, IV, 584 .. Instructions for Kaun1tz, 31 1'I.ay 1817. Van 
Due rm , 253, Note 1, Genotte to Metternich, 2 August 1820. 
Sauvig!V', 118, Instruct10ns tor Appony1, 1820. However, part 
ot the d1fficulty of putting the reforms into etfect was the 
result not or the ill-will of his subordinates, but ot their 
sheer incompetence: see Petrocchi 194~, Chapter III. 
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The opposition of the ~~1~~~~ to Consalvi and his policies 
oontinued to the end of his ministry, nor did it slacken in 
intenslty.116 His measures were constantly opposed and criti-
oized, and he was tldaily thwarted" in the routine operat1on of 
his government by ~elanti office-holders. 117 They ga1ned in-
oreasing influence over the ag1ng Pius VII, especially 1n 
re11gious affa1rs where they represented Consalvi as being luke-
warm in his devotion to re11gious Interests--he was even accused 
of seeking to separate the spiritual from the temporal power and 
to give the Papal States to Austria at Pius' death. 118 
Every occasion was seized upon by the ~~_~!lti to attack him, 
often with little regard for consistency, as when (after having 
condemned Con.elvi for years as too pro-AustrIan) they criticized 
the Secretary' of State for not tak1ng a stronger stand 1n support 
of Austrian actlon against the Neapolitan Revolutlon. ll9 Through 
116 
Ibid., Alao, Van Duerm, 281 Apponyi to Metternlch, 20 
September"T820. Their plotting continued to the very end, while 
Pius VII was on hla death-bed. Petroeehi 1943, 106, Conealv! 
to Cardinal Opizzonl, 13 August 1823-:---'--
111 
Sauv1gny, 168, Instruct10ns for Apponyi, 1820. 
118 
A.V., R247, Extract from Morn1ng Chronicle, 27 April 1819. 
Also, Maass, V, 173, Genotte to Milternlch, 5 ~ebruar,y 1820. Van 
Duerm, 253, Genotte to Metternich, 2 A~~at 1820. 
119 
Van Duerm, 206J Conas.lvi to f~etternich, 1 Oatober 1818; 
281J Apponyi to Metternioh, 20 September 1820. Apponyi however 
realized that the1r sudden support was not due to any change of 
views, but merely to an incorr1gible spirit of opPOSition to any 
policy of Consalvi t s. 
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out his second ministry he was under a constant pressure that 
would hs:ve broken a less resilient and deter-nined spirit. As it 
was, his energy and health were sapped by the long struggle.120 
Perhaps the constant strain and fatigue, both mental and physioal, 
whioh he had to endure were a factor in his comparatively early 
death. 121 Certainly, much tirr:e and energy that he might otherwise 
have devoted to internal refor:~ and diploillacy, probably with 
significant results, had instead to be expended on the ceaseless, 
f'ut1tle struggle with the ~elant!. Any evaluation of Consalvi's 
achievements and abillty~t take this factor into account, and 
any evaluation or. his Austrian policy must likewise take in 
account his Wish for Austrian support in this struggle. 
If the surrounding circumstances are ignored, the reforms 
which Oonsalvi carried out may not seem impressive. It 1s only 
when consIdered against the background of oonstant Zalant~ 
opposItion that they can be seen as the oonsiderable aohievement 
they in fact were. The important and impressive points about 
Consalvi. '13 reforms are, that they were made in the Papal States, 
and that they were made at all. Consalvi himself was aware how 
li~lted they were and would have wished to go fuz'ther, but in 
view of the strength of the Z~~an!! it would seem that he was 
justIfied in hIS claim that he had done all that was possible in 
120 
Ibid., 281, Apponyi to Metterniah, 20 September 1820. 
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As early as 1816, Severoli, then an admirer of the 
Cardinal, had 't'farned hi" that he was putting Ittroppo dtattivita 
ed Intena ione \I into his efforts to secure reform and would ruin 
haiS health by over-wol'k. R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 13 April 1 16. 
the circumstances. 
r~oreover, even these limited reform.8 1I1Sre of SOT'lle value in 
themselves: they dld give the Papal State a ~nore efficient a.nd 
satisfactory governc1ent, one tha.t satisfied at lea.st the minimum 
demands of the politically educated classes. 
The value of his reforms was proven by subsequent events: 
in 1820-1821, the Papal State, which in 1814-1816 had been the 
,noS t turbult1nt and dis contented area in Italy and 1t1Ould again 
become suoh after Consalv1 18 fall, re~ained remarkably qu1et, 
despite the tenlptatlon or an a\!t:lve and temporar1ly successful 
revolution at its very door in Naples. Thi$. remarkable change 
in public spirit must be largely attributed to Consalvi'8 reforms 
and the comparatively good government which the Papal States 
en.loyed under his rule. It 1s s ign1flea.nt tha.t a.fter the SllS-
pension of CorlSa1vl fa l,easures by the successors of' Pd.us VII, 
the Papal territories once again becs'rne a hotbed of revolutionary 
activity and played a prominent role in the revolutions of 1830-
1832. The contrast between the condition of the Papal States in 
1314 -1816 and 1830··11132 on the one hand, :mel 1820-1821 on the 
other, 13 the mOf!lt lmpre3sive testimony to Consalvi l 3 achievement. 
4. Co-operation against the SettarJ 
Few factors encourage alliance so much 88 the possession of 
a mutual enemy. Consal vi and Metternich had the dubious fortune 
to possess two such foes: the Zelanti, already described, and the 
settarJ, the members of the "Sects" or revolutionary secret 
societies .122 Baaed perhaps on Masonry,123 inspired certainly 
----- -.-~ ~f2'"·-'-·'-
The chief source of information on the Settarj of the 
papal State is A.V., R165, which contains ConsalVi's alrections 
for dealing with them, reports of papal officials on their 
activities, strength, and aims, and much similar material. Of 
special interest are the reports of the Legates of Ravenna, 
Forli, and in part1cular Bologna, whoae Legate, Card1nal Spina, 
was perhaps the most loyal and capable of Consalv1 'a subordinates J 
see, !L.&.., his perceptive account of the a trength and a1ms of the 
various Sects and the dangers eaoh presented to Papal rule, 
R165, Sp1na to Consalv1, 12 August 1820, Both Sp1na and Consalvi 
believed that the oh1ef danger came in the long run not trom 
the Violently revolutionary CarbQnari, but trom the nationalist 
liberals who were working slowly-out surely towards their goal 
of Italian unity---a judgment whose validlty later events were 
to confirm. A vast llterature haa appeared on the secret 
societles, most of It more notable tor liberal and nationalist 
enthusiasm and rhetoric than tor objectivity and the crltical 
sense. Among the more useful works are: A. Ottolinl, La 
Carbonaria dalle origlni ai trlil tent.tiyi Insurrezionall 
o ena, 9'3"6TJA". Pieranton, Carbonari dello Stato Pontlficio 
Rome, 19l0),"D. Spadoni, Sette; cosplraziohl, cospfratorl nello 
Stato Pontiticio (Turin, 1904).- -
-""--12:3 -
The masoniC origlns ot the Settarj are asserted in 
Anonymous, Il settarismo," CiYilta ~attoll~a, 1915, II, 41-56, 
and denied by A. Luzio, La MaisonerIa e 11 Rlsorfimento Italiano (Bologna, 1925). The present wrIterDeIleveii' tha the' ~etEari 
imitated the organization of the Masons and may well haye or gl-
nated in their lodges, but split aw~ during the Napoleonic regime 
the Masons supporting the latter, the Settart opposing it. 
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by the ideals of the French Revolution, these societies first 
appeared during the Napoleonic domination as resistance movements 
directed agains t French rule. The fall of Napoleon did not bring 
their activities to an end, but merely redireoted them against 
Austria and the restored Italian governments. The alms and 
ideals of the Settarj varied widely among the various groups 
--_ .... _,. 
making up the movement, but oertain aims were generally held; the 
expulsion of all foreign rule and influence (especially that of 
Austria), some form of Italian unity, a written constitution and 
a parliament, reduction of the influenoe and wealth of the Church, 
and an end to special privilege. They drew their main support 
from the ex-otficials and soldiers of the Napoleonic regime, some 
of the bourgeoisie, and a tew nobles, with little backing among 
the other cl88ses.124 
These aims inevitably drew the Septari into conflict with 
the existing Italian governments, there was conspiracy and 
agitation on the one hand, repression on the other. Austria was 
the natural leader in the effort to repress the sects. Against 
the S~~tar~ within her own territories Austria could and did take 
effective measures, but Vienna was equally concerned with revolu-
tionary activity in the rest of Italy. The ~ettarJ in the various 
states seem to have co-operated to some extent, and were certain1 
---J:2lr---
A.V., 165, Report of V. Galissi, Forli, 17 April 1819. Iii, 
For a diSCUSSion of the attitude of the various classes in the 
Papal State towards the Pontifioal regime, see Petrocchi 1943, 36-39. 
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in close touch;125 hence, a successful revolution in any other 
Italian state would inevitably have serious repercussions in 
Lombardy-Venetia as well. Particularly worrisome to Austria was 
the situation in the northern Papal States, in 1814-1816 the 
most turbulent area in Italy; the waters of the Po would present 
no barrier to the spread of the revolutionary movement north into 
Lombardy.126 Suitable reforms could, by ending the sources of 
disoontent, eliminate the basia for popular support of the move-
ment. Until such reforms eould have their effect, however, and 
even thereafter in so far as a few fanatics were concerned, 
efficient supervision and repreSSion would continue to be 
necessary. 
Aware that a peninsula-wide movement could best be fought 
by peninsula-wide measures, and with little faith in the ability 
of the Italian governments to suppress the revolutionary movement, 
Metternich would have liked to acquire for Austria the direction 
of all police activity against the ?ettarj throughout Italy. At 
the Congress of Vienna he had accordingly suggested to Consalvi 
the establishment of a General Commission of Police under 
Austrian direction.127 All information gathered by the various 
125 
Petroochi 1943, 64-66. 
12o---.-~-·-·- ._ .. __ ..... 
A. V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 10 October 1815. 
127 
A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 8 September 1814, 1 
February, 11 February 1815; Pacca to Consalv!, 13 November, 1814. 
This project was later revived by Metternich at the Congress of 
Verona in 1822; see below, Chapter V. 
Italian states would be sent to this Commission for evaluation 
and correlation, and used as a basis for introducing greater 
co-ordination of the police activity of the various Italian 
states; the aim was a general and systematic attack on the 
gettarj throughout Italy. Consalvi was as eager as Metternich 
61 
to suppress the Sett~~~ and was willing to use all reasonable 
means to do so. However, he rejected the Commission, for its 
establishment would mean, in effect, giving Austria control over 
all police activity in the Peninsula, thus vastly increasing 
Austrian influence and weakening the independence of the lesser 
states~ In short, it would be a major step towards that Austrian 
hegemony in Italy that the Cardinal so dreaded~128 In the face 
of Consalvi1s oppOSition Metternich abandoned the Commission, 
but only until the revolutionary crisis of 1820-1822 seemed 
to present a more favorable opportunity~ 
Consalvi was by no means opposed to all co-operation with 
Austria against the Set~arj. He fully realized that they posed 
a serious threat to the very existence of the Papal government. 
Acutely aware of the strength of the Sects in the Papal State, 
acutely aware too of the weakness of the Papal goverrrnent in the 
event of a widespread revolt, he saw that some degree of co-
operation with Austria was necessary. He was quite willing to 
l28Ibid., Observations on the Project of a Police Com-
mission,-r822; Instructions for Spina, October 1822; Consalvi 
to Macchi, 2 December 1822. For a more detailed description 
of Consalvi1s motives for opposing the Commission, see below, 
Chapter V, Sections 1 and 2~ 
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agree to eo-operation on a more limited scale than the Commission, 
that would not threaten Papal independence, such as a reciprocal 
exchange of information and a voluntary co-ordination of Austrian 
and Papal police activities. Co-operation of this type, he 
believed, would have all the desirable effects of the Commission 
without its dangers. 129 This attitude was the natural outgrowth 
of his general policy of: ao-operating with Austria in every way 
that did not affect the te~poral or spiritual independence of the 
Papacy. 
Although there had previously been so~e limited exchange 
o.f information between Austria and the Papacy, it was not until 
1815 that suoh exchange beoame standard prooedure. It is un-
certain who took the initiative, but the credit probably goes to 
Metternieh, who wrote to Consalv! on this subject in April, 1816. 
After stressing as usual the identity of Austrian and papal 
interests and the need for unity between them, he went on to 
praise the reorganization and reform of the Papal police which 
Consalvi was then carrying out as 'Tlost essential in view of the 
forces working to overthrow both Austria and the Papacy. Since 
Austrian and Papal interests "cannot be divergent" on this point, 
Metternich declared that he was counting upon a mutual exchange 
of confidential information on this subject.130 
----_ ... -_._-
129 
R242, Observations on the Project of a Police Commiss10n, 
1822; Instructions for Sp1na, l822} Conaa1vi to Sp1na, 4 
December 1822. 
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Consalvl was willing to agree to such an exchange, which 
would be mutually profitable, and in April, 1816, he sent 
Lebzeltern the most recent material uncovered by the Papal 
police: an intercepted letter from Forli and an account of the 
latest Settarj plans there. However, still held back by distrust 
of Austria, he did not provide the Austrian ambassador with full 
details of these activities, in particular the nrones of those 
involved. Lebzeltern did not delay expressing his dissatis-
faction~ \fhile thanking Consalvi for the information provided, 
he expressed great regret that the Cardinal, by witholding the 
most important part of the material without which the rest was 
of little value, had failed to show complete confidence in 
Austria: "What could be the cause of this reticence? I cannot 
admit the least divergence of views or interests on a point of 
this nature~ In watching over police suspects we are working as 
much for you as tor ourselves. i.l/e have more ways than you to 
become acquainted with these things: • •• " If fully informed 
by Consalvi, the Austrian government could follow up these 
leads and with its greater resources obtain a much more thorough 
knowledge of the subversive activities, which would benefit the 
Papal government as well as the Austrian. Lebzeltern concluded 
by again expressing his sorrow at Consalvifs unjustified dis-
trust and his hope that in the future the Cardinal would see fit 
to transmit complete lnformation. 13l 
131 ~ 4 ~ A.V., R200, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, !l1ay 1810. 
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Evidently, Consalvi was impressed by Lebzeltern's complaint 
and was careful henceforth to transmit full information; at 
leut, no more complaints were heard on this SOON. In June he 
wrote Metternich that he had been giving Lebzeltern much useful 
information on the activities of the "ill-intentioned." He 
described with alarm the activities and aims of the Settarl. In 
view of their rapid growth and the fact that they were clearly 
working on a peninsula-wide basiS to overthrow all existing 
govel"nments, it was necessary, he agreed, that Austria and the 
Papacy unite to thwart their plota. 132 Soon afterwards Conealvi, 
perhaps to Impress ~etternich with hiB desire for co-operation, 
made a point of sending direct to him the most recent information 
on ~ttarj aotivity in Bologna, although it had already been 
transmitted to the Austrian pollce by the Bologna pollce. l33 
These measures.1 indlcating Conaalvl 's genuine deslre to 
co-operate, did not fall to win Austrian approbation. At the 
beginning of July Lebzeltern conveyed to Conealvi the gratitude 
of Metternioh (who could not write because ot an eye ailment) 
for the confidence he had displ~ed in transmitting this informa-
tion. Austria on its part would respond with equal confidence 
in this and all else, and would do everything possible to aid 
thl! Pope to naintain the tranquility ot his territories. Austria 
was eager to see peace and order reign in the Papal State, not 
IJ2' 
Van Duerm, 136, Consalvi to r~tternich, 11 June 1816. 
133 
~., 143, Consalv1 to Metternich, 22 June 1816. 
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only because of the filial devotion of Francis I for the Pope, 
but also in its own interest, for the Austrian territories 1n 
Italy could only be tranquil if the nelghboring states were also 
tranquil. 13h 
A rew days later tJfetternich (having recovered from his 
illness) wrote that he attaohed an "infinite value" to the 
confidential Infol~na.tlon which Consa1 vi had been sending himJ it 
would be promptly followed up by the Imperial government. In 
l"'etui:'n, orders ha.d been given to the Austrian authorities in 
Italy to pay particular attention to everything that could be of 
interest to the Papal government and to keep the latter informed 
of all such discovEU'·ies. "iettel~ich expressed great satisfaction 
of Consalvits display of confidence, not only because of its 
immediate advantages, hut because it was a marior step towards the 
establishment of that perfeot accord between Austria and the 
Papaoy whieh he so desil~d. He conoluded by assuring Consalvi 
that the Papacy cou.ld count on Austrian aid and co-operation 
whenever neces3ary: "We are convinced that if our own tranquility 
18 to be assured, that of our neighbors must be equally so.n135 
Metternich drove home the same point a week later in 8 
letter to Apponyi which the latter was to read to Consa1vi: the 
134 
AV,R200, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816. 
135 
Ibi~., Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816. 
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Austrlan pollce would keep hlm lnformed of all dlscoverles 
concernlng the SettarJ, ln gratltude for Consalv1'e co-operation 
and in recognition that tranqul1lty in the Papal State was 
e!sentlal for the peace of Lombaray-venet1a. 136 
In a.ddition to ~eeurlng an exchange of information \(lth' the 
Papal goV'erU{1H:!nt, r~ttern1ch also tried at tir:tes to influence its 
p:)licy towards the SettarJ to bring .:tt into closer line w1th that 
, _ . ..........-·_hT 
of AustrIa. He has been accused of seeking to for08 Consalvl to 
adapt harsher l~easures towards the Sects,137 but this accusation, 
thour.'~ not entlrely without foundation, peI-tains largely to the 
period after 1820. Before the NeapolItan Revolution of that year, 
he considered the Italian revo1utionar'1ea less dangerous than 
the Ge~nan, and hence less harsh ~easure6 were necessary aga1nst 
them. 138 The pollcy wh1ch he ll.dvised Conea1v1 to follow towards 
Sect~ before 1820 was essentially one of watchful waiting: the 
Cardinal should maintain a close :supervision over them with "the 
ai:r. of. • • c-oning to a perfect knowledge" 'Jf their organizatlGn, 
plans, and peraonnel. This knowledge should be co~nunicated to 
the Austrian govarn'TIent, \-fhi~h would decide when the time had 
Clyne to act against the "10Ve'1l3nt as a. whole. Until that t1ne~ 
---'--136-- ... _-
Ibid., Appony:t to Consalvi, 8 August 1816, with extract 
from diapa:c'ch of Metternlch to 'pponyi, 8 July 1816. 
137 
E.G., by Cassl, 188., 
138 
w. Maturi, "La polltica eetera napolltana dal. 1815 al 
1820, n Htvleta Stories. Italiana, 1939, 260, Ludo1l' to C1rcel10, 
August;ltrrj-;- MetterrifaK;-nr,u255 , 7 May 1819. 
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there must be no "prematurely rigorous action" which would only 
drive the Settarj into greater secrecy.139 
Thus, Metternich did not condemn Consalvi IS treatment of 
the Sett~rj as too lenient or urge a more severe policy against 
them. On the contrary, when informed that the Secretary of State 
was planning to exile all suspected 5ettarj from Rome, he 
strongly advised against the plan as too rigorous.140 
Nor would Consalvi have needed pressure from Metternich to 
act with severity against the Settarj. Although his best hope 
for creating stability and order in the Papal State lay in his 
reforms, he knew they would not win over the more fanatical 
revolutionaries: "the way of thinking of these Settarj will not 
be changed by means of leniency, indulgence, and pardon; only the 
fear of punishment can affect them.,,141 He therefore consistently 
directed his subordinates to take firm action against them. 142 
However, there was to be no persecution or injustice, no 
139A•V., R260, Extract from Metternichls dispatch to 
Apponyi, 8 July 1816, in Apponyi to Consalvi, 8 August 1816. 
140Ibid• Metternich had been misinformed on this pOint. In 
fact, Consalvi had planned to expel from Rome only three or four 
of the most prominent foreign agitators. There was no intention 
of a general expulsion. Van Duerm, 151-160, Consalvi to Metter-
nich, 23 August 18160 
141A•V., R165, Consalvi to the Legate of Forli, 13 March 
1821. 
142 Ibid., Consalvi to the Legate of Bologna, 3 July 1816; to 
the Delegate of Perugia, 31 July 1820; to the Legate of Forli, 
16 July 1820, 8 July 1821; to the Legate of Ferrara, 5 July 1820; 
and numerous other dispatches to these and other subordinates 
throughout R165. 
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"witch-hunt". Action was to be taken only against those who were 
actually plotting against the government, not those who merely 
held liberal ideas, nor was anyone to be prosecuted upon mere 
suspiCion, but only after "prova incontestabile ft of his guilt had 
been furnished. 143 Consalvi did not hesitate to administer 
crushing rebukes to subordinates whose zeal led them beyond the 
boundaries of strict legalit7 and moderation. 144 
Metternich seems to have been satisfied with Consalvi's 
treatment of the Se..~tart in 1815-1819. It was only after the 
1820 revolutions had greatly increased his fears of the Italian 
revolutionaries that he began to complain of Papal laxity and 
inefticiency in pursuing the ~ettarj and to use diplomatio 
pressure to persuade Consalvi to take stronger measures against 
them. 145 Even then, Metternieh did not criticize Consalvi hlm-
selt, whose sound pollcies he continued to praise, but the 
laxlty and incompetence ot his subordlnates.146 
Close co-operation with Austria in the form of reciprocal 
143 
Ibid./, eonsalvi to Legate of For1i, 15 July 1820, 13 
March 1821r·to Delegate of Perugia, 31 July 1820; to Legate 
ot Bologna, 28 June 1820; to Governor of Rome, 17 July 1820. 
144 
B.g., !bid., Consalvi to the Legate o~ "errara, 5 July 
1821; Consalv1 to the Legate of For1l, 13 March 1821., S. Gualtero,; 
Gli ultiml rtvo1£imenti italiani (5 vo1s.; Florence 1852), I, 
280-281. . -
145 
A. V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 10 March, 30 June, 10 
July 1821. 
146 
~., Leardi to Consa1vi, 10 March 1821. II 
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exchange of information continued for the rest of Consalvils 
ministry until at least 1822. 147 Routine information was ex-
changed between the Papal and the Austrlan police, while more 
important items were sent to the Austrian ambassador in Rome, to 
the Governor of Lo~bardy-Venetla, or direct to Metternich.148 
APparently, Consalvi tried sincerely to co-operate with Austria 
on this polnt, as he claimed;149 there is no evidence that he 
attempted to hold back information. He was even willing to 
oblige Metternich by having the Papal police conduct special 
investigations of particular persons or groups whose activities 
had aroused Austrian suspic10ns .150 
Consalvi's efficient and reliable co-operation against the 
?_~t~~~J. greatly increased Austrian confidence 1n him and h1s 
regime. Atter observing Consalvi's cooperat1on in th1s way for 
nearly a year, Apponyi felt justified in pra1sing h1ghly his 
"activ1ty and so11citude, It and 1n report1ng to Metternich that 
------141---<-<--<-
A.V., R242. Consalvi to Bernetti, September 1822; 
Bernettl to Consalvi. 14 September 1822; Consa1vi to Splna, 16 
November 1822. 
148 
Van Duerm. 151-160, Consalvi to Metternlch. 23 August 
1816. R260, Apponyl to Consalvi, 26 February 1817; Genotte to 
Consalvi, 23 April 1817. R242, Bernett1 to Consalvi, 14 September 
1822. R165. Consalvi to Legate of Bologna, 13 June 1822. 
149 
Van Duerm, 151-160. 
1822. 
150 
A.V., Consa1vl to Spina, 16 November 
A.V., R260. Apponyi to Consa1vi. 26 February 1817, 22 
October 1820; Genotte to Governor of Rome, 18 August 1817. R165, 
Consa1vl to Legate of Ferrara, 25 October 1820. 
"I think I can be sure that everything discovered about the 
seoret societies will be communioated to us with loyalty and 
frankness, and on this point we on our aide cannot use too much 
confidence ViS-~-V~s, the Court of Rome, and must unite all our 
efforts to arrive at our common end, the tranquility and solid 
happiness of Ita1y.nl S1 
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This steady flow of reliable information was of considerable 
value to Austria, and Metternich's desire to prevent any inter-
ruption of it was no doubt an important factor influencing him 
to remain on good terms with Consalvi even after serious 
religious and political disputes had begun to appear. Equally 
important, Consalvl l s obvious efficiency and good faith in 
co-operating against the revolutionaries could not but increase 
Metternich 'a already high regard for the Cardinal and his 
confidence in him. Austro-Papal co-operation against the 
§.e_~.~~~J_ was, and long remained, even during the troubled period 
after 1817, a major force making for good Austro-Papal relations. 
151 .. -_._--
Van Duerm, 175, Apponyi to Metternich, 18 March 1817. 
5. The Project of an Imperial Visit to Rome 
While the foundations of an informal Austro-Papal alliance 
were being laid by co~,operation against the ~_~rj_ and the 
Z~J:.an~_~, plans were already under way for a muoh-anticipated 
event that was to set the seal upon Austro-Papal unity: the 
visit of Francis I and Metternich to Rome as guests of Pius VII. 
The Emperor had first expressed his destre to visit the 
Pope soon after the conclusion of peaee in 1814. At- the Congress 
of Vienna he had told Conea1v! that he hoped to visit Rome in 
1815, but the unexpeoted prolongation of the Congress made this 
impossible. After aOme semblanoe of normal conditions had 
returned in the summer of 1815, Franois I once again began to 
speak with inoreasing frequency of his wish to visit the Pope, 
and at the beginning of October Severol! was assured that the 
visit would definitely take place.152 
This news delighted Severoli, as it did Consalvi and Pius 
VII, for it promised great benefits. The meeting of the two 
sovereigns and their oonsequent personal acquaintance would in 
itself be of great value in promoting mutual understanding and 
respect. At the same time, the visit would allow the two rulers 
------T52 .-- .. 
A.V., R242, Consalvl to Pacea, 17 September 1814. 
ANY 233, Severoli to Paeea, 20 July 1814; Severoli to Conealv1, 






to discuss Austro-Papal problems in person. Consalvi knew that 
there was a powerful faction at the Austrian court hostile to 
the Papacy, which was seeking with considerable sucoess to 
influenoe the Emperor against the Papaoy and to stir up strife 
with the latter by distorting its policies and aotions~ If the 
influence of this faction could be removed, if Francis I eould 
come to Rome and discuss matters with Pius VII in personal 
conversation rather than through hostile intermediaries, it 
seemed reasonable to hope that he would see the essential justice 
of the Papal position and would therefore adopt a more favorable 
attitude towards it. Finally, the visit would serve to demon-
strate to all the world the harmony and good will that reigned 
between Pope and Emperor, thus discouraging the "visions of 
many ill-intentioned minds," that is, the Settarj who hoped for 
disunion among their enemies.153 
The Josephist party in Vienna was equally aware of these 
advantages, however, and exerted all its influenoe to prevent 
the visit~ In consequence, by December "all Vienna is full of 
rumours that Their Majesties will not go beyond Florence~ ,,154 
A few days later Severoli reported that "the trip to Rome is 
still uncertain~ ~ ~ ," for the Josephist ministers were making 
a "supreme effort 
• • • 
153, 
A. V., ANV 233, Severoli to Cons.al vi, 7 Ootober 1815. 
"" 154 ,  Ibid., Severoli to Consalvi, 2 Deoember 1815. At this 
time (November 1815--February 1816) Francis I was making a tour 
of inspection of his Italian territories~ 
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original ideas. II Exaggerated rumours of disorder and unrest in 
the Papal states were being spread with the obvious intent of 
discouraging the trip.15S At the end of December Severoli 
learned thai; all the ministers except I"fetternich and Hudeligt had 
decided to make an open formal appeal to FranciS I to return from 
Italy without vis 1 ting Rome: "the reason given is the: needs of 
the State; that which is not given, is fear of the discussions 
between the Holy Father and H.I.M. I have spoken with the 
principa(l [ministers] and a.m convinced that they have done and 
are doing ••• everything to prevent the trip ••• 11156 
Metternieh strongly supported the trip, ",hieh would do much 
to promote the Auatro·Papal co-operation he ardently deSired, but 
he was encountering great oppOSition, as he explained to 
Lebzeltern: 
This project of the visit is strongly eontested by 
those immediately surrounding H.M •••• There are those 
Who believe. despite all that one ean tell them, that 
Our good Master will be forced to pass at least one 
or two nights bareheaded, barefoot, and without his 
shirt in the courtyard of the Quirinale, as wa.'3 the 
Emperor Henry IV of unhappy memo17. When I pOinted 
out to our learned friend Urbner that times have 
changed and the clrcumstanoes-eLre very different, he 
answered in a professorial tone that this was not 
certain. • • • This affair, which I consider of great 
importance, will only be definitely decided at 
Florence ••• which will be visited in February. 
The only obstacle that Metternich would admit as genuine was the 
1-;-5 --
Ibid., Severoli to Consalvi, 6 December 1815. 
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Ibid., Severoli to Consalvi, 27 December 1815. 
80 
possibility that Francis I might be compelled by the current 
administrative reorganization of Lombardy-Venetia to spend too 
~uch time there. In any ease, he himself would definitely go to 
Rome even if his If August Masterll did not. l57 
Consalvi, who knew well the strength of the Josephist party 
in Vienna, was alarmed by Severoli's reports. On I January 1816 
he wrote to ~~tternich stressing the great desire of Pius VII to 
meet Francis I and his own eagerness to talk with Metternich 
agaln. 158 The Austrian reply of 7 January 1816 was not encourag-
ing: the Emperor greatly desired to visit Rome, but would not be 
able to decide 1.f he could do so until he had arrived in Florenee. 
Consalvi responded by again expressing the Pope's eagerness to 
rneet the Emperor and by stress ing the unfortunate effects if the 
visit did not take place. The Papal government had already gone 
to great expense to prepare a suitable welcome for Franeis I, 
despite its impoveri3hed State, and it would be most unfortunate 
if all of this outlay went for nothing. More important, as 
public opinion expected the v1.sit, its oancellation would be a 
great humiliation for the Pope and would no doubt encourage the 
mutual enemies of both Pope and Emperor, as well as starting 
rumours of 5. rift between them. l59 
157 
Lebzeltern, 343-344, Metternich to Lebzeltern, 6 January 
1816. The author has been unable to identify the "Urbner" men-
tioned in the letter. 
158yan Duerm, 103, Consalvi to Metternioh. 
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Ibld.., 106, Co~~alvl to ~etternich, 10 January 1816. The 
author was unable to find a copy of Metternichts reply of 7 
January. 
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But the balance had already tipped against the Imperial 
visit, and the circumstances which Metternich had feared pre-
viously had materialized. On 16 February 1816 he regretfully 
wrote Consalvi that the administrative organization would compel 
the Emperor to prolong his stay 1n Lombardy-Venet1a on the one 
hand, and on the other to hasten his return to Germany. He would 
not even have time to v1sit Florence, much less Rome. 160 
The explanation given by Metternich was essentially true. 
Although the Josephist party had brought great pressure to bear, 
this would not in 1tselt have suff10ed had it not been reinforced 
by this more so11d mot1ve whioh conv1nced even Metternich that 
the trip was impo8sible. 161 
Consalvi was greatly disappointed by the abandonment of the 
vis1t, whioh, as he had expected, at onoe gave rise to rumours 
of an Austro-Papal qu.rrel,162 but he still had two consolations: 
Franoi8 I had expres8ed his determination to visit Rome at some 
time in the near future, and Metternioh was still expeoted to 
come in 1816. This last was especially important for ConsalVi, 
for whom a personal disoussion with Metternioh of Austro-Papal 
problems was one of the ohief attraotions of the visit. 
Within a short time, however, doubt was thrown on 
100 
Ibid., 114, Metternich to Consalvi, 16 February 1816. 
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Metternich gave this as the true explanation in his 
oonfidential dispatch of 14 February 1816 to Lebzeltern: 
Lebzeltern, 345. 
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Metternich's coming. His subordinates opposed the trip, com-
plicated negotiations with Bavaria might require him to remain 
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in Vienna, and, most important, he was afflicted with a serious 
eye disease. In the end it was the last which made it impossible 
for Metternich to come to Rome; the trip W88 definitely cancelled 
in June. 163 
Once again, Consalvi was diSappointed but not discouraged. 
The Emperor still spoke of coming soon, while Metternich ex-
pressed his determination to come to Rome in the sprIng or 
summer or 1817.164 
As 1817 began, the prospects for Austro-Papel unity and 
co-operation seemed bright. The problems growing out of the 
Austrian occupation had been solved 1n a reasonably satisfactory 
manner, mutually beneficial co-operation against the ~ettarj was 
1n progress, and wh11e Metternich was pleased by Consalvi's 
reforms, the Secretary of the State was duly grateful for his 
support in achieving them. The coming meeting at Rome of the 
Pope and the Emperor, and of Consalv1 and Mettern1ch, would no 
doubt settle any problems that still existed and would set the 
keystone in the arch of Austro-Papal unity for all the world to 
see. lor--
A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 25 March, 2 April. 
10 April 1816. Van Duerm, 119, Metternich to Consalvi, 12 March, 
23 Apr11 1816; 124, Metternich to Consalvi, 7 June 1816. 
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But storm clouds .ere building up on the horizon. Within 
the next three years the foundationa or Austro-Papal co-operation 
were to be perilously weakened, and when the long-anticipated 
visi t ot Francia I at 148 t took place , it wu not as the keys tone 
of Auatro-Papal unity, but 48 a mere outward sbow, an attempt to 
smooth over the gaping rent. that had appeared and to present to 
the world a semblance ot unIty and good will that no longer 
corresponded to reality_ 
CHAPTER III 
RELIGIOUS AND FINANCIAL DISPUTES, 1817-1820 
1. The Religious Controversy 
By 1817 Consalvi and Metternieh had made considerable 
progress towards their aim of close Austro-Papal co-operation. 
Before 1817 had ended, however, that progress had been halted and 
indeed reversed by the revival of the re11gious controversy be-
tween Austria and the Papacy. The tensions arising from this 
controversy were to bring the two states perilously close to an 
open break, and though a settlement was at length worked out, a 
legacy of bitterness and distrust remained to blight Austro-Papal 
relations for the rest of Consalvi's ministry. 
The religious controversies of the CardInal's second 
minIstry were only the latest outbreak of a long and bitter 
struggle between AustrIa and the Papacy, with control of the 
Church in the Hapsburg Empire as the issue. 
In thIs struggle the Papacy was defending its tradit10nal 
claim to a divinely-conferred supreme authorIty over the entIre 
Catholic Church, 1n Austria as elseWhere. Sinee 1780, however, 
this Papal cla1m had been strongly and successfully ohallenged 
by the Austrian gdVernment. Upon his accession in that year, 
84 
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the Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790) began the introduction o'f the 
religious policy which under the name of "Joaephiniam" was to be 
dominant in the Hapsburg states for seventy years. The ultimate 
aim of Josephinism was to create an Austrian state ehurch in 
which all real authority was in the hands of the secular powerJ 
the Papal author1ty would be formally restricted to doctrinal 
matters, and even there would be largely nominal. The Church, 
reduced in effect to the level of a department of state, would 
be used by the government as seemed best to promote the power of 
the state and the general welfare. l 
This policy was quickly realized under Joseph and his 
successors. All direct links between the Papacy and the Austrian 
church were cut. The Church in the Hapsburg territories was put 
under the close oontrol and supervision of an Ecclesiastical 
Court Commission apPOinted by the Emperor and inspired by 
Josephist prinCiples. All Papal attempts to "interfere" in 
ecclesiastical affairs were firmly repulsed and any sign of 
independence or pro-Papal sentiment among the clergy rigorously 
repressed. The selection ot the clergy, the administration of 
eccleSiastical propert7, anel the organ1zation and d.iscipline of 
the Church were all put in the hands of the government, which, 
regulated them down to the most petty details. Education was 
1 
On the origin and development of Josephinlsm, see Maass, 
I-IV. Shorter accounts can be found in Josef Wodka, Kirche in 
Oealerreich (Vienna, 1959, Chapter X. Fritz Valjavec, Dar --jOsepninIsmus: zur ge1stl~en Entwlcklun~ Oesterreichs rm-
acnzehnten una iiiUrizennten"' S anrhundertVIenna, 1945) studies 
the theoretTcil aspects of JOsephlnIsm. 
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! closely controlled and great palns were taken to instill 
Joseph1at princ1ple., e.peelally 1n the sem1naries. 
The Papacy d1d not acoept with passive resignation th1a 
ohallenge to ita authority, and the reign ot Joseph II was filled 
w1th rellgious cont rove rs7 • But once again, as so often dur1ng 
the Enllghtenrnent, the Papacy proved too weak to resist the 
.ecular power ertectively. In the end, the Papacy had to accept 
Imperlal control ot the Austrian church, it not de Ju~, at least 
de facto. 
- -_._---
Nor d1d JosephinisM die w1th ita originator, Leopold II 
(1790-1792) continued the Josephist tradit1on, while the reign 
of Franeia I (1792-1836) was the apogee of the Austrian state-
church. Francie, though devoutly religious, had been educated 
in Josephist principles and was determined to defend What he 
considered hi. sovereign rights over the Church. "Moat jealous 
of hiB authority" in religious aftairs, he "never haa the 
sl1ghtest doubt about following and defend1ng the JOBephiBt 
'Y'stem. ,,2 Moreover, should his own determination ever waver, he 
was surrounded by Joseph1at advisers whose 1nfluenoe ... oon-
stantly exerted to defend state oontrol of the Church. 
ThiS, then, .aB the Situation with which Conaalv1 had to 
deal. Durinc h1s first ministry (1800-1806) he wu aevera! times 
embroiled w1th the Austrian court, moat notably over Imperlal 
attempta to deprive the Papal nunoio at Vienna of the last 
-r----
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remnants of his ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the EmpIre' and 
to reorganize various dioceses on Imperial authority alone. In 
the f1rst of these disputes a combination of firmness and con-
ciliation won the day for Consalvi, but he could not alter the 
fixed determination of Francis I to carry through the second. 3 
The steady consolidation of Imperial authority over the 
Austrian church did not cease while Consalvi was out of orrice 
(1806-1814) and the Papacy was in conflict with Napoleon. By 
the opening of the Restoration era, the church in the Empire 
had been reduced to a "stato servile,w completely dependent upon 
the state, virtually independent ot the papacy.4 The consequence 
for the church and the rellgious life ot the people were most 
pernioious • The reports of the Vienna nuncio paint a gloomy 
picture of religious condltions in Austria. "The clergy present 
a truly horrible aspect," Consalvi was told. Uncontrolled by 
Papal authority and with the disciplinary power of their own 
bishops constantly hampered by state interference, educated In 
seminaries Where more stress was lald on poll tical reliabIlity 
and anti-Papal sentiments than upon piety or religious zeal, 
demoralized by the prevailing atmosphere in Which the tihole 
emphasis .as on the use ot the Church for the good of the State 
and Ifall eoelesi.etics are considered as agents and amp) oyes of 
the State, If the clergy had suffered a d1sastrous decline in 
3 
Memoria, 174-179_ Sohmid11n, 336-340. Maass, IV, 52-97. 
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A.V., ANY 246, Leard! to Consalvl, 29 August 1817. 
numbera, quality, and prestige. They were "scarsissimo," C(Uite 
lnsuf'ticient to meet the religious needs of the people. Their 
• 
level of morality. zeal, and learning was otten deplorably low. 
Such clergy could not strengthen the religioua devotion of the 
people or cOlU'1land their respect .• Popular respeet for the clergy 
the Church, and religion in general declined, While, the nunoio 
warned, immorality, irreligion, and revolutionary principleswere 
spreading rapldly.5 
In 1814 there had been 80me hope. 1nspired by Francis'8 
benevolent attitude towards Pius VII after his release from 
oaptivity, that the Emperor might be prepared to depart from his 
Jo.ephist polloles J but suoh hopes were Q.uickly dashed. Soon 
after Plus'll return to Rome, Severoll wrote in disgust that "we 
here ln Vienna are stUI as ever in the old system, and very far 
from expecting change) we will instead see consolidated in our 
midat the old abU&es." Moreover, "there is no doubt that in 
Lombardy and in the newly-oonquered territories they are thinking 
or reviving or estab11sh111@; the laws of the Bmperor Joseph 11."6 
Here was the first warning ot an Imperial policy whioh if 
pursued would make conflict with the Papacy inevitable: the 
5 
Such pessimistio descriptions of religious conditions 1n 
the Empire are ver,y frequent in the correspondence or the Vienna 
nuncio. durIng the Restoration. See~ L,&.., ANV 246, Leard! to 
Consalvi, 29 August 1817 (from which the above quotations are 
taken), 28 r~cember 1817. ANV 233, Severol1 to Paooa, 29 August, 
19 November 1814. 
6 
A.V _, ANV 233, Severoli to Faeca., 29 August 181!~. 
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extension of Joeephlnlam to the newly-acquired territories. Most 
of the religious eontroverl3ies of Consalvi's seoond ministry were 
to stem trom this policy. To see Josephist principles still 
enthroned in the traditional Hapsburg territories was sufficiently 
unpleaaant to the PapacYJ to see those principles introduced into 
new areas, above all into Italy the very horne of the Papacy, was 
not to be endured. In Italy- the Pope had a. special interest and 
exeroised a speoial authority, tor there he ru.led not only as 
Head of the Universal Ohurch, but also and in a more immediate 
sense as Primate of Italy. As the p8I'eepti va Lebzel tern warned 
Metternioh, nAll innovations made in rel1gious affaire in Italy 
touch the Pope at his most sensitIve spot. It is, eo to speak, 
hiS exolusive domain, and he draws grea.ter advantage perhaps 
from his title of Primate of Ital~ than from his others as Head 
of the Un! veraal Church and Patria.rch of the Wes t • n The Pope 
would tolerate many things in ultramontane lands that he would 
not accept in Italy uwhere he feels he rightfully exercises a 
more immediate juriSdiction.,,1 Lebzeltern therefore advised 
against the attempt to extend Joaeph1nism into Italy, for it 
would certainly lead to conflict with the Papacy. 
Lebzeltern's advice, though ignored by Vienna, was sound. 
The Imperlal poliey dld eolilde with a firm Papal determInation 
to resist further Impe~lal eneroaehmenta upon its own authority 
and the freedom of the Churoh, especIally in Italy. This 
-r----
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collision W8B the immediate cause of the religious disputes that 
marked the Restor&tlon era. 
At the same tIMe, however, the Papacy never forgot the evil 
eonaequenees 'chat Josephinlsm ha,d a.lready had in the traditional 
Hapsburg territories for both the authority of the Pope and the 
rel:tglous life of the people, and 1t never ceased to desil"e the 
overthrow of Josephinis:n in the Austrian Empire as a whole. This 
Papal desire was a oonstant undercurrent in its quarrels with 
Austria, an undercurrent ~4'hich at tL'1les ca-ne to the surface. In 
the last analy-sis, there could be no perr:1anentpe,aoe' or lastIng 
agreement between the Papacy and AtlBtri21 'Nhile J oseph1nism 
ruled at Vienna, for the Papacy eould never cease 1 ts efforts to 
" 
regain its lost authority. Yet good relations between the two 
powers could be preserved and close eo-opera.tion in the poll t1cal 
field attained" as the situation in 1815-1817 demonstrated, pro-
vided lttlstria respected the statu.s quo. It wa.s th~ fa.llure of 
Austria to do 80 that preCipitated the religious controversy w1th 
Rome. 
There was little dissent in the Roman CU1"ia as to the 
desirability of checking the expansion of Josephiniam into Ita17 
and of itlorking to weaken 1.t in .!.ustr1a.; but there was nc such 
general agreement as to the best way in which to pursue these 
a1f1't8. Once again" as in regard to polit1cal reform, religIous 
policy found Consalvl and the ~elant! on opposing SIdes. 
To the ~l.!l1ti, the s1tuation was simple. The Austrian 
r 
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state-ehurch was an affront to the divinely-conferred authorit7 
ot the Pope and had had disastroWl ettects upon rel18ioua lite 
1n AWltr1a; it must theretore be abolished as quickly as possible 
There must be no turther compromise with Vienna, which would only 
encour .. e Awstrian pretensions. Instead, the time had come, 
with the post-war revival of religious tervour, to take the 
offenaive agalnst Jo.ephin1am. The attempt to extend the 
Austrian religious s,.tem must be utterly oppos.d. only if the 
Emperor first ahowed his good faith by the "prompt and sincere 
revocation •• • ot all 1a .. oontary ••• to the prinoip1es, maxims 
and laws ot the Catholio Church" oould any concesslon be made on 
this point. 8 Nor should JoaephinisM be tolerated in the rest ot 
the Empire. Instead, it should be attacked directly, in 
particular by the publication ot a Bull publioly condemning the 
Austrian ecclesiastical 1a ... 9 
Conaal\'i wu in qreement with the basic aims ot the zelanti 
He shared their devotion to the theory or Papal supreme authority 
and their wish to make th1a theory a reality. He too wsa 
horrified by the condition ot the Austrian church, which he 
considered "a hundred thousand times worae than in Franoe in the 
worst or times. "10 As earl;, .. 1805, the Auatrian amba.ador in 
-_. __ .. _---
8 
A.V., R260, Obb1igo de' Nominati, 1817. 
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Such a Bull ... actuall,. drawn up in 1819 'b7 the Zelanti 
and received Papal approval, only the OPPOSition ot 00nailv1 
prevented it. publication. Maass, V, 173, Oenotte to Metternich, 
5 Febru&r7 1820. 
10 
R242, Cons&1\'i to Pacca, 8 September 1814. 
r' " r rRome had warned Ilis government that Conaalvl wlshed to revlve 
~ 
the papal authority In Its fulleat extent. but he added that the 
Cardlnal would proeeed wlth cautlon, for he peroelved the dangers 
of suoh a pollCy.ll Thls last phase ofters the key to Conaalvl 'a 
attitude, the cruolal point on Which he differed trom the Zelantl 
The Papaoy, he saw, was atlll too weak, Austrla too strong, tor 
a dIrect assault Oft the state-church to have any hope 01' success. 
In all probablllty such an attack, tar trom Intlmidating the 
Emperor, would onlY' provoke an open break, perhaps even the 
sch1sm at WhICh Austria ocoaslonally hlnted.12 It would al80 
surely end Auatro-Papel co-operatlon and deprive the Papaoy of 
those Important benetlts whlch It could derive trom AustrIan 
good wl11. 
Therefore, In dealIng with Austria Conaalvi preterred to 
adopt a poltcy 01' moderation which combined tirmneaa on essential 
poInts with a conciliatory attItude on non-easentiala. When the 
bastc rights and authorlt,. 01' the Pope were involved, he could 
be adamant 1n retualng to ,.i81d. On leaa important pointa he 
adopted a tlexible polie,., detending Papal rights or a.ek1ng to 
extend Papal authority it it s •• med possible without undue risk, 
but alao willing to ,.ield on specitic pointa it It seemed tor 
the general good 01' the Church, or 11' reoiprocal concessions 
11 
Van Duerm, 35, Count Khevenhuel1er to Colloredo-
Mannsteld, 26 Januar.r 1805. 
12 
E.G., A.V., ANV243, Consalvi to Leard1, 11 August 1811. 
R260, Quesito da e.&minarei, 1817. 
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could be obtained. "Sacrificing interests at times cansiderable 
but always unessential, he succeeded in saving that which was 
substantial and essential for the Church and the Curia.,,13 
Consalvi was encouraged in his policy of moderation by the 
appearance of one ray of flickering light amid the prevailing 
Austrian gloom: the adoption by Metternich of a conciliatory 
religious policy towards the Papacy. Metternich W88 unimpressed 
by either the theoretical arguments for Josephinism or its 
alleged practical advantages. He believed in principle that 
"to exalt the civil authority over that of' the Church is no less 
an abuse than it would be to exalt the ecclesiastical authority 
over the clvil. n14 In the practical f'ield, he saw that 
Josephinism had weakened religion in Austria at a time when it 
was vitally necessary to resist the spread of revolutionary 
principles. Moat important, the Foreign Minister opposed 
Josephinism as contrary to the political interests of' the Empire: 
the lustre-Papal co-operation that he considered so valuable 
could hardly be maintained if the Papacy was to be constantly 
13 
Petrocehi 1943, 43. This judgment delivered on the 
CardinaIT8·rel1g1oua~-policY' as a whole 18 equally relevant to his 
dealings with Austria. See also the similar opinion of Ranke: 
"Cardinal Consalvi und seine· Staatsverwaltung unter dem 
Pontif1eat Pius VII," Historisch-biogra~iBche Studien. 
Sammtliche Werke, XL (telpzlg,~ 1817): 
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antagonized by Josephist enoroachments. 15 
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In 1814, therefore, Metternich began to advocate the 
adoption of a more moderate religious policy, with the aim of 
conoI1iating the Papaoy by lessening government control of the 
Austrian ohurch and halting the expansion of Josephinism. The 
prince felt oblIged to proceed with great caution. Josephist 
principles prevailed everywhere in the government} Metternich's 
later olaim that in his opposition to Josephinism he had been 
"seul sur le terrain de 1a verite" in government circles was no 
great exaggeration. 16 Any attempt to modify relIgious policy 
was certain to arouse the strong and virtually unanimous opposi-
tion of the bureaucraoy. More serious still, unless Metternich 
proceeded very cautiously, his opposItion to Josephinism might 
cost him the support of the Emperor, who was still firmly 
attached to the princIples in which he had been eduoated. He was 
therefore careful never to conde~n Josephinism too bluntly or to 
advocate the complete abolition of the state-church system, for 
to do so would anger Francis I. He confined himself instead to 
seeking to halt the further expansion of Josephinism and to 
moderate ita rigors in Austria. On the baai. of this limited 
policy, if put into effect, Metternich could have reached a modus 
vIvendi in religious affaira with Consalvi, whose immedIate aims 
--~5'---'---
For Metternich 'a OPPOSition to Joseph1n1srn a.nd his attempts 
to moderate Austrian religious policy, see Maass, IV, 98-120. 
Metternlch, III, 5-7. SrbIk, I, 523-524. 
16 
Metternlch, III, 5-7, Note. 
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would have been met thereby. 
Unfortunately, even the moderate aims of Metternioh aroused 
strong opposition from the bureaucracy, and he could never seoure 
the full Imperial support necessary to override it. H1s 
aohievements 1n moderating Austrian religious po11cy therefore 
fell far short of what he Wished and of what would have been 
neoessary to satisfy the Papacy. 
At the outset, however, the Prince was suocessful in 
moderating Austrian religious policy on several occasions, 
thereby arousing Consalvi's hopes that a general modification of 
Austrian religious policy was possible. The first such occasion 
came when in July, 1814, Pius VII apPOinted Bishop Joseph Maria 
Peruzzi of Chioggia to administer the vacant Patriarchate of 
Venice. 17 Lebze1tern had previously agreed to this step, but 
now the Josephist President of the Eoc1esiastioal Court 
CommiSSion, Prokop Count Lazanzky, stirred up Francis I against 
the appOintment. Arguing that this step represented Papal en-
oroachment on the Imperial right, inherited from the Venetian 
Repub1io, to nominate the Patriarch, he persuaded the Emperor to 
send. stiff protest to Severoli. 18 Before Lazans~ could provoke 
a quarrel with the Papacy, Severoli and Consalvi hastily saw 
Metternieh. They pointed out that the temporary ad~inistration 
rr--_ .. _-
A.V., R242, Pacca to Conaalvi, 18 August 1814. 
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Maass, IV, 417, Lazansky to Mettern1oh.. 11 July 1814. 
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of the Patriarchate by Peruzzi was necessary to check disorders 
among the Venetian clergy, that Lebzeltern had approved the Papal 
appointment before it was made, and that Imperial approval was 
not necessary In any case because the province had not yet been 
formally incorporated Into the Austrian Empire. Metternich was 
won over by these ar~~~nts and was able to persuade Francis I to 
accept the appointment temporari1y.19 
Metternich was also successful in 1814 in dealing with the 
reorganization of the diocese of the Tyrol which Austria had 
recently regained. Lazansk7 w1shed to carry out this reorganiza-
tion in accord with Joseph1st prinCiples, without regard to Papal 
authority. Once again Metternich intervened. After rebuking 
the President for his excessive zeal, he assured the Papacy that 
the Imperial reorganization would be only temporary, and asked 
the Pope to grant his necessary approval for the final reorgan-
ization. Once again Metternich had successfully moderated 
Austrian policy and averted a quarrel with the Papaoy.20 
In 1815 Metternich had another opportunity to demonstrate 
his opposition to Josephist expansion. Lazansky wished to forbid 
the Lombard-Venetian bishops to have recourse to the Pope for 
marriage dispensations in the third and fourth degrees. This 
prohibition would have cut an important link between Rome and the 
~ 19 
Maass, IV, 103-104, 489, ~~tternich to Francis I, 4 
January 1815. 
20 
~., IV, 102, 107. The Bull was finally issued in 1818: 
Bullari ••• , XV, 40-47, Nova diocesum distributio, 9 May 1818. 
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Lombard-,Venettan church and aided in bringtng that church und.er 
closer Josephist control. The Foreign Minister successfully 
opposed the plan, but he oarefully avoided attacking 'che prin-
ciples involved; tm;tead, he 11terely a.rgued that this step would 
antagonize the Papacy and was hence politically inexpedient. 2l 
Thus on these and several less important occasions the 
Prince was able to exercise a moderating influence on Imperial 
religious policy. Under the protective shelter of his moderating 
influence, the Austro-Papa,l co··operation of 1815-1817 could come 
into existence; lacking tha.t protection, it would probabl.:l have 
been strangled at birth by the religious controversies w-vhich 
Josephist policies lnust otherwise have provoked. Furthermore, 
Metternieh's conciliatory attitude encouraged Consalvl to 
continue to co-operate with Austrla even when the Prince was not 
able to prevent the adoption of Josephlst policies, for it 
aroused in the Cardinal the hope that r1etternich might yet be 
able to work a general transfo!'l1atlon of the state-church. This 
hope endured for several years after 1814, only gradually to be 
smothered under the acoumulating evidence that Metternich could 
work no such ~iracle. Until 1818, Consalvi continued to express 
his confidenae that the "spirit of conclliation Which animates 
Prince Metternlch" might yet reverse the trend of Austrian 
p011cy.22 
21 
Maass, 496, staatskanzlei to the Z. O. Hofkommission, 15 
December 1815. 
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Even at best, however, Metternich'. campaign against 
Josephinism was only partially successful. He could not prevent 
the introduotion of several measures that otfended and alarmed 
the Papacy. Some of these meft8ures--Bueh as the prohibition ot 
oommunication between the Vienna nunoio and the Austrian 
bishops,23 the rigid enforoement of the regio plaoet in 
Lombardy,24 and the tntroduotion into Lombardy-Venetia of a new 
oath and eeremontal, very ,Tosephist in tone, for use at the 
installation of bishops25_-were less a.laI'rllng in themselves than 
than a.s evidence of the general trend of Austrian policy. Three 
innovations, however, were such as must arouse the strongest 
Papal resistance! the prohibition to the Lombard-Venetian bishops 
of the Romreise or visit to Rome to reoeive Papal preeonisation 
and approval; the Imperial claim to nominate bishops in the 
newly acquired territories without a formal conceSSion from the 
Pope; and the introduction of the Austrian Marria~e laws into 
Lo~bardy-Venetia. 
For centuries the nominees to Italian bishoprics, before 
they could assume their offices, had had the obligation to ~isit 
Rome, there to he personally examined ("preccnisation"), in-
structed, and coneecrated by the Pope. This duty was an outgrowt 
of the special relationships between the Italian bishops and the 
---~3' . "'-, ".'", 
AtN 233, Severe1! to Pacea, 10 Septe~ber 1814. 
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Pope in his capacity as Primate of Italy. In an age when most 
Italian bishops were nominated by secular rulers to whom they 
tended to be subservient, this custom had acquired a special 
value in that it preserved to the Papacy the influence that comes 
from perlonal contact and reminded the bishops of their special 
duties towards the Pope. Consalvi frankly admitted that "the 
Italian bishops are not in the least called to Rome to be exam-
ined or instructed, but solely to recall to them, to them and to 
the people, that the Holy Father is Primate of Italy "and that 
they therefore had special obligations towards him. 26 The Popes 
were ver:/ tenacious of this right, as of all that pertained to 
their status as Primate, especially since the weakening of their 
authority outSide Italy_ As Consalvi explained, "since there 
only remains to the Holy See, of all its tormer power, hardly 
a~thing except the canonical institution ot bishops throughout 
Christendom and this direot Primatial influence on the Italian 
bishops, it is necessary to preserve these two points, ot which 
the tirst is reduced in most countries to little more than a 
Simple formality_n 27 In view of this strong Papal determination 
to preserve the Romreise, even Joseph II had not ventured to 
attack it, but had formally recognized this right in the 
28 Conventio ~ioabilis of 1784. 
26 
Maus, IV, 591, Kaun1tz to Metternich, 1 July 1817. 
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In February of 1916, Francia I was persuaded by the· 
Ecclesiastical Court Commission to forbid the Lombard-Vanetian 
bishops to make the Romreiae. 29 The official reasons were the 
great expense and inconvenienoe which this trip caused the 
bishops and the need for administrative uniformity between 
Lombardy-Venetia and the rest of the Empire (where the trip was 
not required). The real reason was Josephist fear that at Rome 
the bishops would come under Papal influence and would "return 
to their diooeses as Roman converts, hypoorites, or indifferen-
tists, and hence as useless bishops--doing ~ore harm than goo~ 
to Churoh and State. n30 The Papaoy did not fail to perceive this 
motive: "the real reason must be the maxim of this Court ••• of 
weakening ever more ••• the contact of the bishops with the 
Supreme Head of the Churoh. ,,31 Metternich, foreseeing ; .~:.£ .. ()(~: 
strong Papal oppOSition, had argued forcefully but unsucoessfully 
against the prohibition as inexpedient and Unjuatified. 32 
The second major Papal grievance also appeared in 1816: the 
Imperial claim to nominate bishops in the new1y-acqu1red ter-
r1tories, especially the fOr"!'ler Republics of Venice and Ragusa 
and the A~chbi8hopric of Salzburg, without obtaining a speoial 
Papal concession of this privilege. The Emperor argued that he 
had inherited all the religious privileges, including the 
-.'.---~-.-.-.-
Maass, IV, 505, Franois ! to Metternlch, 27 February 1816. 
30 
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nomination-right, of the former rulers of those states as their 
legitimate successor. In May of 1816 he acted on this claim by 
nominating Bishop Francesco Milesi of Vigevano to the Patri-
archate of Venice, followed by the nomination in July of Bishop 
Peruzzi of Chioggia to the Bishopric of Vicenza, and in August 
of the Prince-Bishop of Lavant, Leopold Count Firmian, as 
Arohbishop of Salzburg.33 
The third Imperial policy that aroused major Papal 
opposition was the introduction of the Austrian marriage laws 
into Lombardy-Venetia; Originally drawn up by Joseph II for his 
transalpine states, no other of his measures had so aroused the 
Papacy. In the opinion of the Papacy, this legislation reduoed 
marriage from its divinely-ordained status as a sacrament of the 
Churoh to that of a mere civil contract under the authority of 
the state. Moreover, many of the specific provisions were oon-
trary to canon law.34 The introduction of these laws into Italy, 
where the Papacy was most sensitive to religious innovations, was 
certain to antagonize Rome. 35 All attempts to dissuade Francis I 
from this step failed, for he was convinced that his sovereign 
authority rightfully extended over matrimonial questions~36 
the 
33A•V., R;60, Consalvi to Apponyi , 2 August, 30 August 1816; 
34 i Ibid., Innovazioni della Corte Austriaca, l8l9,summarizes 
Papal objections to the marriage laws~ 
35Maass, IV, 512, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 4 April 1816; 
36 • A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 15 July 1815. 
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As Metternich h:.::.( feared, these three measures aroused 
the greatest indignation in Rome, which flatly refused to accept 
them. Pius himself seerrlS to have been most alarmed by the 
marriage laws, which he felt violated the most fundamental prin-
ciples of the Church and feared would lead to a general moral 
decl1ne. 37 To secure the revoeation or modification of these 
laws seeIT~ to have become his ohief ooncern in the negotiations 
with Austria. 
The Papacy did not long leave Austria in ignorance of its 
displeasure. In April of 1816 both the Pope and his Secretary 
of Sta.te spoke with Lebzeltern on this subject. The Ambassador 
reported that although they had refrained thus far from making 
an official protest, they were highly displeased by the recent 
religious innovations. Although the earlier innovations in 
Lombardy-Venetia had made l1an unfortunate impression" upon the 
Pope, he would nonetheless have retrained trom taking action 
against them, I'from consideration for the Emperor~ as long as 
"his sacred duties did not oblige him to do 80. 11 Unfortunate1,., 
two Austrian poliCies oompelled his intervention; the marriage 
laws, whose principles "surpassed those which Napoleon had 
established, fI and the prohibition of the !!.,?~~!.se. To these 
"thti Holy See could never consent, If for they were "destructive 
of its authority and opposed, 80 far as the Marriage Patent was 
concerned, to the prinoiples of Catholicism. 1I 
-.--""l"r -._ .. 3. 
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Lebzelternts attempt to justify the innovations as necessary 
for administrative uniformity was brushed aside by Conaalv1s 
such a motive could never justify violation of the inoontestable 
rights of the Holy See or of the principles of Catholioism. These 
measures, he warned the Ambassador, could destroy the "good 
harmony and real friendship presently unit1ng the two oourts. n38 
Lebzeltern seemed profoundly alarmed by these interviews. 
He wrote at once to warn Metternich that the ttpolitically in-
dispensable" co-operation ot the Papacy was be1ng ser10usly en-
dangered by Austria's re11gious policy. "It is no doubt usetul 
and advantageous to maintain our :regulations J 1t would be 
dangerous to extend them. It Such an extension would surely 
alienate the Papacy and lead to the loss ot all the advantages 
which Austria derived from Papal co-operation. "There are some 
things [Lebzeltern warned in conolusion] on which the Pope can 
compromiJIe, and then vigorous measures oan oompel him to do so; 
there are some inherent to hie oharacter, on which he cannot 
yieldJ finally, there are others which he oan tolerate, but not 
approve. The measures indicated above oan never obtain his 
consent. They will be a souroe of interminable disagreements 
without, I daresq, oftering us a result suffioiently advantageo 
to counterbalance this. n 39 The warning was to prove prophetic. 
In this letter Lebzeltern was preach1ng to the converted, 
tor Metternich was already' alarmed by the threat to co -operation 
'38 




with the Papacy_ At that very mor'lent he was attempting to 
persuade the Emperor to moderate Austrian religious poliey. 
104 
The oocasion for this attempt WaB the Papal refusal to 
accept the Imperial nominee to the Bishopric of Laybach. This 
prelate, Monsignor Augustin Gruber, while acting as religious 
adviser to the government at ~ilan had signed the Marriage Patent 
introduced into Lombardy-Venetia. The Papacy therefore refused 
to accept his nomination lest by doing so it seem to give in-
direct approval in the eyes of the Catholic world to the Imperial 
marriage legislation.40 
Informed of this ret"u8al, Metternich sought to persuade 
Francis I of the desirability of adopting a more conciliatory 
attitude towards the Papacy, not only in this particular oase, 
but as a general po1iey. He ref'ut~d the arguments of the 
Josephists that the Papacy was seeking a quarrel and was en-
oroaching on Imperial rights, pointing out that in faot the 
Papacy had adopted a most conciliatory attitude and waa doing 
everything it could to avoid a religious dispute with Austria. 
The Pope would grant any reasonable Austrian requests. Only the 
introduction of inadmissible principles by Austria or tactless 
Imperial diplomacy could drive the Papacy into opposition. Since 
the Papacy was thus well··disposed to Austria, there was no sound 
reason for raising principles whioh Rome could not accept and 
40·_·---
Ibid., 510, Metternich to Francis I, 3 April 1816; 511 
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105 
which would only lead to a quarrel cel·tain to have adverse' 
political effects. Metternich thel~fore advocated the adoptIon 
of conciliatory policies which 'Wuuld e.liminate all possIble 
causes fiJI' conf'lict with the Papacy_ 41 
The Josephists counter-attacked vigorously, arguing that the 
recent innovations were entirely jus tified and clal:ning that if 
the Emperor stood firm the Papaoy ~'lould soon yield. Francis I 
~las persuaded by their reasoning to reject; his Foreign Minister's 
St~gestions and refuse any ooncession to the papacy.42 
Contrary to Josephist expectations, the ImperIal policy of' 
firmness had not the slightest effect upon Pius or Consalvi, 
except to annoy them and to make it more difficult for Consalvi 
to resist Zelant:1: denanoa for a stronger polloy towards AustrIa. 
The Cardinal was still Qete~~ined to pursue his policy of 
moderation and there was no publio Papal protest or crltioiam of' 
AU$t~ia, but the Papacy gave no sign or accepting the relIgious 
innovations. On the contrary, in June the Pope again foroef.ully 
protested to Lebzeltern, espeoially on the marriage laws, Ifa 
point on whieh he feels strongly." The Pope "deolaimed against 
the imprudent innovators" responsible for recent Austrian 
measures "who miaoalculate the results of their plans. 11 Only his 
41 
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great respect for the piety of Francis I and his trust in the 
good intentions of Metternieh, Piue warned the ambassador, had 
thus far restrained him from publicly condemning the marriage 
patent.43 
Atter thla ominous conversation, Lebzeltern sent another 
urgent warning to Metternich that a breakdown of relations with 
the Papacy was possible if Austria persisted in her religious 
policies. The Pope and Conaalvi, he reported, were still firm. 
in their wish for co-operation and were Willing to make reasonab1 
concess10ns, but they would not and indeed could not agree to 
demands that attacked the basic rights and authority of the 
Papacy and the pr1nciples of Catholicism. The Ambassador then 
enumerated at length the benefits which Austria derived trom 
Papal good will and the grave disadvantages whioh would flow from 
a break with the Papacy. He concluded by: 
respectfully pointing out to His Majesty I) that 
the exercise of His sovereign rights 1s not at 
all imcom~atlb1e with recogn1zing those of the 
Papacy; 2) that a perfect accord with the spiritual 
power is oompletely in the interests of the Emperor, 
and, I boldly affirm, in the rank of his first 
interests. 44 
This warning, like 80 many others, had. no effect upon the 
Emperor. 
Conealvi'. policy d.uring 1816 was a delicate balance of 
firmness and conciliation. The path he had to tread to reach a 
43-------




satisfactory settlement was narrow. On the one hand, an open 
break with Austria must be avoided if at all possible, hence no 
action likely to antagonize that power should be taken unless 
absolutely necessary. Consa1vi must continue to display his 
essentially friendly attitude towards the Empire and his willing-
ness to make reasonable conceSSions, thus encouraging I~tternioh 
to continue his efforts to moderate Imperial policy. At the same 
time, it was necessary to avoid the appearance of weakness, which 
would both encourage the Josephists and arouse the Zelantl. A 
further complicating factor was the neceSSity that the religious 
life of the people should be disturbed as little as possible by 
Papal resistance to Imperial demands) for ex~nple, prolonged 
Papal refusal to accept the Imperial nominees to Venetian bishop-
rios, resulting in lengthy vacancies in those sees, would have a 
detrimental errect upon religious conditions there. It was worth 
sacrificing non-essential Papal prerogatives if necessary to 
prevent such harm to the religious life of the people. 45 
Throughout 1816 Consalvi was able to tread the narrow path 
between intransigence and appeasement with some success. He was 
able to work out .ettlements for various disputes which met the 
reqUirements of' his position fairly well. In July ill reasonably 
satisfactory oompromise was worked out in the case of' Bishop 
Gruber. The Papacy agreed to accept the Imperial nominee as 
---If;"-,.,.· .. · - -,,---
The Joaephists were well aware or thi8 weakness in the 
Papal pOSition, and the~ argued that it would eventually force 
the Papacy to yield on the Austrian innovations if the Emperor 
persisted long enough, Maass, IV, 557, ',Iallis to Fra.ncis I, 30 
January 1817. 
rr Bishop o.f tayba:m, but 108 only on the secrwG oondition that'atter 
assu~'llng his office he would state his support for the orthodox 
Catholic do()trine un ;-1~uTlage in a paa tl)ra1 letter. 46 Also 
cTllring the summer ot 1816 the Papaoy expressed its will1ngness to 
gl ve formal approval to the Ir:'lperlal projeot :eor a reorganization 
of the Venetian dioceses; but Consalvi took oare to insert in the 
Papal reply a rearrirn1&tion of Papal rlghtsand a veiled oritlf31.m. 
of Josephist pol1cies that greatly annoyed the Joaephi8ts.47 
In August Conaalvl took up the dispute over the Imperlal 
claim to nominate to Venetian blahoprlos, offering a compromise 
solution. 48 The Imperial alaim was firmly- rejeoted, for ttsuch 
privileges oannot be inherIted or transmitued to a person of 
dynasty different from that to whieb it was granted." To 
sweeten this bitter pill, he added that the Pope was w1lling to 
gra.nt the nomination-right to the Emperor, if the latter would 
request it as a speoial privilege. Consalvi had realized that on 
grounds of consistenoy it would have been very diffioult to re-
fuse to allow the Emperor to exercise in Venetia a privilege 
which was exeroi2ed by ever.1 other Italian prince and whioh 
Francis himself held in all of h1a other territories. If th1. 
40-'--
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C08salvi to APpoD7i, 2 August 1816. 
109 
power was not granted to the Emperor as a privilege, he woUld 
probably continue to exercise it as an inherent right of 
sovereignty, as the Josephists wished him to do in any case. 49 
All that the Papacy could do was to grant the nomination-right 
as a privilege and thus preserve at least the principle of 
Papal authority. At the same time, Consalvi insisted on the 
necessity of the Romreise before the Imperial nominees could 
be recognized by the Pope. Apparently the Cardinal hoped that 
by yielding on the nomination-right while insisting on the more 
important--and more defensible--Romreise he might persuade the 
Emperor to yield on the latter. This was to be the strategy he 
would follow during future negotiations, with ultimate success. 
Once again, firmness and conciliation met in the Secretary of 
S tate I s pol icy. Cons al vi I s note to Apponyi in which he set forth 
this proposal closed with the suggestion that Papal and Austrian 
representatives be appointed to work out a Convention to settle 
Venetian affairs. The whole tone of this note is one of studied 
moderation and friendliness, but the underlying firmness of the 
Papal stand was unmistakable. 50 
During the same month, Consalvi found another opportunity 
to demons trate his friendly attitude towards Aus tria and Papal-
willingness to make concessions that did not affect its 
essential authority. The traditional though unofficial custom 
49---
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of' the !lpr'.Jnot:~on deG couronnes" cllm'J2d each Cntholic pONeI' to 
:1CJ'linatc one II :3l"\)\'ffi c':ll"dinal!t af3 a sort of unof'ficial reprcoenta-
tive to the Sacred College. :)1'1 3 J°ell:!. Lebzeltcl~ infor,TIed 
rJx.S3.Jovi that the Emperor "-<fished the P:>p:~ to grant h1=';). the 
nO-'lination of a second Itcr(n'ln~ardlnal." It Has only just, he 
2..:r:'r;ued, that th3 ~'''1per(>l'' a3 success:>!' tG the Ven.:;tlan Republic 
Dhould nO~11nate its ·::rOl'm cal--id~.nD.l as Hell a.s h13 O'ffl. However" 
he Has quick to add, h'rancis did not clai'~ this as a right, but 
only a3ked i-t as a special favo!' for which he would be forever 
.t.. ... 1 51 grave.1.u • 
r.rhis reQ.uest Consalvi was Q.uite willing to grant, as it 
provided an opportunity to display the friendly attitude of the 
Papacy wlthout involving any weakening of Papal authority. He 
therefore l~eplied that the Pope, though denying that the Emperor 
had inherited any right fro'll the Venetian Reput,llc, would grant 
Fr'ancis s. special T;ark :;,f his regard. If the Err-perer would 
secretly communioat.-: to him the nal~e of his candidate, Pius would 
oonfer the red hat upon him 8.13 his own choice. All must be done 
in strictest secrecy lest the oth~r Catholio courts be profoundly 
irr'itated by this special favor; but even thts, Consa1vi stressed, 
the Pope wa.s willing to risk in order to show his great regard 
for the Emper(~r ~ Whose wishes he l'las always eager to please if at 
all poselb1e.5~ 
--5r-----
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~., Consalv:1 to Metternlah, 23 August 1816. 
Thl. concel.lon had an excellent eff"ect at Vlenna. 53 . A. 
11 
Consalvl had no doubt lntended, Metternloh dld not f"ail to cite 
it to Francia I as pOlitlve proof that the Papacy was wllllng to 
grant all reasonable Austrian requests provided the e •• enoe of" 
the Papal pOlition was not affected. 54 
By the time thia conces8ion had been formally granted, 
Metternich had deoided to resume his efforts to moderate the 
Emperorts religious policy. It was obvious by mid-summer that 
the Papacy could not be bullied into acoept1ng the religious 
innovatlons, but a religious .ettlement wu urgently needed. In 
late July therefore Mettern1ch sugsested to FranciS I that a 
committee be set up to discus. the revision of" Austrian religious 
legislatlon and the conclUSion of a concordat with the papacy.55 
~ 
The JOlephist8 were up' in arms a~ onoe, bitterly oppo.ing 
&nF moditioation of" the state-church .ystem or &nJ agreement wlth 
Rome. 56 The Foreign Mini8ter nonathele •• persi.ted in his 
ef"tort.,57 and tor a t~me ~eemed clo.e to IUGcesa. Franci. I 
gradually became convinoed that negotiationa f"or a settlement 
with the Holy See were unavoidable. He even began to consider 
truL..oonc~W11on of a f"ormal concordat with the PapacT. In October 
53 
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of 1816 he set up a commission which was to prepare in secret 
all the material necessary to negotiate a concordat tor LombardT-
VenetIa, IstrIa, and Dalmatia.58 
Since thIs commission was oomposed entire17 of Josephi.ts, 
the outcome was prediotable. When atter three months their re-
port was presented, it proved to be a torceful polemic against 
the very idea of a concordat.59 
The Emperor apparent17 aooepted the reasoning ot the oom-
mision and abandoned plana tor a OOftoordat. However, Mettern1ch 
oontinued to press tor some aort ot agreement, the need tor which 
was beooming inoreasingl,. presaing, as no atable organization ot 
religious attaira in LombardJ'-Venetia would be worked out in its 
abseftOe. 60 At length he persuaded Franci. I to authorize the 
opening or informal nesotiationa through the new ambassador to 
Rome, Prince Kaunitz, who was to leave tor his post in June, 
1817.61 But Nettemioh t .... 10t01'7 was very limited in 800pe. He 
acoepted the Joaephist Oouncillor Juestel as Kaunitz's religious 
adviser in the negotiations, and he had to submit h1s Instructions 
58··' 
Ibid., 557, Wallis to Franois I, 30 January 1817. 59-
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Ibid., 571, Mettem10h to Francia I, Februar,r 1817. tiJ.- .. _-
Prince Aloia von Kaunitz-Rietberg, • grandson ot Prince 
Anton von Kaun1tz, the great minister ot Maria Theres., entered 
the diplomatic ae"lce at an earl,. ase and held several important 
posts betore being sent to Rome in 1817. In 1819 he beoame 
mental17 ill, sutter1. periods ot protound depres8ion, and was 
relieved trom his poat in 1820. 
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tor the amb .. sador to LaZaMlq "tor inspeotion and oomment. "62 
How limited Mattemiohts victory really was i8 clear from 
theae Instructions to Kaunitz. 63 Little trace can be round in 
them ot the policies of oonci1iation and mutual ooncesaion that 
the Foreign Minister favored. The apparent purpose of the 
negotiations was not to work out a stable and mutually sat is-
taotory settlement of Austro-Papal religious relations bu~ solely 
to .eoure oonce.aions. The most import&ftt of the desired con-
ceaaiona were: Imperial nomination to Venetian bishoprios, 
abolition of the Ro~18~, Papal reoognition ot the Imperial 
nominee to the Arohbiahoprio ot Salzburg with the retention by 
that prelate ot allot the apecial privileges ot hiB predecessors 
concession to the Lombard-Venetian bishops ot the faculty ot 
grantina: marriage elispenaationa in the third and tourth degrees, 
and formal Papal approval for the new diooesan organization in 
LombardJ'-Ven.etia, the 17rol, and Vorarlberg. or these points I 
the greatest diffioulty w .. antioipated, correctlY,with the 
Romreiae. 
These oonceasions were to be obtained, not by reoiprocal 
oonceaalons, but bY' playlng on the Papal tear ot a break with 
Autria and by appealing to Papal gratitude tor the restoration 
ot the Papal Statea. An additional means was the possible visit 
62 
Ibid., IV, lQ4-12S_ 
63-
The.e instructions .ere 1n two parts J the tirst, in 
Oerman, dealt with rel18ioua negot1ations (Ibid .. , IV, 518) J the 
a.cond, in French, po11tical C1ue.tiona (IV, -;8ir). 
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of Metternioh to Rome, Which would take place onlY' if thePapaoy 
responded f"a'YorablY' to all the Imperial demands. In return for 
these major concessiona, Kaunitz was authorized to otfer only one 
minor concession, in the secular field at that: the possible 
withdrawal of the garrisons Which the Treaty at Vienna allowed 
Austria to station 1n the Papal oities at Ferrara and Comacohio. 
No religIous ooncessiona to the Papaoy could be considered, and 
Kaunitz was to avoid if possible e'Yen discussing Austrian re-
ligious policies, especially the marriage laws. 64 
Metternich was not blind to the untavorab1e impression the 
Imperial attitude prescribed by the Instructions would make upon 
the Papac,-. Negotiations conducted in a spirit ot mutual eon-
ciliation such as he had adYiaed eould have appeased the religious 
controversJ'J but negotiations 1n whioh Austria demanded everythi 
and ottered nothing had little chance of suocess--indeed, the,. 
might only utagon1ze the Papacy still tul'l'ther. He warned 
KaUJl1tz that the religious negotiations could lead to further 
disput.s that would threaten ·our sincere desire to maintain with 
the Court ot Rome the moat int1mate relat10na ot confiden.e and 
friendship, If but he hoped--o'Yer-opt1m1stlcally, as he muat have 
known--that Kaunitzts diplomatic ability would pre'Yent this. 
Above all, he warned the ambassador, he Hmuat never contuse 
[religious relations] with the political relations exiStIng be-
t.een the Emperor and the Pope as tempo~ sovereign ot one ot 
the tirst states ot Italy. On th1a delioate nuanoe ••• hangs the 54 . 
Ibid., 578, InstructioNS tor KaunitzJ 583, SUpplementary 
InatrucID'iiis • 
success or the negotlatlons. n65 Metternieh'8 over-riding concern 
with the polItical implications of the Austro-Papal relIgious 
disputes i8 here qu1te evident. 
Conealv1 learned with great satisfaction of the projected 
negot1e.t1ona, whioh seemed to promise a settlement or the vexing 
rel1g1ous d18pt\te~ w1th Austria. Moreover, such a settlement, 
especially 1t 1n the torm ot a Concordat, would tit a<i"n1r~l.blw 
into the overall pattern ot Cons~vlta relIgious diplomaoy. 
The ehief aim ot Cons&l.i '8 religious po1ic,. during his 
second ministry was to revive Papal authority over the semi-
Independent atate-churches under royal control which had been 
set up in moat countries. To attain this purpose he sought to 
negotiate a aer1es or concordats with the European states by 
which the Papal authority, it not completely restored, was at 
Iealt Increased. Such concordats by 1817 had been or were being 
worked out with France, Bavaria, and Naples, and negotiationa 
were 1n preparatIon tor other states.56 A ooncordat or other 
agreement with AustrIa, the greateat Catholio power, would 
obviously be an essential part of Consalv1 's pollo,- J eSp801ally 
as it would give a good example that many other states would be 
inclIned to tollOW.57 
Gradually the Secretary or state ts aattstaction evaporated 
.---:----'_., 
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On Consa1v1 t s conoordat polICies, see SChmidlIn, chapters 
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as disquieting reports began to arrive from Vienna. The news 
that Metternieh himself' would come to Rome only it the Papacy 
seemed diSposed to accept the Austrian terms was ominous. QS 
Further cause for al&l~a was the selection of Juestel as eccleai-
aatical adviser, for his Josephlst principles were well known. 
Most serious of all was the ~~our which the Hew Vienna nuncio, 
Paolo Cardinal Leard!, reported, that Austr1a planned to (;onduct 
the negotiations tlnot by way of prinoiples to be discussed but 
by way of concessions to be demanded." Leard! added that, 8.8 
usual, the "Austrian oabinet, which never wiShes to retract an 
order onoe published," was unwilling to "recede from its adopbed 
prinCiPles.,,69 
LearcU 18 suspicions were confirmed when Kaunitz, just befvl'l8 
leaving for Rome, warned him that the Emperor had a very broad 
conception of his sovereign rights over the Church in his states, 
and would not enter into discussion on those alleged rights or on 
the prinoiples of his religious 1)01101'.70 A conversation with 
Mettemieh brought no enoouragement. The Prinae admitted that 
the Papal 01a1ma, espeoially to the !!.ornrei6e~ were well founded, 
but he warned Leardi of the "danger of an absolute refusal" wh1ch 
- .... ~.--..--------- --68 
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Carc1ina.rua.N1 (1161-l823) replaced Severoli in 1817 after the 
latter had qual'l91led with Conaalvi. A loyal supporter of 
COMalvi but interior as a. d1plomat to his predecessor, be re-
mained nuncio until his death in 1823. 
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would allenate the Emperor and perhaps lead to the los. ot. 
Austrian support in polltieal and rellglous attai". '!'hi. would 
be especially unfortunate at a moment when Francis I had at last 
been persuaded to retreat 80 far from hla Joaephiat principles 
as to open aagotiationa and ask as Papal Goneesslona what he had 
t'o1-mer17 olaimed .. ilia righta. The Emperor's deciSion to 
negotiate "even againat ·the ad.a. of' his min13ters lt WaB ln 
ltse1t', Metternloh argued,". great step t'orward.!71 
Oonaalvl read theae reporta with mounting ooncern. From 
Leardi's information lt was unmistakably olear that Austrla had 
no intention ot concluding I. eoneo~at, or even ot working out 
a mutual17 satistactory .ettlement ot lmmediate problems. There 
had obviousl,. been no basle chance ot policy ln the Austrian 
goYemment, so that I. .ucoe.sful concluslon ot the negotationa 
aeanted unlikel,.. Frlendahlp and co-operation between AU8trla and 
the Papaq, he told Leardl jUllt betore Kaunitzt's arrival, "would 
be solidl,. .stablished. • .onl,. 'When there disappears trom the 
mind ot H. M. that m1ataken d1atruat towards th~ exercise ot the 
just and essentlal righta ot the Hol,. See, &8 1t they were 
opposed to the rlghts ot soYere1gnty." The Oardinal concluded 
that 1t Austri& insisted on oonfining the negot1ations to the 
oonce •• iona demanded trom the Papaoy, with no discussion or 
prinoiple. or even ot reciprocal oonc.'.iona, there would be 
1!~~~1-7~().~ __ ~or a tavourable outoome. ConsalYl 'a "onl7 hope n ,,_ 
Ibid., Leardi to 00_&1'9'1, 7 June 1817. 
118 
that "the spirit of conoiliation which animates Prince Metternlah 
milbt yet lead to a favourable mod1f1oat1on of the Aus tr1an 
att1tude.72 
The Cardinal'. forebodings quiokly pl~ved Justitied. As 
early as their first conference on 16 June, it became clear to 
both Oons.lvl and Kaun1tz that the negotiat1ons were unlikely to 
produc. a sat1sfactory result. T3 Consalv1 was dlap1eas~d to 
obse"e that Kaunitz lf8.8 eJttPC*ered only to request oonc~88ions, 
not to a.rra.nce a general settlement. 'but of this he had been 
forewarned. More disconcert1ng was the discover" that in return 
for the sizable cone.aaiona requested, Austria ottered only one 
minor temporal advantqe. He quickly intormed Kaunitz that the 
Austrian proposal' were unaat1aractory. Not Conaalv1 ts ; anxiety 
to end the relig10us cont rove ray , hi8 eagemeas to see J4ettern1ch 
in Rome, bun1ts'. ve11ed threat of the withdrawal of M:ustr1an 
diplomatic .upport, nor even the amb .... adol". hint. at t .. possible 
schism could 1nduce him to aceept such extensive conces$10ns with 
no reciprocal oompensation. 
Furthermore, even had Conaalv1 '6een m1nded to 71el~:l, he 
eould hardly have done so. Pius VII had been .erioua11 i 111 for 
I 
i 
some weeka, and hts death was generally teared. '!'he ne~arnes8 ot 
1'2 
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death lntens iried ln Pius the a crupulom.tW';. lIhich of"ten troubled 
him and which made him very susceptlble to the influence at the 
Z,!lan~1. The Pope refused to make any deaisiona on the negotia-
tions wlth Austria except with the advice of a speo1al congrega-
tion. This requ1rement was not unusual for' P1U6, but as the 
congregation was made up of ~elanti, with Pacea at their head, lt 
could exert a hampering influence on Consalvi t 8 conduct of the 
negotlat10ns. 74 
On the following day, 17 June, Kaun1tz sent Consalv1 a 
"Punctuation" in whioh--af'ter much preliminary stress on the 
need for Auatre-papal unity to counteract the revolutionarles--
he listed. the rive chler Imperlal demands, as prescribed 1n h1B 
lrustruetiona 75 Consalv! at once arranged for a meeting of the _ 
Congregation to consider thee. demands. 
At the ~_~~_~~ti-<1omlnat.d congregatIon the Austrian request. 
encountered "une plene et entlere renitence, II as least in eo rar 
as the !!.e>mrellE! and the grs.nt or d1spenaation t'acult1es were 
concerned. In view or this oppositlon, Consalvi aBsured Kaun1tz 
that "there was nothlng to be done in this respect with the Holy 
Father." All that the Cardinal could do was to hint that perhaps 
~J '~rJ!,!!gbt be willing to grant frequent dlspensations from 
A. V., ANV 243, Consalvl to Leardl, 11 August 1817. R260, 
Conaalv1 to Cardinals Litta, De Pietro, Pacca, Fontana, 21 June 
1817. Maass, IV, ;86, Kaun1tz to Mettern10h 17 June 1817; 591, 
Kaun1tz to Metterniah 1 July 1817. Van Duer1l1, 185, Consalvi -1;0 
Mettemioh, 23 June 1817; 191, Mettern1ch to Franeis I, 19 July 
1317. 
75 
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the trip on an individual basis to nominees who had plausible 
excuses. This Kaunitz felt, would a.t leWilt diminish "the danger ,. 
of contagion with ultralilontane prillciples_,,?6 
In bis offiQial reply of 23 .June to Kaunitz 'a Punotuation, 
the Secretary of State, atter' first stressing his desire for 
Ifuna inalterabile oonoordla." with AU5trla, declared that the 
Papa0Y' wished in consequence to lIelintinate all those unf'ol~unate 
d1fferenoes on Whioh His saored dUties did nat allow the Holy 
Father to remain silent." He therefore invited Austria to open 
formal negotiatiOns for a religioUfJ agreement. Sorna at least 
of the Austrian demands, Consalvl implied, the Pope would oer-
tainly grantJ but unfortunately h1s Hsaored dutie8~ prevented 
him from yielding on others. The speeial oongregation would 
decide what aoncesaiona eauld be ~ade.77 
Kaunitz transm1tted Consalvi's note to Metternieh, who was 
then in Florence. The Foreign Minister replied that "as long as 
the negotiation remains in this state ••• , it is impossible for 
me to come to Rome." Only if there was a "moral certainty" that 
a satisfaotory agreement wuld be reaohed eould he make the 
Vi8it, and only complete papal acoeptanoe of the Imperial demands 
Gould provide such oertainty. For the sake of hi. own reputation 
both at Vienna and at Rome, Metternich would not become personall 
76 
Maass, IV, 589, Kaun1tz to Mettern1eh, 20 June 1817 (#2). 
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committed to negotiations that mi~ht have an unsatisfactory 
outcome. He wished to Ittout concilier" It but we was determined 
that if this was i~possible, at least he wuu1d not have pel~onall, 
sanctioned an ul~ati6factory arrangenent. Fron Consalvita reply 
it seemed the Papa.cy vwuld re,1ect i:nportant Austrian de~nands, 
thel"eby l1aking an agreement i"1P05Sible. He therefore rejected 
the proposal to open ,formal negotlatlons. Under these 01 ___ "-
cuma tanoes) he 'I CQuld no nothing but regret n that religioUB 
problems ,\4hich Here not essentially his concern would interfere 
tfith Austro-Papal understanding non other questions of the 
highest interest for ROT11e .. for Vienna, and -{'or all Europe." His 
only concern was !fto defend the great politioal interests which 
link our states; n 1n religious questions he was "only a 
neeotiator, only an intermediary," not an independent, and he 
would have preferred not to have been involved in such ~a1Jtera ~,7? 
Before this reply reaahed Kaunltz .. howeve:", matters had 
taken a nore hopeful turn. Conaalvl had received Papal support 
for a compror.lise: the Papacy would agree to all the Au.stl'·ian 
requests, provided "II. T1. on his side does something for the 
Church by removing at least a ,revl of' those very serious abuses 
, . 
in eccleSiastical affairs which have been intooduced into his 
states, and thus put the Holy Father in a position to justify. 
those conaessions to which he 1s ready to consent only because 
or~e ~9y~~agea that would result therefronl to religion and the 
78 
Maass, IV, 590, Metternich to Kaunitz, 27 June 1811. 
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Church~ "!9 ,A •. peeial:ootl~regat~on would be set up to determine 
just what abuses should be remedied, but Consalvi felt that the 
most likely Papal requests would be that the Emperor "modify the 
marriage laws in Lombardy-Venetia to agree with the doctrines 
of the Church, and plan in concert with His Holiness the insti-
tutions of public instruction for the clergy~1I80 A few days 
later the Congregation raised the Papal terms to include, besides 
the two points mentioned by Consalvi, demands that free communi-
cation between the Papacy and the Lombard-Venetian bishops be 
allowed and that Bulls concerning dogma should not be subject to 
the regio placet;8l 
In effect, the Papacy was demanding these concessions in 
return for renouncing the Romreise, for this had quickly become 
the crucial Austrian demand around which the rest of the 
negotiations revolved. The Austrian requests for the nomination-
right in Venetia and the diocesan reorganizations would be 
granted by the Papacy without reciprocal concessions. The 
Salzburg question seems for some reason (perhaps a desire to 
simplify the negotiations by confining them entirely to Italy) 
to have disappeared from these negotiations. The request for 
79ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817. 
80 Maass, IV, 591, Kaunitz to Metternich, 1 July 1817. 
8lIbid., 595, Kaunitz to Metternich, 4 July 1817. Also, 
ANV 243;-ITOnsalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817. 
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dispensation faculties the Pope definitely refused to grant, but 
this was the least important of the Austrian requests and its 
refusal would not disrupt the negotiations. 
The Romreise therefore became the focal point of the 
negotiations. Kaunitz argued the Austrian case: the Romreise 
was a source of great expense and inconvenience for the bishops 
without producing any corresponding benefit; bishops of non-
Italian territories did not make the trip yet were considered 
none the less Catholic for that; administrative uniformity 
between Lombardy-Venetia and the rest of the Hapsburg Empire 
demanded the elimination of the Romreise; and as the trip was 
only a matter of discipline, not dogma, there was no reason why 
the Pope could not yield on it--to refuse to do so could only 
stem from lack of good will towards Austria, which would no 
doubt have a detrimental effect upon Austro-Papal relations. 82 
Consalvi retorted that Italy was a special case because 
there the Pope was also Primate and the Italian bishops therefore 
stood in a special relation to him with special obligations; He 
admitted that the Romreise was not directly a matter of dogma, 
and that the Pope could indeed yield it under certain conditions; 
however, such a renunciation would tend to "weaken de facto the 
dogma of inviolable unity • ~ ~ [bY] diminishing ever more the 
bonds of communication and dependence of the bishops on their 
82A•V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1816~ Maass, 
IV, 587, Kaunitz to Metternich, 20 June 1817; 591, Kaunitz to 
Metternich, 1 July 1817. 
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Head. tt Only if Francis ! counte:r>acted th:'_s weakening by allowing 
free cO;'1munication between the blahops anrl the Pope c()uld the 
:papacy consent to give up the ROl'\Y'else. 83 
--~.-....... .. 
Further-1l0l1 e, Conaa,lvi pOinted out to Kaunitz the serious 
consequenc~s of the I1very grave scandal that 6. concession so 
extroaordinary ••• without any corl'espondlng concession would 
produoe. II The Papacy would universally be acc;n.med of pal"'~ia.lity 
towards Austria, and 1ta reputation would 8Urrer accordingly. 
Great scandal would be given to the faithful, while rIall the 
govemrnents, both Catholio and non-Catholic, would be confirrned 
in their opinion that t La COUl' de ROJTte 6S tuna cour pol tronne , ft 
and would be encouraged to encroach on Papal rights. Finally, 
all the other Italian princes would immediately dem.and the sallie 
concession, which the Pope clluld not 10gioal1y :refuse them. The 
only way to prevent these dire eoneequenoes was for Austria to 
grant the Papacy religious conoessions sufficiently advantageous 
to religion and the Church as to enable the Pope to justify h1s 
coneeeeions to AU8tria. 8h 
Moreover, Consalvi never fa1led to stress the indisputable 
right of the Papacy to require the Ro~reiseJ which he claimed had 
been exercised without ohallenge since the days of Gregory the 
83 




Great, and to point out that Austria had torma1ly recognized this 
claim in the 9_o_~~1!~io ~i~abi~i~ ot 1784.85 
Kaunltz was impressed despite himself by Consalvi's argu-
ments. He was a1ao alarmed by the ~_e.!ant~, who had "grown 
prodlg10ualytf in numbers and influenoe, and Who were encouraged 
1n their intransigent attitude by the very favorable conoordats 
whioh many powers, notably F:ranoe, were making with the Papaoy. 
They had persuaded tae Pope to dra. up III Bull condemning the 
marriage laws and the teaching in Austrian univers1t1es, whioh 
had even been prInted, "it 18 only the Cardinal Seoretary of stat 
who haa been able to prevent its publication. It 'rhel'efore Kaunitz 
had become tonvlnced that\the questions which have leg to the 
present discussions definitely cannot remain open. n86 If a 
settlerl'tent was not reached now with the eoncl11atory Consalvl, 
the situation would rapidly degenerate. Austria could expect no 
more favorable settlement than that now ofrered. For all his 
good will towards Austr1a, Consalvi eould do nothing more: 
"Cardinal Consalvl 1s doIng and will do the i~o8Bible to give 
Your Highness the possibility of coming to Rome, but I greatly 
,,87 
• • • fear he wl11 obtaIn nothIng trom his colleagues. 
The ambassador therefore sugge.ted to Metternleh that it 
~i~t b~ ~CIt~_t to agree to aome or the Papal deman.ds, espeoially 
85 
591, 
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on the marriage laws, 1n order to reach a stable settlement. In 
this way the bishops would at least be t'reed trom the danger ot 
oontamination by u1trL~ontane principles sinoe they would no 
longer go to Rome, and a ,reat damger to the state-church system 
would thus be removed. 88 "It is exaotly as I had toreseen~" 
K&unitz advised; "we will not get what we want except by taking 
w1.th it what ". do not want. ,,89 
Despite Kaunitz'. advice, Metternich replied to the Papal 
ofter with a firm and total refusal to make any religious con-
' •• 810ns. 90 In all probabi11ty he would have been ~11ag ~-
self" to satis.fy aome at least of the Papal demands, but realized. 
that suoh conoession. would never seoure the approval of Francis 
I and his Josephist advisers. 
Mette-mieh accompanied his retusal with a set ot Ra~li.ttQnS'(~ r:e 
replying 1n detail to each of the Papal requests. The marriage 
laws eould not be revoked in Lombardy-Venetia lest this upset 
ad~1ni8trative unlfo~ity with the rest of the Empire. The 
instruction of the clergy was conducted in acoord with Catholic 
principles and henoe Papal intervention was unnecessary. There 
was no point to the Papal request for free co:nmunicat1on w1th 
the Lombar4-Venetian bishops, for they were already free to write 
to him whenevel"' they wished. The E.!~~!'.t .~gl~ was necessary even 
88 
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tor dogmatic Bulls to ensure that suoh doouments did not oontain 
anything likel,. to oause strite between Ohurch and State. '!'hue, 
&11 ot the Papal demands were unjustitied. However, as the Pope 
had now admitted that it was not beTOftd the 11mits ot his con-
scieftCe to renounoe the Romreise, there was no reaaon wh,. he 
should not do so at once. 9l 
These Retlections were read to Oo_&1vi b,. Kaunitz. "Un-
tortunatel,.," the Ambaasador reporteci, "I cannot tell Y. H. that 
the explanatlona seemed to sat1sf)' H. E. 1ft the allghteat. • • • 
The Cardlnal fouftd "une mauyals. ralson" agallWt each at 
Mettern.loh's argumeftts. COR8alvl retuaed to aocept admlniatra-
tive unlformit,. aa sutticient justitication tor the marriage 
" 
la .. J he deolared. that ideaa oontrary to Catholic dootrine had 
been openl,. taught and detended at Austrian sohools tor thirt,. 
Tears J he denied that the mere ability of the bishops to write 
private letters to the Pope while all ofticial oorrespondence was 
clos.l,. oontrol1ed conatituted senuine treedom ot correspondenceJ 
and finall,. he Gould not agree that the state had any right bo 
supervise dogmatiC Bulla. To Mattemich'l argument that the Pope 
had Ihown that he CQuld renounce the !omreise and hence should do 
10, OoualYi merel,. repeated his remarks on the necessit,. ot 
reciprooal oompensatlon to avoid the appearanoe ot part1al1ty.92 
Ift the taoe ot the t1rm Papal attitude Austr1a mod1fied its 
91 
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demands, as klng now that the Pope, as a special f'avor in return 
f'or Imperial ald in the restoration of' the Papal state, should 
grant the renunciation of' the Romreise only ad ~~tam 1mperatori8, 
but this too Conaa1vi rejected. 93 Kaun1tz then warned that "H.M. ~ 
would never allow the bishope of' the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom to 
come to Rome, and atter a long vacancy 11'1 the episcopal aeea, Hia 
Hollneas would have to do w1thout profit what he could now do and 
place H. M. under an ob11gation." COMelv1 "did not hide trom 
the ambassador the strength ot this argument," but he pOinted out 
that 1t would be "bued on the princ1ple of' tore." whose use 
would certainly lead to open Papal hoat111ty and would diacred1t 
Austria 11'1 publlc opin10n. Even should the Papacy t1nally be 
toreed to y1eld, it would do 80 only in individual cuea and 
would never surrender the general principle of' the Romre1aeJ thus 
Awa trla would make no permanent gain~ 
In the hope of' altering the Papal stand, Kaunlt% arranged a 
meetins betw.en Juaatel and Oo_elvi on 13 Jul.,.. Jueatel's 
enu.meration ot the sarvices of' Prucls I to religion and the 
Papacy did not move the Oardinal, who only remarked dryly that 
no other atate had leglslatlon so overtly anti-Papal u Austrla. 
The Counc1llor's arguments made no impression. Conaalvi told 
Juestel trankly what neither he nor Kaunitz had ever openly 
93 Except where other sourcea are c1ted, the f'ollowing aocoun 
of' the negotiations is bued on Co_alvi's long dlspatch to Leard 
of' 11 August 1811, In A.V., ANi 243. Slnoe this dispatoh oontalna 
te. speclf'lc dates, a prec1se chronology tor the negotiatlons 
cannot be derived trom it. 
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admltted in their dlscusslonl, that he knew the true reason for 
abolishlng the ~o~rel.~ was to remove Papal influence OD the 
blshopa, and that Rome could never agree to th1s without adequate 
compenaatlon. 94 
In effect, the negotlatlons ended wlth thls meetlng, and 
they ended 1n fa1.lure. The negotiatlona were not formally broken 
off because they had never been formally opened, but the tacts .' 
were plaln. It wus ole8.r' that neither side would yield and that 
theretore an ~sf! . had been reached. "I have the sorrow of 
having to announoe to Y. H.," Kaunitz wrote to Metternioh on 13 
July, "that I no longer hope tor anythIng from this negotIation • 
• • " The Papacy would sanctIon the dioeesan reorganIzatIon and 
"ould grant the RomlraatioD-right if the Kmperor asked it as a 
speclal prlvilegeJ but on the other demands, the Romreise above 
all, the Papacy would not yield. 95 
The failure of the 1817 negotiatlons was not followed by 
an open break between Austria and the Papaoy, tor the evil'· eon-
sequence. of a rupture were apparent and neither side had given 
up hope ot pereuading the other to modif7 its stand. Nonetheless, 
a perceptlble ohI11 was introduced into Austro-Papal relationa. 
The atmosphere or cordiality and frIendship that had marked 
1816-1817 W83 gradually replaced by mutual distrust and a sense 
94 
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of' gri't!vanee. Both side. felt that they had. been unfairly treated 
On the Austrian sid.e there was resentment and bitterness that "so 
little justice i. paid [in Romel to the magnamimoua efforts that 
Our August Muter had made in 'favour of the Church, ~ whioh should 
surely have entitled him to special conoessione.96 Consalvi was 
informed that "the Imperial Court haa expressed itself most 
strongly agaInst the refusal ot the Holy Pather, and H. I. M. was 
irrItated in the extreme by it. n97 Austrian displeasure was 8Pon 
shown in more tangible fashion by the withdraw~lof Its aupport 
for the PapacJ' In Germany', bJ' AustrIan encouragement of Bavaria 
to reject ita Concordat favorable to the PapaoJ', and by pressure 
on Tuscany to refuse conoessiona. 98 
At the Papal oourt there was equal indignatlon that Austrla, 
while uldng such extensive ooncesalons, had refused to offer 
anything of value in return, rejeoting "all of the just and verr 
moderate requests of His Hol1ness. n99 
RelatIons between Consalvi and Mettern1eh remained apparentl 
cordial. The AUltrian miniSter gave no lign of displeasure with 
ths .. !l •. :rd1na1 ; no doubt it was olear to him from Kaunitz '8 
96-
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dispatches that Consalvi had pursued a conciliatory policy during 
the negotiations and had done his best to work out a settlement. 
Metternieh's high regadd tor the Secretary of state survived 
intact throughout the latter's life. lOO 
Consalvi's att1tude towards Metternich, however, seems to 
have undergone some change in the wake of these negotiations. 
Consalvi's great hope in his religious dealings with Austria had 
been in Metternieh fS "conciliatory apirit. t1 He had counted upon 
the Prince to secure the adoption by Austria or a conciliatory 
policy to match hi8 own. In 1817 Metternieh had singularly 
failed to do 80. The secretary of State did not lose his personaJ 
respect for the Prince or his confidence in his good inten-
tionB;101 but his faith in Metternioh's ability to put his good 
intentions into practioe must inevitab1~ suffer from the latter's 
failure to secure any significant modification of Austrian policy 
in 1817. 
The only guide to Consalvi'a attitude towards Metternieh 
and Austria i~diately after th~ failure of the negotiations is 
a very brief letter of 14 July to Metternioh.102 Conea1Yi ex-
pressed his deep regret at the failure of the negotiations and 
100 
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by imp110atien repreached Metternich fer net having adepted a 
8utticleatly cenci11atory attitude when the Cardinal had dene 
everything possible on h1s part to reach a settlement. Diplematic 
as ever, the Secretar,v of State retrained frem direct criticism 
of Austria. Instead, he made hi. att1tude quite clear by cen-
cluding h1s letter with an apparently irrei'evant remark: ttl 
oannot refrain from telling Your Highnes8 that a special 
ceur1er. • • , just arrived, haa brought the ratification of the 
Concordat by the King of France." The implied oontrast between 
the generous French concessiena in the CQncQrdat and the 
niggardly and anti··Papal Austrian att1tude 1n the negetiations 
was clear. A warning was alSQ implied: the Papacy CQuld find 
other friends than Austr1a. It the Emperor persisted in his 
attitude, the Papacy might turn to France fQr support, tQ revive, 
perhaps, the tradit1Qnal Ita11an game ef playing ott Bourben 
against Hapsburg. Censalv1 was tQ move tQwards such a revival in 
1821-1823_ 
The implications ef this letter were not lQst uPQn 
Metternich, whQ found therein a compelling argument tor the 
adoption of a more moderate religious polley. In his report tQ 
Franois I on the failure lOr the negotiations (which he asoribed 
to the illness of Piua VII and the growing strength of the 
Zelant1 encouraged by the Frenoh Conoordat), the Foreign Minlster 
outlined the course of action whieh he adVised the Emperor tQ 
follow. It was "before all else ne~e •• ar.v to provide for the 
vacant biShoprics of Lombard7-Veuetla and to obtain the Pontlfio 
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sanct10n for the new diocesan divisions ••• 1 this done, a 
more fa.vorable moment could. be awaited for the examina.tion of the 
other Q.uestions in dispute. II Kaunltz should therefore be in-
s tructed to ooncentrate on these meaauree. As for the Romreise. 
he suggested that the Lombar-d-Venetian bishops should be secretlY' 
ordered to approach the Pope ind1viduallY', eaoh stressing "the 
personal obstacles, such as age, inri~aity, lack of financial 
resources, Wh1ch make It impossible ror hi~n to go to Rome in 
person, and hellust in oonsequenoe beg His Holiness to accept his 
excuses. 11 The Pope would no doubt grant these individual dis-
pensations, provided the prinCiples of the ~~ise was not 
attacked. Thus the Ro~reise oould be avoided without antagon-
izing the Papacy until a rnore favorable tinte oarne to resu'ne dis-
cussions. In the interim, however, it was essential that lIW(} 
avoid new subjects for :nlsunderstanding with the pontifical court. 
This implies above all else suspending the publication of any new 
eoclesiaetical ordinance in the Lo~bard-Venet1an Kingdom. • • • 
This policy was "the sole Jleans of mitigating somewhat the un-
favorable i~pression that could be produced by th~ oo~parison 
between the friendly relations of Spain and France with the 
« 
Roman court and those of Austria with that COUl~. This rapprooh-
ment (between Ro:ne and the Bourbons] could produce gra.ve dal'l'}age 
to our political intereste.,,103 
__ The Emp~ror agreed grudgingly to his minister's suggestions, 
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but only, he .U oareful to .4ate, beeauae "all the eeelestaatic 
ordinance. of m7 other statea have, I thInk, already been pub-
lished in Ital,.." The Emperor's agreement was therefere no sign 
that he had been won over to Mattemich's policy of moderation. 1 
The following year saw improvement in neither Austro-Papal 
relations nor religious conditIons in Austl·la. The Papal grant 
of the nomination~rlght in Venetia, intended by the Papaoy as a 
conoi1iator,y move, had the opposIte effect: the Rmpe~or was much 
irritated that the Bull of concesston should insist on the neces-
sity of the Ro'nrtise. 105 Austrian resentment found expression in 
enoouragement given the Bavarian gavern~ent to repudiate its 
reoent oonoordat, whose favorable provisions contrasted strongl,. 
with the Austrian polioies. This threat to one of his moat 
notable achieveaents greatly angered Consalvi, and he protested 
bit;terly to Vienna. He did not, hm'lever, blane Metternich, but 
rather the Josephist advlaers of the Emperor. 106 
Nor was there the slighest evidence of a more moderate 
rellgioU8 policy in the E;npire. Instanoes il1ultiplied of anti-
Papal or heretiaal teaohIng, of anti-Pape~ books, and of. constant 
government interference in religious affairs. At the alose of 
1817 Leard!. submitted a discouraging report on religious con-
ditions I wh1ah could serve to sUi'lmarlze the disappointment of' 
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Conaalvita hopea: 
The hope had been entertained that the Emperor ••• 
would be induced by the favourable dispositions 
of ministers convinoed of the ne~e.8ity of remedying 
the most serious disorders. in relig10us affairs to 
mOVe aw~ trom his pretended r~lts and to restore 
to the Church little by little its liberty and in-
depend.ence. There was also hope that, oonsidering 
the very poor results of the requests sent by 
H. I. R. A. M. to the Holy Father, all the bl~~ 
would fall upon his evil advisers, and they would 
be disgraoed. Finally, there was a strong inclina-
tion to hope that the political interests of H. M. 
would lead him to forge strong bondo with the Holy 
See •••• The sequel, however, has not corresponded 
to these hopes. 
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The Emperor's attitude towards the Papacy was definitely hostile. 
Metternich oould not even persuade him to send the Pope a formal 
letter of thanks tor the nomination-right. The influenoe of the 
Josephists was supreme: "ever'Tthlng ••• show the predominance 
over the mind of H. M. ot his evil counsellors." Metternioh 
"till lavored moderation, but he "laments that H. M. does not 
apeak to him about relIgious affairs, and complains that no 
bishop of the Monarchy haa the courage to tell H. M. the truth. 
All are afraid and all obey his orders." Those few ministers, 
Mettern10h at their head, who opposed Josephinism were d1s-
couraged and tended to lapse into dtspairing apathy: they flare 
aware of the eVil, but say that there is no remedy, that it is 
neces8aI7 to temporize, and thus nothing is done. ff There was 
thus little effective resistance to the Josephists who "are 
seeking in every way to put into efrect the principle of Joseph 
II that one can be Catholic (~, schlsm*tie) without being 
Roman. \I Their latest move was to "insinuate" to the Emperor that 
,... 
he should demand from the Papacy the right to nominate the 
Archbishop ot Salzburg, the retention by that prelate of all h18 
former privileges, and hie apPointment as Patriarch of Germany. 
"And God only knows where these demanda will end, tI LeaI'dl Qon-
eluded in despair. IO? 
Evidently th$ Josephists were 3ueeeaaful in their 
"ins Inuatlons," fc,r in Msrch, l81~., K£'1..l.nl tz presented two de:nands 
to Conaalvi: that H. r-1. be allowed to no'ninate the Archb1shop 
of' Sa.lzburg ana all30 the b1ahops of Gurck, Seggau, Lavant, Trent, 
and Br1xen, and to all the canonicates and prebendarie~ o~ tho3e 
sees; and tha.t the Archbishop ~tatn all or hie extensive former 
privileges, especiall,. that of.' giving canonical instltutilm to 
his suffraga.n biehop3 of Gurek, Seggau, and Lavant. 108 The 
demand that the Archbishop b~ made Patriarch of Ger:-:18,ny had 
evidently been dropped .• but the conceas"tons de~-1anded were in 
the1"1selves sufficiently destructive of" Papal autho!'ity. The 
prl vl1eges or the Archblnhop l1ere very extens iva: if his :f:'ull 
elal:ns were ree··)gnized, he ~'lould be in a "state of virtual In-
dependenee from the Holy See. ~l09 These special privileges v·.rere 
a relic or the pre--Napol~onic era, T:lhen the Al"chbishnp had been 
an independent ~ccleedastical prince or considerable importance. 
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The virtual independenoe ot the German ecclesiastioal prinees 
had long been a source ot worry to the Papao)", but Consalvi was 
yet more reluctant to see the Arohbishop exercising his full 
powers and privileges 11' at the ea~ ~lme he was to be nominated 
by the Emperor and thus under Austr1an influenoe. However, 
partly as a oonol1!atorT move, partly because inoreasing disorder 
1n the Arohbishopr1c (which had been vaoant since 1814) made a 
rap1d settlement neoe8S&r7, the Papacy was willing to otter a 
oompromise of the I~per1al request8. The Emperor was given his 
choice of two alternat1ves: the Imper1al nomination of the 
Arohbishop, who would then be deprived 01' all his special 
privilegesJ or the preservation 01' the status quo, leaving the 
ArchbIshop with all his privileges but elected by the metropoli-
tan chapter of Salzburg.110 
Th1s ohoioe d1d not satiafy Austria, whleh oontinued to 
press for Ita original demands in full. lll When the Papaoy stood 
firm, the Austr1an attItude, 0001 aince the previous Bummer, 
became definitely hostIle. The Papaoy reeelved unwe100me proof 
ot thi8 When Austr1a oeased to support the Papftoy 1n its struggle 
with the Prote.tant prince. of the Rhineland over control of the 
Church in their atate •• 112 Questioned by Leardi, Counoil1or 
Huda~_~11ed bluntly that Auatri& had withdrawn its support 
110 
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to show its displeasure at the Papal attitude on Salzburg and 
the ~~. and at the recent oonoordats whose principles were 
contrar,y to those held at Vienna. Hudellst did not oonoeal the 
joYi of his gcvern-nent at the difficulties whioh the Frenoh and 
Bavarian Conoordats were encountering. Summarising the Austrian 
attitude ~ Leardi ooncluded that "everything consIdered, one would 
.~ th&t this Imperial court would with pleasure see Rome 
humiliated and almost on its knees imploring support and pro-
teotion. 
The behaviour of Auetria in regard to Sa.1zburg marked 
another stage in Consalvi's disillusionment with the A'1.l8trlan 
alliance. Hitherto, even during the most ~ing part of the 
lS11 negotiations~ ennaa1vi had carefully preserved a tone of 
m.oderation in his letters and dispatohes. The Cardinal's letters 
to I.eardi on the Salzburg question Mark the first 1"la,10r departure 
from th:ts moderation. Evidently his patience had worn thin, or 
his faith in Austrian reasonablenes8 had evaporated. The 
Cardinal bitterly oondemned the 'tunreasonable demands It of" Austria 
whioh, unsat1afied by the "very generous" Papal eon~es!!lons, 
contInued to make new de~ands upon the Papaey with the obvious 
a1m of secur1ng oontrol over the Churoh by Itsmall 1neens1ble 
degrees_ nl14 Consalvi was determined to oppose theee unending 
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demands,for 7ielding would onl7 enoourage atill further demands, 
until 1n the end the Papal authority would vaniSh.115 
This blunt oriticism is the more significant 1n that 
Consalvi knew that the Austrian ~overnMent would at once leal~ 
of it, for his correspondence with the Vienna nuncio was regular-
ly interoepted by the Austrian pollcy.llS Either the Cardinal 
was 80 annoyed that he n') longer ca.red lr Austria lee.rned of his 
opinions, or~·-("Jne suspects - .. he deliberately used this means of 
informing Vienna of Papal displeasure. 
Dete~nlned to st~nd fl~ but hoping to avoid an open b~ak, 
Consalvi appealed once again ror the intervention of MetterniohJ 
and cnoa again he was disa.PPointed. The J?oreign Mln:'-ster B.d ... 
mitted to Leardi that the "Holy ~ee has ~uch ~ight on its Side," 
but there was nothing he could do. In religious affaire the 
Emperor \f8.8 entirely under the influence of the Josephiste, who 
"constantly insinuate to the sovereign that he must uphold all the 
inherent rights of the Archbishopric. ,,117 
This was the last time the.t Consa,lvi appealed to flfetternich 
to use his lnfluen~e to moderate Auatrian religious policy. Nor 
after this incident can there be found 1n the Cardinal's cor-
respondenoe any more of those expressions of ccnfidence in 
Metternich and hope tha.t he would be able to a.lter the religious 
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po1ioies of the Emperor, expressions which had been oommon 1n 
1815-1817. It would seem that Consa1vi's disillusionment with 
Metternich, whioh had begun durins the 1817 negotiations, WII 
completed during the 8Ul'1U1ler of 1818. An important prop or 
Auatro-Papal co-operation was weakened thereby. 
Despite continued Austrian pressure, Consalvi refused to 
make fur.ther conoessions in the Salzburg affair. ll8 As Auatria 
did not 1easen its demands, no settlement could be reached. 
Austrian i~itation at this 1mpasse showed 1tse1f in venomous 
oritioism of Consa1v1 by h1gh offioia1s of the Imperial oourt. 119 
The Secretary of State was 1noreasing1y annoyed by this oontinual 
criticism, which attributed to him the blame for the deterioratio 
of Austro-Papa1 relations. In Ootober his pent-up resentment, 
not merely against this slander, but against the Whole oour.. of 
Austrian policy, burst forth in a bitter, eloquent letter of 
pl'Oteat to Mettern1oh: 
-
I am oonvinced that everything whioh has been done 
at Rome for a long time in regard to the wishes or 
the Court of Vienna, except tor a tew thIngs whioh 
f0'r the soundes t reaaom His Holiness could not do. 
must have been to the satistaotion of that court 
• • • .All that coul.d be done has been done. • • • 
I am too frank and loyal to hIde from Your 
Highness that the ohange of sentiment to the Roman 
government J and the unjust and bitter remarks 
aga1nst its oonduct manifested tor some t1me by 
lIS 
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persona attaohed to the Imperlal oourt I have made a 
deep impreaslon on me •••• To have to earr,r 
a.lmost the whole world on 'rry shoulders here J to be 
made an objeot of slander as a man who does not hold 
to principles; to be accused of laxity, because 
within the proper lirlits I try to adapt myself to 
modern ways J to al~o~e hatred as a supposed Austrian 
partisan) ana after all this, instead of finding in 
those attached to Austria. defenders and supporters, to 
discover in them unjust crities and ••• ealumlnatore, 
I confess to Your Highness that I cannot enduI~ it and 
that I am deeply hurt by it. • • • r will tell Your 
Highness frankJl:y tha.t were it not fOl' the unbounded 
attachment which links me to His Holiness, I would 
alrGaay have retired from the ministry I and that if 
God should ~~)~ me survive thl. Pope, whioh I do not 
deSire, then, not owing to Pius VIII what lowe to 
Pius VII, I wo\~ld have no t'urther reason to prefer his 
service to rny repose, and I would. certainly retire from 
a position which yields me noth1ng but oalumnious 
aecusation and bitterness •••• What could be more 
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fal •• than tor me to be accUlJed ot refusing everything 
to Austria and never doing anything for her satisfaction?120 
This letter is of 1nterest because it reveal. the intense 
frustration and resentment which had been produoed in Consalvi 
not merely by recent critioism, but by the trustrating and dis-
appointing attitude of Austria sinoe 1817. The emotions of 
resentment and grievanoe whieh mark this letter had been building 
up for well over a year; Austrian slander was only the last 
straw. Consalvi had s1noerely- wished Austro-Papal co-operation 
and had done everything possible to realize it, he had followed 
policies in the Papal states f~vourable to Austria, he had 
persuaded the Pope to grant Austria substantlal concesslons, he 
had restrained the anti-Austrian efforts of the ~~~~--and hi. 
----1.-~1r-- ._--
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reward for th~_8 'tT8.8 slanderous criticlsrn and en utter f.ailu·re on 
the Pfl,rt of I\ustrta to adopt an eq""a.lly oonciliatory policy. 
Little wonder that he felt :tn~ured e.nd aggrievec 1 
Metternich--50mewhnt astonished at this outburst of eMotion 
from the usually reserved a.nd self'-c0ntrolled C:?rdlne.l--rep11ed 
with soothing worcs that were at the se.rne tl",e a covert apology 
and explflnatiot') of his railure to mo~erate P·ustrian religio\ls 
poliey: 
I am happy to render full Justice to all the nuances--
beos,use they ~U"e el'l11~htened--th8,t you have super-
imposed upon the attitude of the Holy See. I know all 
the.t Y. H. has done B.nd all that \r~hlch you could not 
do-~all that you wish ann all that you do not wish. 
Yo,-} have, Monseigneur, like all ministers, a 1i"il.ited 
authority; mine i8 the same. I can do mueh goodJ I 
try to do itJ but I cannot do eveTything .••• 
After praising COMalv! 's "enlI&htened. and conoiliatory spIrIt" 
ana disavowing any ctlticiam of him or of the Papaoy, the Prinoe 
concluded with a piec~ of new. designed to enoourage the CardInal. 
The long-anticipated visit of the Emperor to Rome, on which 
Vienna ha.d blown now hot now cold tor the last year, waa defin-
itely to take plaae at Aaster of 1819. This would aerve the 
desirable purpuse oi' putting an end to thl! Wide-spread rumours 
ot an Austro-Papal break. !lIt is not 5ufficient, II r1etternlch 
declared, "that governments be on an intimate footing, this 1s 
an age 'ilhen it is useful that the people be not deceived as to 
the nature of the relations which exiet. I apply thiS principle 
eapeciall~ to our relatlona with the Court or Rome ••• "121 143 • 
Conltalvi and Pius were most pleased by thls nen, whloh 
ofrered the prospect or settllng Austro-Papal dlsputes by dia-
ous8iona "at the 8ummlt." Suoh d18cus8ions were not part of the 
Austrian plana, however. HH. M. de8ires, n Metternlch explalned 
to Kaunitz, "that the joy he wl11 experience on tinding himself 
reunited with the Holy Father, whioh he 18 oonfident the latter 
shares, be pure and unalloyed. He deSires that his st..,. in the 
Capital of the Chrlatlan World be marked only by reciprocal 
testimonies or a contidence and agreement between the two 
sovereigna so well established that the oriminal hopes ot the 
enemi.s ot public order wl11 be contounded thereb7."122 Dis-
oussion ot Austro-Papal disputes was to be ayoided, partly 
because the Josephists teared Papal influence upon the Emperor 
might lead to Austrian ooneesllona, partly "to preyent either 
ot the sovereigns trom havlng the displeasure of not obtainlng 
from the other ••• What he would 11ke. n123 A serlous dlspute 
bet .. e. Pope and Emperor 1n their pel'8onal conversatlona could 
more than undo all the good that would otherwise be aocompllshed 
by the Imperial Visit. 
Instead ot dlscussiOnl or Auatro-Papal disputes between 
Pius VII and. Franois I, Austria proposed that Kaunltz and 
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Consalvl resume negotlatlons Oft the two outstandlns problema, 
Salzburg and the ~omreise, wlth the aim ot settllng them betore 
the arrlval ot Francls I In Rome. It a settlement could not be 
worked out then, th.se questlona should be lett open untl1 atter 
the Emperor'. departure. 124 
Conaalvl agreed to these proposals, but hls increaslng dls-
trust ot Auetrla waa evldent In hls comments to Leard.1: 
I tear that th1a [the project tor negotlatlons] wl11 
create a new souroe or sorrow tor the HolY' See. • • • 
I cannot help toreseelnc that there wl11 be attached 
new demands and new prete_10M J and II Ince the way In 
whlch theY' wl11 want to dlscusa eccleslastlcal aftalrs 
wl11 oertainly Dot be oura, the prinoiple protessed in 
the Austrolan atates belng too well known, the HolY' 
Father has theretore every reason to tear that [theae 
negotlations] ••• wlll be a new source ot aftllctlon 
tor the Holy 8ee. 125 
On thls oocaslon, however, Conaalvl 's apprehenslons were 
not entirely jWlti.f'ied. When the Imperial proposals were pre-
.ented by the charge#d1attaires, Chevaller William Gennotte 
(x&unltz being 111), It vaa evident that Austria had been sUf-
tlclently impressed by the tlrm Papal stand to moderate Ita 
demanda. Imperlal oppositlon to the !omreise was contlnued, but 
in a modifled torm. The Emperor would agree to accept the 
prlDclple ot the !omreise, and would allow "the flrst blshop 
nominated in the Lombard-Venetlan Kingdom atter each acceaalon 
to the Imperial throne, and llkewls. atter eaoh acceaslon to the 
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Pontifical sovereignty, to make this trip •••• In return, the 
Holy Father would engage himself and his auocessors to dispense 
the other bishops. • • from this obligation. tt 
As for Salzburg, Austria had deoided to aooept the compromis 
offered by the Papacy. Of the two alternatives presented, the 
Emperor ohose the status quo--the Archbishop should retain all 
his privileges but ahould be elected by hiB chapter, not the 
Emperor. However, Prancis I asked one modification of the 
atatus quo: he felt that he should have the privilege of nominat-
iug to all the oanonicatea, prebendaries, and other dignities of 
the metropolitan chapter as their patron, since he proposed to 
endow them on a very lavish scale.126 
The explanation for this moderation of Austrian demands ia 
not difficult to find: the Imperial government wished to settle 
these disputes with the Papacy and had at length realized that 
only if it moderated its terms could this be accompliahed.127 
If the Austrian government had indeed, held the opinion that "La 
cour de Rome est une cour poltronne" which could be bullied into 
submisaion, Conaalvi's firm stand on the Romreiae and Salzburg 
had evidently disabused it of the notion. 
More moderate though the Austrian proposals were, they were 
atill not aoceptable in their entirety. The Austrian propoaal 
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on the Romreise, though it conceded the principle ot the trip, 
would to a large extent have eroded ita 8ub8tance, and the PapaCY' 
was as determined as ever to preserve thla link between Rome and 
the LOmbard-Venetian bishopa. Not all the eloquenoe with which 
Gennotte repeated the standard argumenta aga1nst the Romretse 
could move Conaalvi to yield on thia point. 128 The Cardinal 1n 
turn replied w1 th all the arguments he bad used a 0 otten aince 
1816: the ancient and incontestable right of the Holy See, the 
£onventl~ ~cabl~ls or 1784, the speclal position or the Pope 
&8 Primate ot Italy, "the eertainty or having in the ruture to 
grant the aame conce.sions to all the other Italain sovereigns," 
and the acandal that would be given both to the mass ot the 
faithful and to their rulers. l29 Atter a week ot tutile dlscU8-
110n Gennotte had to report a total lack ot suocesa.130 On 15 
March Consalvl formally rejected the Austrian propoaal.131 
More 8atlafactor" to all concerned .aa the termination of 
the Salzburg question. The Papacy, pleased that AUltria had 
cholen to malntaln the status quo, agreed. to give the Bmperor 
the rlght of nominatlng to those dignltiel of the Salzburg 
chapter to which the Pope had traditlonally nomlnated. However, 
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the Archbiahop and his auffragan would continue to nominat"e to 
thoae dignitieB to which they had p~vioU81y pOBBessed the right 
ot nom1nat1on. 132 
The Emperor declared himselt completely satisf1ed wIth the 
Salzburg settlement and praIsed Consalvi for the "enlightened 
efforta" by whIch he had contributed to settling thia questIon.13 
As for the !~mreia., the Emperor, though displeased by the Papal 
atand, declared that he would not make it an "objet de 
reorimlnat1on," &8 he deaired to 1mprove relations with the 
Papacy. Francia theretore accepted the princIple of the ~omreise, 
but planned 1n the future to request frequent d1epensatiora for 
indIv1dual blShOPS.lj4 
With theee nesotlat1on. there ended at last the religious 
controversy which had arieen from the Imperial ~. ( attempt to 
extend Joaephin1em into the newly-acquired territories. In 
dealing with this attempt, Consalv!'s policy of mixed conciliatI0 
and firmness had been as euccessful .. was POSSIble under the 
eircumetaneea. Givea the prevailing political and religious 
ide.. of the age, some degree of Imperial control over the church 
in thoe. territories was inevItable so long as they remained 
under Austr1an control. Coualvi had recognized this fact J the 
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Zelant1 apparently did not. Yet, continued Papal influence 
over the Church 1n Lombardy-Venetia had been assured by Consalvl' 
long fIght for the ~omre18e, wh11e Imperial control of a vir-
tually independent Archbishoprio of Salzburg had been avoided. 
Furthermore--a crucial point for Consalvi--these aima had been 
aohieved without provoking an open break with Austria, Which 
would have been the moat likely result had the intransigent 
polieiea of the Zelanti prevailed. CODSal vi therefore had reuon 
to feel that his polieies had been justified. 
However, the more fundamental question of the status of 
the Church in Austria proper stIll remained, and here all the 
efforts of Consalvi and Plua had tailed to secure any signifioant 
improvement. The long··awaited ImperIal visit offered. an oppor-
tunity to alter this state of attairs. '!'hen the Pope would be 
able to explain direotly to the Emperor the need to modify the 
state-church system. It 8eemed likely that Francis I, sincerely 
religious at heart, would be much influenced bY' this personal 
a.ppeal, the MOl!"e so as he would not then be surrounded by his 
Joaephlst advisers. Such hopes might be further encouraged bY' 
certaln indications that the Emperor himself was becoming more 
, 
favorably disposed towards the Papacy_ The modltioation ot 
Imperla1 demands during the 1819 negotiations, the aeeeptance 
ot the principle ot the !tomre1se" the Emperor'. plan tor reform 
1n the Austrian religious orders,135 and finally hls decision to 
135 
A. V •• R260, Leard1 to Consalvi, 5 Febru8.I7 1819. 
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come to ROl1e despite Joaephist opposition, all seemed to indioate 
some modification of his attitude towards the Papacy.136 
Francis I arrived in Rome on 3 April 1819 and spent some 
two weeks there as the guest of the Pope. In between public 
celebrations and guided tours of the city, Pope and Emperor found 
time to discuss the state of the Church in the Empire. Apparently, 
no record of their conversations has been preserved. Fortunately, 
it i8 not dIfficult to form a fairly accurate idea of the topics 
which they discussed by studyIng the report! and memorials which 
Pius ordered to be drawn up for his infor:nation in preparatIon 
for the Imper1al VIBit. 131 Especially useful for this purpose 
1s a. sUJ'mnary of the most objectionable Austrian mee.surea whose 
revocation the Pope was to request from Francis I and whIch, it 
seen. likely, he did In fact bring up during the dlecU8s1o~~.138 
The seven points discussed in this summary (which are also 
the points most frequently nentioned in the other material in 
this file), most of which had long been the subject or Papal 
compla1nt, were: 
--~36 -
Maass, IV, 142-143; V, Chapter I, holds that this change 
in the Emperor'. attitude took place only atter the visit to Rome, 
Whioh was its cause. It aeems more 11kely, however, that _hange,"',,: 
had 1n tact bepn aome tIme berore, tor the reasons given abov •• 
Maass (V, 8-12) oonsiders the Imperial reforms in the religious 
orders as s1gnifioant evidenoe or the Emperor's ohanging attitude 
atter h1a meetlng With Plus; however, the Emperor had already 
planned the reforms before his v1sit to Rome (R26o# 5 Feb. 1819). 
137 
A considerable quant1ty of this ~ateri&l is to be found 
in R250, tascio I, 1819, ino1uding reporta and opinions on auoh 
points as the marrIage laws, teaching) and state or the clergy, 
and oopies or the pertinent AustrIan edicts and laws. 
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A.V., R260, Innovazioni della Corte Austri&oa, delle qual 
i1 B.P. non puo dispenaarai cia! ohi.dame la 1"8VOO&, 1819. 
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1) !lint and foremost, the marr1age laws, long the chief subject 
of Papal lndtgnation. 
2) The "system o~ instruotion in the Universities and sohools," 
whieh "inoludes a great number of theses which are taught and 
defended. • • containing dootrines pervez-se or condemned. «139 
3} The "Inperial prohibit1on of the introduction of certain 
brief.," espec1ally ~uetore~ r!~e! issued against the Synod of 
Piea by Pius VI. 
4) The I~perlal irJi8tenee that all Bulls and other Papal 
documents receive the E!~cet regia before they might be admitted 
into the Empire. 
S) The prohibition of appeals to the Pope by Austrian subjects 
in religious eases. 
6) The new oeremonial for the installation of bishops, object1on-
able beeause it stressed the duties of the bishop to the state 
rather than those to the Papacy. 
~) Imper1al rules for the instruction and ordination of nOVices, 
objectIonable because they involved the teaching of Joseph18t 
principles, and because it was the duty of the Church, not the 
State', to regulate these matters .140 
In all probab1lIty, these Imperial policies (and especially 
the first five) were the points discussed by Pius VII with the 
Emperor. The Importance ot these personal dacus.lona must not 
1819. 
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Maass, IV, 631, lists a large n~~ber ot such theses. 
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A.V., R260, Innovazlonl della corte &ustrlaca •••• , 
be under-rated. In the wordB of" r~aas8: 
The Pope sald v1rtual1,. noth1ng that was new to 
the monarohj but 1t was ot decisive importance 
that he said it, that he had broken through the 
magic circle of the rational1st court, and that 
what the,. had presented as pr1mitive Christian 
doctrines, he had branded as uncatholic, and had 
thereby been able to plant the first doubts about 
the correatnesa of' the Josephist St~ie.flhuroh 
theory in the soul of the monaroh. 
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The Emperor waa undoubtedly greatly impressed by his d1s-
oussions with Pius VII, and according to Metternich he "arrived 
at an understanding" with the Pope on re11gious quest1ons. 142 
The oritical quest ian was how long h1s favorable att1tude towards 
the Papacy would survIve after his return to Vienna, where he 
would once again be surrounded by those Josephist adv1sers to 
Whose influence he had so long been susceptible. 
For some time atter h1s visit to Rome, the conduct ot 
Francis I gave the Papacy grounds to hope that a definite im-
provement in the Imperial attitude had taken place. Shortly 
after his return to Vienna the Emperor broke with long Joseph1st 
tradition by agreeing to a Papal request to admit the Redempto-
rist'order into his territorlas. 143 Of much greater significance 
in ita implications was the Imperial decision in 1820 to admit 
the Jesuits who had been expelled from Russia and allow them to 
~-i4l---~---
Maass, IV, 143. 
142 
Mett~rnioh, III, 3-5, Note. 
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Maus, V, 1-8 
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work in the Empire. As devout oha'11plon..«J of Papal authority and 
inveterate foes or the state-church, the Jesuits had long been 
anathema. to the Josephists; the Imperial deoision, to re-admlt 
them into the F .. mpire theref'l)re indicated a. '11ajor departure from 
tradItional Joaephist concepts on the part or Franoi3 1.144 
A more ravorable Imperial attitude to Papal proteeta now 
beeame evident. In Maroh of 1820 I~ardi felt oompelled to 
protest strongly to Metternieh against the "scandal or the 
theses upheld at the Catho1ia University of Vienna.,,145 D18-
regarding the advioe of the Jogephist Lazanzky that there was 
nothIng oontrary to Catholic doctrine in these theses, the 
Emperor decreed that in the future all theo1ogica.1 theses must 
be submitted to the looal bishop for approval. 146 
Later in the sa...'TIe year Leardi was warned by "trustworthy 
Per3ons" that the Austrian government planned to introduce into 
the Lo~bard-Venetian seminaries the objectionably anti-Papal 
i3ystem of instruction found in the other provInces. The nuno10 
proteeted to Metternich and Francis I, and the project was 
quietly dropped. 141 
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Ibid., Chapter IV, A.V., R247, Leard1 to Consalvi, 12 
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Maass, V, 1t-7. A.V., R247. Leard1 to 00naal.,.1, 29 Apr11 
A. Y., ANV 247, Leard1 to Conaalvl, 17 Ootober 1620. 
ANY 244. Conealvi to Leard1, 18 November 1820. 
The extent and th& limitationa or the change in the 
Imperial attitude were illustrated when in Janu&r;y', 1820, a 
Papal Congregation placed on the Index the !~h~_r!:~~~ juri~ 
ecclesiastici Austriaci of Rechberger and the Institutiones 
_~ ..... __ , •• _'" ... _:It "" .. _ ... ~ -,~ ____ ,-" __ _ 
~i8tori8.E! !~!!.le.si_as~~8J!. ~f ~~~~~~r. 148 '!'hes. weN the 
standard texts, the rormer on eanon law, the latter on ohurch 
history, W!ed in Austrian sohools. Both were permee.ted with 
Jos.phiet prinolple., and the condemnation of these works was 
an implicit condemnation or those prlncl~1.8 which were the 
foundatIon ot the state-churoh system. 
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This wider implIcation or the condemnation was at onee 
perceived by Gennotte, a zealous Joseph1st. He promptly pro-
tested to Consalv! that It constituted "a sort ot manifesto 
agaInst the Austrian Ian" oontral")" to the "assurances whIch he 
[ConsalVi] haa otten given me that he wanted a system ot ealm 
and moderation •••• " 
The Secretary of State replied that he had no responsibilIty 
for the condemnation, Which had been carried out by the Congre-
gation ot the Index without consulting him. No doubt the 
Congregation had had "puissana motirs" tor its action, and after 
all, h~ pointed out, only the texts had been condemned, not the 
AustrIan legi3lation as a whole as the Zel~E_t..~ would no doubt 
have preferred. In any oue, hi. influence over Pius VII in 
religious affairs ... deolining while that of the Zelanti grew 
-·-"~--·-nB-·--<--· - -
On the condemnation of these works J l5Iee MaU3, V, 
Chapter III. 
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steadily, and he "could not Answer for what they might i'lring 
from (the Pope] in 8. moment of weakness •••• n Conealvi refused 
to enter into further discussion of the condemnation, so Gennotte 
could only await further instructions from Metterniah. 149 
It seemed that another round of religious controversy was 
about to begin. Certainly, a few years before, such a Papal 
oondemnation would have 8,roused the Emperor to vigorous protest. 
If no such oontroversy developed in 1820, it was because of the 
ohange in Franeis I 'a attitude. The Emperor did not make the 
condemnation a subJect for protest .. but merely ordered the pre-
paration of revised texts to replaoe the older ones. However, 
sinoe he did not speeifioal1y ~ntlon the two oonde~ned works, 
they continued in use for some years. ISO 
Consalvi was not overly impressed by What he ealled, rather 
contemptuously, "thea. minor improvements II in Austrian relIgious 
policy.151 After all, none of the major Papal grievanoes bad 
been removed by them, nor had they affeeted the essence of the 
state-church syetem. The CardInal fa attitude mingled mild. hope 
arising from the Emperor'. recent moderat1on with the strong 
distrust that was a 1egaey of hie dea11ngs with Austria in 1817-
1818. Franois I had been a stout defender of Joseph1niam too 
--1"49----- . 
Maass, V, 174, Gennotte to MetternIoh, 5 February 1820. 
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A.V., ANY 244, Consalv1 to Leardi, 20 December 1820. 
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long, it aeemed, to abandon it now. Yet "these minor 1mprOve-
ments ," though at no great 1mportance 1n themael ves, m1ght be a 
hopeful prognoatic tor the future. There seemed, moreover, good 
reason to hope that the outbreak at the Neapolitan Re'Yolut10n or 
1820 might show the Emperor the need tor Papal moral support, e.YeD, , 
1t obtained at the expense ot Josephlst pr1noiples. l52 
A touchatone could be tound tor the validity ot these hopes: 
the response to the Papal Memorials sent to the Emperor shortly 
atter his departure trom Rome. These Memorials critioised 
oertain Austrian religious principles and polioies, essentially 
those alread7 discussed at Rorne, and called upon Prancis I to 
abandon them. lS3 Prom the W&7 In which the Bmperor reacted to 
these Memorials, it would be possible to dlvlne the true extent 
at his ohance ot heart. 
The impresslon which h1a meetlng With Plus VII had made 
upon Fra.aoia I .as so protound that he was at tl" t eager to 
comply wl th the Papal reque.t.. Even betore leavlng Italy, on 
Jul,. 4, 1819, he sent the Memorials to hi. Eccle.lastlcal 
Adviaer Ju.stel, lnatructlns him to report on the merlts ot the 
Papal ideas, ftsardle.. ot whether or not they .ere 11'1 agreement 
with exlstlne Austrlan legialatlon. Juestel '8 report ot August, 
1819, .as what the Emperor might have expected trom 80 ardent a 
152 
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Josephiat. He bluntly declared all the Papal complaints un-
justified, and adv1sed that the Memor1als should be ignored.154 
This negat1ve report failed to satisfy' the Emperor, Who wu 
still under the influence of his meeting with the Pope. On 24 
August 1819 he ordered a prelate of more moderata views, Bishop 
Jakob Frint, the !of-~~-~pt~, to oomment on the papal 
requests. Frint •• report was delivered over a year later, on 
1 September 1820. It was in general favorable to the Papaoy, 
though markedly amb1poWi on certain pOints, perhaps from tear or 
the Josephists. Frint acreed that heretical doctrines were being 
taught at Austr1an univers1t1es and Bchools, adm1tted that the 
Pope could not properly perform h1s duties as Head ot the Ohurch 
without tree communicat10n with the bishops, and opposed the ex-
c1uaion of an ent1re Bull s1mply because part ot it was contrary 
to Auatr1an pr1noiples. However, he was unable or unwilling to 
attempt to delimit the respeotive spheres ot authority or Ohurch 
and Stat. in regard to marriage, and oontented himselt with 
advising both to work in harmonr. Nor.as his position on the 
question or appeals to the Papacy ver.r clear, though he did 
advise qainat unneo •• s&1",V state interpos1tlon between A1l$t~.i\~': ,-
olergy an4 the pope.155 
_
__ F~rancis I was favorabl)" impressed by Frint.s report and 
r~-~-· 
Ibid., 14-16. 155---
Ibid., 16-17. Blshop Jakob Fr1nt (1766-1834), appointed 
Hot-und-!U~pfarrer in 1810s enoouraged the Catholic religious 
Nv1ViI InAustrraj espec1al17 1nterested in the 1mprovement or 
Catholic schools and s.minar1es. 
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seemed read7 to act upon it. Leardi reported enthusiastically 
that the Emperor .. "tilled with good will" towards the PapacY', was 
detePmined~i "to oorreot ever.Y'thing oontral'7 to the saund dootrine 
ot religion and the Church." He had just "sent to the Chancery 
ot the Interior the repll" to be given to the Memorials •••• 
The.e good arrangements ot H.I.M. are most remarkable because 
thel" involve abandon1ng doctrines held tor no less than halt a 
,156 
centurt in thia Emp1re. . ... 
Consalvi, though enoouraged by Leardi fS report, did not 
echo the nuncio's optim1sm as to the possibility of sreat changes 
in Austrian religious polio7_ He had learned bl" sad experience 
the strength ot the Josephist. at Vienna and the extent ot their 
influence over the Emperor. 'lbe most he would hope tor was that 
perhaps the Emperor had at last realized that "the Secular 
Authol'1t,., threatened by the secret plotting ot the Settar,l and 
b7 lrrel1gious prinoiples. • • haa no more solid support than 1n 
the propqation and teaching ot the true religion, tt and might 
aooordingly make some alterations in its religious polioY'.157 
The Cardinal's soepticism .as justified by the event, tor 
the Emperor'. original determination did not long survlve in the 
hostl1e atmosphere ot the Jo.eph18t court. The Joseph1sts tought 
a del&)"1na actlon to prevent the sending ot the Imperial rep1l" 
,'" ···";:-15tr---
A.V., AHV 2-7, Leardl to Coualvi, 21 September· 1821. 
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while they gradually won Franei8 I away trom his original resolve 
to satisfy the Papal complaints. lS8 Metternieh maJ--&S he later 
olaimed-~ave continued to work tor a better understanding with 
the Papacy, but it 80, hiB ettorts met with no auccess.159 
In March ot 1822, atter a ,.ar and a half of frustration and 
del~. Leard! reported 8adl1' that, although Francis I wu 
"risoluti d1 proibire ogni iota di dottrine pern1oiose, che 
\ 
s'1nsegno nelle universita," he had declded to take signlficant 
action in response to the other Papal grieVanoes. lOG Soon even 
this expectation began to seem overoptim1s tic. The Emperor was 
falling back again to an inoreasing extent under the influence 
of advisers "hostile to the good cause," who were seeking to 
persuade him to uphold in full the "pretended rights of the 
orown over the ohuroh. f1 lAardi teared that they would be able to 
delaT still further the Imperial reply and make changes in 1t 
untavo~le to the papaoy.lol 
The final blow to the Papal Memorials was delivered in 
Jull.l .1823, when the Emperor t • otticial spiritual adviser, 158 
Metternich, III, 3-5, Note. 
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Ibid., There is no oontempDrary evldence tor Mettern1eh's 
clalm. Hilieems 1n tact to have taken little intereat in the 
religious developments of l820-l8~3. He apparently dId not attemp 
to support the Papal Memorials, the nuncio's protests, or the 
Emperor-s projected change in Imperlal rel1gIoUli pollcy. Perhaps, 
as Maass sussests (V,,), havIng "burned his tingera" ln opposlng 
the Josephlsts in 1814-1811 to no aval1, he was reluotant to do 
battle with them again. 
160 
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~he Josephist Counoillor (Staats - und Konferenzrat) Martin von 
--- -----
ILorenz, submitted a tormal report on the opinions g1ven bY' Juestel 
and Frint. Lorenz was 1n complete agreement with Jues tel that the 
Papal compla1nts were entirely unj~tiried and lnadmlseable. The 
Pope had only been persuaded to present these Memorial by the 
~elanti, whose real aim was to place the Imperor and h1s pre-
I-----.--~ 
decessora under susp1oion ot heresy. He therefore advised 
against any attempt to sat18ty the Papal grieVanoes.162 
In the taoe or th1a strong Josephlst oPPosit10n oulminating 
in Lorenz 'a report, the Bmperor abandoned his orlginal aim of 
satlsfying the Papacy and ceased to concern hlmselt wlth the 
Memorlals. No reply to the Papal Memorlals was ever sent. On 
this negative note the Austre-Papal rellgioua diplomacy ot 
Conaalv~' •• econd mln1atr,r oame to an end. 
The etteot ot the rellglous di.pute. ot th1s mln18tr,r upon 
lustro-Papal relationa w ... erl1lW1ly detrimental. The onset ot 
the d.cline ot lustre-Papal eo-operation can be traced to the 
tailure ot the 1817 necotiationa to produce a mutually satis-
tact or)" .olut1on ot rellg10WJ probl.ma. Mutual distrust and 
resentment, th. inevItable result ot the dlsagreements of 1817-
1818, led to a rap1d deterioration of the once frIendly relat10ns 
betw •• n the two powera. lt the same tlme, COll8alvl t s confIdence 
in Mett.rnioh (an •••• ntial faotor tor .ucc •• sful co-opera.tion) 
gradually d1.appeared. 
162 
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The more concilia.tory Austria.n attitude of 181:) 1820 
cheeked for a time the deterioration of Austro-Papal relations. 
Had the Emperor held to his original resolve to satisfy Papal 
complaints, a revival of Consa1vi f s confidence in Austria and 
hence of Au.etro,·Papal co.·operation would probably have resulted. 
Thi. did not take place, aDd as long as the buic Papal grievancell 
remained, full Austro-Papal co-operation could not be attained. 
Nonetheless, the modIfication of Imper1al pollcy, llmitea though 
It was, had aome good effects. The most presslng dlsputes Gould 
now be settled, thus averting the danger ot an open break and 
making possible the oontinuance of a certaIn measure of political 
co-operation, notably against the Set~. The relIgIous truce 
that prevailed after 1819 oftered the possibility, It not of the 
ereation of full Austro-Papal eo-operation whlch was impossible 
while Josephinism reigned at Vienna, at least of the revival of 
that degree of co-operation whioh had existed in 1815-1817. Had 
political factors not supervened, the gaping rents which 
religious controversy had torn In lustre-Papal unity might in 
time have been patched up. But within little more than a year 
atter the ImperIal visit to Rome, the Neapolltan Revolution broke 
out, and before its reperoU8lions had ceased, the lustro-Papal 
allianee had received a mortal wound. 
When Conaalvl's second ministr.y ended with the death ot 
Pius VII in August, 1823, Joaephinlsm seemed hardlT less dominant 
In the Hapsburg domains than it had been when the Cardinal re-
turned from Vienna in 1815. Nonetheless, all was not as before. 
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With the hindsight of a century and half, it is possible to 
perceive that the flood tide of Josephinism was reached around 
1815, and that by 1823 it had begun, very slowly, to recede.163 
Certainly, this recession had not as yet attained spectacular 
proportions by 1823. Few oontemporaries of Conaalvi peroeived it. 
Nonetheless, the moderation of the Imperial demands in 1819 and 
the aoceptanoe of the ~o~~~eJ the admission of the Jesuits into 
AustriaJ the increased attention paid to Papal protests; and the 
serious, though ultimately unfruitful, attention given by Franois 
I to the Papal Memorials: all of these are indications, small but 
unmistakable, that the long, 8low course of Austrian policy away 
from Josephinism had begun. 
The polley of firmness and conciliatlon followed by 
Consalvi deserves some credit for this development. On the one 
hand, his firmness had checked Austrian encroachment and had 
shown Austria that the Papacy could not be bullied into surrender. 
The Papacy was not a mere satellite of Austria, obsequious to its 
will. If Austria wished to be on good terms with the Papacy, its 
pretenslons would have to be abated. At the same time, the 
Cardinalts attltude of studied moderation and conciliation had 
averted quarrels and antagonism that would have retarded the 
Austrian movement away from Josephinism. The aggressive policy 
favored by the Ze~ant.i would, almost certainly, have so antagon-
~~JL~tr~A-as to have prevented for an indefinite time 
103 
~.alS, IV, 142-143; Schmidlin, 344-345; Leflon, 
340-341. 
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Power from seek1ng a rs.pproche1'flent with the Papacy CLne moving 
away from J08ephinis~. 
Thus Consalvi during hiB ministry carefully cherished that 
tender plant whose seeds were the ultra~ontane revival and royal 
fear or revolutionary prinoiples, and whose fruition would be 
the destruction of Josephiniam in Austtl'e.. He did not live to 
see the triumph of his workJ the h~rvest was gatheeed by 
another's hand. But the credit for having cherished and pro-
tected its growth cannot be d.nied him. 
2. The Forniture Affair: 1818-1821 
-----
Paralleling the religious controversies of 1817-1821 both 
in time and in effects was a financial dispute wh1ch, though less 
intrins 10ally serious, nonetheless played a similar role in 
undermining Auatro·-Papal friendship. 
The subject of this dispute was the ~orni~ure or military 
supplies furnished by the Papal government to the Austrian army. 
During the Austrian oooupation of Naples after the defeat of 
Murat, large bodies of Austrian troops frequently passed through 
the Papal States on their way to and from the Regno. The 
Austrian government, ita military logistics system disorganized 
during the recent war, requested the Papal government to supply 
these troops wlth provislons. Consalvi was reluctant to add yet 
another finanoial burden to the Papal treasury, but his desire 
to remain on good terms with Austria and his fears that a short-
age of provisions might lead to dis orders among the Austrian 
troops Ie. hlm to agree to Metternloh'. request In the Convention 
of 12 June 1815. The detalls of this agreement were later 
worked out between Consalvi and Lebzeltern and embodied in a 
Convention of 24 August 1815. The Papal government agreed to 
meet the requisitions of the Austrian forees, while Austria 
pledged that the Papal government would be tully reimbursed for 
163 
all forniture proVided atter 12 JulY' 1815.164 
During the remainder of the Austrian ocoupation of Naples, 
the Papal goyernment provided the passing Imperial forces with 
all necessary supplies, at great financial inconvenienoe to 
itself. The reimbursement promised for this outlay was vitally 
necessary to the Papal treasury and hence was eagerly awaited. 
Unfortunately, the procrastination and evasion on the part of 
Austria which were to mark this whole affair soon made their 
appearance. Although Auetria b~gan to liquidate her debts from 
the Italian campaign in 1817, it was not until september 1818 
that she finally dispatehed an agent, Earon Johann von Koeller, 
to Rome to settle the Papal claims. Consalvi's annoyance at this 
delay, whioh added oonsiderably to the finanoial diffioulties of 
the Papacy, wu as nothing to his indignation when Koeller 
announoed, immediately upon his arrival, that his government had 
disallowed most of the Papal c1ai~ by reduoing it from Scudi 
135,615.87 to the "minute fraction" of' So. 28,870.o6~. 
Pressed by Consalv1 to justify this "soandalous reduct1on," 
Koeller enumerated the Papal olaims which Austria oonsidered 
~ unjustlf1ech 






, ~ot~~~~~:~an troops. but to those of her Italian allies. I 
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Austria refused to assume responsibility for troops other than 
her wwn, hence this sum ;1Ust be collected fro':l the Italian states 
concerned. Consalvi vehe1'nently dtsputed this eontention. The 
Papal governnent had granted the rlght of transit only to AUt3tria 
and ha.d signed a Convention for' the supply of troops only with 
her; the Italian troops had marched aB part of the Austl"'ia.n arll1Y 
and had been supplied by the Papal govern~ent only in that 
capacity. Therefore, he a.rgued, Austria must accept the respon-
sibility for supplies given to these forces. 
?) Pa.pal olail1'.s t(;tallng Sc. 13,186.65 for the de1::1ts of 
Austrian of'f'icis'ls and officers were disallowed as not being the 
concern of the Imperial government. Consalvi accepted this dis-
allowance as justifled. 
3) Sc. It-3,746.59 for clothing furnished Austrian troops was 
disallowed, on the ground that although this had been supplied 
after 12 July, it he.d been requisitioned before that date and 
hence did not come under the Convention. Consalvi rejected this 
reasoning, arguing that the Convention stated simply that the 
Papacy should be reimbursed for everything ~~PElie~ after 12 
July; the date of requisitioning was cOl1pletely irrelevant. 
lJ.) A Papal clai''''l ror Sc. 16,237 .59 7/8 fOl" tobal~Co and 
b·randy suppl:ted was reJected on the ground that these items were 
not really military supplies, inasmu.ch as they no longer formed 
part of. the standard rea.tion issued to Austria.n troops, and hence 
they did not come under the Corrfentloli. Consalvi replied that 
these ite~s had been requisitioned by the appropriate Austrian 
166 
authorities, that the Papal government eould not re?"'3onably be 
expeoted to be aware of preoisely what ltemB formed pa.rt of the 
Auatrtan military ration, and that if the Austrian officers ha.d 
made an unauthorized requisltton the blame should fall upon them, 
not the Papal governMent. It would be most unJust to penalize 
the Papal government for dotng everything possible to meet the 
needs of the Austrian army, especially as the denial of this 
particular reCjuisition wuuld no doubt have led to disorders among 
the troops,. 
5) The final deduotion oonsisted of Se. 10,434, of which 
968,26 was for Papal errors in oa.l cuI at ion, and the rer1ainder 
for requisition forms (boni) illegibly or irregularly filled out. 
Consalvi agreed that the errors in calculation should be cor-
rected, but felt that in justice Austria was bound to cover the 
irregular ~()ni "because the Papal government in supplying the 
Austrian army did not do so for its own benefit in hope of gain, 
but in the oharacter of a good neIghbor and friend. • • and if 
in 80 vast a transaction the Papal agents, ignorant of the 
language and of the rigorous rules of account of the Austrian 
army, had accepted and supplied irregular requisitions, the Papal 
treasury should not :suffer thereby, tI for such errors stemlled 
only fror'l the sincere des ire of the Papal officials to s atis ry 
every wish of the Austrian forces. 
Conaalvi therefore claimed payment in full for all the 
Papal olaims (except the second above), "relying upon the well-
known justice of His Imperial Majesty" who had assured the Pope 
that the passage of' his forees would not cause the papacy'the 
slightest 108s. 
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With suoh skill and force did Consalvi argue his case that 
he scored a minor diplomatio triumph by winning Koeller over 
completely to his views. In his last oonversation with Consalv! 
and in a later Note of' 28 September 1818 .. the Auatrian representa 
tive l~cognized the justtce of the Papal claims. Althoug,.1-t his 
instructions did not allow him to c()rmnlt his government to paying 
these clni~, he a3sured Consalvi that while l6quidating Austrian 
acoounts wlth her Italilln allies, he \'lOuld IlI'range for the 
oolleotlon frol'1 each state or t ts share of' the S c. 37,796.50 1/8 
supplied to the allied troops and for the eventual delivery of 
this auf1'\. through the proper ohannels of the Austrian government 
to the Papa.cy. As for the other Papal clair1.s J he would talce 
upon himself the task of securing their paYMent by his 
165 government. -
With this plsdge Koeller departed, leaving Consalvi in 
apparent posseseion of' the field. Disillusionment gradually 
set in as 'nonthB pI.seed with the Austrian government ",)1aking no 
move towe.rds paying the Papa.l olai~s. Finally, his patienee 
exhaU8ted and hie confidenee in Austrian good faith strained, 
Conealvion 30 Ja:1.1\.1a.ry 1819 instructed Leardi to inquire as to 
the intentions or theAustrla.n govern~ent and to press for a pro~p1 
165 
The above account of the ne~otlations with Koeller is 
based on Consalvi's detailed description in A.V., ANV 244, 
Consalvi to Leardi, 30 January 1819. 
settle''1ent .166 
Since Leard1. \'iaS then absent fror.1 Vienna, this task 
devolved upon his Uditore, 11onsignor r.'tuZl. 167 The Uditore at 
IGG 
fiI"St directed his inquiries to Baron Koeller, only to be told 
that this Jl1atter was now entil"'ely out of Koeller fS hands and in 
those of the Finanoe Minister, Count Stadion. Upon visiting 
Count Stadion, I,1uzi learned that the il1atter was being dealt with 
by one of the Count's Subol~inates, Councilor Joseph Von Filion, 
whom he would have to see.1G8 
Well aware of Consa.1vi ta eagerness for information, Muzi 
at once visited Filion. T~ the Uditore fa surprise, however, 
Filion refused his repeated requests for info~nation, insisting 
that Muzl would have to direct hiMSelf to the JUnister of 
Finance or the Foreign Minister. Deoiding that it would be 
fruitless to see Stadion again; Muzi oonsulted Baron Johann von 
stuermer, in charge of the f.oreign ministry while Metternich was 
absent from Vlenna. The Baron professed himself unacqua.inted 
with the Question and requested Muz1 to send him an off'oJ.al note 
1(;6 
Ib1ci. 167-----
A.V., ANV 246, Leardi to Conaalvi. 1"( February 1819. 
Leard1 was accompanying the Emperor on his trip to Rome. Muzi 
i8 best known for his mission to Chile in 1823; Sohnidlin, 
397. 
168 
ANV 246, Muzi to Conaalvi, 10 March, 13 March, 20 March 
1819. John Philip, Count von stadion (1763-1824), Austrian 
Finance r·f1nister and in charge of the administra.tive reorgani-
zation of the ::;mpire. 
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requ.eti~~ information, to whioh he would reply aft~r More tully 
l~ornting himself on the t~~~ure affair. 
This official note was duly sent, but Stue~~r's reply was 
long del~ed, and ~men it finally erune added nothi~~ to Consalvl'. 
knowledge. The Baron merely announoed that he had sent the note 
to Count Stadlon, whose concern it was, "requestlng him tc make 
known as soon as possltle the decision that will be made. 1t169 
And there, so far f\.8 Vienna of'fieialdol':1. was concerned, the lJ'1atter 
\!>JEtS to l'SS t for many months. 
Meanwhile, ConsaIvl was beooming increasingly irritated by 
Austria'S procrastInation and increasi~~ly suspicious of her 
intentiona. At best the Austrian government was s~owing little 
oonsideration for tha interests of its presumed close friend the 
Papacy; whioh l1aCi. been c.ounting on the repa.yment of 1ts claims to 
malte ends ~neetj at wurst, it seemed distinctly possible that 
Austria was resorting to a delaying action in a deliberate 
atte'npt to avoid paying her ,1ust debts. Certainly, Muzi '6 ex ... 
perience in bSing sent fro:n one Austria.n official to another, 
none of the'll willing to express any knowledge of or responsibll1t;v 
for the t2Fn~.~~. affair, suggested the la:l;ter alternative. fl~i$ 
8Ul!5pieion was to gr()w ateadily stronger :lS the affair dragged on. 
Consa,lvi thcraf:)l"'e instructed ~,quzi to continue to press the 
169 
A.V., R2h'7, I,!ttzl to Con:ut.lvl, 8 r-1a.y 1819, with undated 
reply of Stuermer and copy of Muz1 fa note to hi" of' 22 TI.arch 
1819. 
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Austrian government for definite information as to ita inten ... 
tiol13. 170 At the same time, he took advantage of the Imperial 
visit to R()me to approsfth Metternich d1reotly on the !ornlt~. 
question. The Prinoe aeemed sympathetic and promised to look 
into the matter when he returned to Vienna, though it was not 
within his Jurladiotion. 171 
vl1th thiS 8.'3r!uranee COMalv! had to rest eontent during the 
summer o~ 1819, as r~tternieh did not return to Vienna until 
September. Nor did Muzzi Bueoeed 1n stirring the Awstrian 
bureauer~ey to action or even 1n obtaining more definite informa-
tion as to its actiOn!. 
ContM!7 to COMal vi'e expectations, the return of 
Metternich to the capital faIled to produee any Improvement 1n 
the Situation. Leardi ~et with Metternlch eeveral times but 
learned only that the matter was still under consideration by the 
Ministry of Finanee. However, Metternlch assured the nuncio that 
the !.,?rnltu~ aft"air would be settled "eoon" and in a satlsf'acto1'7 
manner. 172 "1ettemlch '8 formal reply to Consalv1 fa inqulri9s 
mer$1y repeated the same lnformatlon. 173 
Metternloh may have sought to use his influence on behalf' ot 
....... ~--,.-.--..... "- .... -,.-". 
170 
A.V., A}N 244, Ccnsa1vl to Muzl, '2lf- April, 26 r~.ay 1819. 
171 
I~1_~., Conealvl to Leard!, 2 October, 27 October 1819. 
172 
A. V. J.. R247, Leardi to C0l138,1vl, 15 September, 6 October, 
16 October 1~19. 
173 
Ibid., Leardi to Consalvl, 27 Ootober 1819, with undated 
reply or-1itetternlQ.h to Consalvl. 
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the Papacy in the rO~E~tu~_ affair, as be had promised to' do, 
but his authority was limited to his own Mlnistr,y of Foreign 
Affairs and h1s influence on other branches of the govern~nt was 
alight. In any case, his influence, if exerted, produced no 
via 1b1e results. 
During the year that followed Mettern1eh '3 return to Vienna, 
the f~!!1..:i:t;ure a.ffair ITlade lio progre3s tm·mrd a final settlement, 
but merely repea.ted what had gone before. Consa.lvi continued, 
-v'11th gro\,11ng irl'}pa.tienoe a.nd irrltation, to exhort the Vlenna 
nuncio to press for a settleMent of the arrair. 171l- Although 
Consalvl at times suspected !..es.rdi of' not a.cting with suff:toient 
vigor', the m.:mcio did his bes t to carry ou.t his orders J 175 but 
all his efforts could not overcome the infinite talent of' the 
Austrian bureaucra,oy for procr8.3tlne.tion and evasion. For month. 
after month Leard1 went on a futile round from one Austrian 
:nini3tar to another, but f'l .... O'il none could he obtain e.rr.! definite 
information as to the status of the question; all seemed "content 
171+ 
Ibid., Consalv1 to Leardi, 13 November, 4 December, 18 
December 1819, 15 January, 19 February, 1 I\1areh, 19 Apr!l, 30 
August, 1-1- Oatober 1820 .. 
175 
See Consa1vi's orit1c1sm of the nune10 on this aecount 
in $241, Consa1v1 to Leard!, 4 December 1819. Leard1, though 
loyal to Conaalvi, was not notable for energy or initIative, but 
in this case the Cardlnal's oriticism Seams to have been unjus-
tified; see Leard! 's indignant defense in R247, Leard1 to Consalv 
26 January 1820. Such outburst u this --like, indeed all strong 
expressions of eootion--were 'fIer'Y rare in Conaalvl IS correspon-
dence; it W~ no doubt an indication of the Cardinal's great 
a.nnoyance and sense or f"rustrat1on at the Impasae which this 
affair had reached. --.. ----.--. 
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to let this d11lgraoef"..1l aff'a.ir sleep eternally. Innumerable 
ll),eetings with thIs or that mInister, innumerable letters and 
notes to and f:-o'TI the Auatrian goverrl'nent, innumerable promises 
that the 'natter would be settled "soon, It hopes raised and hopes 
disappointed, and all with no tangible result: this was the 
course of the r<?~i tu~ affair in 1819-1820. 
The outbreak of the Neapolitan Revolution in July, 1820, 
Which ',"lade neoessary a conSiderable increase in Papal defense 
spending, increa.3ed at111 fur'char Consalv1 's anxiety to seoure 
rapid payment of the Papal claims Itwhioh ciro.urnstanees have now 
ma.d.e indispensable .ror us«"1 7'7 He therefore decided to address 
Mettemioh directly. Writing on the SRrne day that he learned 
of the Revolution, he begged Metternich to secure payment "au 
plus vite, tt for thi8 event would. put the PapaoY' in "extreme 
need. "178 This letter having produced no effeot, Consalvi re-
newed his appeal in August, declaring that only MetternlohtB 
intervention could bring about the settlement whioh was now more 
-'----" -t7"€r-
Ibiti .. , I.eardi to COl1Salvi, 29 SeptEwlber 1820. Virtually 
every one 'oJ' Leard1 fa dispatches in R247 for the NovEtmber 1819·· 
october 1820 period mentions some new visit by the nuncio to one 
Austrian rain1ster or another in an attempt to obtain information 
but w'lthout succ~ss. 
ITT 
Ibid., Consalv1 to Leardi, 30 August 1820. For the 
urgent Papal need ro~ repayment created by the Revolution, see 
also: A...W, 2l~7, Leardi to Consalvi, 21~ July, ;;:)1- August, 29 
September 1820. Van nuerm, 249-252, Consalvl to r~tternich; 8 
July, 12 August 1820. 
118 
Van ~uerm, 249. Consalvl to Mettern1oh, 8 July 1820. 
113 
than ever necessary.179 The poreign Minister responded tavorably, 
promising that as soon as he arrived at Troppau he would speak 
to the Emperor on this Subjeot.1SO 
Conaalvi realized that Mettemich, preoccupied with the 
manitold problema arising trom the Revolution, might easi17 
torget what was tor Auatria a m1nor aftair.181 Theretore while 
cont1nuing to remind Mettern1ch ot h1a promiae J he direoted 
Leardi to go over the heade ot the Austrian m1n1stera b7 com-
plaining directl,. to the Emperor. Prancis assured the nunol0 
that he would look lnto the matter p81'110nall,. and 8ea that it was 
settled as soon as posslble .182 Thua prompted, the Bmperor soon 
atterwarde 1asued orders to Stadlon to settle the question, but 
various unexplained ditticulties in the Mtn1str,y ot Flnance once 
agaln brought del.,. .183 '!'wo more months dragged b7 whl1e the 
Emperor and Metternich were at Troppau. A letter in late 
November to the Poreign Minister having elicited no rep11', 
~QM.IY1 Jf.rOJ;e to him again in mid-December in terms ot near-
179 
Ibid., Conaelvi to Mattemich, 12 AUSWlt 1820. 
180-
A.V., R210, Conaal"i to Metternioh, 22 September 1820. 
This letter was written to remind Metternioh ot his promise upon 
his arrival at TroppauJ Mettarnioh t • letter containing this 
promlse, like numerous others in the Consalv!-Metternich oorres-




A.V., ANV 241, Leardi to Conaalvi, 24 Auauat 1820. 
183 
Ibid., Leard! to Consalvi, 29 September 1820; R241, 
Leardi tOCol'l8alvi, 28 September, 12 Ootober 1820, Conaelvi to 
Leardi, 4 October 1820. 
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desperation. The expenses ot the Papal government were growing 
Iteadi1y as a result ot the Neapolitan situation, and the need to 
payment ot its olaims WU noW "M)eT EXTREME" (underlined three 
timesl); it Metternich could not obtain aotion, Consalvi would 
have to send an otticial note ot protest direot to the Emperor 
h1mae1t. 184 
That drastic step proved to be unnecessary, tor wlth the 
oonc1usion ot the Congress ot Troppau Francls I and Metternloh 
t'Uund time to attend to the tornlture affair. In late November 
the Emperor gave imperative orders that the matter be settled, 
and in mid-December the Ministry ot Finance finally acted. On 
16 December 1820, Laardi Joyfully reported that Lebze1tern was 
on hiS w., to Rome to aett1e the Papal c1aims.18S 
Conaalvi'l satistactlon that thiS artair was at long last 
aettled was ahort-Ilved, tor the settlement proved little to his 
liking. He soon learned that the Austrian government, although 
it had by now spent over three tedious years going over the 
Papal claims, W88 .til1 uncertain ot its ob1lgation to pa, the 
greater part ot them. When Lebze1tern arrlved 1n Rome, he 
brought not the Sc. 106,181.01 to whlch the Papal government telt 
i~8e1idntlt1ed, but a mere So. 36,000 tor those claims tdlich 
A.V., R165, Coualvl to Mettem1ch, 16 December 1820. 
Conealvi's earlier letter ot 22 November is 1n Van nuerm, 308. 
18S 
A.V., ANV 242, Metternich to Leardl, 22 November 1820. 
R247, Leardl to Con&alvi, 4 Deoember, 16 December 1820. The 
ma1n purpose ot Lebze1tern's mi •• ion to Rome was to request Papal 
.. aiatanGe tor the Austrian campaign agalnst Naples. See below, 
Chapter IV, Section 2. 
175 
Auntr1a had deaided to aocept. The remaining Papal claims would 
have to be SUbmitted to a new and more detailed liquidation to be 
held at some unspeeitied future date. 186 
Conaslvi was utterly astounded and disgusted by this sudden 
dlsappointment or his hopes just as they had seemed on the verge 
of' fulfilment at lut. He protested "most vigorously" to 
Lebzeltern, with whom he argued the Papal cue for several days 
but without effecting any change in the Austrian stand. l87 In 
Vienna Leard:L too protested to Metternich, who waa sympathetiC 
but unencoura.g1ng. The Fore1gn Minister asserted that he had 
used every possible me811flJ to secure a settlement favorable to the 
PapacY', but unfortunately there were too m&rIJ' debatable points in 
the Papal olaim for the Finanee Ministry to acoept it in full. 
Unde~ the circumstanoes he could do nothing more tor 06nsal~1.1?a ~ 
Consalvl's indignation at this most unsatisfactory settle-
ment, eoming as it d1d after years of procrastination and evas10n 
knew no bounds. He had, he wrote Leard1, not been able to avoid 
tee1ing lithe greatest disgust at hearing that, atter having spent 
as you justly observe, tour years in the liquidation of this clai 




A.V., ANV 247, Leardi to Consalv1, 16 December 29 
December 1820. R247 J Leard1 to Consalv1, 21 December 1820. ANV 
242, Stuermer to Leardi, 26 December 1820, 3 JanUltlT 1821. The 
exact Bum ola1med brthe Papacy is g1ven 1n ANY 244, Conaalvl to 
Leard!, 2 October 1819-
187 
A.V., ANV 245, Consalvi to Leard1, 3 January 1821. 
188 
A. V., A.NV 247, Leardi to COMalv1, 29 December 1820. 
176 given to us, all is to end by submitting our olaim again to·a 
new liquidation which, if one is to take the past as a guide, God 
h'l10WS it it will ever be finished, and that a payment so tar out 
ot proportion to the sum owed to the Pontifioal Governnent is to 
b i "189 e g ven •••• 
Consalv1's doubts as to the comp1et1on at this further 
11qu1dation seem. to have been well-founded, for no mention of' 
further progress 1n this affair is to be found in the records 
ot' hi. adm1ntstration. If the promised lIquidation ever took 
place, the result. would seem to have been negatIve, as no 
further mentIon or. th1s p01nt oan be tound in the surviving 
documents.190 
Thouah it thus disappeared trom the Burface of Austro-Papal 
relat10ns after 1820, the eftecta of this "most d1sgusting 
affair" of' the torn1ture were lasting, and most pernicious. These 
etfects were to be seen not merely in the Papal ref'wsal to 8upp1y 
the Austr1an army that marched on Naples 11'1 1821,191 but in the 
189 
A.V., ANV 245, Consalv1 to Leard!, 20 January 1821. 
190 
The writer has gone through all the pert1nent tiles 11'1 
the Vatican Archives, as well as the .rohiyl0 4i StatQ (Rome), to 
1825, without f'inding anJ turther reterence to the conclusion ot 
thI8 liquidat10n or to &n7 addit10nal pqment bY' Austria. The 
subject is never mentioned In Consalv1's correspondenoe with 
Leardi after J anu&r1 1821. It Is possible that all the materIal 
relating to this toplc was gathered into one file which has 81nce 
been lost or mislaid; but one would still expect to fInd at least 
80me casual reference to it In the Consalv1-Leardl letters atter 
1821. 
191 
See below, Chapter IV, Sections 2 & 4. 
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genel"a1 de<teriuI"atlon of relatiol1s between the tl'IO states. At 
best, Austria thl--QUghcut this affair had shown little consi<kra-
tiol,'). for the needs and r1ghts of its presumed partner in the 
Union of Tllronc a.nd Altar; at \-lOrst, its conduct was susceptible 
of interpretat10n as a de11berate attempt to evade its just 
obligations to the Papal governr:1snt. In either case, it was 
hardly calculated to increase Consalvi IS confidence in Austria, 
a.lready eeriou.f3ly 't'leakened by the relig10us controversy. 
Mettern!ch later attributed the Cardinal's growing d1st~t ot 
AUf'!tr1a and. h1G increasing reluctance to co-operate w1th her 
polioies in Ita17 solely to his resentment at the forniture 
affa1r. 192 Tn!! 18 certainly a great exaggeration. OonsalV1 18 
fa1th 1n Austria had already been undermined by the religious 
controversy, and his po11tical princ1ples would in any ease have 
eompelled him to oppose much ot that Power's policY' in Italy in 
1821-1823.193 Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the 
f'orniture affair did weaken still further Consalv1's already 
deolin1llg trust 1n Austria and thus w1dened the breach between 
Vienna add Rome. As drops ot water can in time wear away the 
rock they fallon, so the many petty delays and evuions of the 
Austr:ten government, c11maxed by the utterly unsatisfactory 
8ettlement whioh it offered, had gradually eroded Consalvi fS 
faith 1n Austria. It would requ1re onlY' the renewed display of 
192 
A.V., R247, Leardi to Conaalv1, 30 June 1821. 
193 
5ee below, Chapter V. 
l\uBtrla1s desire for hege~nonY' in the Italian Pentnsula during 




THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1820-1821 
1. Revolution in Naples 
Early in July, 1820. COM al v1 was dis tractea trom his pre-
oocupation with internal retorm and religious affa11"S by the DeWS 
that revolution had broker! out in Naples.1 On 2 JUly, two 
Neapolitan ~ offioers belonging to the secret society ot the 
Carbonari led their men in a revolt whioh rapidly gained 
adherents in other units of the arrrtJ. Thanks to the inoompetenoe 
and panio of the senile King Ferdinand and his government, the 
rebels encountered no effective resistance and were 800n the 
muters of the kingdom. The te11lritied king granted their 
demands: the radical Spanish Constitution ot" 1812 was proclaimed, 
a liberal ministry installed, and a national parlIament elected. 
The Revolution W88 apparently a complete suocess. 
Oonaalvi reaoted. with apprehension and dismay to the news 
ot the Revolution. The Papacy could hardly weloome the 
establishment upon its southern frontier ot a revolutlonar,y 
1 
On the Revolution, see: George T. Romani, The Neafolitan 
Revolution, 1820-1821 (Evanston, Ill., 1950). Ann-rsare :loertl 
ie~.), Itti ail Par1am,nto delle Due Sicilie (6 vols; Bologna, 
926.19qyr; 'Includea an excallent-s-tud; o? the revolution by the 
editor (IV, vii-cdx). For Austrian policy during the revolution-
ary period, see Paul W. Schroeder, Mettemiohts Diplomaol at ita 
Zenith, 1820-1823 (Austin, Tex., 1962), 25-163. -----
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regi':19 by a secret society notorious for its l'adical and a..""ltl-
cleJ:~i!Ja.l view'S, a rebi~.:le whose ver:; axis tenco waa a stimulus to 
the Setta:j or tile Papal States. Papal distrust grew' when re-
volta led by the C8.l.'\bonar1 ovel'thraw Papal authority in the small 
Papal enela~eD in Neapol1tan terr1tory, Benevento and Pontecorvo, 
even though the Neapolit~n government refused their requests tor 
8lmexatioll. Tk,i:' was it long before anti-clerioal legislation 
began to appeal" in Haplon c 
Under these C.h'OUJ11stance~ J rela.tions between R':)rne and the 
revolutionary govern/7\ent would nevel" be cordial. The Papal 
attitude was a1t"~S rO!"~laJ.ly correct,. and Consalvi was oal~rul 
tt~ avoid. anything that might give unneoessary offense to l1aples 
lest it sarve as a pretext f.or attack. HOt"1ever, though 8,ccept1ng 
the new reg:t:.lC!) as the ~ facto government of Naples J the Papacy 
ret'uaed to grant it formal reeognltton until the other European 
powers had done so. 2 
Except for Spain and Holland, the othel' European nations 
showed no disposition to reoognize the new government. Indeed, 
it soon bec~~e evident that the great powel~ were 1mplacably 
hostile to the Neapolitan regime an.d that Austria in particular 
-1).8 deter-nined to suppress it. From this Austrian determination 
sprang most of Consalvi fe problems in 1820-1821. 
2 
For a thorough study ot the Papal reaction to the 
Neapolitan ReVolution, see Joseph H. Brady, Rome and the 
Neapolit~ Revol.utlon, !?! l820-l~21: .! S~u!il Th PaRi!' 'RiUtral1tl (!lew York, 193'71. 
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Ur~fortunnt~l~T for the rapa.ey, itt: f'!tatf.!s l~~r betlJeen 
Naples and the Austrian terr:ttor:!.es 1 if AUf:'ltr:t~ proposed to 
invade l'!aples # her f'..rmy woulrl firs t have to pus through the 
Papal states. Thus the Papacy 'Would. inevitably be invol'Yed, 
direetly or 1ndireetly, in any Auatro-Neapo11tan hoetiI1t1ee--a 
most cerious e:ttue..t1on, l'ar'tien.l.u-1,. in Yie~" 01' the 'opt' fa 1lual 
aha.recter. ThA Pope WM obliged bY' his rejl:'.glous charaeter to 
T'lR1.ntain peaoe with all statea unlet .. , attaoDd and to preserve 
his neut.ral.l ty- in tlUl!l ~lWolVlng other state... Common pruc1eMe 
dtntat8d the same p01i07, for the militarily weak Papa8Y could. 
not hope to de~end. its IItatee ~aiMt a determined attaok. Un-
fortunately, the geographical position of the Papal. State. would. 
make the preservation of thi. deSirable neutral1t7 diffioult 1n 
an Austro-Neapolltan W~. A serioua oomplieation ... the 
attitude ot Austria, whioh telt that as the champion ot order 
and the eonserV'atlYe cause it deserved the wnole-hearted support 
of the Papacy agalnat Naples and would be most ind1Snant it suoh 
support was not forthcoming. Henoe, the Papal dile:mma: to give 
Autria the full support IIhe des1red W0111.d. be to 'Ylo1ate Papal 
neutrality and risk 'Pl"O'Yoklng NeapolItan invasionJ to refuse that 
support would mean alienating Austria and perhaps the other eon-
serYat1Ye powere all well. Oo_&1vi 'a main concern durIng the 
tall and wll'!Ater ot 1820-1821 was to extricate the Papacy frolil 
this dile'l1.l'!1a. 
The Seoretary of Sta.te was not long left In doubt as to the 
intentions ot Autr! .. towards t.he Neapolitan l'tt&1.'I1le. Within .. 
l82 
tew weeks after the revolution 1e~ji reported t~at Vienna, 
f':;,;aring the opread ';)1 loaevolutiuu to t~1.e rQS t; of' Europe t was 1"'-
solved to Ilr uta'bl11re Iltol~d1ne turbaJco U in Naples~ by force it 
necessary. 'l'h~ ar1lY in Lombardy-Venetia had already be~ll ordeNd 
on a W&1" f~otlng. 3 SO()ft thel'eatter# the Austrian gov@rnnent in a 
note of 10 August announced to tha varioua Italian courts the 
Jlobiliza.t1on c£ lt3 forces and its deter:n1nation to ref] ~ore the 
leg1tima.t~ order in Napl:;:!. The Italian IS tate. weN called upon 
to $UPPo.t't J\;\.U3tria by exhibltiIlg a "atrotlg and pronoUl'1ced !oors.l 
at tit-ade It &;&1nll t the ravo lutionar-.f regi:ne. 4 
Conaalvl 'a 1'1Nt J!'eAGt1on tQ th. new of the Austria.a plua 
.as extreme &litation. "We are loet the told. the PrWIa1an 
a.nbaaaador]. • •• At the fiNt news that Austrian troops ha.ve 
moved from FeI'rar&, th~ Neapolitans w111 oceup3" Ro:ne. u5 Yet he 
realized that to opPGa~ Austria'. plana would oertainly antaso-
ni~ that power. A,1J¥ doubts he miSllt have had on that point were 
remov3d in m1d-AugWJt when Leard1 reported that Austria. waa moat 
irritated beoause the Papacy had not adopted a sUftlOiently 
(Jonde:imato1'7 attitude towards Naples and was not supporting the 
Austrian position with $\lrrloient vigor. Vienna was ttflrmly 
·.l 
..) 
A.V. I 'R2J~1, Ieard1 to COl!l8alvl: 27 July 1820. 
4 
A.V., R165, GenMtte to Consalvl, 10 Au.swst 1820. 
5 
Van Duerm. 253, :Mote 1, NIebuhr to GeftJJC)tte. 2 August 1820. 
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d'!tern"1.!'!ed to ~~tore t ...... oJ~. o!'oer rtt Nnp1.~~. t'no dc~ire~ that 
~11 th~ Italian ~ev~rn"'e!ltR d.ecla~ th~ms~lves in favor or such 
".n o~~.t1on, or a.t least ~('mdcrm Nhl\t has happened." 'rhl~ the 
Papacy had not don~, ~nvlng M8tternich to exolalm ~~r117 that 
"~e "'001" prefer the Carbone.ri to the Aust~lans." The Forel!ft 
... ----....-------
Minister wu &leo Maple ~8d bY' rnmo\ll"8 that Pius VII wttS plannl 
to ~!'ant hie Aub,18ota a eOMtltut:ton. 6 
Mett.1"ft~-oh 1"eruf'ed to see Leard1 when the latter sought aD 
tnt""!e,, to defend the P""an,. e.gfdnet these char'S... Consalvl 
thel'8fore 8.eet)mp~1tl.d the of"ti~i&l Papal reply to the Austrian 
note of l() August (which merely e~reeeed d!l" approval. at the 
Nelll}'1011tan regime, 'Pdslng ovet- 1n al1ene. the question ot 
auppoJl't tot- Austria agat1llJt it) with .. oonfidential letter to 
Mettemlch ift whteh he explained the true Papal position. 
Conaalyl "agre •• pertectly with the •• ntiments ot H.I.R.A.M ••••• 
on the toree. of' Nyolutloa in Naples t .. well .. the dangers 
that Gan re.~t fro. them." He acknowledged that OJ~y in co-
operatIon ot all goyerDmeDta ... ..tety to be towut t but Ull-
tortlUlately the pee\lllar 8ituation 01' the Papacy imposed e .. rtat. 
limit.tiona upon it. eO-9pentlo-n. A8 the Cardinal explltlMd to 
Mettemloh: 
It Y.H. w111 cbse"e the double quality of the 
the Holy Father, .. Head of the Church and ae aov.reign 
of a state. • • 111 contaot alona a ver:t 1081 tJ.'llllt1er 
with t...':tt K1ngdo"1'j. or Naples. • .. entirely- laoldng all 
6 
il,.;I!., AN'! 247, Leard! to Oo11881v1, 21 August 1820) also 
15 Auauat l820. 
meana o~ 4e~eftSe, 70U w111 no doubt peNetve the 
lnvtnethl.-., n~ce9~ 1t~T th:'.t th,. Ho~y r~~,thr.:;r act i'11th 
oare OD .ertain measure. tor putt1D& tato etreot 
ht ... tmi.on l~r:'-th R.I.R •. L N., :tf' it is e. question o~ 
tak1na aJ'l ln1nt1oal att1tud.e towarda the hapo11tan 
govel"l".Ment. 
III Ilia capuity as Hea.d of' the Ch'U.'POh. • • , 
1f the H01y Father eannot, even to save his political 
e:x.1ateac., take actto. qa1aat aoa-Catholio .. tio_ 
in order not to inJure thf'lr Nle;~1cn6 With their 
Catholio aubjeota, l1\\1.Ob 1 ••• OUI Be 40 80 qunat an 
entirely Catho11e state, and still lese to the ~o8t 
aenull u.trlme¥lt of III '1-l"J" reoent eOlloorclat o~ .uch [treat 1mJ)Ol"'t:8.I'lce 'for relIgion [' .• e. s the Concordat 
of 1818 which had made l.mpo~aat OODe ... lo_ to the 
Pape.cyJ. The Hol~ See, which hae a1 ways regarded the 
Sect. &a oppo.ad to the .p1~lt or tkat x-el!alo11 of 
Whieh it 1. the cent8r. • • ,will never cease to fight 
, them, ana all &overnrflfJata that 8ef;tk to deatro7 them 
w111 alw~ rind in the Holy tlee the rnoet eonstnnt 
and aincere aupport •••• Bu.t the re11810u relatloft8 
••• lfb1eh the Holy 8ee must presel"Ve with all govern-
menta. • • forb1<! it to taD It hoatUe attltucie to aD7 
goyermnent. • • • 'the Pope. even 1n matters where he 
acts all a ten~poral $oYere1pl, oan never forset [theae 
rel1g1oUl consIderatIons) nor prefer aDT tempo:ril 
&avantage to them. • • • 
But tbis is atUl mON evlC1ant ••• ltl.'UU'l one 
eone1dere the Roll" lP .. ther aa sovereign or a state 
bovd~rln& on liap~s • • • la.cldng urt lmlaz:a of defense. 
It 18 knOWft with certainty that the Neapo11tM govem-
ment. or rather th$ Cu'bonaz':11 are enl7 ae_k1na II. pre-
text to invade the Papal l'Eates •••• The least appear-
anoe of a hO$tlla attitude on the part of the Boly 
Path~l' would :sUffice to attract lntrne~late17 the entlT 
ot the Neapo11tana 1nto Hia atatea ••• , <)ar17ing 
there the flam •• of ~evolutlone. 
All that I have said abova _111 d.mon6t~ate to 
Y.H. how the moat just and co~pelling motives tores 
th~ Hol,. Father to avoid ••• oertain meMUftI in put-
tIng into practIce his unIon with H.I.R.A.M. it it 
inyol •• s a.tina against the Neapolitan government. 
Consalvl ~onelud$d by st:r-esslng again his desire to aid Austr1a 
lIheMyer po.sible, but at the same ti'lte expl"'efJs1ng his hope that 
Metternioh would uader.tand and 'JmPath18~ with the dIfficult! •• 
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ot the Papal position. 7 Soon atterwards, Leardi was instruoted 
to see Metternich and deft7 the absurd rwDOUN that the Papa07 
preterred the Carboraarl to Auatria and that Pius VII was planning 
to grant a conatltution.8 
At the same time, Oonaalvi took pains to demonstrate his 
tri8.cUiM.S to Austria b7 deeds aa well as words. Ear17 1n 
Ausust, I4ettem1ch had requested Conaalv1 to p .. s on to him all 
tfttormatloD on the aotlvltles ot the Neapo1ltans collected by 
Papal oftlctals. In order to show h18 lood wt11 Oo_alvi agreed 
to th1s request, though it wa hardl7 1n _eping with Papal 
Mutralit", he theretore aaked that it be kept striot1,. aeoret.9 
The Cardlnal oontinued th1s tlo. of uaetu1 intormation until the 
tinal oyerthrow ot the 'eapo11tan regime .10 Another proot ot his 
1004 w111 ... liven later in Auswst, When he complied with an 
Austrian request to arrelt am ex-ottioer ot the Italian &rm7 
•• ,ected ot Carboft&1'1 laaniop. 11 
Conaalv1 f. "1UN.l'lOe., lupporttd b,. these tarc1b1e proots 
ot lood will, luccee4e4 1n 4ilpe111nc Mattemiohts tormer doubts 
about the Papal attltucie. At thelr next meetlng, the Prince 
1 
A.V., R165, Coualvl to Mettern1ch, 23 Aupat 1820. 
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A.V., ANi 244, Oo .. 81vi to Leardl, 9 September 1820. 
9 
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received Leardi In the moat rrlendly mannep possible, warmly 
prai8ed Conaelyi's "wi8e and. prudent conduct," and. "declared 
htmself completely sattsfied wtth the honest and loyal principles 
and maxima of the Pontitical government, which he unceasing17 
applauded." As a token ot Austrian trien<lahlp, Metternich 
ottered troops to detend the Pope aaainat &D7 attack, but only 
it the Holy Father vGluntarll)" requested them. Leard! could 
detect no 11ngerlna traoe ot doubt or suspioion 1n his manner. l2 
The Seerete.I7 ot State took another opportunity to dIsplq 
Papal frIendship, not to 887 partIalIty, tor Austria 1n late 
September. Two Neapolitan diplomats, the Duke dl Gallo and 
Prince C1mitIl., had stopped in Bologna on their return trom 
unauooesstul missioDa to Austria. Their presenee so near to 
Lom'bard7 where th.)" coUld eas11)" spy on AustrIan m111t8.17 prepa-
ratione ... moat d1epleaaI_ to V1enna. f4ettemich theretore 
.ecretly requested that ne1ther the7 nor &n1 other Neapolitans 
'be allowed to remain long in Bologna, and that in the interim 
their oorreapondence should be intercepted by the Papalpolice.13 
Oo_alyi promptly arraased tor the interception ot the 
Heapo1it... mail, with no apparent qualma, but he wu reluctant 
to antason1.e Naples b7 bluntly order1ng the diplomats to leave 
Bologna. Iutead, he iD8tructed the Lelate in that c1ty, 
12 
A. V 0, AJW 247, Leardi to CoUalY1, 29 September 1820. 
13 
Van Duerm, 279, Metternich to CODllaly1 15 September 1820. 
A.V., R242, Co_alvl to Spina, 25 September 1820. R241, Leard! 
to Consalv1, 14 September, 18 September 1820. 
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Cardinal Spina, to interview the Neapolitans, point out the 
embarrassing position in which their prolonged stay was placing 
the Papacy, and request their eo-operation 1n leaving as soon as 
posaible. Thus approached, Gallo and C1mitile expla1ned that 
theY' were only awaIting ord(fVS from Naples before leaving Bologna, 
and their intercepted corl"espondenoe oonfirmed this elalm.14 
Their orders aoon arrived, and by late October both dIplomats had 
departed. 
During the fall of 1820, then, Austria and the Papacy 
seemed to be dra"iDg together under the threat posed to both bY' 
the outbreak ot revolution in Naples. Consalv! ts trielldly 
attitude made a favorable impression upon Vienna) Mattemiohle 
letters to the Cardinal during th1a period are ~~re fr1end17 1n 
tOM than arq- sinoe 1817. This wu alao the period, it will be 
remembered, at which Franei3 I seemed about to turn away from 
his Josephlat poliCies and to eo-operate with the Papaa.r in 
re1ig1ous matters. In consequence, Austro-Papal relatIons during 
the tall and winter of 1820 were more cordial than theY' had been 
for three ,.ears and more. It seemed possible that the Austro-
Papal allianoe, strained b;r rel1&ious strite, m1cht yet be 
restored to its pristine vigor. 
14 
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2. The Prel~ina.ries to Austrian Intervention 
Austrian preparations tor intervention in Naples went 
torward rapidly in the tall of 1820. M1lit8l!7 preparations were 
soon completed, but the diplomatlc preliminaries were lengtn,. 
Before Austria could act, she had first to obtain the support of 
the other powers and to arranae with the Papacy tor the passage 
ot Austrian troope. 
The support of the Powers was sought at the Congress ot 
Troppau in October-November 1820.15 Ensland ana FI'anoe, 
though privately friendly to the Austrian Intervention, refrained 
tor political reasons trom openly endorsing it. Rus.ia and 
PrusSia, however, proclaimed their solidarity with Austria in 
the well-known !TOppau Protocol, which announced that: "states •• 
which have undergone a ohange ot regime due to revolution, the 
results ot whloh menace other states, ipf!o facto cease to be 
paI't of the Uliano., And remain exoluded trom it until their 
situation gives guarantees ot legal order and stability •••• n 
It these states "oausa by their pruz1mity other countries to 
fear ir.m18diate danger," the Allied Powers would employ foroe 
15 
Schroeder, 60-103. Oharle. K. Webater, The Foreil!! 
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if' t'.ecessary to "ering them back into thE: midst of.' the 
Al11anee.,,16 
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With the support of the Powers thus assured, the next move 
was to a.cure I:-'apal 60naent for the passage of Austr1an troops. 
Consalvl had long tilnce foreseen such a de;nand, and while the 
Congress of Troppau was still in 8Gssicn he had ol.:.tlinac. to the 
ParilS nuncio ¥!.Cns;, 19nor Vinoenzo Macchi, the geool."'al pelicy which. 
he planned to rollOt~ 
There are tour maiD points to be considered: 
first .. the pMsage of A~trian troops through the 
Papal States J second. the statIoning ot part ot 
these troops in the Papal ~tatee; third, t~e 
supplies to be provIded tor these troops) tourth, 
the restoration to His Holiness of Benevento and 
Pontecol"V'o. To begin with the last, there oan be 
no doubt that both these territories must be 
restored at once to His Holiness •••• Should 
the Austrians propo1!e to lea.ve garrisons in those 
place. to preserve order, the Papal government 
wIll take eare of that itaelf. 
As tor su.ppl7ing the &rm7, the Papal sovern-
m~nt is definite11 not l.n .. position to aseu.me eny 
obligation, tor it lacks the nece.sary resource • 
• • • • [!18~to furnish euppll •• ] would be to 
take an active part qa1nat the Kingdom of Napl •• , 
eontrtl',ry to the attitude whleh the Papal governrnellt 
must b7 its nature take towards all atates •••• 
!t'1n!!.l11', there 1s the ditf!.oulty which. hu been 
and atill 18 being experienced in .ecuring re-
imburnement from the Austrian govern~nt tor its 
expenditures made tor the maintenance ot its 
t~ops :f.n p~t years.. • • • 
The a tat ioning ot Aua trian troops in the Papal 
State _wei only be asked 'by the Imperial Co'U.l"t tor 
the preservation ot Its communications with the armr 
in Naple., or tor the preservation ot order wlthAn 
15-
A.V., R242, Journal of the Conferences at Troppau, Pre-
lhn1nar,y Protocol of 19 Nove~ber 1820. 
the P~pe,l State. No other reason oould be accepted 
by a government which must preserYe pertect neutrallty. 
B'Jt the first of these reaaons does not require the 
presence ot Austrlan garrlsons in the tortresses ot the 
Papsl State nor the stationing of Austrian forees at 
atV polnt lII1tbln the State •••• The second motlve does 
not exist, and is proved by the tranquil1ty maintained 
here durlng the last tour months •••• The Papal 
governl"'fent therefore dee! not intend to coneent [to the 
statlonlng at Austrian troops]. 
F1nally, the Ito1y "ather does not intend to re-
t'Uae passage to the Austrian &l"m1', but. • • • given the 
peeul!ftr position of Hie Hol1neee, h1s acquiescence muzt 
be h1dden 1n aome wQ'. I can assure ,-OU that the other 
European gov.rn~nte believe that. • • the Holy Father, 
beeause ot hls essentlal neutrality, must protest 
against the pa.asa..~. But the Holy Father, because ot 
the speclal fr1endlhip .nich binds him to H.M. • • • 
would like to spare hi~ even the appearance o~ actIng 
against .. protest on h18 part, and wIsh.es to find aome 
way to avoid this While stll1 conoealing his consent 
to the passqe of troops. When the Imperial Co~t 
makes Its request tor the p ... age, I will concert with 
the Austrian arnbusador sOlne way to allow 1twitbout 
oompromising the neutrality ot the Holy Father and 
without creating the ~npresslon that A~tria 1s acting 
contrary to a protest ot Hia Ho1lne.s.~1 
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Two point. wonhy of comment stand out in the above explana-
tion. First, it is clear' that Consalvi had little interest in 
strict Papal neutralit~ l?!.!:!!.. Pa..."'t1y f:ro;u d.islike 01' 
revolution. partl~' from a. 6.$si;.'?e to retain Austrian gvod w1ll, 
he was qult~ \~1l11ng to 0.110'.1 thl! palla age of the Aue trian a.rrrry, 
provided that I'apal acquiescence could be concealed. His pr1maI7 
motive for' ir..zlstlng en the preservatlon of oeutral1ty 1n publlc 
17 
A.V., Archlves ot the Nunciature at Pari3 (hereafter cited 
... ANP). tile VIII. Cone al vi to Macchl, 1 Noy.mber 1820. A 
Similar explanation was later sent to Leardl: R165, 15 November 
1820. fI.ons1gnor Vinoenllc Macchi, a supporter or Consalvl and a 
sldlltul diplomat, namec nuncio in Paris in 1819; ma.de a. Cardinal 
in 1826. 
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was his teal" of a Ne&.po11tari invas1on~ whioh ha.unted him from 
beginning to end of the Neapolitan crisis .18 He 'Was ceaaeless17 
aware that the Pa.pal a.rmy oould never l-'u&ist .. strong Neapolitan 
att&ok~ whiQh would caU&6 immense damage) in addition to the 
m.aterial damage to the Capital of the CnUl"oh a.."ld the blow to 
Papal prestige # he feared that it Pius VII was torced to .flee 
ROlne again .. the hardahips 01~ the journe,. in hiS present very poor 
health. might aul1y kill him.19 '!'his Bame dis1nterest in the 
principle ot neutrality was to mdk the Carcl1.nal ta conduct 
throughout the Nea.politan erisis--a good example of Consalv1'. 
generall#, prag!rtatlc approach to all questions that did not 
involve the eUlSential P1ghts of the Papacy or the doctrine of the 
Churoh. 
Th~ aeoond notable point is that I while Consalv1 still 
hoped to prase". tr:1endl;y relatiorJ5 with Auatr1a, a oertain 
d1:Jtx-ust or tha.t Powel" had beoome vv1dont on his part. The 
furniture affai:r.* had eV1dent17 destroyed the Cardinal-s oon-
fideRoe in Austrian good. faith in .fin.anoial mattorB. 140:-0 
e1gni!ioant waa hi$ obviuua determination to prevent tho otat1oft-
ing of Aua tJ.·ian troop6 arJ,J'WhSN. Oll Papal terri tory. '!'hough not 
expl:ielt17 atateu, it "ee1ll& likely that one reason under171ng 
this determinat10n waa Consalv1 1a rear or the inol:'eased Auatr1an 
·¢4i¥44 -----
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influenee, not to SR..,. control, in the Pa'Pal Stlltee that would 
result trom such an oooupation. '!'his oODt1"01 would N8trlot 
the temporal independence of' the PApacy Which seemed essential 
tor that spiritual treedom whioh CO_Uys. was determlned to pre-
.e"e. BIn'e, 1ft the m1dat of' apparentl,. growlng Auatro-Papal 
good wl11, .... the .e.da ot 41atruat--a t~at.nlD1 portent tor 
the tuture. 
COllllalv1 soon had ooo .. loft to app17 the pr1ne1"le. outlined 
1n the above 41.patoh. In a ooDtldentlal letter or 22 November, 
Mettemloh aalat4 the Card.laal whether the Papae7 woul4 agree to 
the PUII_ or AutrS... troops and would. provide them with 
supplie.. He alao hlnted that an Auatrip oooupation or the 
strategic o1t7 or Anoona mlgbt be Dece.s&r7 to protect it trom 
the .e.pallt..... Finall7, he requested Coualvl to tell h1m In 
ooatl<!enee the yl.. or the Pope 88 to the posalbUlt7 ot a 
Papal oondemnation ot the Carbonari. 20 
ct • 
III h1s repl7, the Secretar.r ot State pra.1e.d the deo1Blona 
made by the Powera at Troppau (ot whloh APpol'Q'i had 1ntormed. 
h1m 1a oontl'Aiulc.) aru1 declared. that the Papao,. would do e .... 1'7-
thlq polla 1'b1. to aupport them. Mattenioh te request. WN then 
... _"4 1ft aoooJ.'duoe w1th the Oard1ftal t. pMvioua17 ..... t.rm.1ned 
priaeipl... Tb.e Pope could aot tormal17 .. ree to the patS .... ot 
Auatnan t1'Oopa, but "pemapa 80me aeeomodatloa oan be work8d 
20 
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out" ,r'between Conaa1 .. i and Appony1. '!'he Pa:"a]. gov~rnment c.oul4 
not suppl.,. the Austrian to roe. , tor the reasons earlier expla1ned 
to the Pari. llUllOio. There was no need for' Au'!tria to ·P1"Oteet n 
Anoona, tor 1t ..... sate h'om attack. Consalvi did not mention 
the oondemnat1on ot the CarbOnaM. J the Papacy Wd long to remain 
---~.-
war" of aueh a moYe. 21 
The Tl'OPPau PoweJIII hoped to lut&U!'8 more from ther PapacY' 
the mere permis.lon tor the putuige ot troops; they hoped to 
elll1at ita moral eupport tor the1r intervention. Lat& 1n 
NOYember the1 l"quested the Pope to support their invitation to 
the Xing ot Naples to attend the comine: OcngNas at r.laybaeh. 
Sueh support m1cht be useful 1n overoom1.ns the walstanee which 
the Neapolitan Parlle..>nent WM expected. to !n.ake to the Kina IS 
attendance. HopiJII that the Congreaam1ght lead to a peaceful 
'ettlement, Pius VII wUlincl~ sent K1ng Fercllnand. a penonal 
letter UJ.I&lns him to attend 1n tha lnterests ot peace &l'lC1 order. 
The Powe" w1ahed to secUN the full support end. formal 
approval or all the Itallu atatea trom the Austr-J.an intervention 
tbe apPl"OYal ot the Pope was espeoially desired beeaWie at hi. 
d.ual status as an importaDt Italian prinoe and as Head of' the 
Ch\U'Ch. In late Deoember or 1820, theretore. the Allies re-
quested Plus VII to send a representative to jo1n 11'1 the d.eliber-
ations at Lqbaoh. Aoeordlng to the inv1tation sent to the Pope, 
el 
!bid., 315, Conaa!v1 to Mettel!'Dioh, 5 Deoember 1920. 
22-
A .. V. f AWl 2}~4, PtU$ VII to Ferdlnemd. I, 3 Dec.mOOr 1820. 
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the purpose of the C01"'grees lias to \<wrlr cut a. new l~eapolltan 878-
tem of government Which would "en3ure tranqu1lity and peaee to 
Naples 3.nd Eu...'"'Ope-." ~ ince the new syG te71'l of gOV'ltl."'nm.ent woul "-
certainly be a l1'!~ttf:r of concern to 1'I..eighbor1na st,~tes, Conaalv! 
was wil11ng t{;· $.gr~e to the AlltE:d reql)_~~f'$t, th.cugh ht lnew well 
that other as}:tecte c·r the ~ap()11tan situation would be discussed 
including the t~e of forae ag~1nst Naples. He lns1&ted, however, 
that the Powers fJ111St first send Pius VII .. toX'me.1 note or in-
Yltat1on, to avo1t1. Siving Naple$ the impression that the Pap ... ,. 
was spontaneouE1ly pEU't1cipatlng in lstlat the 'N~apol1tarJS eon-
sidered It hot'ltUe gathering. '!'his done, Clmealv! .ppolated 




At the Bame time,. the 1..111.e8 adopted .. Russlan proposal to 
appeal to the Pope to aet .. mediate. tn ending th8 Neapolitan 
cris 1s • AuatPia. was net pleased. with th1a augestton, *ieh it 
relt ... c attempt to ,revlde Ferdlnar14 with analtenatlv. to 
A_tria 1nteneat101l, but felt obl1gecl to agree. Leb!'.eltem wu 
e.tl"'WSted with this miss ion to Rome J he ... eeclNtly 1_ truoted 
b7 Mettemieh that all. lIe.mint; to seek Papal med.la.tloll, he 
should 1n tact try to tum the Papaoy ag&1Mt it.24 
- , ......... " . .... ~ 
23 
A. V ., Rl65, COMaJ.v1 to ,....ttem1ch, 6 J a.rxuar:; 1821. R242, 
AppoJO'l to Oonsalvi. 6 Januar,y 1821, Consalvi to APPOllUl, 1 
J anU8.l~ 1821. Giuseppe Cardinal S p1na (1156-1828) plq-ed an im· 
portant P&1tt in MSOt iat:t.Dg the Fx.n.h Conoordat of 1801 J ap .... 
pointed Lega.te or l301osna. in le11) or.te or CotlSal;ri la a\.leflt and 




Metternich's instructions were superfluous~ 1fuen Lebzeltern 
arrived in Rome, he found the Papal goverrunent already opposed 
to the idea of media.tt6n~· Consal vi explained his reasons for 
opposition in a confidential letter of 6 January to Metternich~ 
The Pope would have wished to act as mediator, partly to show 
his appreciation of the honor paid him by the Allied invitation, 
partly because his religious character obliged him to further 
peace whenever possible. Unfortunately, certain practical 
difficulties made this impossible. Since the King of Naples was 
now in Laybach, the Papacy would have to mediate between the 
Allies and the King on one hand, and a rebellious Parliament on 
the other; the Pope would then have to recognize the Parliament 
as representing the people and as being capable of being the 
other party in the proposed mediation. Furthermore, the rebels 
were determined to have the 1812 Constitution, the Powers were 
determined they should not; it was difficult to see what com-
promise could be worked out between these two extremes~ Hence, 
the mediation could hardly succeed~ The only possible compromise 
would be the adoption of some less radical constitution, but the 
Pope could not suggest this lest it give rise to demands that 
he grant his own subjects a similar constitution~ 
For these reasons, the Pope could not agree to act as a 
mediator. He was eager to do everything possible to aid the 
Allies and avert the threat of war, but under existing circum-
stances the most he could do would be to write a letter to the 
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Neapolitan people pointing out "the dangers of war, the happiness 
of being assured of peace, the duties to legitImate authority 
Imposed by religion, and simIlar thIngs •••• But what effect 
could thIs have on the Liberals?"25 This offer was apparently 
never taken up by the Allies. 
DurIng his Vi8it to Rome, Lebze1tem also disoussed a number 
of other points oonnected with the proposed Austrian intervention. 
The tirst point was the pusage of' Austrian troops through the 
Papal State. The Austrian government had planned a tormal request 
for Papal permis8ion, but Consalvi rejeoted this plan as likely 
to antagonize Naples. Instead, "give us, f1 he asked Metternich, • 
"a Note in which we are told that after having exhausted all 
means of conciliation. f'inding yourselves obliged to tight, and 
considering that the enel'Tl7 ill near at hand. etc •• you are 
regretfully compelled to enter our territory without a previous 
request, etc. This is plausible at 1eut, and the Neapolitans 
will probably believe it."26 
Lebze1tem had alllO been instructed to request that Austria 
be allowed to garrilon Ancona. Consalvi flatly rerueed. To 
Metternich, ae explained that no motive existed to just1fy such 
a breach ot Papal neutrality. Ancona was well defended. by Papal 
troops and 1n no danger of capture b,. the Neapo11 tans. Nor d1d 
Austria have any real need to occupy the oity, either as a supp1,. 
-----
25 




base or as a center upon which her army could fall back in the 
event of a retreat: supplies could be stored at many other 
points, and it was hardly likely that the superior Austrian 
forces could be driven all the ','fay back to Ancona by the 
Neapolitan army. The occupation of Ancona would therefore be 
at most a convenience for Austria, and the Pope could not be 
expected to violate his neutrality merely for the sake of 
Austrian convenience. Such a violation, Consalvi warned, would 
surely lead to a Neapolitan invasion in reprisal, and he drew 
a lurid picture for Metternich's benefit of vengeful Neapolitans 
sacking Rome and destroying the artistic and cultural heritage 
of centuries while even st. Peter's and the Vatican went up in 
flames. Austria could not expect the Pope to expose his terri-
tories to such devastation without good cause. To Lebzelternts 
suggestion that the Papacy yield Ancona after a feigned resist-
ance, Consalvi replied that this stratagem would hardly deceive 
the Neapolitans, and that in any case it would present to the 
world the unedifying spectacle of apparent strife between the 
Papacy and Austria just when their firm unity should be known 
to all. 27 
Consalvi was most deter.mined to prevent Austrian occupation 
27Ibid • See also ANV 245, Consalvi to Leardi, 16 January 
1821, wIl'IC11 contains a good description of the negotiations 
over Ancona to that date. 
of Ancona. He had previously ordered the commander of the 
Ancona garrison under no clrc~stances to allow any foreign 
troops to enter the place. 28 ~lo~.f, in addition to \,Iriting direct 
to Metternich, he also wrote secretly to Count Blacas, the French 
representative at Laybach, asking him to use his influenoe to 
29 AURtria 
prevent the proposed occupation. As the traditional rival ot~ 
in Italy, France would no doubt be willing to support the Papacy 
on this pOint. 
French intervention wu not neeesaar.r. Upon receiving 
Conealv1 's letter ot 6 Januar;y, Mettemich replied that the 
Emperor, to show h1s spec1al respect tor the Pope, had ordered 
that the Neapolitan campaign be planned without the uae of 
Ancona as an Austrian bue. 30 For the time being, Consalvils 
resistance to the occupation of that city seemed suocessful. 
However, Metternich had not given up hope of overComing the 
"resistance opiniatre tt of ConsalviJ he was only awaiting .. more 
favorable moment to: Deftew his demanda. 31 ~he question of 
Anoona would once again rise to trouble Austro-Papal relations. 
28 
A.V., R242, Consalvi to Col. !ilvagni, 23 December 1820. 
29 
A.V., R165, Consalvl to Blaed 6 January 1821. Pierre 
Loua Comte de B1acaa d • Aulps (1771 ... 1839), cloatt friend and 
adviser of Louis XVIII ot Prance J Prench ambassador to the 
Papaoy, 1816-1822; 8ympathetic to the Papaoy_ 
30 
A.V., R242, Mettemich to Conaalvi, 18 JanU117 1821. 
31 
Van Duerm, 359, Mettemieh to APpolQ'i, 21 January 1821. 
3. '!'he Conare.1 ot Lqbach 
In response to the inv1tation ot the PoweN. Conaalv1 had 
&lree4 to .end Carc11nal Spina to repre.ent the Pap ... y at the 
Conere •• of La7baeh, wb.loh opened. oa 12 Janu&l'7' 1821.32 The 
central theme of the Inltruotiona Which he had prepared. tor 
Spina'a guidance at the Oongress WU the oompellt. neoeaetty 
ot preserving Papal neutralIty. The offioial purpo.. or Spina t. 
mi.alon .88 to Itud7 tho measure. adopte4 towards the new 
government of Napl.. l •• t they should prove to contain &nJthing 
likely to be c1etnmental to the weltare or the ne1ahbortng Papal 
8tate. "On..'''' from this point ot yiew 1. the Pa.pal representative 
to participate in the measures to be takea in regard to the 
Kingdom ot Naplesf" he might give his personal opin10n on other 
points, 'but he could not apeak .. the orticial Papal delesat •• \, 
Abo ... all, be must not llWOl •• the P&pac,. la &IV • .,., 41reet17 
or l1l41reot17, 1ft aft7 hoatil. me_UN towardJI Napl •• , 'but should. 
take eare to ,re •• rYe the "most perteot neutNllt7" ot the 
Papaq. 
__ .... Tb~._.R.." •• ".tloll ot Papal aeutralit7 ... alao tob. the 31" -
OJ1 the CoqN •• ot l,Q'bach, ••• Scllroeder, l~-l28J 
Web.ter, 312-3451 Brady, 77-93J An.cel0 Tamborra, "I OODlNS.i 
della Buta All .... a 41 Lub1ana e 41 Vero .. lit II. politic .. della 
Santa a.de." !~hl,.10 _~t_o .... P1 ........ e..... o italiano, 1960, 190 .... 11. 
199 
200 
governifl..g facto!' should the Allies rene\'J theil" request for 
Papal med::ation; however, Spina lias to make no COT,ID't1tments on 
auch a request I but should inste~d t"efer :tt to Rome for careful 
cons1del"atiol1. It the subject ct Papal condemnation of the 
Carbonari should be brought UP. Spina 1'1U to explain ti'..at tw yet 
the Papaoy lacked sufficient information on the Society'S 
religious principles to justify a conde~nat1on. Finally. the 
Powel~ were reported to be planning to request the Italian 
govern,;~en.t6 to Car'l."'Y ou.t variol.t5 internal refo.!'tiW to allay 
popular discontent. Because of the peculiar chara.cter ot the 
Papacy J this was 8 very de11cat~ question. }OTo fOI'l'n of con-
stitutional or parliaY1entar.y govern~nt could be considered by 
the Papacy; any I)ther type of rerOl~ suggested by the Powers 
should be referTed to Rome for judgment. 33 
Arr1vlag in L8)'baoh on 22 J a.nuar:f, Sp1na 1eal~d. from 
Ml;tternieh that the P()wers had already agrec,d to put the 
Pl-:l.l\ciples of the Tl"*oppau ProtoGol into practioe. Within ten 
dalS an Austrian army with the bless1ng of the Allies was to 
advanoe aga1nst Naple. to suppress the oo:aat1tutional regime and 
restore the King to his full authority. In effeot, the repre-
sentatives of the Italian atates had been summoned to La7baon to 
give their approval to this plan. SpIna at onoe remiftcied 
Mattemion that "the Pope, both rl~rn his olt&l"uter and from the 
geographIcal position ot h1a statea oannot depart for a moment 
33 
A.V., R242, Instruotions tor Spina, 10 JanU&17 1821. 
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trom his 87Stem ot the most perfect neutral1ty, and that 1n case 
ot &ll7 cOIl1.ll\unieation made to me, ray reply can only be in t'ull 
accord with thiS prinoiple." The Prinoe aas~~d Sp1na Im&n1 
times that nothing more than thl. wu 01' woula be asked ot' 'Wi. "34 
The Italian representatives, inolud1ng Sp1na lIere tirst to 
partieipate in the OOJJgl .. S8 at the ae$SiOll of 26 January. Despite 
Metternich '5 a.s.uraneeil, Spina. learned tbat at this meeting he, 
l1ke the other Italian delegates, wo\lld be expected to express 
hiS govern~ent '5 approval for the Allied propoeals. ~laples was 
to be ealled upon by the Alliee to aboliah the revolutionary 
regi~e and restore full royal authority. An Austrian army would 
be dispatched to Naples to preserve order during the change of 
£overnment, but if the demands of' the Powers were rejected, then 
the a.t~ would impo!:e the:n upon Napll!.la by toroe. Spina saw 
Vstternieh b~fore the 3ession and warned him that h$ could not 
approv~ th~se measurea with their lmpllclt threat of war aga1nst 
Naples, for this would be a Violation of Papal neutra11t7. 35 
Metternioh was not moved fro1'!1 hiS COUNe by Spina '8 argu-
ments. At the meeting oft the 26th, ha explained the Allted plan 
to the Itall~ representatiyes ana requested their formal 
approval for it. Spt •• s comments were sought first. He re-
iterated that the neutrality of the Papacy must prevent it tram 
giving its approval to any plan that involved the use of foroe 
34 
Ibid. J Spina to CQnsalvi, 24 Ja,nutl.l7 1821 (#3). 35--
~., Spina to CODSa1v1, 28 Janu&1'7 1821. 
agalnet Naples. Metternich denied that there was any l"eaeon 
tmy t~e Papacy could not approve the Allied plan, whioh was 
eeeent1all,. peaceful and conel11~tory ~ the une or t'Ol"ce be:"ng 
~ 
threatened on17 in the hypothetical sitUation that Naples re-
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rtuHtd to aecept it. Spina. \-les un1mpreosed by- this reason100. 
~1eh. eo"ld l'lf't alter the fact that the tllreat of' force .,rtw an 
eesentie.l pert 0'1' the plan. The Pa.pacy could not approve the 
plan without Implicitly approv'.ng its parts. :i.nclud1r4?; the 
poes1~1. use ef terce against Naples. 
The Jit'lU!eian repreeentative. Ct'lpO dlIotr1a. next rose to 
Iltte.(tk 8p'-ntl fttom a different angle. He argued that the Pope .. 
hayif!!: sent e. repreaentatlve to d1soutls a new syst!!'Yi of' govern-
ment for Nap1ee, had by that very tact agreed that the existing 
}.l~apo11tll'1 goyemment r;hould bE:! t'!egtr:)'Y'e~. Having approved 
thl1 end. the Pope could not logioally refuse to approve an.y 
tnel\M Mces.a17 to attain tt. the 'U8e or foree ':'ncluded. Spina 
ret,..,rted that the Po~ had s let!,i.ti~ate right to part1e!pate in 
a eO~'1 that was to set up a ~w Neapolitan government, for 
ohang.. in the Neapolitan s,.te~ OQuld h&ve repercu3310na upoa 
hla own neilhboring terr1to191es. Sucb pe,rt!elpatioJl, however, 
d1~ not comm1t the Papao," to appro •• either that .,..tem or 
covenrment or the mttantl used t~ eatabl1"h it. The Pope would 
,ladl,. 41'prO'9'e all pea-eatnl meane for settling the Neapolitan 
orista J but the A111ed. propoaall Jo1n.ed to conciliation a tllreat 
ot toroe whioh the Pope'a aeutral1tJ' forbade him to approve. 
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The f1nal attack on S!)ina came from the Eng11eh obee1"Ver, 
LI)rd Stewa.rt) whQ re"l'Iarked that although Bngland, l1ke the Papacy. 
had ado~\ted a neutral p031t:i.on in public on the proposed inter-
ventIon, ~he nonethel~s8 ~altzed that the revolut10n had been 
a di.s~~ter s!H1 !!,~cepte(! the All1~d measures to be taken a~a1nst 
j t. The bele~ered Papttl delegate now found an ally in Blac .. , 
who poi.nted out to ~tew.rt tha,t the Pp,pal government!" whtch h-.d 
the revolutf.on&ry' regime at i.tll very doorltep, could hardly 
adopt the same att'.tttde toward8 it 8.8 England,. which was a eate 
distance aw~. The Frenoh ~preeentatlve'8 intervention brought 
the dlseuaeion to aft end. 36 
As ~plM was not to be moved from hill stand, it WY agreed 
that he should prepare ~ statement explaining the Papal position 
for the ,1ournal of the Congress. In this a tatement, composed 
with the aid of' Blaey, Sp1fta put on reoord the argumenta he had 
used at the meeting 01 the 26th: but stressed espec1ally that the 
!'apal relUsal to a!'prove the Allied measures stemme<i not f1"Om 
allY' oppo:.1tlon to those measures u such, but only from the 
neeess1ty of' preserving Papal neutra11ty.37 
Con,elvi rully approved the nosition taken by !~lna and 
---- ,36 ,-,-- . -
This account of the seSSion of 26 January 18 baaed on 
Spina'S report to Conaalvi" R242, a8 January 1821. It is essen-
tially the tUlmeas that in Brady', 81-84, based on the SaMe 
aoewnent. The eaI"ller vel'$lon in Blanohi, II 43-44, ia inaccur-
ate. Jean, CO"!'lte de Capo d' Istna (1776-1831 J.. Greek statesman 
in Rus81an !Service, 1807-1827J later a leading figure in the 
Greek Revolut1on. Charles VaM J Lord Stewart, Brittan Ambassador 
1n Vielma, half-brother or. Lord Cutlereagh. 
37 
!.~1~. J with Nota Verbale ot 28 JanU&1T 1821 enclosed. 
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prailled the 510.11 with wn1uh he bad ~arrled QU'!; h.1~ 1astwot1oWl. 
He dil-ected the Papal @lef:&w to perG:lat .In his ref'wial to 
a88o.;.:.l.ate the ~apa.:"y with ~ j,llan th.at 1molve<1 eVQn the lXIS .... 
the CQr~l"eas. CQnsalvi st:;.:ressed. muat 'be tu stu~ f,UlQ oor.l.:llel1t 
upon the new sya',a;;l of &OVernr:1&ilt tor lla.plea .3fJ 
Thia W.n'l 3ye 'ce~il o.f goVeI'J.1.H18l1t w.as prtitaGnteo. 1;0 thlot Congress 
on 20 Februar'J • I'e ocntalned onll two &ii;l'Ufl<JaJ.'1t i:rmovatioM a 
separ"a.te aalYlini8 tratlons \'iere to be e.et up 1'o~ Naples and for 
Sicily # 'li,thich wrre to bi;,) Jollleu. only by a ~O~jU:.-n m.o~J and. a 
a~"1ltem of adVisoq CJouncila &ilPV1~lt\}d by tl~ kina a.:rMl under b.1.s 
contrel WafS to be crea.tGd to ah&..""e i •• the wO:i,'"lc ot oQftrDlnent.39 
h'hen lU3~d : .... or h.1.a CQii'1nente upou tha ayatem, 3p1.na 1'"'ep11ec1 
th.at fJinee he did net l'lAve rull powera be could. J¥.)t tormalll 
approve the plan And wculd retet' it to Rome. However, it waa h18 
o·wn opinion that the Plan IlQnt&1ned tfno prlncipJ.e tb.&t In1&ht ha.t'nl 
the rigbt~ an4 1nter..:at~ of the Sta.te. of tb.e Hol,. ' .. ,It a».c1 
that accor41n&lJ the rope \loula ttc.io full JliIIt1ee to the putt,. 
40 
of 1:1$ Majest7 'Ii 1nteniliou." 
Th~ other Ita.l1aA .tate. na.vi.n& c1ven their approval, the 
plan waa aocepteci on 25 FebJ:"U.U7 1821. the CODgft.. then 010 •• 4 
'38 • 
Did.. OODII&1yt to Ip1-., 8 "e'J.!'UU'J' 1811. 39----- _ 
Ibid.., Journal or the Ooape •• , ao JPebNa17 1821, 
DeelaraiIon III the Una or litapl"_ in Sp1aa to OQual,,1. 22 
"eb1'Ual7 1921. 
40 
~. I Bpt .. 'a Hote of 21 FebNa17 1821. 
with the re801ution that another Congre88 8hould be held at 
Florenoe 1n September 1822 to consider the development ot the 
8ituat1on 1n Italy.4l 
-~-- .. -'-"'L~:C - ... . 
Ibid., Sp1na to Constllv1. 27 ~eb1'Uary 1821. The 
o.elegat;s-·of 1:;ne Italian atatea nOli left Laybaon, bu.t tho8~ oJ: 
the great powers l"ema1ned to ob8erve the progress ot the Austrian 
inteI'V-en(;ion. 
4-. The pa,,~8as;C cf the Alli.i trian Arr.1Y 
On 6 February an Austrian srmT ot 50,000 men eros.ed the 
Po and advanced southwards through the Papal States on their w., 
42 to Maple.. In keeping with ConsalvllB advice to Metternich. 
Austria dld not formally request permission tor the passage ot 
its torcea, permission Whioh the Pa~ac7 could not grant without 
openly violating 1ta neut~it,.. '1'0 all appearances, the 
A\t8trian government 81.mp17 presented the Papac," with. ta.!'! 
!:c~}')~lJ. In all probability, however, th18 method or procedure 
had :previousl,. been agreed. upon 1n cU.scuasions between Consalvi 
and the Austrian amb ... ad.or .. the best W&"f ot avoiding an open 
"Iiol.tion ot neutralIty, .. COMalvi had P1anned.43 
CoaealYi had al1"eady, in late Januar.v, instructed his 
subordinates how to react to the entry ot toreign troops. Sinoe 
the Papacy was at war with DO OM, all foreign regular troops 
Ihould be treated aa friends and no oppoSition to their passage 
should be made. HOlfever, this friendly attitude shotrld not 
extend to supplying them~ except that local town officials might 
'\.t neces8&1'7 pro'Ylde lodgings for p9J1sing troops. )for, Consalvi 
42 
Itld., Cor..sal'Y"i to 8pir..a. j :2 FebI-u.EU"J· 18'21. 43---- "' 
Van Duorm. 311 J Consalvi to ~tternlch" 5 Deoentber 18·~O. 
R165, Cot1aalv1 to I~ttern1ch, 6 ·Jatrutll'Y 1821. k'-P-VIII. Consa!vl 




stressed, were foreign troops under any- circumstances to be 
admitted to any fortified place in the State. Even in unfortitie 
places, the stay of' foreign troops should be no longer than 
mi1itarr considerations required. During this sojourn of' 
foreign troops, Papal clvl1 and mI11tar.v officials were to con-
tinue with their normal duties, nor WM any toreign lnterterence 
wlth the Papal adminiStration to be tolerated. These principles 
IQ)plled onl,- to regular troops J irregular torces, which would be 
undisciplined and would have to 11ve ott the country, were to 
be driven away. As these regulatlons app11ed to both Austrms 
and Neapo11tans, the Papac,- could not be accused ot partlallty, 
though ot course Austrla would protlt tar more trom them than 
Naples. i.j.':" 
Atter the entrance ot the Austrian &.rmy', Consalvl again 
wrote to his subordinates, informing them of' the Allied decls10ns 
at Lqbach and ordering them to obserYe scrupulousl,- his previous 
inatructlons.4j On 8 February he issued a Proc1amatlon to in-
torm the People ot the State ot the sltuation. This document 
exp1alned the reasons tor the AustrIan troop movements, 
described the attltude ot neutrallty adopted by the Papacy, and 
oal1~d upon the people to treat the Austrians as rrlends.46 
.. -- -""41f' "'- .. -
A. V •. ' R210
" 
Con.'!elvt to all Delegllt@8 and T..a€;a.tes, 27 
January 1821. 
hr; 
. ft.. V., R2!t2, Consalvi to all Delegates L"ld Legat3s, 7 
Februw 1821., 
," t..~L! .. ) 
At the beginning of the Neapolitan campaign, Consalvi 
irnsisted upon rigorous compliance w1th his instructions in order 
to avoid any open violation of neutrality or any friction with 
the passlng At,ustrlan forces. As the eampaigll progressed. how-
ever, 1t became 1nereaal~ly evld~nt that these ai~ could not 
be completely achleved. Difficulties goon aroBe on t\-m pointe: 
the supplying of Auatrian troops and. AustrIan atteTllpts to occupy 
certain place. ln the Papal states. 
Consal.-!'. ru.le against Bupplying Austrian troops 800n 
broke down. The Austrian government before the campaign had 
given contracts to local agents (!0?!l.ltor~J to supply Its troops. 
Unfortunately, these preparatIons ha.d not been made on a suf-
flclently large scale, and to make matters worse, these forn1tor1 
were often unable to fulfill their contracts. Local Papal 
officials .ere thereby placed 1n a very dlfticUlt poSition, 
forced co choose between departIng from theIr prescribed 
neutrality and seeing the Austrians resort 01' neeessIt7 to liVing 
oft the countryside. 
'l'hia problem arose as so~n as the Austrians reached Bologna, 
the first P~a1 cIty on their me.rch south. The Austrian com-
his t:ccops with hospitals and. baggage animals, t01:' which his 
goverrlment had tal1ec. to make .u~l"a.ngements. kf'iat felt j'\.l.i5tifled 
on hu,nar.iG.u'ian ,rc·',L"!os in authorizing th.e ea.re of t):,.$ sick in 
local hospitals. Furnishing traDSportatlon was a more dellcate 
nlattet·,. 0 .... 1; at le_th. Amat decicieu to perauaCie a number ot local 
~itizeu .,,, J1rovlde the Autr!au with the neoessary vehicles and 
ar.lill6l.s, pro{1I1&1J,$ tutUl'e- compensation. Another problem arose 
tlt/len the Auatl-i&.h quaJ·t;e.mMtel" ... ked the Vice-Legate to lend. him 
50,00(,; Ll'anoS with wbicb to pay the looal f'ornitore in actvaltoe,. 
fvl' ott-!~I'~i3e tn. lattel' woule be unable to buy the necessary' 
al.4pplies. A.lna.t l-e£used till. l~que.t but Ciio qree to persuade, 
.f:el~t1;y, .. loea! banker to honor an Austrian Graft for 12,000 
1'l-a.nca wittl .nlcm to tide the tornito" over the LlTiillecUa.te 
el'a!.. A.nat <:Lef.Deleti ili8 eonQuot, which he feared. was not 1n 
L.e;t;51i l.g wlt.h (.;onfAalv1 'il instruotioM, on the grounu that he 
bad "."ltell ..Ln the oul, posaible w,," to prevent the <i18order that 
cvw.lcl have z ... v.lteci from the fa.ilure of the Auatrian auppl,-
ayatElilh .iviol .. ove:r, be hao.oeen oareful. to act aecret17 ana. 
priyately, so tnat Papal neutrality had not been torfliallT or 
f,...-;--
OlJ~nly c:'>!Ilpro,nia.~.i i 
Conaalvl agreed. that circumstances had Justified Amat la 
oonchtet, but advised him to avoid su.ch meaaure8 unleas absolutel)" 
\.0 
neoessary.~v When a similar problem came up at Perug1a, the 
Cardinal 8ugg~sted that the local officials there imitate !mat.s 
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The eventa at Bologna were repeated with varlat10na in 
other eitiaa as the Austrian &ril1T mov3d southwards. At the out ... 
aet, Conzalvi eGntinueQ to insist on the strict observance of 
lleutralit7 by local officials ~ and subordInates who atepred 
too tar beyond his 1nstru.ct1or':i received st1ngip..g rebul'"..es.'O 
Under the pressUl.'e of e'f'entf!, however, he was gradually driven 
to approve an &yer-incl*eulng degr-ee of usutance to Austrian 
foro&a by his subordInates, to the detriment of strict neutrality 
Consaly1 himaelf' worked out with Apponyl a general arrangement 
tor the treatment of' the Austrian alok, Who were to be received 
into Papal hoapit&la or, if thea. proyed 1naurfloient, into new 
hospItal. that ahould be set up and tlupplied by the !,C!.~!t~r!. 
This polioy, he .. ver, oould be c:leten4ed on l\\lJ'nanltar1an groundt! 
against the oh~e of' vielating Papal neut7allty.51 
A few da7IJ 1atel'., on 17 Febru8l7 ~ Consa!v! 1ntervening 1n 
another p?Oblem, instructed the Delegates to ~e their influenoe 
unottle!all.,. with loeal merchants and farmers who were taking 
advantage of the inoreased demand caused by- the pl'esenoe or 
Austrian troops to rais. their prices to exorbItant heights. 
Such price raising !nade it dirrleult tor the f.o~l~orl to keep 
the AU4trlans adequate17 3upplled, L~d the r~sultlng shortages 
50 
~~_~~., Delegate of ViteJ.--bo to COM alv!, 17 :?ebruary 1821 J 
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could lead to disorders among the troops. Coneal vi theretore 
sought to keep prices at a reaaonable level, but without tormal 
action by the governmeftt. 52 
The further the Austrians advanced trom their base of 
operationa in Lombar4y-Venetia, the less etficient their supply 
system became, until by late Februar.y it seemed on the verge ot 
breaking down altogether. Coualvi suspected that this was the 
work of the 5ettarj, who hoped to sabotage the Austrian expedi-
tion. 53 In all probabilit7, however, the chief reasons were the 
inadequate preparationa and the lack of co-ordination in the 
Austrian arm7, added to the innate difficulties ot supp17ing a 
large number of meD in a relative17 unproductive countr.y with 
inadequate means ot transportation. 
Whatever the cause, the breakdown ot the supply s18tem 
could have serious consequences for the Papal states. To prevent 
that calamity, Conaal.vi was compelled to authorize increuingly 
greater departures from strict neutralit7. 54 When in late 
FebruaZT the \ Austrian supply 878tem tailed at Perugia and no one 
i 
could be foud to provision the troope, Conaalvi allowed the 
local ~utbor1ties to take over the burden ot 8UPP17.55 At the 
52 
Ibid,., Conealvi to all Delegates, 17 Febru&r1' 1821. 
53 
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That th1a polic7 was not necessari17 motivated b7 par-
tialit7 tor Austria 18 indicated b7 the adoption ot a 8imilar 
polic7 towards the few Neapolitans who crossed the frontier. 
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same time, as the fornitori were still having difficulty in 
securing supplies because of inflated prices, he authorized the 
Delegates to compel owners if necessary to sell at reasonable 
prices or to lend their gooda against the later return of an 
identical quantity and quality.56 
The situation was at ita wont along the southern frontier 
near Rieti, a poor area Which had alread7 been drained by a 
Neapolitan occupation. Here, all other remedies failing, 
Conaal vi was compelled to authorize the Delegate to resort to 
forced requ1sition if necesaar,y to aecure supplies from the in-
habitants. The Secretary of State also felt compelled to involve 
the central government directly by sending supplies from Rome to 
Rieti to relieve the shortage there. 57 A week later, crises 
Similar to that in Rieti having appeared rapidly throughout the 
Papal States, Conaalvi extended the power to make forced re-
quisitions to all De1egates.58 By this time, early March, the 
Cardinal had reluctantly accepted the unpleasant necessity that, 
given the diSintegration of the Austrian supply s1Btem, the city 
governments of the State would have to act as agents for 
supplying the Awstrian torces. His chiet concern n9,IW wa$ to 
56 
Ibid .. , Cons al vi to all Delegates and Legatea, 24 
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ensure that they, as well as all citizens who had dealt directly 
with the Austrians, should secure receipts tor their goods from 
the proper Austrian authorities so that they could later be 
reimbursed. 59 
Thus, by Maroh Consalvi had been oompe11ed by toroe of 
circumstances to allow the Papal government to become involved 
openly in the supplying at Austrian troops. No doubt this in-
volvement violated the principle ot Papal neutrality, but 
Consa1vi considered that violation well justitied as neceasar,y 
to prevent aerious inju~ to the Papal State and its people. 
Fortunately, the situation rapidly improved with the total 
rout ot the Neapolitan &rmJ at Rieti on 7 March and the sub-
sequent rapid Austrian occupation ot Naples. The bulk ot the 
Austrian armT soon moved trom the Papal State into Naples, and 
the supply problem disappeared. 
The second cause of friction with the Austrian forces 
arose from their attempts to oooupy various Papal cities against 
the will of the Papaoy. The cities mainly conoerned were 
Anoona and Bologna. 
It will be recalled that the Austrian government had 
wished to occupy the strategic port ot Ancona as a baae of 
operations against Naples but had temporarily abandoned this 
design 1n the faee of Papal OPPOSition. Hardly had the Austrian 
59 
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Ib1d., Consa1vi to all Delegates and Legates, 10 March 
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march southwards begun than it became apparent that Austria 
still cherished hopes of garrisoning the city. On 12 February 
Conselv! learned that the fornitore at Ancona had been instructed 
by the ,,'~. Auatrians to provide supplies for 2000 troops who 
were to arrive at Ancona ahortly and remain there "until 
further orders. ft The Cardinal at onee suspected that Austria 
planned to occupy the City without warning and thus present the 
Papacy with a !!i:.1! accompli. He protested strongly to Apponyi 
whoae protestationa ot Austrian innocence failed to convInce 
him. The CardlBal therefore instructed the Delegate of Ancona 
that when the Austrian had reached Slnigaglla tifteen miles to 
the north, he was to intorm them that the Papacy was aware of 
the order to remaIn "until further ordera" and had no intention 
of allowing them to occupy the tOWll. If the Austrians con-
tinued to advance, when they were within three miles the City 
gates were to be barred and the Austrian commander again for-
bidden to enter the City. Should the Austrians nonetheless 
insist on entering, they should be allowed to do 80 only atter 
breaking through the gates. It would then be obvious to all 
that the Papacy had attempted to preserYe its neutrality and was 
only yielding to Austrian violence.60 However, Consalvi thought 
it unlikely that the Austrians would actually proceed to such 
60 
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extremes beeause ot the bad effeot upon public opinion of 
"presenting to the world the spectacle [of Austrian troops) tir-
61 ing upon the Pope." 
Conaalvi alao instructed Spina to protest to Metternich at 
Laybaeh. The Foreign Minister, however, denied that his govern-
ment planned to occupy Ancona except in the case that Neapolitan 
troops had alreadJ' done 80. If the City waa a till in Papal 
62 .'" hands the Austrian &rm7 was to by-pass it and continue south. . 
Despite Metternioh's denials, events soon indicated that 
the Ca.rdinal fS suspicions were well founded. As the Austrians 
':1loved. towards Aneona, the Delegate duly warned them as Consalvi 
had ordered. Nonetheless, on Februal7 15 the commander of the 
app~aehing a~7, General Vermodeu, dispatched an officer to 
Ancona to prepare the way tor the occupation ot the City. The 
officer explained that the occupation of Aneona was an integral 
part of the general Auatrian war plan, and denied that any 
orders to the contrary had been reeeived trom Vienna. The 
Delegate repeated hi. government'. determination to oppose an 
oecupation, which could on17 be carried. out it the Austrians 
tirst took the place by storn. General Vermoden was apparently 
61 
Petrocehi 1943, 82. 
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A.V., *242, Conaalvl to Spin&, 12 February 1821) Spina 
to Cons al v1, 17 February 1821. 
~mpressed by the Papal s_and: upon receiving his officer's 
report, he announced that trom respect tor Papal neutrality he 
"ould retra1n from occupy1ng the c1tY'. The Auatr1ans then 
noyed away southward w1thout atte~pting to occupy the city.53 
Consalvi was less suecessful in oppos1ng Austr1an plans 
215 
to occupy Bologna. In m1d...January he was warned by the Papal 
consul at M1lan, Count P1etro Alborghett1, that Austria planned 
~o occupy certa1n plaoes 1n the Legations, espec1ally Bologna. 
il'he purpose was two-rold: to protect Austr1an lines of communl-
~atlon and to "watch over the oonduct of those lands," where 
A.ustria feared a 8ett~rJ uprising. Oonsalyl at once or<ieNd 
~plna to protest to Metternioh against this Violation of Papal 
pemtra11ty. Spina was to point out th!tt neither Austrian pretext 
~as justified: Austrian commun1cations were in no danger 1n the 
~apa1 State, a friendly power, while the Papal gove:mment was 
rlulte capable of maintaining order in the Lega.tions I where 
~ranquility now prevailed.64 
In response to Spinals questioni~J, Metternich declared 
Fhat his government had no intention or leaving garrisons any-
"here in the Papal states. The Prince profesaed h1m8elf tullY' 
.ati8r1ed ~th the tranquility prevailing in the LegatioDS and 
63 
A.V., R165, Delegate ot AneoM to Oonsalvl# 15 February 
821 (#l & 2). Blanchi, II, 73-75, inoorrectly describes th1s 
ncident ~ taking plaoe 1n August, 1820, 8ix months earlier, 
It a time when no Austrian troops had as yet entered the Papal 
State. 
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A.V., $242, Consalvi to Spina .. 16 Ja.nuary 1821. 
the firm attitude taken by the Papal govern~ent towards the 
65 S~t.tar.J there. 
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Oonsalvl hl~selr approached Apponyl and compelled. him to 
admit that the Austrian ~ilitar.r had indeed eCn3idered leaving 
e. garrison in Bologna, but the A":1baesador insi3tl!d that no plans 
had been ~ade to put this project into effect. 56 
Despite the atnuranees of Metternieh and. Appon:yi, COllfJalvi's 
suaplclona were not allayed. On the day after hts eOl'lYersetion 
with Appony1, 7 Februll.l"'Y', he described to the Ar-ehbishop ot 
Bologna the Austrian "proposizione lndeeente" of leaving a 
garrison of 3000 1n the ctty.. He repeated Met ternieh '8 and 
Ap~onrl's eomforting re~liee, but added: 
But I think that this is onl,. a feigned retreat, 
and. I am or the opInIon th.at rrr:! determinat ion to 
remain neutral trom the outset, and our constant 
refusal to VariOll2\S requests for things eontrllry 
to neutrality, have caused the adoption of a 
plan of' aa.ylng nothi!U!:7to us and presenting us 
with faits !ccomp11s.0 
On the following day Consalvi wrote to ~pina of his fear that 
the Austrian go,rernnent planned to occupy Bologna a.nd then place 
the bla'le upon the initiative of the :-nilltal'7, but without 
withdrawing its troops. The Papal representative WafS to bring 
-..--.. -----
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this possibility to Metterniah's attentlon. 68 
Under Spina's persi8tant questIoning, Metternieh finally 
admitted that the Austri&.n army aa it passed throUGh Bologna was 
to leave troops there to gue..rC. its commtmicatione. However the 
Prince ins leted that these trocops would not form a pernlanent 
garrison, but would be withdrawn as soon as the ma.in Austrian 
army reached Naples. He alao denied that the force was in an1 
way intended am a "mlsura dl pol1zia" s,galns t the ~ettarJ and 
expressed hiB satisfaction at the tranquility maintained by the 
Papal government ~_n its territories. 69 
Spinats proteste having had no effect. he enlisted the 
help of Blaeas, who as French representatIve could be expeeted 
to look with disfavor on any extension or. Austrian eontro1 in 
Italy. Blaeas saw Ytetternlch. but received from him only the 
s~~e assurances that the occupation was necessary and would end 
when lTaplea was occupied. Blaeu next suggested that Spina seek 
a fo~al written ple~ge from Mettern1eh that the troops would 
be withdrawn, but Spina fea.red that th.i8 tJould shot-' too apparent 
e. distrust of the ft.ustr1an '$ good fa1th. B1acas then arranged 
with Ce.po d'!etria that the subject be brought up at the next 
general ~eesion of the Congress, but for some unknown reason 
this general discussion did not take plaee.70 Consalvl was thus 
------- . ----68 
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left with no gua~antee but Metternieh's word that the Austrian 
foree would be witbdrawn. 
By the tI~e Consalvt learned of these developments at 
Lay-bach the !ustr1a1'l oecupation of Bologn:l he,d 8.lready t~.ken 
pIaee.. On 8 !'ebrttaroy th.e pe.se age of '.u~trian tro::tps throu;~h 
the city bagan; on 13 T4'ebruary the A.ustrlal'\ e~'Tlmander requested 
the municIpal of.flciale to provide ~larters for 2000 troopsJ 
and on 14 'Feb'l"'Uery, dftspite the protf!sts ot the Vice-Lega.te A'l\at, 
a toree or 2000 was stationed. if! the o1.ty. A~a.t could do no 
mope th.an ins 1st What the oeeup"l'l"!g torce be regarded not as a 
"~art"i.on," which would implY' a perma.nent stationing of troops, 
but only as "peaslng troops mak1:ng a !)ro1onge<i soJourn." He 
alao insiated that the troopIJ' ex~ft8e. must be borne by Austria, 
not the elty.71 
COMe.!.,.t. approved ot Amat'lS conduct. The C81~1.na1 had 
apparently- resigned b1ms~lr to the oCI'lupat1on whlah he (!ould not 
prevent} be oontented h1~~elr wIth insisting that Austria must 
P«1 tor the expenses of the oeeuratlon.72 Approaehed by 8pina 
on this point, Mettern:teh prcrr-tsed that the Pa.paey liould be 
I'ebhursed fot' all expems3.13 Con$alv1 mace no further :protest 
71 
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about the oeeupatlon wh11e the eampaign lasted. It reMained 
to 'be seen it Metterl1ieh would keep his yom to withdraw the 
Austrian troops atter the capture or Naples. 
Though the Austrians were a.ble to oeeu~J Bologna., their 
attempts to occupy other alties failed.. At Perugltt. the Austrian 
co~~ander atte~pted to station a garr18on, thinl7 disguised as 
"rrl11tary poliee,· In the c1tadel. The Delegate, remewberlag 
Consalvi's strict prohib1tio~ on the entry of foreign troops 
into any fortress, refused the request, aDd the Austrians marched 
orr w1th no further lne1dent.14 At Spoleto the Austrian comman-
der openly demanded the right to g8.l'Ti:son the efts.del, but here 
too dep&rted atter meetIng w:!.th a r1m refusal.15 Somewhat 
elm1lar in nature was the attempt of the Auatr1an government to 
seeur~ passage for its troops through Rome itself. This request 
woe was refused by Conaalv1 as incom.pat1ble with the special 
poa lticn of Rone as cs.plt·al 0: the Ce'.tholic Chureh.16 
'l'h& Austrian atterllpts to occupy Papal cities againa t the 
known will cf the Papacy were probabl~' the cl~eial teet or in 
the l>enewt:d deteriol'at1on of 1.~atro··Pa:pa1 relations that began 
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attempts of Austria to deceive the Papac7 as to its intentions 
and. it. blatant disregard. tor Papal sovereign rights had. a veX7 
bad effect upon Consalvl. Once again we fina in hi. correspon-
dence a strorc J'lOte ot 41at1"W1t towards Austrla. 77 This lack ot 
contldence was to grow in months to come. 
T7 
8ee. e.g., p. 218 above. 
5. fte'fol t 1n Ple4mom; 
With the Auetr1&ll "l~to%7 at R1etl. the tate of the 
Neapol1tan Revolution _aa 3ealod. But eyen betore tile Auatrlan 
torees en:tereci NapleS Oft 24 lYIa:Nh came the lleWS ot another 
revolution, in Piedmont at the oppoSite end of the peninsula. 
The Allied represantatiYes atill at La1baeh hastily authorized 
Austria to suppreas thla new revolutlon&r,1 oontlagratlQn before 
it couto spreao. 
With one of it. armie. entAie4 in oeeuPTlng Naples while 
another WP <ii.patchett agail'Wt PltHimont, Auatria felt an 
iocreulng neeQ to hold some .trong point in central Italy to 
aate&uara ita over-utended lines of eOTl'!!nurdcation arlfJ suPP17. 
Ancona, the :i tronges t fortreata. and bee t po~t on the Adria.tic 
between llaple& anti the Po, Wd the logical onoic..e. lienee.. on 
24 II.areh Appouyi once aga.ia renew"ui hla gOYel'nmEw.tts req\.&.eat 
tv occupy th.at city. Afte;,.'" e.x;pla.ill1~ th.e I;.) ltuatiQn,. he ~ued 
that u the Ne&~11ta.u War W8£ 'Virtually at '"-1:' (,:11.0., tile Pupa.ey 
r.aec.i no lOI~er preset'vEl its neutralit;,y uo ~cru.pulously as bti:fore 
and could p~:H'iuit thw ~uatrlUl ocuupat1on. H1a govertln1eut would 
eover all t:1Apen:uu" of t:ru.; ocuu.pation and \fould uuUE;;rtake not to 
lnt.rte~ w1th the uormal Papal administrat1on.18 Three days 
~ .... 18 .-.---
A. V ., Rl55, AppoJS71 to Cona&l 91, 2.4 March 1821. 
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l.!tter the P:r"usslan a.nd RUlI!sia.n a"'1bMSa~ors e.lao wrote in 
supp~rt of the Austrian request. 79 
Consalv1 was reluet,ntly eo~pel1ed to ~~1t the force ot 
the AUfltrian argm'lent, and be h~.d no wish to put the Papet(~y 1n 
the position of o~nll' oppoa1ng the wi.shes of the three powe:rs. 
Yet, his .version to an Austrian oeeupat1on was as strong as 
~verJ evid~ntly it Wd dtstrust or Austria. rathar than concern 
toJ!' Para! neutrality that inspired it now. These eonrl1et1ng 
taotoN mingled 11'1 his reply to AP!'ony1. Cort!ullvi elecla-red that 
the Papacy was elw87$ reedy to meet the wishes ot the AllIes, 
and .specially or AustM.a, wheneyer poSSible, and admitted that 
w1th the end or the Weapolitan Revolution it would now be 
po.aible to aclmit Awstrtan troops without 'f'lo1ating Papal neu-
tNllt.,.. Ho weYe I' , Buob ... oocupatlo11 would still Inevitably! 
oause great inoo .. enienee to the 11th .. b! tanta or Aneona and might 
alao be unravoraDly laterpNte4 ab1'Oad. Moreover, the 
Pl.4mont ••• altuatlon had greatll" Imp!'OYed in reeent 4Q'S and 
the Yloto1'7' or the IIsooci Oa ... " .eemed .. all'. In y1ew or these 
tacto .. , Coual..,s. hopetull.,. 11lC1uired 'tfhethe1" the Allies would 
.till teel the need to oocupy Ancona, and expressed his govern-
meat'. hope th.at th.~ would not. Should the)" continue to lna1at. 
however, the Pope would agree to the ooeupatl1) •• 80 
-----"--79 
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The Cardinal appaftRtlJ' reared that th18 plea would h ..... 
no .ttect, for on the folloWing dq he ordered tbe Delegate ot 
AMona to prepare solutio_ tor the ,,&1'10\18 problel1lS that would. 
be raised by the entry of' A:ustrian troops. 81 
Aust1l1a was moat ~avol*ab17 imp" ••• d. b7 00 .. &1'91.'. 
attitude, Which oould DO longer be expla1De4 .. OOne8ft for 
Papal nenltft11.t;y lUlU feu- of' Nsapo11t_ repriaala. Ria re11&O-
t8J'1ati to admit the AuatJtiUl forces was obYious" an4 th1a 
"strange 1nflexib1l1tylf toWBl"ds the lttrwt friends of 1'811&1.08 
and. the good O&ua(;lu w_ .. vere17 erit1clze4 at V1eDDa.82 Austria 
nonoth~lesa took prompt ach'aut&&e of the ooa41ttonal 'apal QO .... 
sent. and Appo~1 waa aireoted to work out with Conaalv1 the 
cond.1tlot18 and pl\)~a.tiona for the ontruee ot Auatri.an tl'OOpa 
into Ancona.3S 
~he reault ot <Uacuas1QIW between Conaalvl, APpoJQ'1, ud. 
the Austrian General B~atr waa ~he Car41nal'a aote of 7 ~ 1821 
Getting f'orth the pl!Opoeed t.J.IImIl fOl! the oooupation. COlWalyl 
bfjcan tha uote 07 po1ftt1na; o\1t qaiD. that w.tth the r'07al1at 
l~atoratlon in ?1eGmont taure ••• med little reaaOD tor .. 
Austrian oeoupatioD, but nonethele •• the Pope, to show hi. 
devot1on to the ttgQod C8.lJ.8e ~ 1't would pert>l1.t it. '.rhe most imnnrtu 
. _ ... 81 _.or-
A.V., RIGS, Consalvi to the wIe, .. k Qr Anoona .. 3l ~ 
1821. 
82 
A.V •• R2hl', Leardi to CQl1salvi, 17 .. a6 AprU 1821. 
83 
R16!3. COM al vi to Delepte or ~Qna.. 31 MarCh 1811. 
of ·t;h~ cond:ttions l~:td i10"frm. f0r th~ occupation '(feN: the 
prrison was to bl! l1r'11.ted to 2000 In~n, or whom 110 "!lore than 
fifty ,m'..1ld be a(j·;l1itt~d t:, the lrmer eltadel J the expenses of 
the oceupllt1on :!'hould 'be borne 'by ~:uetrl.a, y..mJ.eh tlo ..... 'l.d m~..ke 
nrran~~ment5 tor supplying the troops prior to th~lr arriTnl; 
there ~houlcl be nc! inter-Terence lr'.th the ol'dt-nary c1v11 t'.nd 
~11itar.r a~in!$trat1o~ or the laws or the elty; an~ the foree 
r.hould be w1thdr~wn a~ $o~n aa the ~mergeno7 ereat$~ by the 
Pledmontese R~volutlon 11ad ende~, or in the event that Aust~a 
became involved in a war in Which the pretrence of' the Austnan 
gtlM."i$(')n would oompl'O'11! .• e Pal'al neutrality .. 84 
In order to oounterflet ~ny bat! f:':lpres~ ion that this ad-
mission of Austrian troo~ "!'tight oreate Pl"Oad# COnllalTi 4is-
pat;.el1ed a. note or eXJ)l_tloft on the following d.q to all toretca 
tJel't-elJentttt'-"es 11"1 Roryte; e.nd to Lord Ca.stlerengh in London. '!'hie 
note de~~tt1be4 the A.llied requests to occupy Ancona, the Papal 
1"esiets.l'loe I and the eond1t1otta 011 1Ih1ah tbe Papac,. bad f1JJJa117 
e~sree., .. -dcmU t1_oM a •• i~,ultd to tu"fegt,p.ri the essential lftde~n­
deRfte or the pepa«y.85 
~.~ cor..d~_t1.{)na IF.!.td down. by Ccn.<'Jalv1 wn~ s.ecepted by the 
AU!ltrian p::oveml'ftent;. and 8.!"l"Ilngement5 _)!Ie rapidly made tor the 
'mp' .at. tbg gam.ecn :tn Jtme. 86 Just when nll ~eemed ready, 
84 
Ib;Ld., Corwalv:!. to APponJ':t. 7 Mq l821. 
85 
Ib16." CODlalv1 'a Note of 8 Mq 1821. Bnalam.t had. DO 
reprea.h~~:t'iye in }lome at; ~.At time. . 
86 
A.V •• AJW 245. Appti):Q71 tQ eo_at ... ,. 2l _ 1821. 
• alol.4dea reveraal of th. Autn.... attltu_ took pl_. On rr 
MaJ'~. APPGtq'i notified COMalvl that fma BmpEJNI', 1. 'V .... or tILe 
aUJ.rp~liul.ltiin ot tM 11eGm.ollkse a4 Keapolltan litevelut1o_ and 
tn. tranqu1111;y re1gn1nc tbroughont Ital7, Q4 _cd.ded that tile 
oOG,upat1on of A.ncona would be unnece.sal7 aad batt aAcorQ.lDSl7 
swpended plans tor it;. However, should o1rcuraatucea ever 
oIU~1ee in the future to make the occupation a necesstty again. 
Augtr1a expected the Pope to agree to the oeoupat1on under the 
conditions prev1ou~lY worked out.87 
Conaal'Vi t'laa plea.<sec:1 by t."t1s news, but the Auetzt1aD. assump-
tion or a right to garrison the city in any future emergenc7 
~as not to hte liking. Ats this stipulation had no time limit, 
it w~uld in theol"Y g1:ve A\18tria a pernanent right to oecupt 
Artoona. Pref"err1rc not tQottend Austria by open oppoa1 .. tlon 
on this poi'nt, he adopted an indirect wa;y of setting " t1.tJ:le 
ltm1t. !n his I"eply to Ji.pponyl, he agreed that th~ pa:pa07 would 
indeed allow all Austrian oeeUpation of Ancona, under 'bhe same 
e~nt\ittol1$ M those ~eently established, b:ut only -if', .. a 
eo~equenee of recent eventrs, the fc,:rcee of the Sects should 
twer er;ein !,;lanage to th~aten the tranquility Of Italy. • • eo 
th~'t in the rev1v-al of the aarte circWldltan.ee the Allies should 
l'IIfIaaN AJv)()~.tl. as indiepenaable. 1l88 ':fhua* A.ustria. could oal)'" 
Meu.py ,A.tM:Oll& in ... -l'W.~ tha.t ... a di_et l'H\llt or the 
o. 'S'7 . . . 
A.V., R165, Appon;y'1 to Con&alVi, rr Mtq 1823.. AD-YIII. 
Oo.al.1 to "' •• Id., 9 .TUM 1321. 
88 
Did .. , 1.1", C_aId to AppoDJ'l, _ .1 .. 1821. 
1820-1821 revolutions. Thls limitatioll!, aooepted by Austria, 
.e~p11shed its a1m: as no further emergenoy arose in 40nsequence 
of" the 1820-1821 revolutions!' Austrla -.taB not abl~ to oocupy 
Anoo:aa.n9 
89 
,sc;h,In1<1J.in (201, Note 80) et'Z's on thifl p01nt. 
6. The Condemnation ot the Carbonari 
It w.. in late 1820, while engaged in preparing the way at 
Troppau tor Austrian military .. tion against Naples, that 
Mettemich tirst tentatively suggested to Conaalvi the desirabil-
ity ot a tormal Papal condemnation ot the Carbonari. To 
Mettemich, such a condemnation seemed a logical compliment to 
the Austrian intervention: it w .. one more weapon 1n the arsenal 
ot legitimacy, to be used when it seemed expedient. The 
Carbonari "must be attacked by all weapons at once," spiritual 
as well as temporal. 90 The Austrian armies soon to attack Naples, 
representing the secular arm ot Soc1ety, would supp17 the material 
torce necessary to crush the Carbonari; but this alone "&11 not 
sufticient. The Pope, wielder ot the spiritual power ot SOCiety, 
must also unloose his weapons to destroy the moral poSition ot 
the Carbonari. 91 
Mettemieh broached this subject to Consalvi with some 
caution, traming hie requests in general terms and not as yet 
mentioning a tormal Bull, though that w .. clearl,. his aim. No 
doubt, he tore. aw that hi. reque. t , involving u it did the 
rlther obviQY8 intent to use spiritual weapons tor an essentially 
90 
Van Duerm, 311, Mettemich to CO_UTi, 22 November 1820. 
91 
Ibid., 326, Metternich to Corasalvi, 13 December 1820. 
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political e.d, .ould encounter .ome dlftioultle. at Rome. Such 
pro.e" to be the c.... H.edle •• to • ." Mither Oonaalyi nor 
PI_ VII bad the .lighte.t .7Mpath7 .1th the Carbonari and .ould 
hardl7 ha.e b •• D d18pl .... d bJ the .xtlrpatloD 01' the S.ct. Th. 
dltficult,. ... that the Carboaarl could. aot be .0nclemMd .1mpl,. 
'becaus. theJ' .ere politlcallJ' obaox1oU8 J 1t would ha.e to be 
demo_tNted that theJ' held to errors in mattera 01' doctr1M, &ad 
.. ;ret the PapacJ' lacked .1lttlole.t lmowledge 01' the sect to 
ju.qe lta NliSlo_ priacl,le.. Moreo.er, cODdemnation 01' the 
Carbo ..... l milbt ... tacomae the reYolutloDal7 COYel"l'lmcnlt In Haple • 
... d lead to repriaal.. POl' the.e re .. o .. , the PapaoJ' •• 
ratl0.at OD the poa.lbl1itJ' 01' a condemnation at that time. 
Coual.i replied. to Jlllettemlclt fa letters oDlJ' 'be d.eclariq in 
c ... raJ. te1"l1dl that the Pope would 01' courae "t17 to o"ncur, on 
h18 ,art, 1. e •• J.71;h1q that 18 possible to him 1. h18 oharacter 
and hl. relat10 .. wlth the .ie .. maalte.tedH 1. Matteraioh'. 
lettera.92 Taia .... 1 •• rep17 taile4 to .attar,. the Pril'1c., .no 
coatinued to beeeech the 'ap&Oy to briD8 1t •• pirltual weapons 
to the aid 01' the Alll.. 1. order to orush the Carbonar1 
complete17.93 
Suapeetlq trom the.e appeal. that NetteNioh would re._ 
hle i_tat •• ce at x.,-baoh, Oo .. al.i la •• Sp1aa preo18. i_tNo-
92 
Ibid., 315, Coualyi to flletternich, 5 Decembe .. 1820. 
93-
Ibid., 326, Jlletteraich to Oo .. &1Yi, 13 Deoember 1820. 
Jlit£era1oh to 00U&1Y1, 18 3_&17 1821. 
.. 
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tlo" Oil th18 ,olat. Th. Papal ztepzte ••• t.tl ....... to explain to 
Jletteraleh th.t the Cubonarl, 11ke any oth.r oraaalzatloft, 
could oal1' be condemned tor dootrlaal N_O_, lt the,. erred ln 
mattel'll or taith, p4 tb\UI tar the illYest1gation ot the 8eot had 
not produced sufticient e .. l0.clt to make thl. posslble. The 
PapaoJ' had gone as tar .. 1t oould 1ft the "lot ot 15 August 1814, 
nleh hact prohiblted the "ooat1auatlon. 1"8 .. l ... al, or .stabllahmeat" 
ot treemasolU7 or slmilar seoret orgaa1zatioM. It th1a general 
prohibition ... ROt autllcieDt tor Mettera1ch fa purposes, then 
theN .... !lOthlDS more that the Papa07 could. 40 at the pres •• t 
t1 •• 94 
looa atter Splna arrl ... ed at LQ'bach, NetteNloh d14 1n 
taet br1111 the l"b.180t up, &1'1\11 .. vehemeatl.,. that auch a 
eoademnat1on ... neeee.an tor the cI.t.nee ot Cllurch ar:4 Itate 
al1ke. Spl •• replled. 11l aeool'Clanoe wlth Co_al1'1's l .. 1;l'\1otlo_. 
The Prill •• the. arcue4 that 're.masoar,r ha4 been coDdemne4 be-
cauae it. .eoreo7 m... 1t •• peot J th.retore, the CaPbou.rl, as 
.. _ .qaall1' I.oret orgp18atlon, should al.o be eondema.ed tor 
the lame .... uoa. Ipl ... polnt.d out that th1a araument .... ste4 
upoa • tals. premise. the ooadem ... tl0. ot tbe m"o_ had be •• b.... 011 ao\U'l4 e.,.ide... ot th.lrdootrlaal el'1"O", 80t upon 
thelr •• 0reo1' alo_. Welther th1a ItOr &R7 other ot Spin '. 
arcumeats macle any i.t1lpNss1on upoa J4ettern1ohJ the Priaoe 
94 
A.V., 1t2.i, I_tNotio_ tor 8piRa2 10 JanlUl1"1 1821. COPJ' ot the B410t ot 15 !quat 1814 1. Jt2~2, Janua.r:r 1821. 
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remaiaed UReony1need an4 oont1nued to insist upon the neoesait,. 
01' a eoad.mnatl0 •• 95 
D1.cour .... pemapa by Papal res tat..... • Autria allowed 
th18 ~estio. to 11e dormaat until April, 1821, whea lt .as 
rals.d qaln b7 a peraoaal letter f'rom Pranois I to Pius VII. 
That the Emperor himselt aaw tit to write d.ireot17 to the Pope 
lndloate. the import.... waich Austria attach.. to this question. 
Eyldeftt17 lutria had grown -&17 01' the del.,- &ad. opposition 
encountered at Rome, and hoped to OV.Nome all opposition by 
appealing stra1Pt to the Head at the Church. 
In h1s letter the Bmperor explained that he .as writing 
directl,. to the Pope bee...... ot the great importanoe 01' his 
aubJect, "which int.reste .quall,. the welfare of' ael1l10n aad 
that 01' Soolet7. tI H1s armies had oruhed the leapo11tan 
Revolutlon, but: 
The 8ueo.s. whloh •• ha.. jut soored aga1nat 
crime cannot be oompl.te, rather it wUl be Ull-
certain 041 l .. ecure. as 10" .. the 1m,luus seo,'ts 
are act .u,pre ••• d ••• whioh. threat •• to cover 
Ital7 and the world wlth d •• olatlon and rulae • • 
• .The temporal power aloae euuaot brll'11 to an 
ead .0 aalutU7 a work. '!'be .ove. ot the .'111 Is 
1. the tleld ot morallt7 &ft4 ,..l1&io., lt 1. that 
whloh Your Holl .... rule., an4 lt is trom 1'0u that 
I ask'aid &ad .. s1st ..... 
B7 ooa4emiq tlle.e wimpio\18 s.et., the Pope would. "oo.tri-





than the uited eff.orts ot the Powere ha". thus tar ••• 
oontributed to it." The Imperial letter 010.ed wlth the hope 
that -tour Holine •• will wlah to complete, In a moment ot sueh 
aa.ra! .ria 1s, the trlu. ot principles by whioh alone oan 
Soolet., be sayed from ita own eM"ON" 'b7 comp1ylng with the 
A_triu reque.t to condemn the O~JIlazei. 96 
Conalderab1e diplomatIc pressure was exerted upon the 
Papaoy b7 this direet I'TIper'la1 request. DUcua8ioae Oft the 
proposed condemnation were now besun at Rome by the Austrian 
ambassador. No d.etalls ot thea. oonveraatloJ8 aeem to hay. 
8ul"t'lYed, but eYide.t1y the Austriu point ot 't'iew gradually 
preyailed. '!'hla wealcen1ng ot the papal posltlon was no doubt 
aided 'lt7 two faetore I atud7 ot thlf wrltinp ot the Carbonari 
I 
N't'ealed illereul", eoncNte eyide ... ot doctrinal errors on 
their part, while the collapae ot the .eapolitan "11me remo't'ed 
the daqer of repr'18ala trom that qu.arter. At the elld ot JIa7, 
Matteraieh learned with aattataetton that "the d1louaaiona whtOh 
haya· taken. pla.e to 11lduca the Ho17 'ather to speak as Head ot 
the Ohurch aca1nat the ',ettar" ••• haye ended wlth mutual. 
aattataotloD. • • • Pather wl11 make 811 apostolic Yoioe heard 
96 
Vaft Duerm, 316, l'raRe1a I to Ptu VII. 12 AprIl 1821. 
Thia lett.~--aad lndeed the Whole incident or the oODdemaatioD--
i. an iaatruoti.e example or the Autrlan theol'7 ot the Union ot 
Thro ..... Altar at work. both _lDC thas.r Nape.tlye _apons ift 
01801l tor the benetit ot aociety .. a whole. .. well as ot a 
certain hasitaao7 OR the part ot the 'apae7 to al.e its full 
s.pport to puttl-S that theory iato pneti.e. 
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to the ta1thrul. M91 
The prepal"at!oa of this muoh-de.ired Bull (or, more 
pro pe 1"17 , Pontifical Constitution) occupied some tinte, but it 
finally ap,eared on 13 September 1821. It decreed the rormal 
condemnation ot the Carbonar1, described as ~a multitude ot 
wicked men ••• ulted against God and Chnst, with the principal 
objective ot attacking and destroying the Church. • • , deceiving 
the taithtul, ad lea<iiag them. astra,. from the doctnne ot the 
Church b7 means ot a valn aDd misleading philosoph,.." The 
reaSOn5 given tor the condemnations weres 
The 'books • • • , .tatute., anc! ather authentio 
doeuments ot the Carbonarl • • • .. well as the 
te.timoDJ' ot th .. e iii. mer beloac1ac to the 
soelet,. haTe lett it • • • • demoDitrate clear17 
that the Cv'bonarl aim at li .. 1Jl1 e .. e17oM the 
110 ••• to ere ate at wl11 hie on religion ae .... 
coNi.. to hta 0 .. opialo_, the reo,. latro4uo1ft1 
rel1g1oua 1a41ttereaee, than whiob nothing mON 
pel"lliolo'U c .. 'be 1mas1_dJ that the,. paroq 
••• »eel ritual. by their .acrilegious oeremonies 
• • • aftd that theJ plot to ruin the Apostoll0 
s •• as.teat wh1ch ••• they hay ... special 
hatrecl.9t5 
eoualv! took OaN to aead copies of the Bull to Mattemien 
1mme41ate17 atter its appearance. The Prince was highly pleased 
§7 
A.V., R241, Lear41 to Consalvl# 31 Ma7 1821. 
98 
Bullattl Romani Cantlnuatic ••• , XV, 446-4l&.8, Damnatl0 
.ooleta\;i8 .e.reiil _oupatM ouboaariol'Um, 13 September 1821. 
b7 tlle Bull, wbleb he tel t would be a potent weapon In the 
st1'U&Sl. qal_t the reYolutioaarlea. He took care to hay. the 
con4emaatloD well publIcized in the presa and elsewhere, aDd in 
Noyem'ber all Imperial Patent q;atll8t the Oarboaari ... 18aue<l ,-
support ot the Bull.99 It .e.. improbabl'e>, ho .... r, that the 
Bull eyer had the great moral ettect that )lett.mich had uticI-
pated. Liberal. were un.l.1kely to PQ' mueh head to 'apal 
patlle1'fl8, While thoae aurti.iently re11&io_ to be impres.ed 
thereby were not lUrel,. to become Settarj 1. &IV' case .100 Here 
ohyiousl,. ... a major taa. 11\ Metternlch'a plantto use the 
Ohuroh as a weapo. acatnst the aeyolutlon. 
Contemporaries were ftOt unaware ot the role that Austria 
had pl.,.d in the eon4emaation or the Carbonarl. Some LIberals, 
'" 
at least, felt that the PapaoJ' had. been too reapoR8Iye to 
AustrIan wiahe. and criticized the condemnat1on as ft. political 
maniteato and not • rel1cious act."lOl There.as aome Justifi-
cation tor th18 view. Althouch certainly the condemuttoR •• 
justified by the aociety'. pr1ne1ple., there can be 11ttle 
doubt that the immediate motive w.. politi.al and that the 
99 
A.V., ANV245, Oo_81.,.i to Mwti, 15 SeptemDer 1821, R247, 
LeaJ"di to 00_&1y1, 27 .eptember, 26 '1o.ember 1821. 
100 
Abbe de Pradt. lt~fB pd. Amariea 1ll 1821, traM. J. D. 
Williams (2 vola J LoadOD,d); II, 2C'1-209. Alberto AquaroDe, 
"La reataurazloDe nello Stato Pontlt1eio 84 1 suo1 ladlr1zz1 
1.Cl.latl'V1~l." Arehlvle <lelIa So.leta roman. ci1 Storia patria, 
1955, 119-1~. .-
101 
De Pradt, II, 209. 
ohler impetus wtuJ provided by the pressure exerted '01' the 
Austrian government. 
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1. The Aftermath of the !tevolutloM of 1820-1821. 
The Neapolitan Revolution was Grushed in ~~h of 1821, 
but two problems deriving from it continuod to plague the 
Papacy for some time thereafter: the coll.etlon or Austrian debts 
and the presence of Austrian troops in Bologna. 
During the passage or its troop" through the Papal state, 
Austria had given frequent usurMcee that it would relmburse 
the PapaoT tor all expenses caused thereb7.102 Sooa atter the 
end of the oampusn, 00ualY1 thereto" 4ireotec1 the Delegat •• 
to lea.rn from their eommunee the expenses 1ncurrec1 anet to send 
their ela1m8 to Rome. where he would work out a settlement with 
AWlt:r1a.103 
Tbe 1n1t1a1 Austrian ;response to the presentation of these 
claims was unsat1sraeto~. The Austrian autborities declared 
m8.ft7 of the claims invalid, while the rema1nCler war. first 
reduoed 1ft amoun.t and then tumed over to Slcnor Pol1dor1, the 
chier tom1tore, for payment. Prom laek of fUnds f PolIdori was 
. ... 
able onlT to make sMall 'Q"ment. on aecouat:l clef.entDg pQ1nent 




A.V., R242, Spina to COMalv1, 12 Feb1"Ual7, 28 Februarr 
A.V. , 
AprU 1821. 
R210, Conaal,,1 to all te1.gat •• and. Lecate., 7 
2 6 
the tuJ~ure. 
The indignant COmnt1lDeS complained to 00_&1v1, who •• 
v!6orous protests to APP011¥l produced a Nvenal or Auatrian 
policy. In eal-1;y May V1.exma agl"eed tllat it would itself settle 
all claims at th.e1:tt full value during the luonth of June. Thll 
promise lfaa unduly opt1r:1istic, for to Consalv1 '8 exasperation 
the Imperial Tressur:r.r, with what seeraed to be its O\68tOl1l8J:.7 
procrastination where debts to the Papae:r were ooncerned, failed 
to i:take the expected payments in June, and tl,e s~r and earl,. 
ftlll passed with flO ful.~heI' progrea6 on this point. Not until 
l-Joyember elid pqnent at lut begin. BJ' mJ.d-December the 
Austrian ioyern~nt had settled its accounts by the parment ot 
Be. 1;2, 572, 13i to the varioua Papal oommunea.104 
Thea. flnaneial negotiations were parallea. e'd; b\)rr :teq.ua;J.1W;,piFo-
traoted 4iseu8s1oftS on the Austrian torces in Bologaa. It w111 
be Nealled that Metteraioh had promiaec! that the oecupatlon ot 
Bologna. would be aDded When the Aus trian &r!1l¥ took Naples. 
1)4-0-
The Vatic.. Archlves oontain little on thea. Degotlatlona 
aR4 mwst be supplemented b7 the add1tional material in the 
Arohlvio cit atato, Rome (A.S.It.). '!'he above acoount 1& baaed 01U 
A.V., R197, Conaalvl to all Dlleptes and Legates, 30 .Mq 1821. 
Jt210, Conaalvl to Appoll71. 23 July 1821) Consalv1 tofAardl, .4 
Ausust 1821; Consalv1 to the Delqate or Maeerate, 1 lIovem.bel" 
1821;. ANY 245, ConaalYl to Leard!. 16 Janul.1'7 1822. A.8.B., 
Ar-eb.1v10 dl Buon Governo, !3er1e I., Busta 5. Passag10 dell 'armata 
••• t December 1821, 8er1e XI, Busta 221. Pl"Ospetta general. d1 
11quldazione ••• , DeceMber 1821. The last contains a list of 
the creditor oommunes, with the type ot goods and services 
supplied. 'l'he author "'~.beell Wlable to fia4 &rrI' addltloft&l 
intormation on Polidori. 
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Naplea was oceupled. en 24 March, but nonetheless aeveral months 
paa&ed. and the Ai;.atr1ana showCl no sign ot evuuat1ng the clt7. 
Consalvi I. ear11er 8uspiolona tha.t the Austrian force was in-
tended as a per!'nanent gart'i&on .retul"'uod in full force. and 'lIeN 
increased wh6n Spir48. l"'G'por-tea th.a.t rumoura to that effeot were 
cI,u':r'ent allQng the Au.strian OrriCCl'll" 105 )lore ta.rJglble evidence 
was proviUt#u b¥ the dell.W'l~ of' the Auatrlan commander that Spina 
undertake anu,utansive ren.o(V1l.t-a.ol'1i. of tile baJ:'raelw to ranaex' 
tht}m suitable £01" ocoupation d....r:ing the ooming winter106 ....... the 
~~p11oat1on was oBv1ous. 
For .orne time 00.&1v1 d.elayeu taking action, perhaps 
beea,uae he lloped that Awatria m1ght yet w1tbc1l'W ber foroes 
'YolUfttarl1J'. '8y Sttptembep it had b~hlorf1Et apptt.rent tkl.&t th.1s hope 
was vain.. On 5 September theretore, eoual ... 1 presented Apponyl 
with a formal demand tor the withdcra'i1al ot the Austrian torce, 
in aooordance with Mettern1cb t s prmn1f:es.101 
Two months palSlSed betore the Aua trian rep17 oame --a t1rm 
though 1"Ogrettul. retusal. The Auetr1al'l covern.-nent would like 
to grant the Papal reques t, but unfortunately thiB was irnpo8s1ble 
lJ.be oontinued paaenee ot an Austrian ngarr1sonll--tllls term WM 
now used for tbe tirst time, a1'1 o'jinoue sign-... 1n :901ogna wu 
105 
A.V., R242, 3pt .. to OOD$.lv1, 21 April l8al) .210 
Spina to Conaalv1, 28 April 1821. 
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essential to seeure communications with the army occupying 
Naples. Moreover, the garrlson was no doubt useful to overawe 
the Settarj and maintain order in the Legations. To show his 
regard for the Papacy, Francis I would reimburse it for any 
expenses caused by the occupation; but the occupation itself 
must continue. 
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Consalvi was unimpressed by this display of Imperial 
"regard." He prepared another note, in which he criticized the 
Austrian reply at great length~ He denied that the force in 
Bologna could be considered a "garrison,tt which implied a 
long-term occupation, for no agreement for such an occupation 
had been made and Austria in consequence had no right to 
garrison the city~ Moreover, Metternich had specifically 
promised that the troops would be withdrawn at the fall of Naples~ 
The Cardinal pointed out that an Austrian garrison was not 
needed to protect communications, whieh were threatened by no one, 
or to maintain order in the Legations, where tranquility reigned; 
He also stressed the inconvenience caused to the Papal government 
and the people of Bologna by the occupation. The only point on 
which he fully agreed with the Austrian note was that the ex-
penses of the occupation must be borne by Austria. 109 
l08Ibid., Apponyi to Consalvi, 9 November l82l~ 
109 A.V., R260, Consalvi to Apponyi, dated 17 December 1821 
but never sent~ 
This tlctG; was written in mid-Decerr,'ber, but for sOTl:e :reason 
was never sent. Possibly Consalvl delqed 'because he had been 
privftte17 informed that a 8pontaneou~ revereal of AUBtri&n po11C7 
might soon t~.ke place. In any' c~~e, he ~ade no further protest, 
tl.nd 1n February }\:a~tr1.a:l poliey 'rlGlS lndeet1 reveme~.. On 16 
Feb!'Ue~J f1~tternleh !nf'orr"!e~ Appony1 th:lt the E'nperor had de-
e1deCi to shc')l" h!.~ sp~e1f.l mepeet for the 'P8.pney by ol'deI'1ng 
the :ti11med~.$te e"llel.1~tlo'M or Bolcgna, dee1'1te the -rll1tary draw ... 
ba,el-tS 0'" snoh '1 ~tefJ# HC'l1'fe"(!i!l', ~hould th~re 'by any serlo'US 
d:teturbanoe in the !..er,tlt!on" ~uI'!n~ the Allztr1an oeeul'atlo1'l of 
Naples, Vienna reseM'ed the r1ght to l"eoeeupy Bolo«na to protect 
its commwn1eatlons.110 !n this reply Consalvl aeeepted this 
reservation and expressed hl~ ~ati8rRetion nt the friendly 
solution that eliminated a potential source of irrltation.Ill 
The incident wne thus closed in a ~Rt1Eract~ry manner. 
C()nsa.lY~ .. ''las entitled to :-eel SO"':1e sa,t1stactio1'l with the 
results of his policies during the revolut1onar'Y period.. Un.der 
extremely difficult cll'eumstanees he had dealt skilfull,. With 
both Austria. and !iaplcs an.d had :3ecured his essential :u::w: the 
preservation or the independenoe and r~ut~lltr of the Papacy, 
~md the prevention of a:erioue dttlilage and hardship 1'ot" the Papal 
State and its people. Althou.~ Papal neut:ral1t,. had perhap.<J 
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been bent, it had neft:r:- pUbllely bI'Oken. ConsalY1 had 1n taet 
,,,~roI'r:lad nUille!'Ol.13 unnelltt'al acts (for example> int-e:ttOept1na the 
.orrespondenoe of the Neapolitan d1plo!'lats at Bologna) j but these 
r<tr'tained scc:~t. Obv1oU51y, eom~l.t '13 p1"1tJtB.!*'IJ' eoncem in t..h1s 
regard was not the abstl·act principle of' Papal neutttality an auGh. 
but Its preservation in the eyes or the world: the forme!' be had 
not hes1tated to "iolate if' expedient, the latta!l he had defended 
tenaalousl'1 t:lrtd 6ucaesst'ully. ReI'S:ts!l\ gorHI ~.11ustI'at1on C'tr 
the Cardinal fS easentlal1y pJ:'tBo~at1rt app:roaeh to r.)o~t q\le1!t:tons 
tha/c did not involve tho essence o~ Papal authority OP aa.tho11~ 
doot:pina. If it seemed expedient to def'nd the prinCiple of 
Mutnllty··-1n ()rda~, $ay' to 'PrtWlfn't !l Neapolitan invas1on--he 
would do 80; and. likewise he Gml14 at t11\14!s use Papal neutrality 
as an excuse to oppose Auatl"iaD pol1t!lss .... ueh &8 th8 o<)cupatto'B 
of A1&<lQft& 01', .a~11.!t, the Ital1a:n Co1l1."8ftfttto" ...... whlua he 1ft 
taCJt oppoged ttrontd1atPWIt ot AU8'~lall 1llte'fttlcms ~ H • ...,er, 
.ho\tlti it seem expedient to disftgud the pM-neiple of' MutralttJ', 
he Gould &ad' did do so lf1thout a q\laL'lt. Conaal"l had ,...s1ated .. 
the." nth ()ons1del"llble thcmgl'l not eomplete s'U6ees8, these 
A".tnan ~e!tlaftM 'Wb1eh would ha"e eOm'p'PO.-.1set! Papal neut!'tlllt1' 
01' limited. Papal :lndepe1'l4enoe. tfnlU.the ether ItalLan atat •• 
wh1. were oont.1It to follOe. a1o~ In the wake of. AuatPia. the 
Papal lo.el't'lment __ • COMalYi's 41N.tloJllta4 adopted and 
rollowed both at Latqtacb and elaewheN an iadepend.eat policy 
b ••• Olt 1 tB own proper lnWresta. At the .ame t1me, b_ ll1a 
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skiltul diplomae7 and his insistence on aeutrallt7 he had averted 
the danCer ot :Neapolitan iacureions. The mat.rial los. inflict.d 
Oft the Papal State b7 the .eapolitan War had be.a sl1sht com-
pared to what It might have be.n had a major Neapolitan il'lVUion 
taken plao •• 
But OOJ'Ulalvi'. poliole. had olle untortunate cOM.quence z 
their .ueo..... had been purchased at the coat or a further 
d.terioratlon In A_tro-Papal relatio". At the outs.t or the 
•• apellt .. Revolution, it had •• emed that the ver,r oppeait. would 
be the case--that the PapacJ' an4 AUlltria would draw to,.ther 
acai .. t th.ir mutual enerq the RevolutioR. Durins the briet 
Iadian Summer ot AWltl'O-Papal oo-operatlon 1ft late 1820, 
Oo .. alvl had demoaatrated hia lood wll1 towerda Austrla whenever 
po.,lble, whlle the Austpl .. attitude towardl th. Papao, became 
veq trle.ell,. as Vi.JU'l& reallzed the value or Papal moral aupport 
and the ... d tor Papal co-operat1oR In the cruade qalD8t 
Napl... Mett.rnich '. lettera to Coualv1 or late 1820 were more 
oord!al thu &D7 he had wrltte. tor over three ,.ean. Once more 
.ere heard tho.e e.tlci .. phrue. "Auatl'O-papal oo-operat10n," 
"Ulll0 • . ot ThroM 04 Altar,· ~14entlt,. of Auatrlan and Papal 
iatere.ts,· and others, once .0 common, which had .eemingly dis-
appeared forever durlnc the ,ears ot rellcloua controversy. 
Yet thl. rev1 val was oftlJ' temporar,r, foredoomCd b, the 
inherent conflict betweea Conaalvl t s pollcles and those of 
AWltria. That Power had expeeted, not \Ulft&turall,., that the 
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'apac,., reallz1na the ciallger poaed to Church aad State allke by 
the Neapolltan Revolutlon, would co-operate whole-hearteelly. 
CertaiDl,. Oo .. alyl teared the danser presented by the ReYolutlon, 
hoped to aee lt auppressed, and waa wl111ns to co-operate wlth 
AWltrla to that ead, wlthl. the 11mlta ot hls overall pollcy 
baaed on Papal lnteresta. But those limlts proyed too aarrow 
to satlsty Vienna. Co_alYl, lt ltlUIIt be repeated, wu cletermlned 
to preaerve the lndependeaoe and neutrality ot the Papaoy and to 
avoid aD.7 pretext tor Neapolitan 1_ulon. '!'hese aima inevltably 
, 
ooDtllcted wlth the Austrian pl.... tor crushlng the Revolutlon. 
On ~ polnts the Cardlnal telt obllged to oppose Auatria--the 
supply ot Austrian troops, the occupatio. ot Papal cltles, the 
proeeedinsa at La7baoh--aad thoUCh he trled to be taotful ~d 
cORoUiatory, Austria was surprised and irrltated by hls un-
expected oppositloR. 
Aa 1821 WON on, lustro-'apal relatlona became lnoreulncl,. 
stralaed, and ORee again bitter ctlt101am ot the PapaOJ' aDd ot 
eoualyl beS'" to be heard at Vlenna. "I would be bet1'Q'iac my 
d~t7 [Leardl reluotantly admitted to Co_81yl ln Aprl1] it I 
oonoealed trom you that ••• on those oooulona on .nioh Y.R. 
haa Yigorawll,. sWlt.ined the system ot strlot aeutrallt7, there 
~ave not been laoki. oomplaints b1' tho. attached to this 
Is0yermnent about 70ur strance obatlnac7 towards the true trlends 
ot religlon and the sood. cause. If Oo_alyl fa obvious reluctance 
to allow Austria to occupy Ancona had oaused. these complaints to 
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be redoubled. This apparent cU.strust ot Austria, a "proven 
friend," W&8 UDtavorably oontrasted with the tormer w1llingness 
ot the Papacy to allow Napoleon,"a lc:nOWD anet dangerous toe," to 
garr1son that city in 1805. The Card1nal's reluctance was oon-
aidered inexplicable, unle.s it stemmed trom d1atrust and 111-
wl11, for "now the Holy See haa 11ttle reason to maintain a 
strict neutrality between the Gooel and the Evil, aince, Naples 
haYing submitted, It 18 DO longer exposed to imminent ctanser.,ll2 
Oritioiam ot the Papaoy ia general and Oonaal.l 11l 
partioular continued to gro., cd Leardi could 40 little to 
cheek it. Mettemlch anc:l Prancia I were 800n to retum from 
Lqbach, ud the nunoio had. reason. to fear they too would .101n 
1n the chorus ot critloism. Aooord1ngl7, on 26 Aprll he begged 
Oonaalvl to "gl.e me speolal instNot10ns tor the case that 
durlna the dlscusalona [with Mettel"ll1cb and the Emperor] the,. 
ahould apeak to me ot aome cauae tor d1aoontent that a govern-
ment, though aaimated b,- the beat Inte.tiona, mQ' In ve1:7 dlt-
tlcult clreumatancea elve to another." The BUncle explained 
apologetioally that .. he w.. not tamiliar wlth the details ot 
00 .. aly1'a pol107 it w .. dlffioult tor hlm to defend it 
4IfteotlYel,-.113 
TRial requeat proyolatd a sharp rep1,- trom the Seoret&17 ot 
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state. He was "amazed that you could so much as conceive the 
idea that H.I.R.A.M. or H.R. Prinee Mettern1ch could have anT 
cause tor discontent with the Pontifioal government atter the 
shIning proofs ot special regard that the Pontitical government 
has given to that ot H.I.R.A.~.· To show the absurdity ot such 
ideas. he embarked upon a lengthy dere .. _ ot his policies. 
describing in d.etaU the great co--operation of the Papacy w1th 
Austria durinc the entire NeapolItan cris18. e.pecially durIng 
the pus8le ot Austr1an troops through the Papal Statea. He 
enumerated at length the expe •• e and 1nooRYenienee Wbteh this 
W11111'11 c0-operatioJl bad. c&Ullec1 the Papal go.ernment and its 
subjects J aurel,. tbe.e aaoritice. .hould prove Papal lood wUl 
towarda Austria. In oo-openting with AWlStria and. tultilliftg 
1ta wiah ••• Oo_al.l had lone .. tar as he could. po.sibl,. go 
without open17 vlolating Papal neutralIt7. which Austria could 
not justly expeot hIm to saoritioe tor her aake alone. The 
greateat proot ot his good w1l1 was the recent agreement allow-
ing Auatria to OCCUW Anoona. The Papao," might well have 
retuaed to allow this oocupation, as there waa DO mll1tar,r 
neceastty tor it, nor ... It nece.sary tor the preservation ot 
order. Honetnelea., the HolT See. 801e17 trom cood will towards 
Austria. had acNed to the occupation. though in so doins It 
had .erious11 imperilled ita preclous neutral1ty and impartiallt1 
betore the wole world. Xe.pins in mia. all these -shining 
proote" ot Papal lood w111. Oonsalvl eoncluded, be could not aee 
how AWltrla could. DO.aibl,. tind. au jut AAHA .. fitop eli. a, .... 
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with the Papal goverrrnent. Le~1 should therefore have little 
d1ffieult,- 1n defending it against unjust critie1am.llJt. 
It Leardi uaed the detallSe outlined. by COJJ8alvl, it wu to 
l1ttle etfeet, tor criticism or the Papacy contlnued. llS The 
The Papal cOMent to the occupation of Allcona and the condemna-
tioD ot the Carbonari produced some improvement, and the attitude 
of Metternlch upon hi. returD was leas critical than Leardl had 
teared. Nonethele.a. the Prince had not forgotten Conaalvi IS 
opposition and feared that it might continue. 
In hie first conversation with the nuncl0, Nettemieh 
prai •• d the Pope, but ci1d not entirely conceal hilS annoyanoe at 
the "dlvet.'ge.ce of opiJliontr between Auatria and the 'apacy" in 
regard to the ut11it,. &ftd ):Olitical aims 01" the neutral It,. 
mainta1ned bY' Hia Holiness dur1ng the hosti11t1es. tt Afq' such 
41 verse.ce ot opineD ... • threat to the commell cause J 01117 1n 
00-ope"'t10n ancl uait,. could. safety be touD4. In th •• e er1tloal 
tlme., "governmente must become oloe. friende and establlsh 
among themse1ve. the moat pertect trvat." In partlcular, the 
It&11 .... tat •• muat ahow createI' contldence ln Awatrla: lurelY' 
"the Italian gO.,ernmellta mut b7 now have beea cOJlYinoed by 
expel"1enee that. • .Auatria hu no other aim then to preaerve 
pu~11c order, .no.. di.turbance menace. the .ecurlt7 of all 
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throne3 &"'1.d of the altar as well. II TheY' must therefore trust 
in AU$ 'tria and 00 -operate tully- with her. with no doubtful 
reservations or excusers. Ar~ doubt that m1gh.t have lingered in 
I.e a.rdi • s mind as to whether these remarks were pr1::narily 
directed at Conaalvi was d1spelled by JrIetternloh ta (loncluding 
Nrr.arks. "H.R. charged me [the nunoio reportaQ to ConsalVl] on 
th13 point not to let a11p a'n7 opportunity that mq &r'ise in 
writing to Y.E. to confirm w1th the moet explio1t assurances on 
his part, that no mot1ve ot ambition, nor anT other motive 
beyond those 1ndioated above. could ever ent~r into the conduct 
116 
of the Imper1al Cabinet." 
It 18 a.pparent tl'Om the above that Mettemloh was not 
merely annoyed. but also a1~ned by eonsalvi'. polioy. He had 
divined that btlthlnd the various explanat10ns of his opposition 
offered by Consalv1--explanatlons otten quite genuine in them-
selves--lurked an 1ncreasing d1struat ot the aims and ambitions 
of Austria 1n the Italian Peninsul.... His remarks to Leardi were 
clearly- 1ntended to reassure Oonsalvl. They were, in effect. an 
appeal to the Cardinal to abandon his di8 trus t ot Aus tria. and 
co-operate Wholeheartedly with her again. 
1'1\e appeal rail.fi. It faUed, 1:n ....... 10., beeaWie 
00_alv1'a 8upie1oDS were not 1n tact without found.ation. '1'l'WJ. 
Mett ... l4bt. defenee of Austrian po1107 ... aouad--but only 1. 
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a aert;a.in seooe. The Frinae was not l;ying \'lhen he asserted that 
A·tlstria IS essential ai!;1 was only to maintain order and the 
status quo in Italy and that ahe oherished no expansionist 
8.l'"':bltiol"ls there. Howevar# the Austrian goVertrilcnt, Met;tat'nich 
in the lead, had become convincsd that its pr1ma~1 aim of 
maintaining tranquility could only be attained by greatly in-
creasing Austrian influence over the var10us ItalIan governments 
and by exercising a t'~ight of' supervision" over them, whioh 
inoluded the right to intervene in their polioies both internal 
and external.111 From the point or view of" the Papal atatesman, 
these policies preaented almost sa great a danger as ~ ter-
ritorial ~~bitlon could have, for they threatened that t~mporal 
treedom or !t.ctiOJl which was considered neces.&l7 tor the 
Pa.pacy 18 aplrltual INlependenee. COmialYi therefore did not 
and eould aot respond to :t.t!tternioh'$ appeal. He could not 
trust A~trla so lo~ as these considerations governed her 
Italian pol10.1 ~ tor thaI' poseci a threat to what he wu determined 
to delead. While Austria persist~d in her present policy. 
Consalvi was reluotantl7 compelled to pppose hare 
The end result or the Neapolitan Revolution, then, was DOt 
to draw the lapae7 and Awstna oloser together, as miSht have 
been expeeted, but to drive them farther apart. To the distru.at 
anel enmltl' arcueecS bJ' 1'811&10\18 eontro.eN7 ... ROW added -'-:'-, .-;'-, 
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tha.t resulting fron political l,}onfl:tet. A'tlStr1a peX"SisUtd in 
ita Italia!1 policy 1 Conflalv! pe!'l!iBted in oppos1ng it. '!'he 
reeult was growing d.1atruat, mutua.l Busple1on,; and renewad. con-
flict. The rel1C1ous eont'tOve:fIBY' (}f lsrr"'18~ had begun the 
deel1.."l& of Auatro-Papa! (to --o~ratl()1'lJ the pol1t1ealdiaputes ot 
1821-1823 were to oomummate 1t. 
THE COLLAPSE OF' AU~tt'RO -PAPAL CO··OPERATION: 1821-1823 
1. The IDter-CoQlre •• Per1od, 1821-1822 
Superficiall,., the eighteen morr'chs batween the Congress 
of' Laybaa.h and that of' Verona ware a perlod of' oalm 1n Austro-
Papal relations. The even tenor of" tht'Jir relations was 
apparently disturbed only by a '~inor incident in Januar,y of 
1822 when an Austrian offioe!' was Iddnapped by brigands in the 
southern ~apal states and the Austrian eo~ander in Naples 
threatened to enter 'apal territory to suppr3ss the brigands 
h1~selr. Through prompt action by the Papal toreea, the eaptlYe 
Austrian was returned and. the bl"'~ds punished. The Austrian 
GOm'nander waa rebuked by Mtttternieh tor his threat to occupy 
~apa.l terr1tory an4 the affair blew oVllr. The onlY' significant 
result was, in fact, a :rnea51..tN for increased Austx-o ... ~a.pal 
ao-<)peratlon, 1n the form of an agreement tor joint act1ol1 
against the brigands alollg the lleapolltan border.1 Papal 
antagonism that had .. "eared during the revo1ut1ol18 had not 
.. 
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C1T.inlshed. but rather had grown. ter its essential cause 
eon\lnuec to exist t AViSt:r1a. had not aba..'1doned her plans tor 
Increasing her eOl'ltlt"Ol over tl\e Italian hn1r.aula, 1\or was 
Conaalvl any lesg det&rtitt~d to oppos~ those plar~. 
CODlalvi tl9 grow1.rJg rJ1.Stl"'tiSt 01 Vlemna was ted bT several 
Austrian polieies during ~e inte~-eon&ress perla4. MOst im-
mediately annoying, pifrhaps, was Austrlaa P"SSUH tor mQre 
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.evere repreSSion or the Set'tarJ. l'rlor to the Neapolitan 
ll(tvQlutlotl .. rl.ettelmioh had appeared fJI!!.t1atled with Papal measurea 
agaiM t the Seo'ts I but the eyenta of 1820-1821 had ~'Ught a ,"at 
eha!lg& 1n his attItude qn this po11tt. He Game to believe that 
the 8e'tar3 wette t~ T!\Or-G da.qe'J.40tUJ than It., ha~ thought P!'e" 
.iously, and that in iSOM&q .... et\f.t& hartthe]!t "p~8s1on of them wall 
aeCeSfS8l'7. 2 
Desp1te the alarr1 al'Otm\,Hi bY' tha :'eVolution i. HaplCHJ, 
Coualv1 ha.d not been tl-1&htened into extreme measures ap.UWt 
th(t 3ettarj -' He ci1x.cte&S that ~lr agitation 8hould be r1~nll 
rapretuJe41 ud those whO$6 se:rlo'WI guilt could be pt'oyed were to 
lie punial1ed aGool'd1ngly. Howver # be ol·dered the atr1ct 
Obaeftan48 ot lega11t7 1n tM arN3t pc! trial ot auspect •• td10 
1IQ:N t;) 'be puUiahad QnlJ' it tltei .. pilt could be pt-o\,en beyond 
III doub'. Aft'e.t OJ- 1mpriaO'l1.l1le'ft' 011 meN suspioion W88 tor-
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bidden. Subordinates who aoted with exoea81ye rigor were rebuked 
aJld ordered. to proceed wlth moderatlon. Dur1ag the oru18 or 
1820-1821 a number ot ~ .. C!~~.~..1 were &rr8ated, but no executlons 
or other .e"ere pun18hmenta were oanled out J exUe or pollee 
8uperYleloD were the oDl7 penaltie. intlioted, and eyen the 
exl1.. were .OOD allowed to retum. 3 
'!his mild po110y met with no raYOr at VleMa. In "aroh, 
1821. LeIU"d!. reported that -the Imperial government 18 not eft-
tire1y pleased with tae oonduot or the Oourt or Rome OD this 
point. • • , which 40e. DOt 418.,1", that rigor ud actlYlty that 
such situatic_ call ror •••• - Autl'1a oompl.1Md that the 
Papal IO'l'4!UI'runellt d14 not alwa;re aet on the lato!'mat1on siven lt 
b7 the Autrlan poliee. ud that when it 41d. it trequ.entl,. dis-
pIqe4 too muoh -indulgence. tt Th18 lenient Papal con4\tot was 
contrasted untayorably with the properly aevere measurea recentl,. 
taken qai11St the Seeta in Lombard.7-Venetla and Mode_.4 
COMalv! did. yield to mountillg A'WJtrian cHtiolsm to the 
extent ot arresting and exiling a tew S~~~jl ~om Austria de-
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ounaed, but in. tt,eneral he held to his poliey of' moderaatton a.nd. 
l~~a1ity.' No doubt it was partly beeAlme or his dlssat15faction 
ith Canadvi's continued moderati.nn th.at Mettemleh revived a 
torme~ plan r~r oombattl~ the Seets, one that posed a r~~ 
reatel' threat to Papal independenae t the establtsh."'!ent or a 
polltieal Commission or General Commisslon ot Polioe under 
This Commission would. eo-ord:tnate and direct 
he police activ1ty of all the Italian states against the 
e~"'!:~3. t the Peni1UJula-wide peyolutlontU"y' ol'gMizat:f.on would be 
ontront&d uti ov.reame by a Peninsula-wide pol10e, efficiently 
'l'o Metterrdch, the idea may ha ... e seemed. 
bjeetlonable J COMalyi saw it 1n a 41fterent light. 'l'he 
apuy--and any other Itallu gove1'nl't1ent DOt content to be a mere 
uatrlan aatelllte--had a compelling mot1y. tor op~lt1ont auoh 
Commusloft would in ettect 81ve Austria oontrol oyer all 
liee aetiYlt7 ift Italy, 8ftatly increasing her influence over 
be Ital~an atates and presenting her with limitless opportunt-
1e. to interfere 1n their internal atta!",. 6 '!'he pro~fJal ot 
ueh at Commission could onlY' 1.nereesft Consal..,! '8 d.1strUllJt or 
uetrian aims and ambltlo~. 
The Cardinal. first leamed ot Metternieh '8 plan from the 
GlW.!tel'io, I, 36-27- A.V., RlGS, Consalvi to Governor of 
ome# 20 July 1821. 1t242 , Coualvl to Spina, 16 November 1822. 
6 
A. V. t R242, Observations on the projeot ot a Po1itioal 
OMm.18sion. • • J 1822; Instruotions for Spina. 1822J Consalvl 
oSpina, 28 November 1822. 
~~. 
latter'. con~ldant, Count Butro, wbo y1alted Rome In April. 1822. 
The Count, at MetteMllch '. inatruetlona, Informed Consalvi ot the 
projeet and sought hi. :reactIon. The Car41nal, taken by surprlae 
... unwilllng to eommlt himself and merel~ replied 1n general 
terms that the 'ap.07 would. a.lw..,.. 00 -operate agaift8t the 
S,ettar.,- _tn.yer po.slble. Mettel'ftioh mq have interpreted thes. 
Nma,rlal .. indicating 'apal approYal. In tact, COMelV! was 
Implaoabl7 hostIle to the Oommi •• ion, though he planned to yell 
hie opposition as much .. po.aible 1n the hope that the plan 
!'11cht !'all through without hUl intervention. But he toresaw 
the l1)el1hood that Nettemien would propose h1a Comm1aslon at 
the approaehing Congress, and W88 prepared to oppose Austrian 
de.iSM there openly it MC ••• &r7.J 
A seoond sauroe or continued Auatro-Papel tenelon was the 
app&l'ent determination ot Austria to impose eertaln retorms upon 
the Papal and othel:' Italian governments. Mettemlch be.d long 
8\tpporte4 Consal ... l flJ plane to reform the Papal goYerRn'tftnt, as 
hu bee. discuaeed ln Chapter II, but after the Neapolitan 
R .... olutioft, he de.leSe« that the slow paM or Papal refol:'m, ham-
pe~Cl b7 the !!~_,=, .... t.uttlelent. He eaw "without .urprise 
but Rot without eoX'l'OW that because of the.. obetacle. rnan.v 
Ibid.., Alao, R242, OODBe.lv1 tQ Leardi., 1 MI!Q" 1822. Fur1an1. 
XXXIX, ~.J;.85, is inoorrect in assuming that the chief subject 
of Rw"'i'o '8 mi.alo11 .aa the reform or the Papal government) there 
i& no e1,.ldenoa the le.tter lias e·ven discl.latled. See R2/~2, ConsalYl 
to Spina., 28 November, 4 Leeemb-er 1822. 
t")~:5 
'-.,I 
parts (Of Oonaa1vl f8 reform program] haye remained unexecuted or 
paral,-zed. • It the Papal goyernment would not oarry out neces-
S&r1' retorms Oft ita own initiative, then the Powers would haye 
to 4tOmpel it to aet. 8 
A_tria waa not alone in this opinion. At ~baoh Russia 
ba4 been eonoerned l •• t the NeapolItan Reyolutioft spread to the 
Papal territor:!.es. In January', 1821 ~ the Russian ambassador at 
Rome, Prince Andre Itallnslty. was instruoted to impress upon 
Conaalyl the Mees8it,. or prompt reforms to forestal.l revolution, 
aftd to ttuggeat that the subject be brought up at the COng~sB of 
LQ'baeh.9 
Itallnalq/'. ovel"tUl"es were unwelcome tOi Oonaalvi, who had 
no 1nten1;ion or allowing f"oJ."'etgn 1nteI'fex-eflce :tn Papsl 1.nternal 
affairs and bel1aved that his ~..:P.!-~l'2Jt~£. of 1816 contained all 
the essentIals or a sound govemment if only he could put 1t into 
erfect. Mo:reOV61', as Ital1M ky did not 8 pec!ty the type of 
rrero~ desIred. the Cardinal tea1"ed it might be in the direction 
of constitutional go,~et'l'!ment. which was Inoorr.patlble with the 
absolute authority of the PO'f'e. Re therefore re,1eeted the 
Russian pJIOposals!, e.nd the sub.feet was not brought up at Lal'baeh 
8 
A.V., 1~2h·T .. Leardi tc Cvnsal'Vi, so June 182l. 
9 
A.V., R2h2, C~nsalvi to Spina, 14, 11 F'e'bl'Ua.I·Y 1021; 
Nesa.Irette to Itallnsky, 22 January, 3 Febl"tlary 1821. Prince 









during Spina's sojourn there.10 
The Taarts interest In promoting Papal retor.m seems to have 
dwindled a:f'ter thb rebu:f't, tor hencetorth llussla took onlY' a 
",err aeoonda17 role in this queatlan. It .... now Austria that 
took the lead in preasing the Papal and other Italian governments 
to carr.y out fetorms. 
'!'he queatlon ot retorm was taken up bY' Austria, Pl'UBsia, 
and llus.la at La7baoh atter the departure ot the Itallan dele-
sate.. The re.ult ot their d.ellberatloM .as the ie.uanoe on 12 
Ma7 1821 ot Ciroulal'll bJ' the three Eastern POWN to thelr 
represent.tiv •• at the various Italian oourt.. '!'he Austrlan 
Circular, the atroqe.t ot the three, argued. th.t s 
A_tria can be oo_i"red • Part17 Italiu power. 
Auetri. h .. lent to the other St.te. ot the Pet.insula 
material ... i.tan •• whioh had led to the re .... t.bll.h-
meat ot peace. Austrla otters to tho •• state. the 
materlal me.. ot whloh th.7 will atil1 tor aome time 
have Med to ensure the preaervation ot thl. bene-
tlo1al peace. • • • Theretore, Austri. b in a oertain 
aenae .uthoriz.d to i_1st on the adoption ot m .... ure. 
that the state. themselves must take so that this in-
eORV.nient and expeMive aid wl11 aot be continuall,. 
••••• &1'7. • • • 
Austria did not speci:f'7 1Ihat these measure. should be J the 
individual .tat •• should choose tho.e measures ot reform be.t 
calcul.ted to .ati.t7 the legitim.te grievaRees ot their subjects 
aDd thus .1imin.te all cause tor disconteat. At the Congress ot 
10 
Ibid., Spina to COMalvi, 26 'ebruar;y 1821, Co_elvi to 
SpiRa, If Mii-eh 1821, with undated letter trom Conaal..,1 to Itallu 0 
257 
Florence the ItallaD atatea would have to explain to the Powers 
the measures which the,. had adopted and demonstrate that the 
latter were suf'ficient to ensure tranquilit7 if the Austrian 
forees were withdrawn. If' their measurea were found inadequate 
at the Congress, then the Powers would themselves have to pre-
scribe suitable reforms and ifti!at upon their implementation.ll 
It is difficult to S&7 which more alarmed Consalvi in these 
circulars: the immediate threat of interferenoe with his own 
reform plan or the explicit assumption b,. Austria of a general 
right of iDterterence in the Italian states, but neither was to 
hi. li1dJl8. Hia first reactioD wu to aend Leardi a detailed 
description of all receRt ref'orms, le,al, administrative, and 
financial, eaacted in the Papal Statea, as well as those that 
were planned, with inatructiona to communioate it to Metternioh. 
This description, the Cardinal felt, should convince the Prinoe 
that Austrian i.terterenee in the reform ot the Papal State was 
unnecessar,r as well as objectionable, tor "the paternal solici-
tude ot the HolT Father does not ee .. e to ocoupy- itselt in giving 
to his people the moat uaetul institutions which serve to 
establish their well-being on solid to\ll'ldations, and that it is 
wrong to accuse the Papal government ot not proti ting trom the 
present moment ot calm to promote those uaetul institutions that 
ever increase the love ot the people tar their legitimate 
11 
Ibid., Clroular of' 12 May 1821. Alao printed in Alberti, 
IV, 458~. 
govemmel'lt • "12 
COMaly1 evlc!ellt17 dld not tl"T to hlde h18 di.like tor the 
Circular 1n his private con .. eraations, tor news ot critioism on 
hiS part soon reached Vienu. At the end ot June Metternich 
decided to let the Card1nal know ot h18 c!1apleaaure at the 
latter'. attitude and at the same time to t17 to reassure him as 
to Austria'S pollcies.. Speaking with Leardi (who had just oon-
veyed Consalvits congratulations on the Prince's eleYation to 
Chancellor), Nettemioh praised the Seoret&l7 of state's "rare 
gift. ,.. but "he cltd not tall to let me know ~the nuncio reported] 
that he had experienced some disple_ure in noting that Y.E. had 
not alw.,a judged the eoDduct ot the Austrian oabinet with the 
full conti4enee it dese"e •• II Oo_alyits reaction to the 
Circular wu the latest example of this miaJudgment. The 
Chancellor eXl'la1ned that the 801e motive behind the Circular 
had bee. the fear that it the Itallaa courts did not malre nece.-
s&17 reforme, the reaut tine popular disoontent would end in 
reyolutionJ Auatria had thus be •• acting wIth the beat interest. 
ot all the Italian Bo ... rnmenta in mInd. ~e Italian so.eromeat. 
oannot fairl,. judge in anv other • ., the intentioDS at H.M., tor 
H.M. h .. alreaQ' si.eR the moat atrUd,. proofs that his aotions 
are not motivated by U7 pereoDal ambltIoaa, but onl7 b7 the 
good of all the 80 .. ere1&_ ot the Peni_ula. tt In view ot thIs 
12 
A.V., R247, Conaaly1 to Leardi, 9 June 1821. 
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purity of' Austrian intentions, Metternich could not conceal "the 
e orrow he reels that Y.E. has, in reading the Circular, as als 0 
in the progress of the negot1ations for the occupation of Ancona, 
shown an irritation that betr&JS a certain distrust, as if the 
House ot Austria wished to encroach upon the sovereign rights of 
the Italian princes." 
Metternich .ent Oft to praiae Conaalvi's great efforts for 
reform, all the more commendable in that "the obstacles to be 
overcome are much greater and more complicated than anywhere 
else." Nonetheless, it was undeniable that despite his heroic 
efforts the Cardinal had been unable to put more than a fraction 
of hie reforms into full efrect. Circumstances demanded the 
rapid 1ntroduction of' more extenaive reforms. ConaalYi should 
not allow the apparent tranquility' of the Pa.pal States to de-
oeive him, tor revolution&r7 forces were at work under the sur-
faoe. tiThe present milita17 occupation keeps the <11scontented 
in check, but this will not last forever •••• " Coual.,.i and 
other Italian statesmen must therefore take advantage ot the 
present temporaJ.'7 respite to aat1at7 all popular oauae for com-
plaint, or the withdrawal of' the Austrian torces would be 
followed by peninsula-wide revolution. At the coming Council of 
Florence the Papal and other Italian governments must be able to 
convince the Power. that they had satisfied their subjects, or 
AustrIa could not evacuate it. armi.s. Metternich charged 





"you will agree that I can hardly be oalled a JacobinJ so it I 
speak to you ot necessary institutions and reforms. I can only 
be motivated by the wish to see the repose ot all legitimate 
governments 88sured."13 
Apparently Metternioh never specified in detail the reforms 
he desired the Italian states to adopt. The general model he 
proposed can be seen in the new government set up for Naples, 
which provided tOl" a system ot councils whose advice the king 
must hear but need not tollow, tor some participation by the 
pl"Opertied eluses in 100al government, and fol" greater admin-
istrative articien.,-. For the special case ot the Papal State, 
he particularly desired a greater number or la.ymen~in the 
government.14 
The Card1nal t 8 d1st~.t of Austrian policy was not dimin-
ished by Metternlch t s explanations. Realizing thiS, the 
Chancellor delivered another equally lengthy apologia tor 
Imperial polio)'" 1n June 1822, using the same arguments as berore 
with an equal lack or suceess.15 
Despite Metternich's denials. the tact remained that the 
Austrian attempt to compel the Italian states to introduce 
--~3~---
IbId., Leardi to Consalvl, 30 Jun.e 1821. 
14 
Ibid. Also. R242. InstructIons tor Spina, 1822) Untltled 
dooumen~llnn1ng "Easendosi stabllito ••• ," 1822; Fog1l 
lettl nella prima Conge. tenuta. • •• 1822. Schroeder, 124-126. 
15 
A. V • J R247 J Leard! to Cons a1 vi, 6 June 1822. 
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reforms did represent interterence in their internal affairs, and 
might well be the thin end of' the wedge tor mueh more extensive 
interference later. Such interference Consalvi could never 
willingly aocept. Furthermore, though considered b7 itself this 
attempt might be as innocent in motIvation as Mettern1eh claimed, 
when taken In the oontext of' Austria'. overall Italian policy it 
assumed. more sinister aspeot: it then appeared as one of the 
three facets of an oftensive movement designed to establIsh 
Austrian hegemoJ'l1' in Italy. The tiNt facet WM the AUlItrian 
attempt to assume control over pollce activity in Italy by the 
establishment ot a (Jenera! Commias iOl'll interference 1n the in-
ternal arfai" of the Italian states in the name of reform 
appeared as the seoond; and the third taoet, the keJStone in the 
&reh, was the revival of Mettemieh '& old projeot tor an Italian 
Contederation. 
It will be recalled that the project of an Italian Oon-
tederation had first been suggested by Mettemich at the Congress 
of Vienna but had been abandoned in the taee of strong ItalIan 
opposition. He had. howYer, been able to persuade Naples and. 
Tuac8ll7 to sign treati •• lomewhat NltrIctlng their independ.ence 
an4 forbidding them to oontract any obligations that might 
weaken the proposed Italian Confederatlon--t~atie8 that were 
clearly intended to aerYe as a possible basis tor the ContedeN-
tion.16 
16 
See above, Chapter II, Seet10n 2. 
There i3 some doubt as tc ,mat Mettornich meant by an 
"Italian Confederation." The phrase' "'HJ3- " applied to have two 
different concepts, and Metternioh never stated clearly which ot 
the two he sought: first, a true Confederation, similar to that 
in Germany-; seco1'1d, a 8Y'8tem of bilateral allianees, si>'l'lilar to 
that of. 1815 with Naples, by which Austria would acquire con-
siderable control over the polioies ot the individual Ital1an 
states. The most plausible explanation for this contusion is tha 
Metternieh himself was not certa.1n as to which concept to pursue. 
probably he would have preferred the true Confederation which 
offered greater control over the Italian states, but in view ot 
the strong opposition to that scheme considered the alliance 
BY3tem to be more practical. Ift art::! ease, it the alliance 
8yste~ could be worked out it could serve roB the toundation on 
which a true confederation could be bul1t.17 
\Ihlohever of these two versions TwIetternich had 11'1 mind in 
1822, the Italian Oonfederation was certain to meet with strong 
oppOSition fror" the Papal government: 
Whate .. er might be the advantage that might result 
to the Italian governments trom a Confederation 
(ConaalYl explained to Spina) their chief interests 
are always opposed to it •••• The exeesaive dis-
proportion between the colossal torces of Austria 
and those ••• eyen of all the Italian atates 
together would give her a preponderanee so decisive 
that Austria alone would decide the destinies ot 
Italy. and the independence of' the Italian rulers 
--.... \[11"{.--
On the different ooncepta 01' the Oontederation, see 
Bettaninl, 3-501 Srblk, I, 561; Furlan! XXXIX, 488-491. 
'tlculd be tn the greatest d~tne:er. But if e"eIT Itallen 
government should recoil from this sys tern, how much 
J!ore ehould the Pontiftee.l govern~1ent oppose it' (The 
Pope, as Head of the Chureh as well as a temporal ruler, 
1'1'ust !,rezerve co~r.plete impartiality towards a.l1 nations.; 
therefore he cannot] join for temporal objeetiyes with 
other rulers, for their interests, though now common 
with those of the Pontitieal government, could at times 
be in opt'los1t1.on to the relations Which the Pope must 
preserve with other powers •••• 
['1'he le;paey1 therefore w1l1 have to rejeet any 
proposal for an Italian Contederation, whether this 
Confederation ecvers all the relations of the Italian 
states or whether it is limited only to so~e 01' them. 
Should ~ ot the Italian sovereigns, whether 
for family connections or tor an.y other reason, agree 
to form with the Em~ror 01' Austria a politieal alliance 
and to regulaDe in accordance with the will of hls own 
state [the PapaellfiUlt also aisapprove such an 
Alliance. • • • J 
203 
Thus, Cor~alvi was opposed to either form of Metternich's 
Italian Confedera.tion. Indeed, he feared the Political Co:nmis-
sion and thz Austr1~~ insistence on refo~ in large part because 
those :neasures could serve as stepping atones to a Confedera-
tion. l9 
Beneath the superficial c.alm of the inter-Congress period, 
then, tension had in faot been buIldIng up between the Papao7 
and Austria over the latter's program tor attaining hegemony in 
Italy. 'l'h.UB far, prior to the Congress of 1822 .. thiS tension I, 
had been l.tent. It iHhirrJ.ed proba.ble, howeveI1 , that a.t the ap-
"lTf----
A.V., R242, Instructions tor Spina, 1822. 
lq 
~ Ibid ... Instructions for Spina) Queaitl che 8:1. propongono. 
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il'l I! 
proaehing Congress Metternieh would attempt to impose part or 
all of his program upon the Italian states; and if he did so, a 
direct collis 1,,,0,. hetween Papal and A:uBtria.n policies could not 
be avoided. 
,..... 
2. The Congress or Verona 
vl'iginall,. scheduled for Florence, the Congress of 1822 
was shifted to Verona \\'hel"'e the ~ore efficient J\:ustrian poliee 
~ou1d rnaintuin better ord~r. 20 As the disousslon of Italian 
affairs WEW to be an important part of the Congress, every 
Italian state was to be I'epresented. rJfet'ternloh hoped that 
Consalvi wCluld act a.s Papal plentpot€nt!ary I "at least for e1ght 
days, until general prinoiples have been agreed upon; II thereafter 
some lesser diplomat, pNf'erably 116ardi, could handle the :re-
ma.in:1.ng negotiations. 21 Evidently, Metternleh w1shed to d1seuas 
the sore points in Auatx-o-Papal relations 1n the hope or 
qu1etir.g Consa.lv1 's distrust and persuading '1m to eo-operate 
with AustrIa's plana. D1t'f'iQultle& between Austria and the 
Papacy had been ~moothed out before by personal discussions, at 
the Congress of V1ennaJ p4&rhaps the $ame eould be <lone at Verona. 
Tha Chaneellor realized, however, that very possibly the 
"press of business" would make it impossible for Consalvi to 
---.-----20 
A.V., R247, Leard! to Consalvi, 4 July 1822. Leard1's 
explana.t1on, appa.Nntly oYerlooked by Furlani" rendel"S unneoes-
sary the latter's arguMent that the Con3ress vias moved to Verona 
for the sake of Awstrian pOBtal esp1.onage, the latter may' have 
been a factor, but there 1s no evIdence to support it. Furlani, 
XXXIX, !~65-".f.7l. 
21 
Ibid.)' Leard1 to Consalv1, 8 June 1822. 
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attend the Congro;Js. 22 In that evant, the probabl;, Papal 
represalltat:.e would be Cardinal Sp1na, a choice little to 
!Jbttern13h '3 liJ,::ing, for at Lay-bach Spina. had not hesita.ted to 
oppose AUEtrian plana and might be expeoted to do so aga1n at 
Va rena. l'./rett~rnlch. would ther--etore have lU'eferred some other 
delegate, suoh as the more do~lle Lear41, but hia f'requent hint. 
at this preferenue produced no response from ConaalVl. 23 
!~ttefll1eh therefore appears to have made an attempt to 
prevent Sp1na f 8 apPointment shortl~' before the Congress was to 
begin. In August, 1122, Spina was aoewsed by the Dulce ot Modena 
(",rho .t'reqv.ently served as a "stalking horse" for Mettem1Ch24) ot 
having displ&Jed sympathies with the $~tt~~_ while Legate ot 
Bologna. Spina, I>ealizing the probable or1g1n or th18 accusation, 
at once sent an eloquent and skillful :refutation of these charges 
direct to J\!etterniah. Confronted b7 the detailed proof' ot 
Spina's il1nOCenC6 presented 1n his letter, the Chancellor 
grudgingly ad"ltitted that the 8.eousation was unjustltied. Nothing 
more was heard of thase oharges. 25 
This aeeusatlon, whether insp1red by Mettern1ch or not, 
taUed to affect COmsalY1'B determination to appoint Spina. In 
. 22~n1d. 
23 
Ibid., Leardi to Consalv1, 8 June, 16 July, 9 Septe~ber, 
2lt, Ooto\ier-·1822. 
24 
E.G., SChroeder, 226. Furlani, 474. 
25 
Furlani, XXXIX, 414-483, dieeusses this 1nc1deat at length, 
argt:d.l'lg that !<tltternlch l'las behind ltj this see.lllS very probable, 
though not eomplete17 proven. 
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September, Metternleh formally iftylted. ConaalYl to attend the 
Coql"ess. The Seoretary or Sta~e reruaed, oourteously but flrmly 
stl.·CH1Bing the "press of bus1.ness'* and_ the "praoar1oW3 state of 
health of His HolIness, which m.akes it blpos81ble for the 
Seoretary of State .... to leave hie 81de." He had ohoseR Splna 
as hls representa.tIve, for he hs.d "eomplete oonfldence 1n hi. 
ability and loyslty_" As for the Duke or Modena'. oharae., 
"that very e1~cw1atan.e in a way obl1ges HiB Holiness not to 
Oh0080 al'"J.yOlH~ elsa, sinee l' he should pass eyer Cardinal Spina 
II ••• he woulcl thus ea'WI. lt to be belleye4 that he l.olas 
oomplete \!:cmric1enee in h1:n a:r"tcr the letter of It.R.H. tbe Duke. tf 
1ft derereaoe no doubt to Metternloh'. frequently expres.ed wl.h, 
Learcll was to aeeompany Spina, but onl,. 1ft ... advlsor,r capa-
elty.26 
fl'be PoweN had qreed that the Coqre.. should be cl1yld.ed 
into two per1ods: the r.lrst~ a dieeu8810n of gene~ E~pean 
questions, ... to begia Oft 1 September, the secoRd to begln 
three weeks later, would deal witn Italian attaiI'S. The Itallan 
delegatee ~re to attend only the eeeoRd period. However, the 
auiolde of' LON Caatlereagh. the BI'1t1ah Forelgll MinIster, In 
Auauat 4el8784 the ope.1"1 at the ColtCree. until 29 September, 
aad p~longed dllpute. OR the Spanish queation further retarded 
the discus.lon ot ItaliaR problema. Spina therefore did not 
26--··--- -
A.V. R242, 00_&1'1'1 to Leardl, 17 September 1822. Leardl 
pl.,ed only a yer.y .econdary role at the Congre ••• 
c.?68 
1 eave Ho~ for Varona ul1.til 21 OatobeI'. 21 
Comal vi pu'; this del87 to good use bY' thoroughl1' discuss1n,g 
with an adviS01~r congNgation and with Spina. the problems that 
seened likely to <lome up at the Cotlgreas. As J'light be expected, 
the discussions with the Congregation centered s.roUlld the threat 
p,:>sed by AU3trian 1'011.,.. It flU agNe4. that Aut .. 1. 1IQul4 
probably not da~ to p~pose openly an It.t.llan Contederation, ~u.t 
Wl)ulti 'l;ry to prepa:.r>c the wtrJ fo1/' it bY' seeking a Politte&! 
C~·rlirlta. ien and bl attQ1nptlng to, lnt~r!ere in th!3 inte:r.nal attaiN 
of the !tal1a~'l gO~\T(~rtlIi3nts in the l\a}~ of reform. Both these 
po11c1(ls were to btl QPlY.,sad as u.~oea.ar:r. useleas, and danger-
01.18 to Papal 1ndapandenee. 28 \With Sp1M, Consal vi i11aeuaee4 a. 
[wide range Qr top! .. that m!pi; be bNupt up, panlou.lar 
attention being given to Austrian po11e1ea.29 
'.rh.s eoneluaiQn8 re&cheti in the8e vuio'WI ci1sewss1oDa were 
jel:1bo<lied in Spinats ID$truot1o~ of 1)) October, u1ttea b7 
ponsalvi. Arier first describing the Congresa of I..qbaoh and the 
r. ... YlAtl1 J:.H 1~>1J:i\ed at it'" eoneltlalon, the Seeretar,y of state .. at 
27 
Ibid., Spina to COMal1f1s31 October 1822. 
28-
Do~a~nt$ bearing on tbes~ ·d1sCUJ$lons ~aa be found 1. 
RM2, Congreelo dl Verona, 1822. See "",alall,.: Que.ito Ohe 8t 
propongo!1O. • • : OSsf)"a~1onl suI Pro,~tto della Commi$sioue J 
'od-l l1ttl nella prima Conge. tenuta. • • J and the document 
beginning 1I~~ssendoIJ1 stabUito •• « •• 
29 
110 l:eeord or the,s dl •• uaalo11$ haa b4teJ1 pl'esewe4, but 
there u1ats a 118t of tu teploa 4.1a ..... z Rt_I, Le _'en. 
"'e11e cr..lal1 s1 'e PU'lato CI08 1 'E11inent1aa1rlo Spil'lO, 1822. 81g-
I1tioantly' , "Oonr.4en.s1oJM ItaJ.lltlUl lf is the first item oa tile 
list. 
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on t.r) a...'rla.lyze Austrian polioy and the thre&"t it posed to the 
Papaay, 
A_tria, being that power which possees ei;;-.iii~· I..'tltly 
a t,~rri"hory !'lOi'e extens lYe than 3Z'l1' othGlr ruler .. 
ad ha,,:lftg eont:rlbutad :tte trooP'! to !'eetore the 
diRtul"bed order in Na.ples and ttledm.ont, see:t'lS to 
believe that ahe has t'he right to oompel all the 
other Italian goyernments to adopt measures (she 
oonal.).IIII] app1'Opnate .... , and to uettm.e a sort 
of' 8Up1"emaey in the Tl'L'1nage"nenJc of' those interests 
oommon to all the stat.. of the Peftlnaula. • • • 
Pl"U8sia and Russla. rag~\31 ... " tha.t .Austrta 11.aa 
• Bpe.lal 1atereat 1ft ItalIan ~ta1".. .. .. and should 
pJ.ay the do"linant role 1" tht';;;TI.. .. • • 
TllefIe e1J.teumatpe .. J .1on a.re certainlY' favor-
able to the ~"H3Ul1l'Ptlon by A\wtria. of a prepondel~a.nt 
1Bflue __ OftJl all tlle Ita11an gOTemments, eauae 
aO"lle to believe that the ktUSt1"'la.n goverrlntent. • • 
a1ma at PJlltparillC the.., to. the establ1'hJ!'Jent of 
an Ital1.an Confeciaration flimlla:r to the Gem .... '\n Con-· 
fe""'t10., ma1d~ keNelt Head e.af. Protector •••• 
rBut English ana FNneh opposition has made Austna 
ii •• ltat. to .uaeet t1\le pro,1 •• t opeJ'll7]. Howeve:J!'. 
the Aus trlan govfll'nlneftt J not being able to propose 
thia ym')j •• t opealJ' 3_t DOW, wUl probably .eek to 
prepare fo~ it b~ securing the adoption or p~1no1ple~ 
and. 1mtt1tutloll!l of suoh It. nat1Q!l'e as to lead little 
by little to a federal ayste~ under Austrian pro-
tect:10ft. 
ObviouslY:t Spina ltl'l111 havo 'to reJect any proposal tor an 
Italian Confederation" :tn view or th~ restriction of' Pa.pal 
1ndependence tmieh it would ineVitably produ<1e. Less obvious 
Wa,8 the an..Bwer to 
the yeX7 4el1.oate b\1.t -.1'1tW q'Wtflt1on,fta.'R81y 
whether the Pontlf'loal Plen1potent1aryshould refuse 
to agNe to a.ny measure, institution, 0 ... gellera.t 
principle regaN.1ftS ~. lntel'Mta ot all the It-ellft 
stiat&3 .. [Such COrmllOrl nteaaurea 'Might be uaei"ul asa1l1St 
the 1~t.:tari{. * .. .. Howve~) wha1)ever ganenl in-
.'1tut1oR adopted, 'tdlate",.r eommon .aaUJ.ll'e 'be 4e-
I 
cJ'ee4 ••• , it would al....". be another step. more or 
less (}Ol'lS 1der&ble.J to'\;;rarl!3 3. syete'i~ of federation. ana. 
AU8t~la Will always wish to have the dominant role 1n 
S:lch I;iea.sur~6. • • • 
COl\Sal'Yi therefore concluded th.at the PapMJ' would kave to 
oppose Auatpiaft project. tOf!' Bueh eommoa measures .:>r iJl8t1tut1ona. 
'fhe projeot that wu moat l1ke17 to ..,. propoae4 was the OenenJ. 
Commus1on of Poll... S,lft& mut oppose th18 OOnmlUS10D, but 
with.out atating" it pcaalble, the ••••• t1a1 "_Oft tor hu op-
poa1.tloa, namel", that 1t WOUld IMH •• Autp1aft intluenc. 8.f1d. 
le.. to a Cont.deMtt.O". I i._te.4, he 'Ao\lld Q'&ue It·that the 
Po"tift.a! so •• J.IIftm8at 1It tald.. a4e4Ute .t.,. to hoI4 the 
!!!~ar.1. 1n ehe.lt, u4 tllat "'!p.I'Oe4L1 communioat1oft bet,,"n 
gO .... J.IIImeIlU or thelp 41JJooye.1e. a'Dout the S!!~arJ wo\l14 otter 
... _t~e. eqn1 t." tihoae that oould be "rl"ed. treJIL a Oom .... 
mi •• lon." 
'!'he I_tNotic_ ..... eO,"N' tAe tkiN ph_. of the 
A_tnan ott •• iYe, tM att8w.pt to 11\tart8;' 11'1 ~ lateraal 
af'taiN ot the Ital1M .tat.. 1a the name or :retorut and. to lmpoee 
upoft them • GOmmoR .,..tem of 8QVel'ftm8R' model" upoa 'that 4r&1m 
up tOI' Naplea at Lqbaoh. 8p1n& 1fU to oppoa$ aJV' such 18-
ftOy.t1ons on tn. srowula that they weN ~.e •• &l'Y. tor the 
"tOt-IllS wl'l1eh Conaalvl had drawn up and whioll were alrea,dJ beiDg 
put into effeot would satiSfY all th~ naeda of good government 
and ... ,uld ell!tt1natet all just cautJe tor' discontent. A detailed 
deaor1ption ot the3e reforms and the progreaa made thua tar 1ft 
II 
putting them into etteot was enclo.ed. The various teatures 
ot the Neapolitan a,..tem were then eOl'Ulldered in detail and 
shon to be either superfluous or undesirable. The MOst un-
desirable teature ... the Coaeulta, the eODSultative council 
27[ 
whose advioe the ruler was required to hear, though not neees ... 
saril,. to take J thiS bod:;r oould become "the tirst step towards the 
formation ot a constitutional goyernment"·-a prediction whose 
aGourao,. was to be demonstrated b,. the later experiment ot Pius 
IX ift 1848. Consalvi concluded b,. detemting certain much-
criticized aspects ot the Papal administration: the tinanoial 
8ptem, *oa. bur4e_ were, he demonstrated, 11&hter than thoae 
ot the other Itallan atates J and. the judiclal a,..tem, whoae 
remalnt.. detecta were to be remed.Ied b7 turther retorms. 30 
'l'heae Inat;ruotiona .pbollze the breakdown ot the Austro-
Papal al11&ftoe: their v.PI e •••• oe 18 a protound d1atI'WSt ot 
Austria and. all her worD. Co_alvl 'a dial1lusioRmeRt wlth 
AWltria ... oomplete J her pollol.. were a threat to the In.d.epen ... 
dence ot the Papac,., 8d. he ... d.etermiJled. to oppose and deteat 
them. '!'he Cardinal made 'DO turther attempt. to cOllcl1iat. 
Austria or to pateh up the raveled. web ot Auatro-Papal oo--opera-
tlon--the time tor that, he reallzed, was pot. POI' the re-
mainder ot hi. mIaI.tPl, d1atruat ot Austria and hoatilit7 to 
her ambitIons would be the D7ftOte. ot Consalvi'. diploma07. 
30 
A.V., R2~2, Inltructlons tor Spina, Oetober, 1822. 
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Armed "ith the.. iutructioM, Splna s.t out tor Verona, 
rriving there on 29 October. He round that the dlsousslon or 
eneraJ. European attaira was stl11 g01ng OD, 80 that tor three 
aks he had l1ttl. to 40 but obserye the d1plo~t1c world and 
eourt •• ,. oalla upon the v&l'ious rule" and minutera 
sent.31 S(,Oft atter h18 arr1't'al, he wa rece1ved ln audienoe 
., FPano18 I. The Emperor 41eplqed gNat concen OYer the 
t1v!t7 ot the Settarj in the Papal state ancl the .ed tor 
torme there. Bpiu, mald... use ot the lntormatlon aupplied 
1m b;y 00_&1.1, described reoent Papal retorms IUl4 measures 
ainat the Bettarj, 1Ihloh •• emed to aat1atJ' Pranc18 I. 32 
B7 the third week in Bovember, however, the geaeral 
.-opee tuefltiou are well on their "q to .olution. Metter-
lob was aow tree to tun tUB attention to Ita1&an attaira, and 
ln consequenee Spina'a inact1vit,. soon came to an abrupt •• d. 
On • lfovember, the Sar4!R1Ul Foreign lUa1ater, Count de la 
our, v181te4 Sp1na to tell him ot a "cl1sooUNe" whlob Mettem1ch 
ad dellyered to him the previous dq. The A_trio had a4m1tted 
at t1Nt he had. thoupt or e.t&bliahi_ .. Comm1aa1on 
Ib1d., Spina to Conaalvi, 31 October, 1, 2, 9, 14, 18 
Hovem'beFIlJ22. 
32 
Ibid., Repopt or the Imperial Audience, 7 November 1822. 
rancia '8 ilarm at Settar.1 aot1vit,. ill the Lesationa was UJ'lt.1g1'l .... 
eI, and .... expres.ea: eye. MON stronslJ' to the 1"wIoan eDY07_ 
•• t A1'OhlYio 41 Stato, Florence (hereafter oited ASF), Ord1ne 
2392, Se1'r. 1931', Corain! to Fo •• ombl'ODi, 2, 3, No.embar 1822. 
tor Ital7 like that at Ma1nz tor QermanT, but had 
then abandoned the idea because of the diftioult7 
ot briDging lt about. However, the idea had then 
oome to him ot to1"'t91ng instead a Politi.al Com-
misslon made up or commiesionera tl'Om all the 
Ita11aa goy.l"ft11tenta, whose duty would be to tollow 
the MOYemente ot suspects in order to cl1scover all 
the .tnadll or their weba and their relationa 
abroad, e.pe01all,. with France which 18 their 
ce.ter. The eomm188ionere would be ift touch .ith 
their reapeotl.. governments and would reoiprocally 
exehU&e the lRtormatlon thus obtained [trom their 
so .... mment.] • 
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Mter th18 des eriptloa ot l4ettern1oh la "die.OUNe, If La Tour 
.. ked. 5p1 .. to ooulc1er it ouef'ull,. 80 that the,. might later 
exohaale ideas 011 the a,,'bJecat. 81'1_ acre.d., Gomme_tUg that 
"at t:1.rat s1&ht lt a.e. to me 1mvraot1eal, and, preo •• r, simpl,. 
the 014 lnqu1aitorial eommi.slon under a new name. 1f33 
COR8alvi agreed. that Metternieh'a ... project w .. much the 
same .. the 014 aDd. had tae _ame purpoae J it mut be iDrlexlb17 
opposed by the Papal t*eprea •• tative tor the same re_o_. 'fhe 
Auatn_ drive tor h.pm0lV' in Ital7 had "sun. The tiNt step 
was "to take control ot all the police ot Ital7H through the 
proposed OommisaionJ it this moye succeeded, Austria would have 
gone "a long distance towards a Oontedel'ation, Whoae resul ta 
must be moat tatal tor the amall atatea." Coftlla1Y1 theretore 
d1rected Sp1na to t17 to 11_ up the other Itallan repreenetative 
i_ a Uft1ted tront to deteat Mattemid 'a plana J but even 1t thls 
l3 
Ibid., Spina to Consalvt, 20 November 1822. 
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oould ROt be achieved and the papacJ' had to stand alone, Spina 
must atill retuae to aocept the Comm188ionJ de.pite the Austrian 
enmity that such a course must produoe.34 
Conea.l.vl realized that the opposition ot the small Italian 
state. might well prove insufticient to preyen.t Austria trom 
estab11alhlft6 the Comm1aa1on. However, "It Franae should oppose 
hereselt to such an iutttution.. • • then the protests ot the 
Papal plenipotenti&l7 would acquire much greater toree and one 
could hope that the Commlsslon un<ler duenas.lon would not be set 
up. " He therefore wrote at onoe to Macch1 in Paris. After 
exp1a1nlns the 81tuation and po1ntlftg out ita great dangers, he 
i_trusted the n\lJ\O!o "to dieOUS8 this subjeot [with the French 
milli. teN]. • • 1n order to peNuade the :FrenCh go"ernm.ent to 
oppoae the e8tabl1ehmeJlt ot thi8 Commiaaion without showing trAt 
the 'ollt1tlca.l. soyemment hu had "COUN. to it, 80 that he mq 
be eompromlled .. little .. possible." As the traditional riyal 
ot A_tria 1ft Ital7, Fran.e mtsht be w1111ng to oppose Mettel"-
nieh'. plua.35 
Spina had not mea:nwb.l1e been 141e. Long before Conaalyl '8 
repl,. same,· the Papal NpNse.tat! ••• u attempting to align the 
other Italian atat .. , .8:peelally TuaoUlJ' and Salldln1a# in a 
uD1ted opposltloa to the Com:n1as1on and to enlist French support. 
31 
Ibid., (Jansaly! to Spina, 28 November 1822J al80, 30 
NoyembeFl'B'22. 
35 
~. It Consal'Yl to kechl.. 2 Deoember 1822. 
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His first move had bean to inform the 'l'uacan representative, 
Prince Corsini, of the Austrian plans. Corsini agreed that the 
Commission was a device for giving Austria control over the 
police of all the Italiar, states, "to the destruction or their 
independence. 1f He promptly set to work with Spina to "dev1ae 
suitable and prudent ways of defeating auch a measure." They 
agreed upon various pretexts for refusal, auch as that the 
CommisSion was unnecessary slnce a voluntar,r reCiprocal exchange 
of information among the states could achieve the same results, 
so that theY' need not express their distrust of Austria too 
bluntly-. They ale 0 agreed to invoke the aid ot Franee in 
secrec7 and. to cOMult the other Italian governments. 36 
The efforts ot Spina and Corsini to obtain the support ot 
the other Italian states had little sucoess. Al though. La Tour 
had first given the alarm about the Commission, Corsini at their 
next meeting round him ine1ined to aoquiesce in Mettemich's 
plans and unwilling to oppose the Commission activel;y.31 Probab1 
the difficult negotiations with Mettern10h tor the evacuation of 
Austrian troops from Piedmont 1n which LaTour was then engaged 
36 -
A.S.F., Corsini to Fos8ombronl, 24 Noyember 1822} alia, 
23 Noyember 1822. 
37 
Ibid., Cor.1.1 to PoasombroD1, 26 November 1822~ 2 
Deoembe~22; Fossombroni to CorSini, 30 November, 6 December 
1822. 
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explains his reluetanee to go against Austriafa wishes. Of' the 
other Italian statee, Naples seemed favorable to the Commission, 
wh11e Parma and Modena would eertainl:J' accept It. '!'his lert 
onl7 the tiny sta.te of LUGea in oPPoslt1on.38 
vIith the Italian states thus d.ivided among themselves, 
Metternich pressed forward with hIs project during early December 
"The artair or the Comn1ssion. far troD being abandoned, 1s on 
the contl'al'7 maldng progl'tlSS," Spins reported 1n alarm.. To make 
matters wONe, Metternioh now spoke of locating the Commission 
not !n Piacenza as tonner1y planned, but in the Papal city ot 
Ferrara.. 39 
Ooneal.,! WaI not daunted by the knowledge that the Pap&47 
stood almost aleae aga.S.nst the Commasion. He continued to 
1natruet Spina that even if' all the other Italian sta.tes should 
agree to the .Ituatrlan P~OPOI!Hil.. the Papal representative must 
still refuse bis consent, no matter wha.t diplomatic pressure 
Austl"ia might bring to beer. He real1zed tha.t "the odium or 
refusal Will tall entirely- upon !!'le," and that'not onlY' the Papal 
go"errtrnent but h1maelt personall,. wotlld incur thereby the enmitJ' 
ot Austata, -but u I know that I would betn.y nrr duty it I 
aeted differentl,., I am ready for ~ consequence that ~ betell 
'3S--
Ibid ... COrBin! to Foaaombronl .. 2, 6, 8 Deoember 1822. 
A. V ... R'M2. SpIna to Co.elY!, 2 .. 5 Decemb$r 1822) Conselv! to 
Maeohi, 2 Deeember 1822. 
39 
I.V ... Ra!f.2, Spina to Consalvi, 2 Deoember 1822. 
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However" the p081t10n of the Papaey was not 80 serious, nor 
that of Austria 80 strong, as COMalvi feared. :Mettemich was 
well aware ot the opposition of the Papal anc1 Tuscan govex-nments J 
should both of these states, which between them oontrolled all or 
central Ital7~ pera1at in their refusal to join the Commission, 
the latter would be so han410apped as to be ot little value. 
He~ pre.sure by AlUltria, supported or at least tolerated by t11e 
other Powers, upon these small s tate8 might eOll1pel them to 
submitJ but thiS Mattemien could not bring about. Sp1na had 
already warned the Frenoh representative., the Fwreign Min18ter 
Via.ount Mathieu de P<tontmorency and his usatant Count Pierre 
De La Ferronaye, that A\18 tr:La was maneuvering towards a Com-
mission. Spina had little diffioulty in oonv1ncing them that 
such a. move was daadvantageous to French 1nteres ta, and they we 
aooordingly p:reparec.1 to inteM'ene on behalf of the Italian 
state. aga1nat the Austrian project. Moreover, La Fel.'TOn&.73 
diSeusseCl the proposed COIIlld.ssion with the Teal'" and was appar-
ent11r able to oonvince him ot its un(lesu-abi11ty" Faced with 
the oppoaition of France and the central Ita11an statea and 
deprlvea. or the support ot hl8 Ii!.08t eS8eut1al all,. Alexander I, 
Mettern10h fS hopes ot toreing the CommiSsion upon the recalcitran 
40 .... -
Ibid., Comalv! to S:pina, If Deeer.'lber 1822; alIa. 7 
De •• mbeP 11I22. 
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tade4.41 
Thequestian or the Commission came to a head at the 
•• as ion or 8 December, Which was prlinarl1y oonoerned with the 
evacuation ot Austrian troops from Naples and PIedmont. After 
the latter aub.1ect had been treated, Mettemleh announoed that: 
The ape~ial af'tairB of' Al'Jltr1.a, Piedmont, and 
Naples being settled, it remains for 'US to W'at'rt 
the other governments of the PeninsUla, beoa~e, 
although those goftrnments rtUI.'Y' see their 1nte%"Nl.1 
situation in rO~7 oolora ••• , rMettern1ch] has 
ver./ d.1tterrent reports, and coula not doubt that 
ferment and disoontent were evel"'f1fh.ere I as pec1aJ.ly-
in the Papal States. 
He theretol~ felt it _8$ neeessary to "warn them of their true 
situat1on. n 
At this poInt La Fl!rro~ 1nterrupCted Jr.'letternloh to uk 
ttit he really l'nahed to limit himself only to warnlrCtl, t: as he 
had heard d1fferently. Mtttex'uich ins 1$ ted tha.t thiil was 
indeed his sole aim, but the Frenc.h l.~pre.entative Watl not 
deceived: he at enc'! retorted bluntl,- that !lit WaB by now 
notorious ~nong the plenipotentiaries that 'i.H. had expressed 
.:;;tb.er 1de., and in part1eul~ that he had spoken ••• of' a 
certain Corr~n1ss1on.u Trapped, Mettern1Gh tried to equivocate, 
but IJlrn La. I"errona;ra.. obv1ous1;r well informed, eont1nued to 
A.V., R2l~2 .. Spina to Oonsalvi, 9, 11. 17 Deo.e:".'!ber 1822. 
A.S.F. COl"'S1Di to P08sombroni, 9, 10 Deoember 1822. Schroeder, 121-12~, 225. Viscount Mathieu de Montrriorency (1767 .. 1826), French 
statesman and .t'avoz.1.te ot LouiS XVIII} M1n1Ster tor Foreign 
Affa.ll"'s .. 1821-1822J Duke in 18221 Ye1!'T devout Catholic. Count 
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pres. him., he finall., admitted haying broached the idea. He 
still continued to protest his innoQenee or any ulterior motives, 
offering the Ingeniou~ defense that ~he had only acted thus with 
the aim ot creating fear, oonvineed that without this prel1m1nar,r 
the Italian governments would have g1yen little attention to his 
a.rn1nga. NOlf, tilled with apprehension, they w111 be more 
oompliant!1 to aug •• tiona of reform from the Powen. 
It i. unlike11 that tb1a 41aingeauoua explan&t1on eon-
.,inoed IIl1YQne, but sinee Mettern16h had now publlc17 dJ.savowed 
h18 plan, La Ferronqa allowed. the subject to drop. 
"I believe that the arfair or the Cormra1.8s1Qn wUl end 
here. h predicted Spina, and hla propheey proved accurate. De-
prlve4 of the su.pport ot hiii Ruaaian alll' ana With France openly 
h~tile, lVlettem1eh could not oompel the Papal and Tusoan 
goYernmenta to lu~t. The Commission was thGrtif'ore abandoned. 
l~2 
Papal diplomae7 had aeored a. notable success. 
'!'he Oommia.lon had been deteated and an I~al1a1'l Cent.4eratic 
had not 80 mu.eh .. bee. mentioneci .. but 0" threat .tll1 re-
malned: A_t,,1arl interfere.. in the intemal attain ot the 
ra,..oY' in the name ot reform. Mettemioh had. long been oritical 
of the Papal regime, but at th. Cone"' •• h1lJ criticism became 
1noreaa1ngl7 virulent and publio .. Papal o~poslt1on to hi. 
42 
A. V • , _ R2421 Spina to Conaalvl, 9 December 1822. Also .. 





plans beaa~e obvious. Ria rGmtw.'"k at the ae~s1on of 8 D~hleJnbe1" 
tha.t "ferment and diseontent" WrtN cr.r,pee1all3" bad in the Pa.pal 
State was only the latest evidence of his attitude. He had 
p:revioue1y spolmn vehemently in this atl"ain not only to the 
Italian :representatives but also to t![ontTuOl'enoy # In an. apparent 
attempt to pre.1ud.1ce the latter against the Papal gover-nment. 43 
Spina therefore suspeated that the plen&lV session of 11 
December whQn the question of reform itl the Italian atates would 
be taken up, would be the occasion for uS 0li18 censure of or 
a.ttack upon the conduet of.' the goverrenent of H1s Holiness. ,,44 
lIe decided to approach lVfetternich the evening befOJ:le the session. 
to "&ho\1 hLrn my distaste f"or the unfavorable opinion he has oi' 
us" and prove how unjust this opin1~n WaJJ. Spina. "told the 
Prince frank}y that I 1~t.nded to ~l"ase tlli1:l ol>inion and all the 
false repol.""ts that have caused it '* ff lils frank and vigorous 
defense of the Papal govel-ttment <lay have had some effect upon. 
r:;etternich,; at leaat) the Prinoe au.m1tted that his infor.:lation 
uight; lie el~l:'oneous and uked fol.'- a confidential note uesoribing 
the true s tate of affairs. 45 
Whether beoa.uae ot Spina '8 defense or--more 11k:ely--as pfU1tt 
of a seneral weakening of the Austrian clJ:'t1ve tor hegemony in 
-- 43 -- -
A.V., R242, Conaa1vl to Macchi, 2 December 1822J Consalvl 
to Splna~ h December 1822. 
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Ital,. in the race of strong opposition, no 8~c1al attack was 
Made on the Papal governraent the next day. l1!ettern5.oh merely 
read ~. Declaration by A,11r-;tr1a, Prussia, and Russia whlch did no 
more than repeat the 1deas ot the Lqbac.h Circular'. The Italian 
floy.reigns lffn'e reminded that they rrust act to end d1aoontent. 
tlwhether bY' ra1nfol"01ng and consolidating their power on the 
basts of just.ioe and orden?, or by introducing into their ad-
m1xus'trat1ve systems GUQh Lilprovementa as are necessary to 
l:t.6 
satiat"y tIle tI"U6 needs or their States. It ' 
The Italian atatea were to repl,. to th1. Deolaration and 
to the L,,··':bacb. Circular at the aeaaion of 1:) December by 
desoribing the reforms whiob. the,. baa undertaken and demonstra-
t1ne that the-y were rntttlc10Dt -to end popular disoo.teat. 
Mettern1eh had intended. this aeasion as the s;rand ol1r.nacter1c ot 
the Congress, 110 far u the Italian statea tere eoncerned. 'l.'hoae 
state. would be ealle'ii upon to det'\~nld their intemal polioies. 
and. 111 the 11_17 event that they would be unable to do so 
aueee •• tull;y, he had planned. to put forward ... -uabg the Duke of 
Modena. U his "stalking borae"--a program of administrative 
refol"ms and a common pattern of government to be imposed upon 
them. The opposition of the Italian staa.tes, ba.okad by- France, 
had 11'.s.de it evident to h1."11 that his position was not strong 
enough to put this plan into street. Therefore. all the d.eclara-
_ .. ____ "."~.Q'''''''''_-''''''_v~ _., ....... 
CO!);! of I:ecla\"s,tlon (~f 11 lJe.ee!:1CCl' 1822 1n ~. J also 
printed in Blanchi, II, 133-135. 
r 
~ 
tions of the Italian gove~~nts a8 to the1~ ~forms were ae-
oeptod by Metterniah without OOT!ltl'lent 01" o'tlt1c1sffi, although most 
were ovas1ve or unsat1fl fnctory.i-1-7 
Spj.na wu -the tirst called upon to read his government 18 
decl8,ratlol'l. In this statement, he explained that the Powers 
wlehed the Ii..;.l1an governmenta to carry out reforms. but 
fort\;:.natelr: 
The Plenil'otentlaI'ies of Hls Holiness have the 
great satietaetion of ob.ervl-C that their so.erR-
ment has fore-seen the des ire of' the Powers, In such 
a way that, to conform to their .uh, this goyern-
ment haa only to follow Without deviation the oourse 
it a~opte4 some years ago. 
S!11na then enuf'1eI'ated brietly the reforr-,16 v..111ch the Papao7 
had carri~d C),llt, l)eg1nn:tng t1:tth the ~J_l!..:n..:r:cJ2!.~()_ of. lS16. (.!'bene 
~"'Ol"m8 had este'bl ifShed "!,crfeet tranquility-" in the Papal 
~te..teB anCf henee no alteration of' the basic refvr':'l plan \1a$ 
rtPt'!estHlry.48 
This roelaration Gonstituted, in affe.~, a polite rejection 
01" the l\llicd dat1a..l1d for goverm;<iontal @hanges j on the ground 
that the policy long followed by the Papacy rendered thenl un-
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that all that (the Papsl government] h.aa done has been well done I 
8.nd that they intended to continue to per.3ist in thtl same 
&~t.m," whcth~r it pl~as~d Austria or not.49 
Although no doubt Mett~rnieh perceived as olsarly as 
Corsini the oefiant tone of the Papal Declaration, he made no 
oo;~ent upon tt or upon the polioy of the Papal government. The 
other ~;tatef!J then lllade their declarationa, the Powers aceepted 
the'11 'I'lithout d,emur, and tbe :Jea~ion oame to an end. 'l'be thir<1 
facet of the Austrian plan for esta.blishing :LtG hegemollY' 1n 
Italy had failed all! the other two had done before it. 
"!lth the end of thi3 ocaaion, Spinats 'tliss1on to Verona 
was conoluded. In general, Consalv1 had good reason to be 
pleasad with -"he outcon',o of the Consress. 50 Austria's plana for 
the expansion of' her inl"'luence in Italy" which had seelned 60 
f01."L1idablo a maaa,co 'co Papal independence. had been cbeolred all 
along the 11116. The Itali.an COnfeaE:l·e.tion had not even been 
m:nri;ioned by l/Jetternich. though its speotre had haunted the 
Italian delegate~ throughuut the Gon,zre8s" for the Chancellor 
had realized that it could not be set up 1n the teeth of Italian 
and FI~nGh opposition. 
TDe Political Cormni&sion had been a more genuine and im-
mediate danger. It 'R" a lesa obvious device for extending 
'1$9 
11..3.!' •• COl'1'J:i.ni to Fossombroni, 15 Deoember 1822. 
~o 
.- C~nsalvl IS sat1sfaetion is eVident froY1 the tenor of hi. 
letter Ov~nplirnenting Spina on the latter'. skillful oonduotJ 
A.V •• R242, Comalv! to Spina, 21 Deeember 1822. 
JI.Hstrian inf"luenllo and a plausible ease eould be made for it as 
a weapon agaInst the ~ett8;,r.J., hence it might be expeeted to 
nrOmle less opposition.. ~1etternich had therefore passed the 
project vigorousl:;, l10ping it ;T..1ght i~ aueeess!'u.l seJ:."V'e as the 
tirat step tc\~ards a Confederation. The f'irn resis.tance of the 
?a.pacy and '1:\.!"'\ can.y; bacl:ed by ~~rance J had disposed of this plan 
onee o~d :cr al1_ 
:,"llnall:r I the fl.uatr1arl atte'npt to e:Iercise a u!'1ght of 
3upervls1onH over the Italian s·tatea bY' interfering in thair 
internal affairs in the name of reform had (lome to nothing, .. 
Metterulch's pos ition was not sufficiently strong to finable him 
to ir:lpose such "fO:rtl~lS upon the r-c!calcitrant states. Spina '8 
Deolaration of 13 Decerfiuel' was in effeot an announct)"':1ent that 
the Fapacy iuteudt:d to puX'Sue its uwn (jou;rsu in internal affairs 
and would '!;o1erate no Aust:r.·ian lr\terfe4~n(Se thereilh 
Thus none of' the dangens whioh Consal v1 had fea.l~ed had 
iliateria,lized. In pal"t,. this happy QUt(,Hh1e was the result of 
f'ortuitous Jevelopu;.ents--"co l\fettern1.-:h's preoceupation with th$ 
.spanish q.u<~$.tion that prevent.ed him. f'rom devoting s\.1.f't1aient 
attention to Italian atraire_and to his inability to obtain. 
13urfi~lent support f'ro~n the other POvJ'ezte to overcome Italian 
resistance. Yet the stubborn resistance ot the Papaoy and 
'J.'uculny l1.a4 been an essential t •• tor without WhIch Hettemioh fa 
plana would hay. 8uoft.e4ed. Spiu was JUlltitlea in NlllUld.nc 
that ntt one e&r.! .ongratulat~ 8. Jti.rdater beo8.\I8e noth1", of that 
whieh a eertain Power planne~ to do at the Congress was ac-
complished, that negat1ve ;~er1t can well be applied to the 
ministers of QUI' Italian governr-:ents. ,,51 Certainly, Austria hact 
aah1e',ed none of' its a1ns for strengthen:~_ng its powe.r in Italy, 
and, though Spinn was too TtOdest to lay so, it was undoubtedly 
he of' all the Italian ropre£entat::Lv~s who deserved the najov 
credit for this result. He had taken the lead l.n opposing 
Au.stri~).n designs and had per:.~cv(;rcd in his erfOl .. ta until success 
was attained, despite the apathy O~ hostility uf all the other 
Italian delegatoa but Corsini. Consalvi appreciated Sp1na'. 
achieven.ent aD its full value and p:r:al.seti him \'iarmly tor the 
!fzoal, skill, and loyalty" tl1th which he had performed lUa mis ... 
s ton, "especia.lly in the delioa.te rmttel' of the CO;:~Jtd.s61on. "52 
l\t the Congrm:.;s (xf" Verona. then .. Papal diplo":\a.ey ha.d been 
hl.r:hly successfulj hut it \,las to be the last d1plonatlc vlotoJ'1 
of ConsaIv:f. '13 career. Already J even befol"e the end of the 
Conr;ress, another prcblem, prev!.ouely unforeseen" had arisen 
that "rould compel Cnnsalv1 to rer.laln in oppos!t!on to Austria, 
ns h(! had been at Verona; but the dlplo!'j\atlc lStruggle that 
follotred--the last of COM.lv!'e l1fe--had no such happ,- outoorae. 
51 
A.V_> R2_2, Spia. to ConaalYi, 11 December 1822. 
,2 
A.V., R242, CORBalv1 to 5p1Da, 21 Deoe.la.r 1822. 
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3. The Postal Controversy: 1822 
The oentral issue in Austro-Fap&l relat:!..on.:: during the last 
months of Gonsalvi'u minil:ltry was the attempt of Austria. to 
bring under i~s contl"Ol all th~ cOl"j,"espondence of the Italian 
l.'eninsula. This .. ttempt. though. a continuation of a long-
atandinc; Austrian polioy, waa also all integral part of the 
genel'al Au.atz-ian dr'iye, 1napireu by the 1il20 revolutions, to 
flna1'leial aru1 admiaistrat1ve aciYantagv&t fo~ A'Wttria, it wu 
de.ired primarily froM politieal motive.. Du.ri.~ tile Restora-
tian period. eep10nage WP & NgW.&r' and iiil5Nrtant f'llnQtlo11 01' 
tile Austrian poatlLl serviu", all ll1a11 tlult pas&(jd tllrough the 
Austrian poat oti'ioe8 WU oUiltUnla>.·Uy (Jpttne4 and exaul1nea for 
".. ,- ...... _f-.;" - .... - ... _.- ..... ,.- ~ 
;)j 
'!'his a~ooURt of AUtlJtpu. 'a geaePal poatal po1107 18 baaed 
.,r:tmarl1y 1,l~OU tlle standa.l'd 'iNo!"l..: of thCiof pi.oneer in th(~ fi.eld,$ 
Josef K".rl ~J lt3;tem1W aCh.,_&- Britr.s,,,.t: paat1 _ n aDd.. 
llo;:;tlru.r:ie CV:ilJn, 1935) whioh. 18 ·oased .on aoeurnentatlon from the 
illeMe. Arent .. s. Little else has bettn done OD thta _aleet.d 
subject. which is Qf greatel~ tilgnificance than m~ at f lrst bQ 
apparent. Si1v10 Furlan! planned a study' ot Austrian postal 
policy in Italy. but haS apparently abandoned the project afte~ 
produeiq two artie1es s "La eODYOUiOM postale a\VItro ... 
pontif':leia del 1815, n UC\}1ylo g,11A l&umltaz,"ON! Damena d1.. StOMa 
Patria, 1946, 23-58) and La que.tic .. postal. italian&. a 
Congresso 41 Verowa," Ha9YI B1Yi§ta Star1Qa, 1948, 36-49- Con-
Siderable wOFk remaims to be dOM on th1S suoJeet •• 8.,.01&117 OD 
ita Italian aspects. 
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intormation that mi&ht be at use. The data thus obtalned was 
otten at couiderable yalue to Auatriu diplomats as a guide to 
eon4itlona in toreiCIl atates. and ot even createI' value to the 
Austr1an aecret polloe in keeping track at the aotlYlties and 
later-relatloM at the yarlous NYolutl0n&17 organlzations. 
Oby1ouslJ", the yalue or thi. postal espionage would be 
much enchanced it ne1ghboring state. could be persuaded to turn 
oyer to Austria tor torwarding all correspondence pas.ing 
throuah thelr boundaries, correspondenee wb,ioh normally they 
would haye aent bJ" other routes. A8 a step toward this goal, 
Austria opened new and better postal rout.s throUlh it. ter-
ritori.s alons which mall eould move more rapIdl7 and cheap17 
than b7 older routes throUlh other states. An example ot thls 
polie7 ... the openl .... ot a MW route trom Ital7 to HueJl1ncen 
OD the Rb1ne J because ot its more etticient organizatlon, a 
letter .eDt trom BoloCU to Paris on this route would arrive a 
• 
4q earlier than on the older route. throUlh PIedmont, However, 
despite the adYantaaes ot theae route., tew states were willing 
to send all their eorrespoDden.e alone them, tor the espionage 
ot the Auatrian postal a,..tem was too well known. Austria was 
there tore compelled to reaort to diplomatic presaure, to 
aubterruge, and to otterine speclal tinancial lnducements in 
order to pe"uade or oompel other atate. to enter it. postal 
orbit. 
No_ere were the ettorts at Austria to attain postal 
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hegemolV stl"Onger--or, for a time, more successtul--than in 
Italy. There, the weakness of' the small states made it diffioult 
for them to rea18t Austrian pressure for long, and their lack 
ot tinancia1 resources made them susoeptib1e to Austrian 
financial inducementa. Nonetheless, the first Austrian efforts 
in the Peninsula bore little fruit. 
The first Auatrian target 1n Ital7 was the Papal state, tor 
oontrol ot 1ts correspondence would be eapecIal1., valuable: 
beeause of' it. geographical looat1on, virtually all correspondenc 
between northem .... southern Italy, IS well .. a good part of' 
that 'between northem Europe anc! the Med.1terranean, natural1,. 
' .... d through Papal terrltor,r. 
In 1815 Metternich .ent to Rome his mo.t .k11Itul poatal 
diplomat, Baron Char1.s de Lilien, to negotiate a oonvention 
"plating Auatro-Papa1 postal relations with the Superintendent 
ot Papal Poata, Cayali.re Lorenzo Altieri.54 The ohief' purpose 
of' Lilt.ft t • miaaioa wu not the mere regulation ot routine 
poatal matters, but to sain eontrol ot all Papal eOrN.pondenee 
tor Austria. Altieri, an uaimqinative bureaucrat, W88 con-
cerned onl7 with technical poatal queations and had little oon-
ception of' tbe _ider political implicationa ot the negotiations. 
54 Iii 
Por a detailed d.ner1ptioft ot the 1815 postal 'ftesotiationa 1'1 




,,',:,:., 1831 he.oncluded more than twent)r !'Oatal eonventions with varlous 
atatea. Lo1'e1lZO Altleri (117a-la17) wu Superintendant ot Papal 





Lillen therefore had little difflculty in aecuring the insertion 
into the prelimlnary draft ot aeveral artie lea that would 
.&hiev. h18 politioal obJectiye. Moat important was Article 6, 
.nlch provided that "the Po.titi.al Poat Ottiee will conalgn 
4ire.tly to the Imperial Ottice all eorre.pondence. • • destined 
for ••• " and here all the nations ot Europe, trom Ruseia to 
England, were lated.55 
Altieri made ftC) objeotioa toib1a olauee, Gioh would have 
made Austria the master ot all Papal correspondenoe. At this 
poiat, however, Co_alv1's attention wu attracted to these 
MgottatioM. The Seoret&r7 ot State saw the dangerous im-
plicationa ot Article 6 at tirst Ilance.56 Though Austrian 
control ot its correspondence l'JlU8t 'be 41atastetul to aftl" 
Italian state, it posed a much mo1"'8 aerious danger to the Papal 
government than tor &n7 other. The reason wu that, wbereas 
most atatea sent their important diplomatic correspondence by 
apeeial diplomatic eourlers, the impoverished Papal government 
coulel not aftord thu upensi •• meana of communication and was 
theretore oompelled to communicate with ita repreaentatives 
abroad by regular mail. Papal correspondenoe with the Vienna 
nuncio was alread7 aubject to Austrian 8crutiJ'O"J should. the 
55 
A. V •• Rll1, Prellmlna17 dNtt of the postal eOJ'lYention. 
Au.guat 1815. 
56 
Oonaalvi's reasona tor o"osi-. this article are explained 
in A.V. Rl11, oaaerYazioJU aul proletto del 318. Baron Lilien, 
1815. 
Papac)" agree to tum over all ita mall to Austrla, then all 
lts diplomatl0 correspondence would be as restricted and 
hampered as that with Vienna already was. 57 The da'llage that 
such a sltuat10n would do to the conduct ot Papal diplomacy is 
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readily apparent. The Papal govermnent, theref'ore, had greater 
reaaon than 3nJ other 1n Italy to oppose Austria's plans to 
obta1n oentrel at all Italian correspondence, tor those plans 
poaed .. threat Rot only to the pr1vao7 ot its citizens, but to :,i 
the 8uoces.tul conduct ot tts ow dlplomac;y as well. Consalvl 
aoeorc:t1ngl,. rejected Lill.n fS proposed convention at onee, sub-
stltutlng a project ot hlw own elim1nating tbe objectionable 
artlcle •• 
Onoe hiS subterfuge ~ been detected by Conaalv1, Lilian 
made no turther attempt to seoure oontrol ot Papal eorrespon ... 
dence. No attempt waa made by Austria to apply diplomatic 
pre.sure upon the Papao)", probabl,. because any such pressure 
would haye intertered with the pollc)" ot Austro-Papal oo-opera-
51 
Unless, that la, some other sta.te offered the use or 1ts 
c11.plomatie .0urieN or some trwstworth;y priYate traveller was 
willing to o&l'r7 the Papal correspondence. Code would be and was 
uae4, ot eourse.. but the sk1ll ot the Austrian cl"1Ptographers 
made this an insecure ret'Uge. Th18 situat"n explains wh7, tor 
example, much ot CCMalvi'. correspondence with the Vienna nunoio 
or w1th S,1J1l8. at Verona and Lqbach (both In Auatrian terr1to17) 
wu ao pard.ed in tone. Oftl7 eft the infrequent eo_10na when 
he could seJl4 b18 letten b7 8cme other state'a couriers or by 
pr1'Yate trayeller <lid Consalvl teel able to speak treely. The 
historian t1nda it cl1ttleult to cSi.eover Co_al'9'1-. real attitude 
to AWltria trom hl. eOJ'1"e8poftdenee.. tor the latter was written in 
the knowledge that it would. SQon beeorne known to Vlenna. 
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tion then sought by Metternieh. The postal convention which 
wae eventually signed on 7 Ootober 1815 dealt only with rout1ne 
admin1strat1ve matteI'S and had 110 political overtones. The 
Papacy was left tree to send its Gorrespondence by whatever 
route it preferred.58 
For six Tears af"ter thiS rebuft Austrian postal diplomac,. 
1n. Ital,. was relativel,. qu1escent. Once again, as in other 
fields, it was the !'evolutions ot 1820-21 that stirred up 
renewed activit,. on Austria's part. The information on the 
aetivities ot the Settarj that eould be obtained by control over 
( 
all the oorresponden •• ot the PenInsula now came to seem vitall,. 
1mportant to the Austrian govpmment. The opinoD ot the 
, 
Aatriara charge in Turin, Baron DUser, that the revolutions 
could ha.. been prevented had Austria been in control of all 
Franao-Italian eorrespoBdenoe I !fUQ' have been an exacgerat1on, 
but it w .. tn1oa! ot the Auatriaa attitude.59 
In 1822, theretore, Metternioh aet to work with redoubled 
eneJ.'gJ' to impose Auatr1an control upon the corx-eapondence ot all 
the Italian states. The buic Austrian stratea' was a revival 
ot an older plan I to torm a sort ot poe tal blocka4e across 
oentral Ital7 through Which no mail could pass without falling 
into Austrian haadll. :Metternich would oreate this blockade bJ' 
58 
CO" ot this Convention in Rl17J al80, printed 1n Purlani, 




by negotiating oonventions with Twsca.ny, Modena, and l''ta.;..''''1na, bY' 
which those states would agree to turn over to Austria all 
correspondenee originating in or passing through tbeir terri-
torj.es. These three states when Joined with Lombarey·-Veneti& 
f'ormed a contin'UoutS band of tcr:t'1to17 stretching across the 
Peninsula froM the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian Sea and all land ... 
borne (Jorreapondence between northern and southern Italy ril.Wt 
pa88 th:POUgh. them. The Papal State and !'1edm.ont, the states 
rmet likelY' to oppose Austl:"Jian designs, would then be isolated 
from 6aoh other. If they would not voluntar1ly agree to tum 
their correspondence to AUfJtr1a, then it would perfol""Ce be 
turned oveI' by the central Italian atatee through e10h it must 
pass. aWe out Italy- in half a.nd becol.~e its master'S," oOn1!1:1cnted 
Mettern:tch. 60 
Tbe crucial 11nl{ in this plan was Tuseany, for Parma and 
f.1cdena were eompletely subservient to Austnan wishes. Seeret 
negot1at1cne were iftitiated at Florence in early 1822. and 
Tuscan hesitation waa overcome by a niXture of diplomatic 
pressure and very advantageous finanoial ooneess1ons. The 
result was the Austro-'l'uscan Convention of.' 4 September 1822, bY' 
which Tuscany agreed to "pas!! on to the Imperial Austrian poets 
all letters or1g1nat1ns 1n or in trans1t through the Gra.nd Duchy. 
'60---
Ibid., '61 ,-
deetined tor ••• , in ehort, the whole world, except only· 
letters to and from the South ot France, which alone are to be 
consigned to the Sardinian ottlce.·61 
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With the conolusion ot this COR vent lon, Metternich had 
taken the tlrst and most crucial atep towards poatal hegemoD7 
In Italy. A postal barrier had been ereated 1.01'0.8 central 
Italy Which eould not easl1y be o1roumvented and throUSh wh1ch 
no mail coul4 pass without talling into the Austrian hands. This 
agreement pJaced. Austr1a 1. a strong, 1ndeed. almost impregnable, 
posIt1on, from whioh It would be ver,y ditficult tor the Papacy 
to dislodge her. 
The Oonveat1on wu kept secret tor some months. It 1s 
uncerta.1n p1'8c18e17 when Oonsalv1 t1rst learned ot 1t, but 
apparently he had some idea ot Its cOl'ltents by late October. In 
that month he apoke about it to B1_, requesting the aId ot 
Prance to avert Austrian oontrol over the correspondence ot all 
Ita]:,.. In relpe_e, the Pnnoh government .. sured him it would 
oppoa. anr such Austrian deSign. 62 Equall,. enoouraglns was the 
attitude ot Piedmont: De 11. Tour promised. that "he will dlsp1ay 
the greatest f1rmne.a In the postal cueatioD at the Congress 
ot Verona, and wl11 do eYerything there in complete hc.rmol'l7 
n63 Jdtb ••• Sp1na •. 
5l a. A.V., R2~2, Consalv1 to Spina, 4 December 1822. 
6~ 
A.V., R201, Blaoaa to Consalvl, 28 October 1822J R248, 
Macchi to Conaalvl, 29 october 1822. 
F~ 
.... A.V. Rt48, Macohi to 0088al.,1, 29 ootober 1822. 
At the ye~ minute these assuranoes ware g1ven~ however. 
both Pl~(lmont and F~ce W0l'l9 negotiating postal agree:nenta to 
g1ve all their eorrespondance to Austria. Imnedlately upon 
heu1ng of the Austl"O-'l'u:!ean negotiations.l Piedmont hood dis ... 
patched the Poste..l D1rectol" of Genoa .. Ce:.a11ere Cerruti, to 
Flottetlef1 to negotiate e. fa'J'orable convention. In the end, 
Cerruti was eompletel:r outmaneuvered, and the 'l'i.maall-!Jier'!.ontese 
Convention or 9 Novenbel' 1822 which he ~ 19ned lW.6 a die liE tel' 
for Piedmont. By this ~r;t.ent Piedmont was obliged to turn 
over to Tuscany (and hel'tee to AU8tl:"1a) all rr.a11 trom or to the 
Papcl State and Naples, While '1'u!cany 'IaS not bound to tl.um over 
64-to Piedmont any eorreepondeftce save that tor southern France. 
The inept Cerruti was promptly disavowed bY' his go"er-n.Tl.ent .. 
which rrerua.d to ratify h1l conventloa as too unfavorable to 
Pie~~onteae interest!. Not only would this Convention contribute 
to Austrian postal hegemony .. it would also tlepr1ve P1e4mont of 
an important aou:roe or l"I!venue, for the eorrespondenae of Italy 
tor w •• te~ Europe would no longe~ pass thro~~ th~ Pledrnontese 
postal 8J'8tem. Time \f'M to show that the eeeond or these draw-
baoka f"ar Gutwe1ghed the tltt8t in the e,-es of '1'ur1n. and that 
Piedmont '8 main obJeet1Ye was to se$ure lt$ own f'1nana1al 
Interec ts t not to detend the freedom or Italian corr$S pondence • 
In late 1822, however, P1eal'ltont seelaed eqe~ to ao-operate with 
-----6lf-.--






the papaeT to defeat Austria. 
The oontent. o~ the lustre-Tuscan Convention were fully 
divulged to the Italian goYernments in late November, and at 
once Spina, La 'four, and the pepresentatlYe ot LuoQa, Marchese 
Manzi, met to disouss it. All agz-eed that the eODYentlon must 
not be allowd to go into effeet, but it lfP tlitfleu! t to see 
how th1a desirable aim ... to 'be attained. The oall' • .,. in 
whleh these tlu'ee atat.a could brlJlg p1'&"aw.-. direotly would be 
foft them to clel\7 Auatria and 'rwIO&n1' the use or certain %'Outes 
1d1ioh th.,. oontrolled I the 11piae pas... through Piedmont, the 
Bolopa Road from Venetia throUlh the Legatione to Florence, 
and the route throUSh Luoea to 'l'usc&m1'. Unfortunately, Austria 
aa4 Twlean:r had alternate.t though longer, routes to theae I so 
that closing the latter would. aot oompel those powers to give 
in. Oil th1a SloomJ' aote the tlaDterenoe 'broke up. ·OUr 
situation ••• 18 .ertaiftl7 .,st unpleasant,· Spina conoluded.65 
Meanwhile.. Coneal'Yl too had learned the f'ull content ot 
the Austro-Tuaean CORYentloJt, _loh was eyen worse than he had 
reared.. He at once realized that the Papaq alone had little 
chanee of defeating Austria under ex1atlng oiroumstances" The 
only hope 11\1' in aeeUl'1ng the eo -operation of other powers. Hla 
tiNt ate, ... to seek .. understanding with Piedmont. A 
reoent dispatch from Turin had implied that if the Papaey would 
formally protest agaInst the Tusoan-Pledmontese Convention ot 
65""----
A.V., Rl17, Spina to Consalv!, 27 November 1822. 
r 
9 November, Pi~d~ont would use this protest as e vretext for 
refusins; to ratify the agreement. Con$u vi. accordingly dlrec;ted 
Spina to give De 1a Tour such a protest. At the ~&.me time, the 
Cardinal r:l.l\Q.e plans to bl"ing the A:umtro-Tuacan Convention to the 
attention of' France and England, ltho oo'Uld hardly look with 
favor upon the conoentration of their correspondence in Austrian 
hands. 66 
Spina promptly sent De 1& Tuur a rO~"'lIfnal proteat, as 
Consalvi had directed. The P1edmonteae repl1ed with two notes, 
(>lle public, one oonf'1dent1a1. The f1rst declared fQrma.l.ly that 
piedmont, from considerat.1oll tOl" the l"1&iite of the Pope, v#ould. 
r-efrain from rat1.fyiag the Convention with 'I'uaealll'. In the 
eonf'1dent1al letter, De 1 .. Tour agreeu eor.lpl"tely on the dangers 
pNsentec1 by the Aust1"'o~_.an Convention and the need for 
Piedmont to unite wi.th the Papacy to oppose it. suagestir", as 
one means of' opposition tae establ1sror..ent of a pa(Jketboat 
sel"Yice between Genoa and C1vitavecGh1a to circumvent Austrian 
control of the land :routes.67 
Consalv1 was pleased b7 De 1& ~ourts rep17 and. Gorw1darsd 
the paeketboat 3ugseat1on 1.te~st1ng. but he teared that l?rance 
might objeot it its eox-respondence was dolqed V \We 01.' this 
()l) 
A..V., Ra42, Coaaalyi to Spina, 4 December lS22. 
67 
Ib1d..~ Spina. to De 1& Tour, 9 De.ember 1822) De 1& Tour 
to Spinr, 15 Deoember 1822 (#1 & 2). 
r 
novel route in bad. weather. 68 
Meanwhile, Consal"i •• efrorts to rouse France and Engla.nd 
were haYing e, miXed sueeess. The Cardinal had b$$n astounded to 
learn 1n late November that despite Blaess's promise of support, 
Franee had signee! a Conyent1on turning oYer all ita Italian 
correspondence to Austria. 59 Macchi ~ported that the French 
postal bureauerat$ h.d signed the 8I:reel1'lent without realizing 
its ,ollti.~e.l tmpl1GattoM. The Freneh li'oN!lgn Minister 
Mont~reney ha4 been "most svrprlsed and indIgnant to learn or 
1 t ,t1 and had M sured J'!teeh1 that the French gov$rnment would 
refuse the ~~lrleatl¢n or th~ Convention. TO 
J'font'l'loreneyts Sttrp!ttse was probably genuine. Like most 
stateam.n, he tended to ignore postal m_ttere es mere teehnleal 
C!'Ueet1ons of no po11tical significance. HoweYer, be wu h1gh17 
auspicious or AU$tr'.an ~s1ans in Italy and favorably disposed 
t('lwards the PapaeYJ When the po11.t1cal t1'>',p11eat1ona ot' the 
Conventicn were made elear to him, he promiSed to dQ all in hUS 
po~r to help d.ereet Austriafs aims.11 At Verona he made a 
aeterrttned effort to persuade Tuscnny to abandon its convention 
"t1th lhl£tt1a., and to his errorts were joined thote ot Lord 
_·_--w .. _··-
A. V. Rll1, Oonae.l v1 to Maochl, 2ti Deoember 1822. 
G] 
Ibid. J Consalvi to Macchi. 29 November 1822. 
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Ibid. J Consalvl to Papal oharse'lost! in Turin, 30 
December;-yg22. 
71 ,-
Ib1d~, Toati to Oo_al ... 1., 25 Febl'WU"1' 1823. 
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Burgherish, the English ambassador in Florence, who had also 
been enlightened as to the danger; but their combined efforts 
met with no success. To all pleas and protests, the Tuscan 
government replied that its Austrian convention was far more 
advantageous than its former agreements with Sardinia had been; 
that in signing the Convention it had been motivated entirely by 
these financial advantages and was unaware of any wider 
political considerations; and that it accordingly saw no reason 
to abandon its Cmnvention. 72 
Since Tuscany, secure in the knowledge of Austrian support, 
thus resisted the combined pressure of France, England, and 
the Italian states, nothing was accomplished at the Congress of 
Verona to halt Austriafs drive for control of all Italian 
correspondence--and as 1822 passed into 1823, it became 
increasingly apparent that that drive would not be stopped. 
72A•S•F ., Corsini to Fossombroni, 7 December 1822. 
Even before the !ll'l1J. ai:J&oluticm ,?t tne Congr~s:J the 
opposit1on to Aua'tria had suffered a seri(}w, s¢tb8.4k: 1n lat& 
December ~Iontmo.ren¢y r~ll from power a.nd was repla.ee~ by Vlseount 
Praneoia Cha.teaubriltnii. Since Cr,.ateaubrial'.ld was less ecncerned 
with Papal. interesta and lees die.posed to qt~ar1"'el ,d.th AU1!!tr1a. 
over ttuy thtm hu pre<leces:tvl", J.'f.ont!'?1oreney t e rall wu a 
aer10us raattel."' for the Papacy I a.e Conse.lvi ret~l ized.13 From tht. 
tUte onward, }l1reJl¢h cppos1t1on to J:u.striaft;, plans ateadily 
.-akenea, in raot it not in prlneiple. 
Ko_thel ... , at their tint la.eet1n& ClLateaubriand. alluJul. ... ed 
Jluell.1 th.at tb.e A_t70-i'WMh eQDyea1;1on would not be ratified, 
ht oRll' Walt tha't asreoment cOlltr&'17 to l<"fren.ch i.terea -l;a I but 
B8Ilaad too bad .t1"O~11' proto.ted. the \leviation ot its oor-
fta,ondenoe h-om the former route. Fo:rtunat(;tly .. eonvenit)nt 
pre,,"t for reJection eouid. 'be fowad in the refusal or S&"41n1a 
to rat1t7 its oonvention with Tuaean;.y .. a ratiflcatioJl Vlh14h 
the AustI'O-Freneb ConYfltntlQn had stipulated as It nc¢easary pre ... 
lL"!l1n.a:t:7. Tune aaavanoC'$ Wel"'e vel!7 encGuraglng. bu'; when 
.. chi sua&eate4 a GOl'l4u"ete plan to~ action in the form ot the 
• .. '?j ,~ .. , .. -... , .. 
A"V., :R165~ Consalv1 to Bpi_, 19 Jal'lU8.t'Y 1823 (eoW) J 
Rll? Test!. to Consalv1, i!6 ~ebraa17 1823. P .... eo18 V1.aeount 




paeketboat aohe::1., Chateaubl"'land pro;;').ptla' 'Vetoed i~ on the 
gr.:>uw1 that it ;ni3ht delay the transit of Frenoh correspon-
denoe. 74 '1'1118 was to bo the pattel"'l of :Frenea policy dw.1Oing 1823 
voluble Q.'i3Ull anoes I but no tangible ~upport.15 
Nor ttl.. the oourse ot: eventa in Pi.elmont entirel,. rEtaasur-
ing. Tul:tin continued to p:roteBt ita i'1nn oppos1tlou to A'U8triarl 
plana, '75 but COll$alVl waa diatUllbea to learn that Sarcl1n1a ·:.~i 
MU al.l,1Ultaa&oual¥ engaged in _801;1&t11'18 a BflW poatal .on-
vent10n with Austria. Oa 28 Jamuu"J', the 11edmollt ••• Oharg.~ in 
itOI_. Count :6a.1th.~ux. 1llf'orme4 Consalvl that h1a sovernntent waa 
~ontempl"1ng axl asreeme.t OJ' Wb1011 it would turrl o.er to 
A:ustr1a. all co~poRde" to IU.'l4 tl"Om the _.tem but not the 
.. tern Pa.pal at&tea. Altho. sueD an agree.nit would not ln 
1teelt be a serious th.l'eat # eoualv1 considered 1t all al&1'fB1D8 
sign that P1cd.tnont was waVGJU.ll8 in ita O»POfj1t1on to A.tria. III 
his repl¥ to Bar'bcroux he eDQrte4 P1eanlOnt to ftmaiR f'1ft. 
wam1ng of the Austrian atl'l.telJ': 
Haying ral1.d with thft Papal go..,el!'nllent, AustI'ia 
now rruLkeo tn1. proposition to ~arQ1n1a, 1n order 
to tONe the hand ot the Papal gov8lmmant a.nd 
11l" 
P..111, r-1acchi to Ccrmalv1, 9, 28, Januar:r 1823. 
15 
Ibid., Consalv1 to 'l'osti, 2'7 Pebl"'Uar--.f 1823; Macchi to 
Consalvr;-rr ~.h, 22 Apl'il, to ~, 2 August 1823. 
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. !~i..t:!., 'l'ostl to Consalvl, 13 January If-'23. 
divld~ the Italian states. This l.a the Bola 
al~ of the Av~t~o·Sard1nian negotlatlon8 •••• 
Austrian 1'l8."8 to dlviea and conq,uo!l by ap-
proaching S IU'dln1a alOM. It Ss.rdinta agrees, 
~he Papal State \'l.1.11 be isola.ted and forco::;d to 
See. • • its e0Tr'spo'ft4enee b:r-oUSht into 
Aua trlan hands. 
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Despite the Oardlnal IS warning" the Sardinian government 
eontinued the negotla.tloM. 'I'wo weeks later, Oonsalv1 learned 
that 'J.'ul'in was ,lying ta:f'orable eonsia.ratioR to a new Austrian 
proposal 1tto c()nslgn to the Sardinian poste all the eOrTeapon-
de." received at Milo to'l! Frane., England., Ute! be7ond.. • • .1t 
Ho .. yer, all Ital1u. eo~pon4enee would stUl pue tlu"Ough 
the AustrIan. ott! •• at Milan betoPe be1!lg Slftft to SaMin! •• 
"'!'his tleheme. 1t eo_sly! e01l'1l1\ented bitterly, "W111 aast1re the 
peeualU'1 tnt.rests or the Sa.N1nian poats, but al10118 the 
.oneellt~tl&JIl ot OOl"ftspo.den.. 1n Austrian hands to oontinue to 
the tullest exteat; pu'm1ta the pre •• rn.t1on !! totQ lOt the 
A_t1'O-'l'8o_ Oon'ftntlo'll, ancl ••• deprive. Prance or it. best 
ezeus. tOXt !lOt ratlf'J'1.l'l8 ita ool'l'f'ltntlon. • • • It Sa1'd1ft1a 
'78 71e1ds to Auatr1. J all 11 loet. If 
While Prance and S6\l"dln1a were thua wav.r1ng, Oonsal"l had. 
been maiJlta1nlng a tlrm Hsl.tan .. to A'WItr1a t s plau. The 
7';,~~-i""-­
, ' 
.. Ib1d., COfl..salv1 to Barbero'UX, 29 Jan'W.U'7 1823. with cOPY' 
or Bu'baroUx to Co_al ... 1, 28 JaJlUal7 1823. 
78 
Ibid., Conaal~1 to Tosti, 10 Februar" 1823. In taot. 
this scheme had been t1.r6t propose' by Sardinia .. not A\I4tl'1&1 
aee Xueni to Conaalvl, 4 Mareh. 1823. 
r 
! 
t'tll8t o:rfle1al notice 'he F~"al go .. ernmtnt had had of the 
Austro .. 'l\l,qaan ConV'$tlt1on \i'M a 'brief le1;te~ tr-.)lTi the TUsean 
1'ostal ~hlperi.nt$ndtlnt I Cavallej.--.e Luatrini, to h.iS ?apal equiya-
lent, ~arquia 1'18..;131mv (Who had replaved A1tie~" in 1817}, in ... 
forming h1r:l or th<t Oonv.ntion"a pro'V1a1ona. As th$tU: provUlolW 
\fOuld neG<!ss1tata various ilhangea loll T'usCa,n ... r-a.pal ,ottal re-
lations, Lust~ni l"'equ9sted .. m.eetinr; with Ma$s1:rno to dll!euas 
th(J$tt points. A~ent17 L_trtll1. Vfa, follow1ll; the usual 
Iln,e~l~ taet1~ or tt'.11nt: tl.) malm 1. ts pGstal 1nno.,at1ol'lS appear 
as men rQutine adm1:Jilst%lat1ve :'leasUl'es. r.fa.I!:l1.'1l0 was ~t 
de<)e1ve4; he replied that as this ;:na:tti!t' "~o:l!b1ne$ not onl~ 
~«ol'lo'ltie ~.ltda41"1J.1n.1St:Mlt:1.ft afr.1l"$, but also pol"ual and. 
n\in1.te .. la1~ n 1t was beyond. h1s compatenG~ to treat and must be 
tak~ up wt tA t!ae 1'3~~l!'eta.l7 of St&t~. 19 
'WO weeki after ~18 robl.ltt" Appony'i ('Who served 11'\\ nome 
d fusee ambalfSafo!l as well $,$ AUlJtltian) took up the postal 
question on the ae.ired i1liltlBMr1al level" l"QQuesting Oama).v1 
\0 authorize Massi"11.O to ,"at with LUlStPi."1"d..8Q In hie l'ePl:r 
Goualv1 ~tused Appony1 '8 r$quest and ~"t forth f'ol" the tiraii 
time the arguments aga1nst the Auatro-'l'UsCall C01'lV9U1;1on wb,1oh 
he was to U'5e l'egv.1arly henee:r.orth in bill ot'f1oial ~()mmun1o.a ... 
tlons. F1l'1Jt t "e .l'Jl.U!d~ tile OonventiQn Violated the pl1ilU)1plAt 
----.---
7<') 
. :tbl~., Me88t.mo to Lustrl.ft1, a8 ~.el" lata; &110 
tustr1nrto Massimo; 26 Jfo"Y'!mbep 1812, _ai;mo to. Oonsaln, 18 
JIf ..... be:r.- 18ft. 
80 . 
. p.~t.. APPOlfl1. to C_"'tIl, 10 lie .... 1". 
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of ~dom ot eo~po"denee, the right or the sender to choos. 
the rrrttte along wh1ah his mail should go J seet'}n.d, A-..mtr1a and 
Tu8ean~,r had no r1::::ht to negotiate fl treaty d1sP081ng ot Papal 
eO:P!'espondenee without eomult1ng the 'Pope and. satistying his 
1\IPJt interests and soyereign rights J third, the lJal*l S;OVtu'nwnt 
~ould not agree to the deYiat10n or its oo~spondenee ror 
~~anee, England, et~.j· r~ its natural oou~e without those 
nations. eonsent; and tinally, the new route was longer and went 
th1"Ough. ~ore dlftleult tex-nln, henee it would delay the transit 
of ~oM'lttlpon6!nee. 1'01' these reuoM, Comalvi declared., the 
'f'Ja'Paoy ~t fo~a11y ,!'Ot •• t &g&lnat this Oo!W'en:tion ad reM. 
to oo-ope~te with it in .~ way, ro~ example by ada~ting Papal-
'!'u.s.an postal ftgulatloM to eontol'm "ith its Pl'OV1al0M. liIfore .... 
O'ftr', $1?loe TuiJoany aftd Aust1'1a retuled to allow Papal eorl'eS-
l'Ondttftee to 1'a.'!t! fNel,. t the Pope '1'tU8t exercise h1a sovereign 
right of retwalrag to allow their eourieft to 1..tse the POSt road 
through Bologna. fte Papal gove1't'l1Tlent would be w1111ns to dis -
flUS" anew }OO8tal eoftYetrt1oft, but o1'll.y it the interests of all 
the Ita11art states WN .. speeted.81 
The lm~ed1ate reaction to thIs letter was mildly eneourac-
it'll: TufJeanye- aMOuneed that it WOUld, not put ttl! Oonventlofl with 
Austria into eftect on 1 Januar,r 1823, as plan~d. but would 
poatpone it u~t11 1 ~areh. Howeyer~ this pcotponement betokened 
no tund .. v'1ental changi";> in policy. A letter of ~o Jar.lUtu.,. from 
'B~' ,'---
~. J COnlalv1 to Appony1, 19 Deeember 1822. 
r 
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Metternich to Apponyi which the latter read to Consalvi rejected 
all the Papal arguments. The most telling point was a demon-
stration that although the new Austrian postal road (through 
Hueningen) was indeed longer than the old Piedmontese route, it 
was better organized and in better condition and therefore mail 
sent along it would travel faster and arrive with equal or 
greater rapidity~82 This contention--which was in time proved 
correct83_c-seriously weakened the best of Consalvi fS offioial 
arguments, and was therefore repeated in greater detail in 
Apponyifs official reply to the Cardinalfs letter of 19 
December. 84 Consalvi could only retort that it remained to be 
seen whether the new route could equal the old in rapidity, but 
"this muoh at least is certainly true, that the longer road, 
despite all improvements, remains the longer." Hence, the Papal 
government would persist in its protests. 85 
In the following weeks, various unofficial communications 
were exchanged between Consalvi and Apponyi, but none offered 
anything new or in any way eased the tension between Austria and 
the Papacy. On March 20, Apponyi, following Metternichfs in-
structions, made another lengthy attack on the Papal position~ 
82Ibid~, Consalvi to Macchi, 8 February 1823, describes 
Metternicfifs letter, of which no copy could be found in the 
Vatican Archives; 
83Ibid;, Macchi to Consalvi, 2 August 1823; 
84A• V., ANV 250, Apponyi to Consalvi, 9 February 1823: 
85Ibid;, Consalvi to Apponyi, 14 February 1823; 
II 
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He began bY' del'17ing that the Auatre-Tuscan Convention "had any 
polItical end at all" (a good example at the guilty tleeing 
where none pureueth, aince Consalvi had caretully retrained trom 
even hinting at this charge), but was deSigned solely tor ad-
ministrative and financ1al improvement ot the postal system in 
Italy. He also denied that the Convention v101ated the Pope's 
soyereign rIghts, tor Auatria and TusoarQ' had the aovereign 
right ot regulating the transit ot ma11 within their bor.rt~-r~' as 
they Judged best. In conclua1on, Apponyi asa1n praised the 
advantages ot the new Austrian route, which was both ahorter 
(he olaimed) and better.86 These same arguments were repeated 
in tive additional notes which APpol'17i gave Consalvi during 27-29 
March.8' The Cardinal replied that he had never accused the 
Conveation ot beins politioally motivated, that h18 information 
on the length ot the new route d1ttered tram APPOft7i '8, and that 
in a.n,- cue it was an unnecea8U7 deviation trom the natural 
route J and that Austria and TuacaJ17 did indeed have the right 
to regulate poetal attaira within their borders, but not to 
injure the riChts and interests ot other states in 80 doing.88 
So pused the winter and early spring at 1823 tor Consalvi, 
in ceasel.s. aetivity to .tem the AustrIan advance: protests to 
Austria, proteats to Tuae&J'J7, exhortations to SardinIa to hold 
86 
Ibid., Appony-i to Consalvi, 20 March 1823. 8.,-
Copies 1n Ibid., ConsaIv! to Leardi, 12 April 1823. 
88 
~., Consalvl to Appony1, 29 March 1823. 
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firm and to France to oppose Austria's designs, plans for new 
postal routes to circwnvent Austria's, plans tor paeketboat 
service, plans for a congress of all Italian states on postal 
aff'airs--but all in vain. As Oonealvi already suspected, the 
struggle was hopeless. Neither Austria nor Tusea.ny could be 
forced to abandon their strong position by any pressure that 
Consalvl alone could bring, and ot' his presumed allies, Piedmont 
sought in effeet only its own financial interest, while France 
feared to challenge Austria openl,-. In the last analysis the 
Papacy stood alone--and in a single contest with Austria and 
Tuscany, Conaalvi knew well that the Papacy had no hope ot' 
victory. 
The crucial step 1n the isolation ot the Papacy came with 
the sign1nr; 1n March ot a. new Austro-8addinian postal convention 
by which Piedmont acquiesced in Austrian postal hegemony. Tosti, 
the papal charge' 1n 'l'llrin, had long foreseen this development: 
"The primar.1 interest ot this government," he had warned 
Conaalvl in Peb1'l1ar'Y, "is its peeuniar.r advantage J on various 
pretexts it WUl negotiate, as it i8 now doing, anc! will 8ign 
&n1 treaty with Aust~ia that safeguards its tlnanees."89 
Tosti'S prediotion was proven acourate at the end ot March, 
when De 1a Tour admitted that Sardinia had signed a convention 
with Auatrla. '!'be Piedmonteae insisted that the agreement con-
tained "not a word.. • • that coulc! harm the rights. • • ot the 
89 
A.V., R117, Toat! to Conaalvi, 19 February 1823. 
Ho17 Father,n90 but the facts belled hls words. B,y this oon-
vention Piedmont agreed to turn over all correspondenoe for 
states on the lett bank ot the Po to Austria, While that for the 
right bank (including the Papal States) would be consigned to 
Parma. Thus, in theo17 , the concentrat1on of all correspondence 
1n Austrian handa would be ayolded. In return, Auatria would 
consign to Sardinia the correspondence tor much ot western 
Europe, but onl7 atter it had tlret ,dsed through Austrian 
oft10es and had thus been subject to 1nspection.9l Thus the last 
gap in the Austrian po.tal barrier aoro.. Ital7 had been t1l1ed, 
and every route b7 whioh the Papal State m1ght send mail to the 
Mol"th .... cut ott. 
Oonaalvi, brushiJtg asid.e De 1a Tour'. attempted justifica-
tions I .a bitter17 critical or What he considered Piedmontese 
betrqal: 
Piedmont J by which the Pontifical Government was 
tiNt eDcouraged to oppose the Austro-Tuacan 
Convention, 1nstead ot holding firm in the defense 
ot the old s7lltem as the Pontltlcal Government has 
done, has sought to ass'u.re ita o\'m selfish lntereets 
07 securlng the greatest posslb1e consignment ot 
correspondence, without opposing the concentration 
ot all letters in Austrian handa •••• It is true 
that Austria, feigning to retreat trom the principle 
90 
Ibid., Toati to Conaalv1, 31 March 1823. 
91-
. COP1 or this convention in R1l7, 1823. Sardinia also 
agreed to put its convention or 9 November with Tuscany into 
errect. 
I 
of eoncentration too olearly manifested in its 
Tuscan Convention. has set up two centers for 
correspondence ••• ; but this does not really 
prevent the conoentration of all coreespondence 
in Austrian hands, for Parr'1a can be cons 1gered 
as aotually an Austrian territor,r. • • .9 
But Consalvits indignant protests had no effect and the Con-
vent-ion was duly ratified. 93 
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The Cardinal's last hope was to arouse Prance to active 
o~osition to the Austrian plans, but onee again he was dis-
appointed. When Macchi, rollev1ng Cones-lv1's instructions, 
sought the support of Chateaubr1ana against Austria, the latter 
agreed as to the ftn~eessity that Prance protest and thwart 
them.-
However (Macehi eont1nued) he oontessed to me with 
complete frankness that 1n these timesot war with 
Spain he could not clash with Austria and eater 
upon aorimonious disputes. For the present, he 
wished to limit himself to using language that will 
not displease Atwtrla, and to g1ve advioe, not 
protests. 
No help, then, eould b9 ex~oted frc:n Franoe. The isolation of 
the Pa:paoy was eomplete. A.I1 that was left for the Pontifical 
government to do now, Maochi felt, was to negotiate with Austria 
in the taint hope of n~aF~ng her a bit more reasonab1e."94 
92 
A.V., ANV 250. Conaalyl to Leard!, 13 April 1823. 
93 
A.V., Rl17, Tosti to ConsalYi, 4, 11 June, 2 July 1823. 
9b. 
~., Ma.e.hl to ConealYi, 22 Apr11 1823. 
r 
309 Conaalvi had already come to the same distasteful con-
clusion. On 29 March he had suggested negotiations tor a postal 
convention, but Metternleh, atter a lengthy crIticism ot the 
Papacyfs 8~legedly unreasonable suspicions, had refused to 
negotIate untIl the Papacy revoked certain measures it had 
:recently taken, notably the denIal ot the Bologna road to 
AustrIan eourlers.95 
Consalvi :rejected this de"1land l which would have compelled 
the Papacy to abandon the use of' what rew weapons it had against 
.A.ust:ria, and onee agaln defended the principle ot tree cor-
rest>Ondenee !.n terms sharply ci'ttioal ot Auatria.n postal 
poll:3ies.96 
Ma7 and early June passed while the PapacY' and AustrIa 
exchanged acrimonious notes on the preliminary conditions tor 
negotIations.. Desptte all Austrian pressure, Consalvl retused 
to :retreat tl"Om h:ts standJ or to eo-operate in any way' with the 
Austrian postal oonventions.91 As the conventions could not be 
put fully ~.nto etfeat unless the Papaoy adaptAd its postal 
regult!tt1ons to oonform to those of Austria and Tusca.ny, their 
exeou.tion. was cons 1de:r.-ab1y ha."'1pered by the Papal ret'usa1 of 
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A.V., ANV 250, Consalvl to Apponyl, 29 Maroh 1823, in 
Consalv1 to 1.teard1, 2 Apr1l 1823; Mettem1ch to APpol1J'l, 17 
API·:1.1 1823, in Conzalvl to Leard1, 21 May 1823. 
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A.V., Rll7, Consalv! to Appony1, 9 Mar 1823. 
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Ibid., Apponyi to Consalv1, 19 June 1823. Also, AliV 250, 
COlUHtlvrtO Leard!, 28 June 1823. 
eo-operation, and postal aftaris in central Italy were in 
contusion. Austria and Tuscany needed aome sort of postal 
settlement that wauld end this confuaion, which meant obtaining 
at least the pasll1'V'e adherence of the Papacy. To obtain this 
adherence aome minor caneeasiona on Austriats part seemed 
Juatified. On 19 June Apponyi informed Consalyi that his 
govera~ent had decided to drop its prel1minary conditions and 
open negotiations for a new canventlon "correspondant awe 
",if ,~~ • interets rec1proques. tt Once agaln, Baron Lilien wuuld aerve as 
Austrian plenlPotentlary.98 Consalvi accepted the Austrian 
oyerture and appointed Massimo as hil plenipotentiary.99 
Lilien arrived 1n Rome at the end of July and began 
negotiations with Massimo, but after a rew meetings 11'1 which 
nothing Wal aocompl18hed he requested 118~4e.1on~ wlth Conaalvl, 
"to establish fundamental principles on which the aubaid1ar.y 
proylaioM dt the convention can be baaed." Consalvl agreed, and 
henceforth the negotiations on major las~es were conducted be-
tween Conaalv! allQ Ll1len.100 
These negotlations took place agalnst a tragic background: 
on 6 July, P1U8 VII had autrered a ser10us accident from which 
98 . 
Ibid., Appo~l to Consalvi, 19 June 1823~ Also, ANY 250, 
Conaalvr""to Le8.1"dl, 28 June 1823. 
99 
A.V., Rl17, Conaa1vl to Appo~1, 7 July 1823. 100 . 
A. V. II A~"V 250 .. Consa:lvi to Leardi, 13 August 1823. The 
follow1ng acoount ot the 1823 postal negotiations 1s baaed 
largely upon this 418patch, together wlth thoae to Macchi, 4, 9, 
14 August 1823, in H1l7. 
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in h13 poor state of health he eould not recover. DurIng July 
his condition tended to deteriorate, and by early August hope for 
his recover.; was slight.. During these weeks when ?ius VII was 
edging closer to death, Consalvi1a chier concern was with the 
health of his sovereign a.nd frlendJ he could spare only a 
f'raetlon 01" hie time for the postal negotiations. Moreover, thea 
cireul1stancea in effect iHlposed a time limit upon ConsalV:11s 
(!onduct of the negotiations, for the death of Plus VII would 
mean the end of the Cardinal's ministry. If the Secretal~ of 
State waa to complete the posta.l negotiations himself, he I:lUSt 
fIght not only Austria, but time as well. 
Discussions between Consalvi and Lilien went on in halting 
fashion during the early weeke of August, whenever the Cardinal 
oould find time to spare fro:u all the pressing probleMS c8.uaed 
by the Pope fa condition. At !"irst, IlLl1ien was unable to reply 
to [ConSa!VlfS] sound arguments ••• , and seemed dIsposed to 
become itlOl"e reasonable # It but "suddenly he presented a project 
• • 
• co~plately Identleal to the Auetro-Tuscan Convention." Such a 
project was of course inadmissible and Conealv1 at once rejected 
it, remal~king eaustically that if this wo all LI1ien had to !Q', 
"it was useless for him to have come to Rome from Vienna. n10l 
After this rebufr Lilian abandoned his proposed convention, 
.but ogt h.1J--.tternptm to persuade Consaly1 to eo-operate with 
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A.V., Rl17, Consalv1 to Macchi, 4 August 1823. 
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A1.1strla '5 aims. The chief point at issue during the discussions 
that followed wns the Austrient~ insl~tenee that the Papal 
government "o~~~~t~ l~se...:1f" to give to Auetria all the corres-
pondence originating in or passing through the Papal State, not 
only for Austria, but also tor [all of Europe north of the 
AIrs]. ,,102 In 3UPP('Jrt of this derrand, !.Jillen argued that the 
nations concerned were indifferent to what route their eorres-
pcndenee tool{, tha.t J¥lail would travel l';ore rapidl~r over the 
Austrian route, and that the la.tter was more eaonom:'Leal for the 
Papa.cy. Furthe;r:'more, oontinued Papal I"esiatance "would be 
useless ~ ror 'ruscany would have to turn these letteI'li over to 
Auatria in I!J.n1 ease. f' 
Conaalvi was hard pressed to answer these arguments: 
How difficult and de110ate [he lamented to Maoohi) is 
CAe F'apal position on thifl point. If only we could 
give the polit1oal reason tor not wishing the conoen-
tration of correspondence, we i'/ould have an unanswe:I'-
able argument J but as we are unable to adduce this 
r·ea.sol1, all the vdlum of I'ef·u.aa.l falls upon the 
PontIfical Govermnent which, againat its own finanoial 
interest and with the eet"talnty of not being able in 
&n7 case to attain ita objeotive ••• , finda itself 
in the necessity or giving a most embittering refusal 
without being able to support it with the arguments so 
i)oliC. thaI; they a<1:11t of no reply. 
But "despIte all this, we have held firm to the prinoiple of •• 
~t ob111!~ ~u.!Welves to give Austria the eorrespondenee. Ml03 
f"02 
A.V., ANV 250, Con3alvl to Leardi, 13 August 1823. 
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A.V., Rl17, Oonsa!vi to Maochi, 4 August 1823. 
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Consalvi fS position became yet raore difficult during the 
second week of negotiations when Lilien, in addltlon to repeating 
his previous arguments, offered tempting financial inducements 
to overcome Papal reluctance. He first offered free transport 
for all correspondence for the Papal States from France along 
the Austrian road from Hueningen to Bologna, and when this had 
no effect, added the free transportation of all foreign corr>es-
pondence for the Papal State through Austrian territories. Thus, 
the cost of sending a letter between, for example, Rome and Paris, 
would be reduced by well over one third. If, Lilien warned, the 
Papacy should still refuse "despite these great advantages, 
Austria must conclude it had some ulterior motive and is dis-
,,104 playing a definite hostility to Austria. • 
• • 
Consalvi "could not but realize all the strength of this 
argwnent, and all the offensiveness of a refusal which (not 
being able to give the true motive on which it is founded) must 
appear utterly irrational~1t Nonetheless, he perSisted in his 
refusal~ The Cardinal was now pursuing a favorite tactic: 
seeking to preserve a principle even when compelled to yield on 
its practical exercise, in the hope that one day more favorable 
conditions might allow the Papacy to put that principle into 
effect again~ He saw clearly enough that under existing clrcum-
stances the postal situation was hopeless: the Papacy alone could 
not possIbly overthrow Austrian control over the Italian postal 
104IbiC!., Consalvi to rvIacchi, 9 August 1823. 
system and preserve the freedom of its own correspondence. How-
ever, if the Papacy could avoid binding itself to turn over all 
correspondence to Austria, if it could preserve the princ1ple of 
free correspondence, then ln time circumstances might turn 
agaift8t Austria and the Papacy might recower its postal in-
dependence. Such a charge could come about When the Spanish 
war ended and France we free to take a stand against Austria. 
'I'he Papaoy must prese"e its freedom of action until that time 
came. 
Conealvi therefore rejected Lilien's proposals, despite 
his tempting otters and his threats ot Imperial displeasure. It 
was difficult to tind arguments to justIfy this stand publicly: 
ln this "difficilissima" sItuation Consalvi "could tind no 
better argu'1lent than that bued on the natural character 01' the 
Papal government," that ls, lts necessary neutrality and im-
partiality. The Papacy, he elaimed, would be displaying 
partiality fo~ Austria if it agreed to give here all lts cor-
respondenoe, an~ other states (tor exa~ple, Piedmont) would have 
just cause for complaint. Lilien brushed thls admittedly weak 
argument aslde, and, irritated by the tenacity with whioh 
Consal.,.1 clung to it, broke off the talks, warning tha.t lithe 
Austrian ambassador would intervene in this .ffa1r~ and the 
Papal governMent would haTe to explain 1ts refu~al to Austria. HlO 
c "'ro5"'"c .... ~c.:..;'"_C_ 
J.bj.,d., Consalvl to Macchi. 9 August 1823. 
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Appcny1 then entered the negotiationa in support of Lilien, 
but desp1te thel:e \!o,!~bined PI"eSSure C0l1salv1 held firm. After 
another \'i~a]{ Gf talk;;) t;he Austrians at last gave up and. agreed 
to the Convention of 19 Auguat by \'oilieh the rapac;y '8 freedom ot 
a~tion, in prinoiple if not in practioe, was fo~nal1y recog-
nizt)d.106 On the clrueial point, the oonsignment of Papal 001"-
respondence, the Convention reads: 
Th.e ?apal rost Office wlll t:;.end in closed a.nd sealed 
packet.I07 the oo~pondene. .nich it m,y decide to 
to turn over' to the General l'c\st 01"f106 of 3 .M. the 
Emperor of Austria, both that origlnat1n@ 1n its own 
b0r'ders lilm:! that eOtlling from • • • Na:ples and bey-ond, 
and de.tined tor tall ot EY5@pe and. the Near Eut ex-
cept tha ItalIan atatea]c. 
W·ith this Convention the postal controversy C9..1'l"e to an end. 
Though not unimportant in 1tse1f, the greatest s1gnifioance of 
that a1spute liem 1n the revealing light it casts upon the dis-
integration of the Austro-Papal alliance. The h~leyon d~B of 
-------~- .. 106 
Ibid. .1.1&0, Consa!-vi to Macchi, 14 August 1823. Ho 
account of the negotiations after 14 AU~8t 18 in the Vatiea..'1'1 
Arohives, but one may assume f'rom the outcome that COMa! vi con-
tinued his resistance and the Austrians f1n1l11y ",-drn1tted defeat. 
10'( 
This ... a point on whioh there h~d been e~nsiderable 
d1aeuasion. Custo1narlly, rna!! was gl'9'en to t'orelp,n pORt orrices 
in sealed pa~l\Sts. As this would ha~per, though n~t prevent, 
AustrIan inspeotion of the letters I Lil1en ..-tJ~hed the mail to be 
trana:nitted loose. Consalvi, equally aware of these faots" in-
aisted on 010 •• " and sealed paokets and $v&ntually won his point. 
10<'3 
Copy 1n :tI17, 1823. 'I'he numerous othex' ?z'o"v"1s io!W dealt 
with t~~hnioa1 po.tal mattera onl7. 
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ustro-Pa~&l eo-operaticn were long since vanished. For five 
eat'S Auatl.\,;)-f'apal relations haft detel'iorated und<:r the Lilpact 
and polit.tcal disputes until by 1823 those states 
l~ ill open oP1>os1tlon. The Q(J"ntrast between the ~o$tal n~goti­
tiona of 1823 and those ot' 1815 is ~:lO$t instruot1Ye in this 
onnection. In 18156 the negotiations had been conduoted on a 
riend1y basis throughout: the Papal rejection of the A\Wtrian 
roposals had l>een aocepted. by Vienna with good &l"aoe, and the 
8sue had disappeared beneath the smooth flow of Austro-Fapal 
o-operatlon. How different waa 1823 when tha tone of the whole 
eget1:t.t1on \1as oue of hostility and distrust. nhen Austria and 
he Papacy fought to bne b1tter ead tor its objectiv.s~ each 
1ag whatever weapon it could tino. Clear17J by 1823 Austro-
l\'hat JadgmE'mt shc)uld be passed upon CCMa.lvl'3 handl1ng ot 
postal controversY''? 'l"he grudging prll.1se given by enemies 
s JT!ore 1>;pres31ve than. th.e eager adrntl'llt1on of friends. Let 
hen th~ fi!l.tll wordR ()l'l the postal dispute and lts 01ltCO"l'Tle be 
ttered by one ~1ho h:td. no 10V6 for Consalvi: his bitter enemy, 
he Zelantt CardInal della 8e~ag11& who succeeded him as 
eeretary of ~tt.te ~ 
Prex (the eCl'lvent1on of 19 Augttet], it a:1n be seen 
th~.t the Pont:Lf:tca.l Government, despite all obstacles J 
held f1rm to the p~tne1ple ot freeoom ot correspondence, 
and has not o1:;·11ge.ted itself to give A~tI'1~. th~ cor-
refJpOftieiCi" eltfier for England or ter JPr8J'l •• ~ or UIT 
other foreign eOl."'l·esponde11ce, but has only ril~de arrange-
ments fop the cost of that correspondence wh'.ch it !!!!Z 
r 
decide to giVt to Austria, under Which arrangement it remalns-Yree 0 give any correspondence to whomever it 
considers most suitable. 
Moreover, ••• the Government ot H.H. has not 
obligated itselt to give its correspondence IOOse-to 
Iustrla, so that it remains tree to transmit closed 
packages •••• 
It is true that the Austro-'1'wIcan Convention, by 
Which Tuscany haa obligated herselt to give Austria all 
toreign correspondince, prevents in practice this con-
signing (ot Papal correspondence to other states than 
Austria)) but it France and Sardinia should ever make 
Austria and '1'wIea~ recede trom their convention, the 
Pontitical Government will alW8.1'S be in a position to 
make a special convention with France or Sardinia, and 
will alw.,. be tree to consign that correspondence 
which, aec~rding to the Convention, it ~ decide to 
11ve them. 09 
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On the testimony ot his toe, then, Cona&lvi had once again 
sk1llt"ully guided the Papacy through another "ditticilissima" 
situation and, acting under the most Gntavorable circumstances, 
had managed to save tor the Papacy all that could still be saved. 
It was hi. last servioe to the Papacy. On 20 August, the 
d8.1' atter the Convention was Signed, Pius VII died and Consalvi 
once again reSigned his ottice" th1a time torever. Sick, worn 
out by years ot overwork and bitter contlict, within six months 
he had tollowed to the grave his friend and ruler whom he had 
served so well. 
169 
Ibid., Cardinal della Somaglia to Macchi and Tosti, 30 
November-nJ'23. Giulio Maria Cardinal della Somaglia (1744-1830); 
Cardinal Deacon (1820) J ultra-reactionary and a bitter enemy ot 
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Consa1vi's second mlnlstry, whlch had opened with such falr 
promlses of Austro-Papal co-operatlon and good wl11 In 1815, 
ended In 1823 In an atmosphere ot mutual distrust and hostility. 
The development of Austro-Papa1 relations in 1815-1823 exp1alns 
how and why thi8 radical transformation took place. 
A~ alliance will be effective on17 do long as it continues 
to satisfy the essentlal interests ot the states concerned. Thls 
principle al80 applies to the informal alliance that Metternlch 
and. Conaalv1 sought. In the yeara trom 1815 to 1817, Austro-
Papal co-operation seemed likely to serve the interests of both 
states. Austria hoped to obtain thereby the support ot the 
Papacy's moral and religious authority 1n the struggle to uphold 
the existing order and defeat the revolutionaries. The Papacy, 
on its part, sought the material backing of Austria against any 
possible future aggreSSion and, more important, against the 
immediate threat of internal subversion. Moreover, Papal co ... 
operation with Austria might persuade that Power to moderate its 
Joseph1st re1iglous po1ic1es. Finally, Consalv1 had his own 
motive: Austrian support could be of great value to him 1n his 
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bitter struggle with the Zelanti for reform. For a time these 
expectations seemed justIfIed, both states benefited trom co-
operation, and the alliance prospered. 
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However, this Bmiling surface of eo-operation could not 
permanently conceal certain fundamental divergences of interest. 
The elairns ot the Josephist Imperial government to control the 
Church in Austria were essentially incompatible with the Papal 
claims to supreme authority in the Catholic Church as a whole. 
The lurking Austrian ambition for hegemony in Italy posed a 
threat to the political independence of the Papacy which the 
latter was oertain to oppose. In 1815-1817 these divergences 
were latent, over-shadowed by the points on which Austrian and 
Fapal interests were in agreement. As long as these conflicting 
interests remained submerged, Austro-Papal eo-operatlon survived; 
when they once again eame into prominence, then unless one side 
or the other retreated, co-operation was doomed. 
The first stage in the decline of the informal Auatro-Papal 
alliance came with the revival in 1811 of open religious con ... 
trov~7 between the two atates over the extension of 
Joaephinism, especially in Italy. Metternlch foreaaw that the 
Papacy must resist this expansion, but his attempts to win over 
FranCis I to a conciliatory policy ended in failure. ~e 
rel18ious negotiations of 181'7, which might have saved Awstro-
Papal oo-opeaat1on, for a t1me at least, had. Austria pursued 
them 1n a conCiliatory spirit, failed because Vienna demanded 
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everything and ottered nothing in return. Despite his wish tor 
good relations with Austria, Consalvi could not negotiate on 
such a buis. To the cardInal, Auatro-Papal co-operation 1mp1ied 
a relatIonship between equal partners, each respecting the 
other'S rIghts and interests and each willing to settle disputes 
on a mutual1y-satistaet~ basis through a process ot give-and-
take. The relIgious negotIations of 1817-1818 made it apparent 
that this was not the concept that prevailed at Vienna. Con-
salvi'S disillusiOnment with Austre-Papal co-operation began at 
this pOint. Mutual dlatru.et and recrimination soon came to 
charactepize relations between Rome and Vienna. 
The rapid deterioration ot Austro-Papal relations which 
began with the religious controversy and wa. ted by the 
torniture attair was temporarily checked in 1819-1820, when 
Francis I seemed to be planning some mitigation ot his Josephist 
policies. The outbreak ot the Neapolitan Revolution ot 1820, a 
threat to Austria and the Papacy alike, also serVed to bring 
those states closer together. Austria wished the moral support 
ot the Papacy and itsco-operation in the passage ot troops 
towards Naples, while the Papacy tound Austrian military strength 
a reassuring bulwark against the spread ot the Revolution. 
Thua, a basis tor renewed oo-operation existed. Austro-Papal 
re1ationa during the autumn ot 1820 were better than they had 
been for three J'ear8. 
This revival ot good relations was only temporar.r. It soon 
r 
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became apparent that Austria and the Papacy were onee again at 
croas -purposes. Au,.-;tria expected fi.1l1 Papal eo -opera.t1on against 
the Neapolitan rev()lutlonartes. Con3alvi was willing to co-
operate, but only wIthIn the li'71its 01" hie firm determination 
to preserYe the independence and neutrality of. the Papacy and to 
prevent a Neapolitan invasion. This determination compelled the 
Cardinal to oppose Auatria's wishes on several. occasions. More-
oyer .. varioUl3 inCIdenta, such as the AUBtrian attempts to occupy 
various Papal cit1es .. reawakened hIS cIa $uspicions of Austrian 
ambitions in Italy. AustrIa, on her aide, was (U .• appointed and 
angered by this oppositIon and distru.at, and became increasIngly 
critical of the Papal government. Before 1821 had ended, all 
the improvement in Auatro-Papal relations that had talmn place 
In 1819-1820 had vanished. 
The revival of Austrian ambitions in Italy, which Consalvi 
first suapected during the NeapolItan campe1gn, dealt the death 
blow to Auatro-.J:'apal co-operation. The 1820-1821 revolutions 
had convinoed Vienna that greater Austrian control in the 
Peninsula was neceasar-.r to preVG1'lt further outbrealo1 there. The 
w&J'S in which Austria sought to increase its control were varied: 
an Italian ConfederatIon, & Political Commission, the exercise 
of a right or supervision over the Italian states in the name 
ot reform, control ~f the Italian postal system--but all in-
evitably met with Coftsalvi t s oppoeltlon, for all would Berve to 
restrict the necessary polItical independence of the Papacy_ 
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Austrian and Papal interests were now obv1ou~ly 1n coll1sion, 
and the last two ye8l""S of Consslvi is ministry were mal""ked by 001'1-
flict w1th Austria, none the 1es8 bitter for being partly con-
cealed. Austria's plaM to increase 1ts control in Italy came to 
a head at the Congress of Verona; the Pa.pa.cy took the lead in 
opposIng those plans there, and eventu.ally brought about their 
defeat. Thill stI"Uggle sounded the death-knell of the Austro-
Papal allIance. Heneeforth, little more than the bare pretense 
of friendly reletlons was maintained. 
Two other faetors must be mentioned that probably m.ade the 
Cardinal le88 reluotant to oppose Austria. First, it was clear 
b7 1823 that Franois I was not gGing to undertake any sweeping 
revision of hie religious poliey and that Josephinlsm would 
~ontlnue to rule at Vienna. Since eo-operation with Austria 
would plainly not produce any favorable modification of its 
re11glo'WI pollcy, auch began to seem less desirable. Seeond, 
by 1822 the Revolution that Consalvi had so dreaded had swept 
through Ita1y--but there had been no uprising in the Papal State. 
Even durIng the heIght of the NeapolItan Revolution on the 
Papacy'. very doorstep, there had been little disturbanoe and 
the Papal government had little d1fficulty 1n preserving order. 
The Secretary of State may well have felt that his reforr,~ had 
appeased popular discontent and that Austr1an support against 
the Revolution was not so necessary as It had previously seemed. 
Thus, the factors that had once made the alliance seem attractive 
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~o Consalvi were dimin1shing in appeal, Juat at the moment when 
~he fundar,li:hltal dJ .. VE;4"genC&i3 in the polit:'cal and re11gioU3 In-
~vident. 
Only in ita seheme3 f"or postal hege~ony in Italy was Austria 
.ueeesarul dur1ng Consalv:t fa ministry. The PapaQY onoe ass:!.n 
~ook the lead in the atl~la ~or free oo~reGPondenaej but, 
~.8erted by the ,)ther Italian state3 and unauPPol"ted by Pra.noe, 
~t was t'oraed to L'ecognize the Austrian viotory in practioe, 
~hoU&h by a deaperatte N8utanee C01l3alv1 was a.ble to save the 
princlple ot tree oorreaponden39 for tuture use. 
The poatal ovntroTeray 1s stgn1flc&l1t, not only in lt~elr, 
~ut tv~ thu revt#allli6 ligl.t 1'1; sheda upon the bNakdown of 
~WJtro-Papal oo-opeJ.4s,tlon. ?iT the time that con·trov~rsy was 
~ettled, the A·~tro-lap&l alliance had cll.ilarly ~$aaCJd to exist, 
• victim or the divergi~ inter~sta of the two states. The 
It'Yentua.l oollaptlte of Auatrv-l'apal c")"'operatlon wa. tor all 
practicAl purpo.e~ 1nevitable, giv~n the basic pNconeeptlons 
~omltlatlng Austrian poIlu,.. True, the alliance could. have been 
~ .. v~d bad Auatl-'1a a.dopted a more ¢onc.d.11ato~· rellCious policy 
~d been willi~ to respect the full temporal independence of the 
~apuYJ but thel"$ was little ohance that these modifications of 
poliey wolud be adopted under el:1st11'lg ol);ocu:'llStanees .Joseph.:tn1sm 
~u stll1 too strong in the Imperial goV'ex.rf4nt for ever. 
Mettornlch t", be able to defeat it--too atrOl1g, indeed, rOI~ even 
the Emperor to be able to rever'Be l"eligioua policy unless he 
were a stronger man than Francia I. Only after the intelleotual 
climate in Austl'ia had u-tldergone a ratUoal trtanSforr:1ation could 
the hold of the Josephleta on the 1'~ustrlan government and ohurch 
be broken. It was equally unlikely that Austria would cease its 
efforts to ti&hten ita control in Italy, £lor since 1815 tha.t 
l'enirusula had been :r-egarded as a leg1 t1r:late lmstrlan preserve, 
and the revo1u~~lon5 Qr 1820-1821 had seemed to show that such 
increased control '/JSiS vitally necessa::. .. / if a.nother outbreak of' 
the dreaded reYolutla~J fever waz to be prevented. 
While these po1ioies prevailed at VIenna, there was nothing 
Oonsalvi could do to s.ve AUIltro-Papal eo-ope!t"ation exoept by 
saoriticl.ng essential Papal interestl, which he would never do. 
The Fapao7 oould no longer continue to eo-operate with Austria, 
tor to do so would mean aoquiescence 1n AUJ3tria.n Nl1s1ou3 and 
politiea! ambitions that thl~atened both its spiritual and its 
tempot'al power. 
In tliew of the ul tlmate fa1lue of Aus tro -Fapal co ··operatioD) 
the question may well be asked whether Conaalvi was Justified in 
attempting the experlm~nt in th~ til~t plaee. The answer would 
8eem to be definitely in the arfir!n.ative. The expel'irnent was 
well worth tr,rlng" tor, it auoeessf'ul, It promised. great 
benefits to the Papacy: protection ~ainst foreign attack and 
internal reVolt, SUPP01~ tor reform and tor Papal interests 
abroad, perha.ps a moderation of Austrian religious policy in the 
3~"!5 
interest or good relations. In 1815, thet .. seemed good reason 
to hope ths-.t the expe:t. ... :1nent would be ~ success. f1ettcrnioh te 
opposit1on to .Tl.JGGph.in:t.sT:', ~.rotwed hope ot relis:tous 1!"llpro'fementa, 
while Austl~la for some t:1; ... e after the Congress of' Vienna gave no 
hlat that it "l1shG<l to '.ncreaae its pol1t:.i.ea.l control over the 
Papal State.. T$lJ.-:ing thesG promising CirCu,l7lStanees into cona1dera 
tioll, it would surely have. been an error- for Consalv1 to have 
refused at leaot to try tll& e:r.perirnent of. co....operation with 
Austria. 
Pu~~~~ore: 3ven though the Info~nal allianoe with Austria 
eventuall;, Qollapsed, 1 t did bPlng sor!1\1 bllnef'1t to the Papacy. 
The fir", support t!1a.t COl13alv1 ro9celvad from J\ustl"1a for his 
raro4~ waa ul~doubtadly an lIaportant factor itt uaow:r1ng th.11' 
enaot:,u6nt. AUlltr!a.,,-,. d1plolnatla $UPport was at tl:,naa very uaetul 
-to the Papacy 1.1 deal1ng with nOl1-Catholla states su~h a3 
Tul"k<l7. Co ... operat1Qn aaa11lSt th~ 3attarj .. tho-:lgb. Austria. was 
p~obably th~ ~hlat benet1eial"J /I -':3.a also ot slf:vietl to the Papal 
govwrr1in.el1t. 
In Nturn for ~es. StUns. ~onsalvi gav~ up VflJry little b7 
eo -operat1on with A.ustria. His trans;nis.s lon of intormation on 
SettarJ aetivit1~s to Austria coat the Papacy noth1Dgil and was 
in liU~ Q.a&6 1n the general interest of the "good eaus€:. ft In hi. 
rel1gious negot1at101'UJ lt1th Austria he surrendered little, it 
anything, that the Papac.,- would not have been compelled to 
relinquish by- terce of a1hrc\ll'l1Sttl,nces in a~ ease, suab as the 
nominltt1on-r1ght in Venet:!.a; on ({Ue~t1on!J where the essential 
authority of the PaptvJ'!! wa.s eoneerr:::ed, he neye!, '1:!.elded. or eOM-
promised. ConseJ.v! '8 8.;ld wae of velue to AUJltrta dunng the 
N~npt')l~tan eempa1gn"; but the tJnppreas10n or that revolution was 
also in the Papa). 1nte:rest 7 and th~ C8.:~M"ne.1 '8 skilful handling 
of the situation p~1'fentAd any eer10UB ha~ !'~~ befalling the 
:t:>a.l'al !tate in the 'ttlake "r the A'tlStrlan intervention. A,ll thinp 
~ons1de~d, Conedv! in his deali~ with ft,ustria yielded ..,e'J!'1 
little that oou.ld hlllve been IUl'Ved, M~ reeeived usetul aes1atanoe 
im :return. EYftn leavlngll51de the ~reat poe~lbil1tles or 
Att'3tl"O-Papal eo-opel"at1on whieh never mate!'1e.llme4, Oonsal,,1's 
decision to oo-operate eeems juet.i:r1ed on a practical buis or 
value reeel.ed tOJ!t "alue g1v~1'!. 
One furtMr question m~ be _ked in e1"1t1eis'ft or COMuvl'. 
pol1oy: waa he TYtotlvate4 too 'ftUeh by eonsld.entlom ot secular 
polley, to the det1"1r'1ent or religious lntereats' Although it 1.8 
ditfleult to determ1ne the pree1se motivations of oue 80 
seeret1ve as Oonsal,,1, in 30 faY! ae his deal1ftg8 with Austria at 
least are eoncerne4, this questIon ~3t be anewe~d 1n the 
"eg~t1.e. In the relIgious ne~ot1at1ons o! 1811-1919, he 
Ilel'ttail'llY' dld not aael'lflee the :rell~ioUJS 1!'ltereets or the 
flapacy ~ l:mt 4etended them tenae1ously, even though in eo <loins 
h~ angered Austria and the~by weakeMed hie ~lit1eal posItion. 
Ho1.f easilY' eould. eonealvi have kel't Au.etrian good. will, 80 
po11t1eally valuable, by ext$n31ve rel1g1ov~ eonteAelons-~but 
~oreCTerl the ~%t~nt to wb1eh even Consalvl t 3 secular polio, 
was ~~t1vate~ by r~l!,lous ~vn'1~~ratl~m3 ~U3t not be overlooked. 
1111 politte&l ~tal:r1, 111., bas 1e aim wu tto pr~s$"e the tttmpoftl 
1."pe~de~ce of tha ?apa41. not, bowav~r. a~ an an~ in itself. 
but U &11 (tssa1'ltlal ;Ui!lQ.r.3 ~o the prtls!!M'atlon ott the Papa41 f lS 
epirlt'tlal rN1d~·T. of aotloll. It AutStl'la had su.eQGed(Jd 1~' :t .... 
4't.:ut1:sg the !apal 3tata to the l'3vel of a. satelllttt, eou14 th~ 
'a.pae1 ha.""e pre4~M'~d its full s,1rltual 1l\4&l»!.'l~n. •• ? l'<trhaptl, 
'ut the blato~ of th~ Avignon lapae7 doe$ not prov14e an $n-
eour&g:tng parallel. earta1nly the Papal repllt.tt1on to¥' 1m .. 
J)ttrtla11't;J' '#Oul4 have $utfINd. 
It. anT cune, .h~ther the tem~oral 1ndepe~Qoe of tho 
Papacy was still e3sentlal or not, Consalvl. like virtually 
evel70ne else lr~ 1S1;, ae::ta1nlyb$lieved that it waa. In 
fight1ng tor th~ ~apac7t$ political 1ndependence, he waa t1sht-
ins: 'lor its f!plt"ltu.al f:t'e¢dQYJ as Til~11. No one -.110 luis stud1e4 
the record of thlf! Clard1nal '3 A\latr1al\ d.i~lomaey ~&n deny the 
consu~~ate 3~...l1 tr1th wt.loh he defended bot:b. Th~ l"epu.tatlQn 
which Oonsalv1 hac long justly enjoyed for th. aehleve:i1!@llta of 
his first ~lt1n:!ztr.r rr.u:st now be f'u.rliher enhanced. by the stu4y of 
r 
I. PILCHiJ:lY souac-d! 
The pr-J.nc1pal; docun~erit~ SOUI"Qe for thia die:.:.ertation is 
the Vatioan Ill!"Chivea (A,rchivi.o SQeto ya.ti~c). Or the ~ 
oollect1ona 01' UoQUli.ente in the Vaticun. the 1a.l"'&eet. and b:r fa-
the lnot.\t il;lportant for the u1plomatlc h1atorian. a that of the 
Secretarl&te of State (~eIPetar1a.to .s! ~tato). 
~lb. §,(t0t u-.1a.to ~ 3ta.to oolleotion u arran&eQ in three 
div1aiorm on a ehrono1o&ical buiu: tll.e f..ondo yec~o. eOL'1pr18iaa 
lnaterials pl'1ol.~ to oa. 1790/1800 J ~ea N!i91eonioa.. FJ&terial ot 
tho NapoleotU.c era. now be1xll reor&ani%Oci, tUld tlle Fondo l"bderno. 
materials a1nee 1814. from whicll. the 4ioc\Ullen'ta oited in this 
diladerta>t1on a.re ta.ken. ~ Fon40 l'Cod.Gr~ ia cU.v1f1ed. into u1ne 
<iivilsio.w ealle(,\ ~1tQl.1 (~itle8) .. caoh Titolo aOnUin1na the 
docwnente pe:cta1n1~ to ona oi: tn. SeCl"\1tar:;- ot State fa maJor 
tields of ACti"ity. Tlle ~1toli are J.n turn eubd.1.vj.d.eQ. into 
:ulaller collections called 1!UPl:'1che 'l:ula.d1~).. ~aeh rubl."1Ghe 
d.ealini w1th OM 11lnite4 aapeClt of the general aubJ$Qt 01 tIle 
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'bttndl_ (~e) of &:Jeu1!etlts. ~~e4 in ~nelo~ o~. 
III pnenl~. t~e ~e"Ume'. that date frOrll ~r():.re 1820 ha\le Mell 
~ ':irJtty~l't1~'1es, tfhUe thoete after tha'bdate ~ still ,.. .. 
lOO\tel~ in ~ o~ bunCes ~ The lattel,t ~ orten dtBQ~ 
M4 ht#Me ~ .. d1ff*1cu1t to use flhan t'hoae that h~ __ n bo'Und. 
'rhe- do~~s from thef Restoration ~a ~ Uf$tW.l.r in a. s004 
s:t«teQf "~.P1at10l'l; on17 1"~1Y' has. tbeiP ·l~g1btllt;yauff"C 
:rttmn ~he efJfe:ets of asEt Ott carelea$ t:tteatl!tent. 'rhecbt.t 
obstMle fop tba historian using the~e OoO'\lments to%' the n.t 
1»1_ i. th~ eleit~&nth cl!!ntul.'7' Italian .erlpt; in wh1Ch tas,. an 
w.r'1tt'ell.' 1.'!\:t!l style 6~ ~t1. t11tte8~!~."cJ$'1cr.%'C_t21am that 
" or 'bhtl I":reut. day, and the htlt<U'ian mar a.tNtI'St iU's'l:e ~OI4(! 
d1.tt!wlty in nndttl"l!tant!1'n8 1t. rf1 ttl 8urt1clent p~t1ce 1n 
, 
read111.g the :s mpt 1 hot'ta'\t'tn', th1J obtftaole ean read!l, be 
ove"aOllle. 
O1.'t!\e etner Vat1e:an Colletltionl, the Arehi1fU ~ut£l¥1, 
c0mp111z1l. the a.."""¢hlves of the YarloUlJ ,apal nunol~G abwa<l. 
a.."""e tmpontmt tor tl\$ $~ of th. A1.$i;ro .... Papal 1'01at10_; the 
.A.reh1ws" Clf' th$: Nunc1atUMs of" Vienna and of Pa.x.-1s aft fmpGeWlt" 
valuable. Alth~ ~uCh of the nta:t~riEll in theBo Ar~h1v,11 
& '. • • 
!tlant~ is dUplleated ttl the Nl?rfehe or the SegNtario d1 
~ta.te $C.lleetlo)t, some '11 _t: tOI' .~ple, the lrthtwa ot ~ 
N'u1te1atUl'e ot' vtenns eatltail', num~ro. d1.spatehes bet_~n 
Com.lv! and the VlanK'mIJ'lqi& that are Jlt)t dup11aated ton 
rn'P!!ea flIrr, Q f)l1S lGOlIla han eltPGoted. 
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For a turther and more detailed description ot the 
organization and contents of the Vatican Archives, consult 
Natalie Wood, "Vatican Cit,.,« in Daniel H. Thomas and Lynn M. 
Case (eda.), Guide to the Diplomatic Archives ot Western Europe 
(Philadelphia, 1959), 288-310. 
Material usefUl tor this dissertation was also found in the 
Archivi ai Stato (State Archives) in Florence and Rome. In the 
Florentine Archive the following material proved ot value: 
Oraine 2392, Serie 1931: Congress ot Verona and 
Congress ot La7bach. 
Oraine 2393, Serie 1932: Revolutions of Naples, Spain, 
and Portugal. 
Ordine 2407, Serie 1932: Minister ot the Austrian Court. 
Ordine 2435, Serle 1973: Tuscan Lesation in Rome. 
Ordine 2452, Serie 1990: Tuscan Legation in VIenna, 
1820-1821. 
Oraine 2453, Serie 1991 : Tuscan Legation in Vienna, 
1822 
The State Archive in Rome ,.ie1ded the following material 
dealing with Austro-Papal relations: 
Archivio della S. Congregazione del Buon Goveme: 
Serie I, Attari Generali: Buste (Files) 5, 33, 88. 
serle XI, Conti e tasso diverse: Buste 219-221. 
Nothing ot value tor this stu~ was obtained at the other 
State Archives consulted, at Naples, Parma, and Lucca. It may 
be noted, in pasSing, that the Archives in Naples and Parma 
suttered sever1,. durIng the 1&8 t war, and that at Parma in 
particular considerable material.~ tor the Restoration Era was 
destro7ed. 
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